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Results for “evolutionarily stable strategy”

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PubMed2005

Why are males bad for females? Models for the evolution of damaging male mating behavior.

One explanation for the cost to mating for females caused by damaging male mating behavior is that this causes the females to adaptively modify their subsequent life histories in a way that also increases male fitness. This might occur because the reduction in residual reproductive value of the female increases her optimal oviposition rate or because an increase in the current level of damage increases the female's optimal remating interval. In this article, I present models of a stochastic dynamic game in which males choose the level of mating damage that they inflict on females and females choose their oviposition rate and whether to remate. The models show that some level of damage is always an evolutionarily stable strategy and may even provoke females into making terminal reproductive investment (and hence a semelparous life history), that nondamaging populations are always invaded by damaging male mutants, and that damage evolves because of its effect on oviposition rate and despite its effect on remating interval.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Seed dormancy and delayed flowering in monocarpic plants: selective interactions in a stochastic environment.

We explore the effects of temporal variation in multiple demographic rates on the joint evolution of delayed reproduction and seed dormancy using integral projection models (IPMs). To do this, we extend the standard IPM to include a discrete state variable representing the number of seeds in the seed bank, density-dependent recruitment, and temporal variation in demography. Parameter estimates for Carlina vulgaris and Carduus nutans are obtained from long-term studies. Carlina is relatively long lived and has a short-lived seed bank, whereas most Carduus plants flower in their first year and the seed bank is long lived. Using the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) approach, we predict the observed flowering and germination strategies. There is excellent agreement between the predictions and the field observations. The effects of temporal variation on the joint ESS are partitioned into components arising from nonlinear averaging (systematic changes in the mean resulting from the interaction between variability and nonlinearity) and nonequilibrium dynamics (fluctuations in fitness caused by temporal variation). This shows that temporal variation can have substantial effects on the observed flowering and germination strategies and that covariance between demographic processes is important. We extend the models to include spatial population structure and assess the robustness of the results from the nonspatial models.

Asteraceae↗

PubMed2006

Maternal condition and facultative sex ratios in populations with overlapping generations.

Facultative investment in offspring sex is related to maternal condition in many organisms. In mammals, empirical support for condition-dependent sex allocation is equivocal, and there is some doubt as to theoretical expectations. Much theory has been developed to make predictions for condition-dependent sex ratios in populations with discrete generations. However, the extension of these predictions to populations with overlapping generations (OLGs; e.g., mammals) has been limited, leaving doubt as to the specific prediction for maternal-condition-dependent sex ratios in mammals. We develop a population genetics model that incorporates maternal effects on multiple offspring fitness components in a population with OLGs. Using a rare-gene and evolutionarily stable strategy approach, we demonstrate that sex ratio predictions of this model are identical to those for equivalent discrete generations models. We show that the predicted sex ratios depend on the sex-specific ratio of R(o) (offspring lifetime fitness) for offspring of good and poor mothers. This offspring lifetime fitness rule indicates that empirical research on conditional sex ratios should consider all three components of offspring R(o) (juvenile survival, adult life span, and fertility).

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Structure and function of plant canopies.

This section comprises a set of papers taken from those presented at a symposium held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Monsi-Saeki theory (1953), together with invited papers. The papers describe recent advances in the study of structure and function of plant canopies and are written by former students (and their collaborators) of Professors Monsi and Saeki. The topics cover construction and maintenance of efficient photosynthetic systems at leaf, individual plant and stand level. Canopy structure and function are analysed with respect to optimization and an evolutionarily stable strategy. A new translation of the original paper by Monsi and Saeki (1953) into English has been commissioned and is included in this section.

Botany↗

PubMed1991

The comparative biology of genetic variation for conditional sex ratio behavior in a parasitic wasp, Nasonia vitripennis.

