Biosafety consequences of eradication of wild-type polioviruses.
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Containment of Biohazards↗
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Recombinant DNA technology.
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Containment of Biohazards↗
Negative-pressure flexible film isolator for work with class IV viruses in a maximum security laboratory.
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Belgium↗
The science and intricacy of environmental safety evaluations.
Safety issues in biotechnology are subject to considerable controversy in public debate. Public concern is focused in particular on the degree of uncertainty associated with inadvertent and unforeseeable impacts of the deliberate or accidental release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment. The objective of this article is to demonstrate that there is a factual, scientific basis to environmental safety issues, by means of which the real, case-specific hazards requiring serious consideration by scientists, representatives of regulatory agencies and the public can be distinguished from conjectural hazards and naturally occurring background processes.
Biotechnology↗
Biosafety: future priorities for research in health care.
Currently the public interest in biosafety issues has focussed on the discussions surrounding the use of genetically modified organisms, very specifically on the use of transgenic plants in agriculture. Although many of the questions raised in connection with genetically modified organisms are of legitimate scientific interest, attention should be drawn back to a number of other more classical biosafety research areas, namely the problem of control of new and reemerging infectious diseases, the need for new vaccines, control of transport and routes of dissemination, biosafety information exchange and networking, where research results are dearly needed. In the area of modern biotechnology new applications such as gene therapy and transgenic animals will be on the list of future priorities for biosafety related activities and research.
Agriculture↗
Principles for emergency response to bioterrorism.
The recent occurrence of a series of anthrax-related hoaxes illustrates the need to educate emergency services personnel about how to best ensure patient and worker safety in the case of suspected exposure to biological threat agents. There are very few data to support the methods being used or the variation in current care. Emergency physicians, first responders, and hazardous materials response teams need a standardized approach to the management of patients who may have been exposed to biological threat agents. Currently recommended hospital infection control procedures seem appropriate for the level of risk involved with aerosolized biological threat agents. Such recommendations include standard and transmission-based precautions. These groups need a working knowledge of the isolation and infection control measures recommended for the treatment of patients exposed to those biological threat agents at outlined in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Guideline for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals.
Biological Warfare↗
[Poliomyelitis eradication initiative. Search for and control of wild poliovirus stored at Spanish laboratories].
INTRODUCTION: An initiative to achieve global eradication of poliomyelitis was proposed in 1988. Since then, World Health Organization (WHO) efforts have been focused on reaching and maintaining high vaccination coverage and on implementing effective surveillance systems. Additionally, since 1998 the WHO has urged health authorities from countries over the world to locate and control the wild polioviruses stored in laboratories as well as potentially infectious materials that could contain these viruses or originate them under particular circumstances. METHODS: In Spain the Wild Poliovirus Containment Plan was initiated in 1999. All Spanish laboratories were inventoried and a specially designed questionnaire was distributed to them. The responses were analyzed. RESULTS: A total of 3209 laboratories were surveyed and 10 of them were found to contain infectious or potentially infectious material with wild poliovirus. The heads of these laboratories were informed about the Containment Plan and were requested to destroy this material under proper conditions. The laboratories that did not destroy the viruses adopted the BSL2/polio bio-safety measures. CONCLUSION: Despite its complexity, the search process was completed within the schedule established by the WHO, thanks to the efforts of health authorities from the Autonomous Communities. Spain reported its results to the WHO Regional Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication in May 2002.
Africa↗
Overview: cause and prevention in biowarfare and bioterrorism.
Bioweaponry is rooted in the ancient past. It became a science in the early 20th century following the breakthrough discoveries in microbiology and immunology of the late 1800s. The 20th century, with its major and minor wars, saw the research and development of biological weapons capable of immense destruction of life, which were used both by nations in preparation for military warfare and by individuals who engage in asymmetric warfare. Treaties, international agreements, and political pursuits have not been able either to control or to rid the world of bioweapons. The tools for specific defense against bioweapons consist of vaccines against both viruses and bacteria, and of antibiotics and drugs against bacteria. Vaccines and antimicrobials are of limited usefulness because of the large number of possible microbes that can be used for weapons, because of antimicrobial resistance to drugs and antibiotics, and because of limitations in technical feasibility for developing vaccines and antibacterials against certain of the agents. Induction of non-specific innate immunity by immunostimulatory vaccines (at one time licensed) needs to be explored for possible immunoprophylactic-therapeutic activity when administered immediately following exposure to bioweapon pathogens. The ideal solution to the bioweapons problem lies in measures to end their development and application throughout the world. Emphasis was made at the recent World Economic Forum of the need to end poverty and hunger in the world as a means to reduce the incentive to engage in warfare. Added to this is betterment of health, focused mainly on preventable diseases. A further solution to the problem may lie in the development of modern robotic systems for rapid forensic detection of development and production of bioweapons by "rogue" nations and even by individuals. This review deals with the specifics of the development of bioweapons and their control by vaccines, by therapy with antibacterials, by non-specific immunostimulants, by advanced systems for detection of development and deployment of biological agents of destruction, and by political and health-giving initiatives.
