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At least 199 records · Page 11Linked to original sources
PubMed1997

Costs of dying: alternatives to rationing.

In western industrialised countries, about 30% of health-care expenditure of retired people is incurred by individuals in their last year of life. The corresponding high costs of dying have led medical philosophers to ask for a rationing of health-care services according to age. By contrast, this paper pursues an individualistic approach. High costs of dying are identified as a consequence of moral hazard on both the demand and supply side of the health-care sector. Health insurance prevents demand for health-care services from decreasing when an individual's residual life expectancy shrinks. Age-related moral hazard can be limited by a coinsurance scheme with a deductible that increases with the age of the insured. Given the high costs of dying, the optimal insurance policy links the coinsurance rate to the age-specific mortality risk.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed2001

The impact of pharmacotherapy policy: a case study.

Universal drug insurance coverage has been endorsed by the National Health Forum and the Liberal government as a means of providing equitable access to prescription medication for Canadians. In 1996, Quebec legislated a universal drug insurance program. To finance extended coverage for approximately 1.2 million previously uninsured beneficiaries, an income-indexed coinsurance and deductible cost-sharing policy was introduced for previously insured beneficiaries (people 65 years of age and older, and those receiving income security allowance). The increase in cost-sharing for previously insured beneficiaries led to a reduction in both essential (senior citizens: 9.1%; income security: 14.4%) and less essential medication (senior citizens: 15.1%; income security: 22.4%). Reductions in the use of essential drugs were associated with an increase in the rate of emergency visits (by 43% in senior citizens and 78% in income security recipients) and adverse events (by over 100% in senior citizens and 88% in income security recipients). The 442 physicians and pharmacists who were surveyed reported that the policy reduced the use of antilipidemics, inhaled steroids and antihypertensives in the previously insured beneficiaries, but improved access to previously unaffordable medications for cardiac disease and asthma in the newly insured beneficiaries. Although universal drug insurance appeared to enhance access to essential medication for the newly insured, these benefits were exacted at a cost of producing unintended health effects in two vulnerable subgroups: senior citizens and income security recipients. Because no prior studies have shown that consumer cost sharing can lead to expected objective of selective reductions in less essential drug use alone, alternate policy approaches for financing universal drug coverage need to be considered.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗
PubMed1995

Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: an empirical study.

If premiums for health insurance are not risk related, there exists a consumer information surplus that may result in adverse selection. Our results indicate that insurers can greatly reduce this surplus by risk-adjusting the premium. We conclude that there need not be any substantial unavoidable consumer information surplus if consumers can choose whether to take a deductible for a one- or two-year health insurance contract with otherwise identical benefits. Therefore, adverse selection need not be a problem in a competitive insurance market with risk-adjusted premiums or vouchers and with such a consumer choice of health plan.

Actuarial Analysis↗
PubMed1984

Health insurance under competition: would people choose what is expected?

To determine relative preferences for different cost-sharing options, we asked a 17% random sample of 2,754 nonunion employees to compare health insurance policies that differed in the level of 1) deductible amount, 2) coinsurance rate, 3) coinsurance limit, 4) maximum liability, and 5) price. Using conjoint analysis, we derived preference curves for each of the five components and measured preferences for the compromise between more coverage and the corresponding price increase. In contrast to other studies, our findings suggest that under fair market prices, respondents would choose policies with greater coverage for catastrophic illness, and they would as likely choose cost-sharing policies that contain incentives to reduce utilization as they would choose policies without these incentives.

Adult↗
PubMed1996

Can medical savings accounts for the nonelderly reduce health care costs?

OBJECTIVE: To understand how medical savings account (MSA) legislation for the nonelderly would affect health care costs. DESIGN: Economic policy evaluation based on the RAND Health Expenditures Simulation Model. SETTING: National probability sample of nonelderly noninstitutionalized households. PARTICIPANTS: Persons in 23 157 sampled households from the 1993 Current Population Survey. INTERVENTIONS: Medical savings account legislation would allow all Americans who are covered only by a catastrophic health care plan to set up a tax-exempt account that they can use to pay medical bills not covered by their health insurance. The interventions we evaluate differ in the deductibles of the catastrophic plan and in whether the employee or employer funds the MSA. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Changes in national health expenditures and net societal benefits of health care. RESULTS: If all insured nonelderly Americans switched to MSAs, their health care expenditures would decline by between 0% and 13%, depending on how the MSAs are designed. However, not all nonelderly Americans would choose MSAs; taking into account selection patterns, health spending would change by + 1% to -2%. CONCLUSIONS: Medical savings account legislation would have little impact on health care costs of Americans with employer-provided insurance. However, depending on the size of the catastrophic limit, waste from the excessive use of generously insured care could be reduced, and MSAs would be attractive to both sick and healthy people.

Cost Sharing↗
PubMed1987

Bonus systems in health insurance: a microeconomic analysis.

Faced with the cost explosion in the health care sector, policy-makers in most industrialized countries have been focusing on cost-sharing in health insurance as a possible solution. This is a sanction meted out to users of medical care; the alternative of creating positive incentives for non-users has not yet received nearly as much attention. This paper reports on the experiences made by German private health insurers with their plans offering rebates as well as experience-rated bonuses for no claims. It is argued that a rebate offer may be at least as attractive as conventional cost-sharing plans from the point of view of the consumer since these new options allow him to choose the time at which he is to bear the financial consequences of an illness. In the second part of the paper, predictions are derived concerning the incentives contained in the policies written by three particular insurers. Clear evidence of a decrease in demand for ambulatory medical care at the lower end of the billings distribution is found in rebate and bonus plans. The concluding section of the paper contains a discussion of the results with a view on the continuing debate about the reform of social health insurance.

Community Participation↗
PubMed1985

Biased selection in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.

The existence of biased selection in health insurance markets has long been assumed by economic theorists as well as seen between classes of health plans. In this paper, we use a model of the premium rate that takes into consideration the effects of moral hazard to make empirical estimates of the extent of selection in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. We find that biased selection has raised the premium of the Blue Cross Plan high-option coverage by 21% and lowered the premium of the low-option coverage by 29%, both relative to premiums that would have been charged in the absence of selection.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurance Plans↗