Using genetic markers, we tracked the sex ratio behavior of individual females of the parasitic wasp, Nasonia vitripennis, in foundress groups of size 1, 2, 4, 8 and 16. Comparison of 12 isofemale strains extracted from a natural population reveals significant between-strain heterogeneity of sex ratios produced in all sizes of foundress group. Under simple assumptions about population structure, this heterogeneity results in heterogeneity of fitnesses. The strains differ in their conditional sex ratio behavior (the sex ratio response of a female to foundress groups of different sizes). Females of some strains produce more males as foundress group size increases (up to size eight). Females of another strain produce more males when not alone but do not respond differentially to group size otherwise. Females of two other strains show no conditional sex ratio behavior. Females of only two strains behave differently in foundress groups of size 8 and 16. Correlation and regression analyses indicate that the strains differ significantly in their fit to the predictions of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) model of conditional sex ratio behavior. Such heterogeneity contradicts the notion that females of this species possess conditonal sex ratio behavior that is optimal in the ESS sense. The results imply that this ESS model is useful but not sufficient for understanding the causal basis of the evolution of this behavior in this species. This is the first report on the sex ratio behavior of individual females in multiple foundress groups in any species of parasitic wasp. Data of this type (and not foundress group or "patch" sex ratios) are essential for testing evolutionary models that predict the sex ratio behaviors of individuals. We suggest that a test for an ESS model include the answers to two important questions: 1) is the model quantitatively accurate? and 2) is there reasonable evidence to indicate that natural selection has caused individuals to manifest the ESS behavior?

Animals↗

PubMed1992

Error-prone signalling.

The handicap principle of Zahavi is potentially of great importance to the study of biological communication. Existing models of the handicap principle, however, make the unrealistic assumption that communication is error free. It seems possible, therefore, that Zahavi's arguments do not apply to real signalling systems, in which some degree of error is inevitable. Here, we present a general evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) model of the handicap principle which incorporates perceptual error. We show that, for a wide range of error functions, error-prone signalling systems must be honest at equilibrium. Perceptual error is thus unlikely to threaten the validity of the handicap principle. Our model represents a step towards greater realism, and also opens up new possibilities for biological signalling theory. Concurrent displays, direct perception of quality, and the evolution of 'amplifiers' and 'attenuators' are all probable features of real signalling systems, yet handicap models based on the assumption of error-free communication cannot accommodate these possibilities.

Animal Communication↗

PubMed1992

A kin selection model for the evolution of virulence.

The costs and benefits of parasite virulence are analysed in an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) model. Increased host mortality caused by disease (virulence) reduces a parasite's fitness by damaging its food supply. The fitness costs of high virulence may be offset by the benefits of increased transmission or ability to withstand the host's defences. It has been suggested that multiple infections lead to higher virulence because of competition among parasite strains within a host. A quantitative prediction is given for the ESS virulence rate as a function of the coefficient of relatedness among co-infecting strains. The prediction depends on the quantitative relation between the costs of virulence and the benefits of transmission or avoidance of host defences. The particular mechanisms by which parasites can increase their transmission or avoid host defences also have a key role in the evolution of virulence when there are multiple infections.

Animals↗

PubMed1993

Natural selection on multivariate traits in age-structured populations.

The theory of selection on multivariate traits in age-structured populations has important implications for empirical and theoretical studies of life-history evolution. A model of natural selection on a set of correlated quantitative traits with age structure is derived here, using an extension of previous work on selection at a single locus. This formulation provides an equation for the change of the mean of a vector of traits that is accurate is selection is weak, and does not require the population always to be in demographic equilibrium as selection proceeds. The treatment is extended to density-dependent populations, and to equilibrium populations under frequency-dependent selection. In addition, further approximations are derived that produce evolutionary equilibria equivalent to those predicted by optimization and evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) theory. It is shown that the conditions for equilibrium are valid even if selection is strong.

Aging↗

PubMed1993

Sperm competition games: sperm size and number under gametic control.

This paper examines sperm competition games in which both size and number of gametes in an ejaculate can be varied strategically, but under the control of the haploid sperm. It is a companion to the previous paper (Parker (Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 253, 245 (1993))) for the case where the strategic control is by the diploid parent. Under haploid control, the optimal balance between size and number of sperm in an ejaculate becomes quite different from that predicted for diploid control; there is a conflict between parental and gametic interests over sperm size and number. This occurs because both intra-ejaculate and inter-ejaculate sperm competition are present with haploid control, whereas intra-ejaculate competition is absent under diploid control. The magnitude of this conflict is affected by the risk of inter-ejaculate sperm competition, and by the fact that gametic interests depend on the nature of available mutations. If ejaculate expenditure trades off against numbers of matings achieved, with haploid control there is escalation towards maximal expenditure on the ejaculate. If the ejaculate expenditure is fixed by the diploid parent, but there is a size-number trade-off under haploid control, solutions depend on the mode of action of the mutation affecting sperm size or number. If mutant-bearing sperm deviate entirely at the expense of non-mutant sperm, any increase in size or number will spread. If mutant sperm deviate entirely at their own expense, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the same as for diploid control; there is no conflict.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Animals↗

PubMed1998

Coevolution of recovery ability and virulence.