Adjuvants, Immunologic↗
Implementing planetary protection requirements for sample return missions.
NASA is committed to exploring space while avoiding the biological contamination of other solar system bodies and protecting the Earth against potential harm from materials returned from space. NASA's planetary protection program evaluates missions (with external advice from the US National Research Council and others) and imposes particular constraints on individual missions to achieve these objectives. In 1997 the National Research Council's Space Studies Board published the report, Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations, which reported advice to NASA on Mars sample return missions, complementing their 1992 report, The Biological Contamination of Mars Issues and Recommendations. Meanwhile, NASA has requested a new Space Studies Board study to address sample returns from bodies other than Mars. This study recognizes the variety of worlds that have been opened up to NASA and its partners by small, relatively inexpensive, missions of the Discovery class, as well as the reshaping of our ideas about life in the solar system that have been occasioned by the Galileo spacecraft's discovery that an ocean under the ice on Jupiter's moon Europa might, indeed, exist. This paper will report on NASA's planned implementation of planetary protection provisions based on these recent National Research Council recommendations, and will suggest measures for incorporation in the planetary protection policy of COSPAR.
Containment of Biohazards↗
Planetary protection issues for Mars sample acquisition flight projects.
The planned NASA sample acquisition flight missions to Mars pose several interesting planetary protection issues. In addition to the usual forward contamination procedures for the adequate protection of Mars for the sake of future missions, there are reasons to ensure that the sample is not contaminated by terrestrial microbes from the acquisition mission. Recent recommendations by the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (United States), would indicate that the scientific integrity of the sample is a planetary protection concern (SSB, 1997). Also, as a practical matter, a contaminated sample would interfere with the process for its release from quarantine after return for distribution to the interested scientists. These matters are discussed in terms of the first planned acquisition mission.
Containment of Biohazards↗
Integrating public perspectives in sample return planning.
Planning for extraterrestrial sample returns--whether from Mars or other solar system bodies--must be done in a way that integrates planetary protection concerns with the usual mission technical and scientific considerations. Understanding and addressing legitimate societal concerns about the possible risks of sample return will be a critical part of the public decision making process ahead. This paper presents the results of two studies, one with lay audiences, the other with expert microbiologists designed to gather information on attitudes and concerns about sample return risks and planetary protection. Focus group interviews with lay subjects, using generic information about Mars sample return and a preliminary environmental impact assessment, were designed to obtain an indication of how the factual content is perceived and understood by the public. A research survey of microbiologists gathered information on experts' views and attitudes about sample return, risk management approaches and space exploration risks. These findings, combined with earlier research results on risk perception, will be useful in identifying levels of concern and potential conflicts in understanding between experts and the public about sample return risks. The information will be helpful in guiding development of the environmental impact statement and also has applicability to proposals for sample return from other solar system bodies where scientific uncertainty about extraterrestrial life may persist at the time of mission planning.
Containment of Biohazards↗
Population dynamics of transgenic microorganisms in the different microecosystem conditions.
The role of key environmental factors in adaptation of spore-forming and non-spore-forming transgenic microorganisms (TM) have been studied in model ecosystems. Model TM Escherichia coli Z905 (bearing plasmid genes of bacterial luminescence Ap (r) Lux+) has been found to have a higher adaptation potential than TM Bacillus subtilis 2335/105 (bearing genes of human alpha 2-interferon Km (r) Inf+), planned for employment as a living vaccine under varying environmental conditions. Effects of abiotic factors on migration of natural and recombinant plasmids between microorganisms under model ecosystem conditions has been estimated. The transgenic microorganisms with low copy number survived better under introduction conditions in the microcosms studied. This trend has been shown to be independent of the microcosm type and its complexity. Grant numbers: 99-04-96017, 25, 00-07-9011.
Adaptation, Physiological↗
Expression of cloned genes of transgenic microorganisms introduced into man-made ecosystems.
Modeling of transgenic microorganism introduction into small man-made ecosystems can help forecast changes in expression of cloned genes under different conditions of existence. Introduction of the E. coli Z905/pPHL7 strain containing a plasmid with luminescent system genes of luminous bacteria led to changes in cell and colony morphology, reduction in metabolic activity of cells, and, as a result, a lower level of expression of cloned gene. A low concentration of nutrients has been shown to favor greatly the phenotypic change of cells of the recombinant strain. Expression of cloned genes changed due to: a lower concentration of plasmid DNA, a change in regulation of cloned genes, and a change in cells of biosynthesis of substrates needed for expression of luminescent genes. The conducted investigations can provide a basis for the use of marker transgenic microorganisms in closed ecosystems of different types. Grant numbers: 99-04-96017, 00-07-9011.
Adaptation, Physiological↗
Critical issues in connection with human missions to Mars: protection of and from the Martian environment.
Human missions to Mars are planned to happen within this century. Activities associated therewith will interact with the environment of Mars in two reciprocal ways: (i) the mission needs to be protected from the natural environmental elements that can be harmful to human health, the equipment or to their operations; (ii) the specific natural environment of Mars should be protected so that it retains its value for scientific and other purposes. The following environmental elements need to be considered in order to protect humans and the equipment on the planetary surface: (i) cosmic ionizing radiation, (ii) solar particle events; (iii) solar ultraviolet radiation; (iv) reduced gravity; (v) thin atmosphere; (vi) extremes in temperatures and their fluctuations; and (vii) surface dust. In order to protect the planetary environment, the requirements for planetary protection as adopted by COSPAR for lander missions need to be revised in view of human presence on the planet. Landers carrying equipment for exobiological investigations require special consideration to reduce contamination by terrestrial microorganisms and organic matter to the greatest feasible extent. Records of human activities on the planet's surface should be maintained in sufficient detail that future scientific experimenters can determine whether environmental modifications have resulted from explorations.
Aerospace Medicine↗
Planetary protection and the search for life beneath the surface of Mars.
The search for traces of extinct and extant life on Mars will be extended to beneath the surface of the planet. Current data from Mars missions suggesting the presence of liquid water early in Mars' history and mathematical modeling of the fate of water on Mars imply that liquid water may exist deep beneath the surface of Mars. This leads to the hypothesis that life may exist deep beneath the Martian surface. One possible scenario to look for life on Mars involves a series of unmanned missions culminating with a manned mission drilling deep into the Martian subsurface (approximately 3Km), collecting samples, and conducting preliminary analyses to select samples for return to earth. This mission must address both forward and back contamination issues, and falls under planetary protection category V. Planetary protection issues to be addressed include provisions stating that the inevitable deposition of earth microbes by humans should be minimized and localized, and that earth microbes and organic material must not contaminate the Martian subsurface. This requires that the drilling equipment be sterilized prior to use. Further, the collection, containment and retrieval of the sample must be conducted such that the crew is protected and that any materials returning to earth are contained (i.e., physically and biologically isolated) and the chain of connection with Mars is broken.
Containment of Biohazards↗
Sterilisation properties of the Mars surface and atmospheric environment.
The radiative and chemical conditions at the surface and in the lower Martian atmosphere are computed at various latitudes and seasons combining a 2D photochemical model and radiation simulations. In most situations, the solar UV B and C radiations reach the surface however, suspended dust and, in polar cases, ozone can constitute an effective UV shield. The daytime and night time concentrations of the sterilizing oxidants: OH, H2O2 and O3 are determined, as well as the concentration of the substances which could influence the metabolism of microorganisms. The possible habitats of a remaining Mar's life as well as the possibilities of contamination by resistant earth life forms will be described.
Atmosphere↗
Modern aspects of planetary protection and requirements to sterilization of space hardware.
The viewpoint of working group of Russian experts on the problem of planetary protection for future manned and unmanned Mars mission is presented. Recent data of Martian environment and on survival of terrestrial microorganisms in extreme conditions were used for detailed analysis and overview of planetary protection measures in regard to all possible flight situations including accidental landing. The special emphasis on "Mars-94" mission was done. This analysis resulted in revised formulation of spacecraft sterilization requirements and possible measures for their best implementation. New general combined approach to spacecraft sterilization was proposed. It includes penetrating radiation and heat treatment of spacecraft parts and components which is to be carried out before the final assembly of spacecraft and gaseous radiation sterilization of the whole spacecraft during the flight to Mars (or from Mars for return missions).
Containment of Biohazards↗
Planetary environment protection ID no: F3.3-M.1.05 implications for the development of a network of surface stations on Mars.
The European Space Agency's studies of a Comet Nucleus Sample Return mission (ROSETTA) as its Planetary Cornerstone in its long-term programme 'Horizon 2000' and the Marsnet mission, a potential contribution of the Agency to an international network of surface stations on Mars, has revived the interest in the present state of Planetary Protection requirements. MARSNET was one of the four candidate missions selected in April 1991 for further Design Feasibility (Phase A) Studies. Furthermore, of all space agencies participating in planetary exploration activities only the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration had a well established Planetary Protection Policy on Viking and other relevant planetary missions, whereas ESA is considering the feasibility and potential impact of a planetary protection policy on its Marsnet mission, within the framework of a tight budgetary envelope applicable to ESA's medium (M) class missions. This paper will discuss in general terms the impact of Planetary Protection measures, its implications for Marsnet and the issues arising from this for the implementation of the mission in ESA's scientific programme.
Containment of Biohazards↗