Most models for coevolution of hosts and parasites are based on the assumption that resistance of hosts to parasites is an all-or-nothing effect. In many cases, for example where parasites require an appropriate receptor on host cells, this is a reasonable assumption. However, in many other cases, for example where hosts mount an immune response, this picture may be too simple. An immune system is expensive to maintain, which poses a question as to how much of its resources a host should allocate to resist parasites: if the risk of infection is low, natural selection may favour hosts with less effective immune systems. As optimal allocation to defence will depend on the force of infection, and the force of infection, in turn, depends on the level of defence in the rest of the host population, a game-theoretic approach is necessary. Here I analyse a simple model for the evolution of the ability to recover from infection. If parasites are not allowed to coevolve, the outcome is a single evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). If the parasites coevolve, multiple evolutionary outcomes are possible, one in which the parasites are relatively avirulent and common and the hosts invest little in recovery ability, and another (the escalated arms race) where parasites are rare but virulent and the hosts invest heavily in defence.

Animals↗

PubMed1999

'Small worlds' and the evolution of virulence: infection occurs locally and at a distance.

Why are some discases more virulent than others? Vector-borne diseases such as malaria and water-borne diseases such as cholera are generally more virulent than diseases spread by direct contagion. One factor that characterizes both vector- and water-borne diseases is their ability to spread over long distances, thus causing infection of susceptible individuals distant from the infected individual. Here we show that this ability of the pathogen to infect distant individuals in a spatially structured host population leads to the evolution of a more virulent pathogen. We use a lattice model in which reproduction is local but infection can vary between completely local to completely global. With completely global infection the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the same as in mean-field models while a lower virulence is predicted as infection becomes more local. There is characteristically a period of relatively moderate increase in virulence followed by a more rapid rise with increasing proportions of global infection as we move beyond a 'critical connectivity'. In the light of recent work emphasizing the existence of 'small world' networks in human populations, our results suggests that if the world is getting 'smaller'--as populations become more connected--diseases may evolve higher virulence.

Animals↗

PubMed2000

A new demographic function maximized by life-history evolution.

A goal of life-history theory has been to understand what combination of demographic traits is maximized by natural selection. In practice, researchers usually choose either density-independent population growth rate, lambda, or lifetime reproductive success, R0 (expected number of offspring produced in a lifetime). Others have shown that the maxima of density-independent lambda and R0 are evolutionarily stable strategies under specific density-dependent conditions: population regulation by equal density dependence among all age classes for lambda and by density dependence on a single age class for R0. Here I extend these connections between density-independent optimization models and density-dependent invasion function models in two ways. First, I derive a new demographic function for which a maximum corresponds to attainability of the equilibrium strategy or stability of the mean rather than stability of the variance of the strategy distribution. Second, I show explicitly a continuous range of cases with maxima between those for the lambda and R0. Graphical and biological interpretations are given for an example model. Finally, exceptions to a putative life-history generality (from lambda and R0 models), that high early-life mortality selects for high iteroparity, are shown.

Biological Evolution↗

PubMed2001

Reaction norms with bifurcations shaped by evolution.

Two versions of a model for the evolution of seasonal polyphenism investigate the evolution of reaction norm bifurcation and branching. The first version is without a specific submodel for morphological development and the second has an explicit developmental map. Version 1 is evolutionarily relatively unconstrained: (i) reaction norms are specified by matrices containing the probabilities of occurrence of environment-phenotype combinations, (ii) all conceivable reaction norm matrices are reachable through a sequence of mutations, and (iii) small as well as large mutational effects occur. This version is used to find the evolutionarily stable strategy favoured by the population ecology that is characterized by stabilizing viability selection with a cyclically fluctuating selection optimum. When the strength of selection is large and when the lag between initiation of development and selection on mature phenotype is not a multiple of half the period of the environmental cycle, a branching reaction norm evolves. In the second model version, branching reaction norms occur for certain parameter combinations of the developmental submodel, but the evolution of this pattern is often constrained. The evolutionary trajectory becomes trapped in a local selective optimum for the parameters of the developmental system. Substantial developmental noise evolves, but mutations that produce a selectively advantageous branching pattern do not occur from there.

Animals↗

PubMed2003

From reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling benefits.

Cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals is commonly explained by the potential for future reciprocity or by the risk of being punished by group members. However, unconditional altruism is more difficult to explain. We demonstrate that unconditional altruism can evolve as a costly signal of individual quality (i.e. a handicap) as a consequence of reciprocal altruism. This is because the emergent correlation between altruism and individual quality in reciprocity games can facilitate the use of altruism as a quality indicator in a much wider context, outside the reciprocity game, thus affecting its further evolution through signalling benefits. Our model, based on multitype evolutionary game theory shows that, when the additive signalling benefit of donating help exceeds the cost for only some individuals (of high-quality state) but not for others (of low-quality state), the population possesses an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) profile wherein high-quality individuals cooperate unconditionally while low-quality individuals defect or play tit-for-tat (TfT). Hence, as predicted by Zahavi's handicap model, signalling benefits of altruistic acts can establish a stable generosity by high-quality individuals that no longer depends on the probability of future reciprocation or punishment.

Altruism↗

PubMed2004

Evolution of size-dependent flowering in a variable environment: construction and analysis of a stochastic integral projection model.

Understanding why individuals delay reproduction is a classic problem in evolutionary biology. In plants, the study of reproductive delays is complicated because growth and survival can be size and age dependent, individuals of the same size can grow by different amounts and there is temporal variation in the environment. We extend the recently developed integral projection approach to include size- and age-dependent demography and temporal variation. The technique is then applied to a long-term individually structured dataset for Carlina vulgaris, a monocarpic thistle. The parameterized model has excellent descriptive properties in terms of both the population size and the distributions of sizes within each age class. In Carlina, the probability of flowering depends on both plant size and age. We use the parameterized model to predict this relationship, using the evolutionarily stable strategy approach. Considering each year separately, we show that both the direction and the magnitude of selection on the flowering strategy vary from year to year. Provided the flowering strategy is constrained, so it cannot be a step function, the model accurately predicts the average size at flowering. Elasticity analysis is used to partition the size- and age-specific contributions to the stochastic growth rate, lambda(s). We use lambda(s) to construct fitness landscapes and show how different forms of stochasticity influence its topography. We prove the existence of a unique stochastic growth rate, lambda(s), which is independent of the initial population vector, and show that Tuljapurkar's perturbation analysis for log(lambda(s)) can be used to calculate elasticities.

Asteraceae↗

PubMed2004

The evolution of brain lateralization: a game-theoretical analysis of population structure.

In recent years, it has become apparent that behavioural and brain lateralization at the population level is the rule rather than the exception among vertebrates. The study of these phenomena has so far been the province of neurology and neuropsychology. Here, we show how such research can be integrated with evolutionary biology to understand lateralization more fully. In particular, we address the fact that, within a species, left- and right-type individuals often occur in proportions different from one-half (e.g. hand use in humans). The traditional explanations offered for lateralization of brain function (that it may avoid unnecessary duplication of neural circuitry and reduce interference between functions) cannot account for this fact, because increased individual efficiency is unrelated to the alignment of lateralization at the population level. A further puzzle is that such an alignment may even be disadvantageous, as it makes individual behaviour more predictable to other organisms. Here, we show that alignment of the direction of behavioural asymmetries in a population can arise as an evolutionarily stable strategy when individual asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behaviour with that of other asymmetrical organisms. Brain and behavioural lateralization, as we know it in humans and other vertebrates, may have evolved under basically 'social' selection pressures.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Fitness and evolutionary stability in game theoretic models of finite populations.

We investigate two methods of measuring fitness in evolutionary games played among members of a finite population. Classical notions of stability account for the action of selection only, and use immediate reproductive gains as a measure of fitness. This classical interpretation of fitness is what we call reproductive fitness (RF), and is found in the early studies of evolutionary stability in finite populations. More recent work has incorporated the influence of random genetic drift by applying fixation probability (FP) as a measure of fitness. When defined in this way, fitness represents a measure of ultimate evolutionary success. Our main result describes an equivalence between candidate evolutionarily stable strategies under both the RF and FP interpretations of fitness. We apply this result to matrix games in which the use of mixed strategies is permitted, and find here an equivalence between the RF and FP conditions for evolutionary stability.

Biological Evolution↗

PubMed1993

Why we need ESS signalling theory.

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) models of biological signalling are important because the intimate coevolution of signalling and receiving strategies is complicated. Tentative results from a numerical study of error-prone signalling show the value of formal modelling. Error in perception can create discreteness in the distribution of signals produced, and so observed discreteness in nature may call for no more complicated explanation. Further developments in the theory of signalling may include a link with theories of aggression such as the sequential assessment game. The technical device of a 'scratch space' may allow a natural development of 'two-way' information games in which each contestant plays the roles of signaller and receiver simultaneously. This device may also incidentally derive mental states from purely strategic considerations.

Animal Communication↗