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Three experiments examined whether the mere priming of potential action effects enhances people's feeling of causing these effects when they occur. In a computer task, participants and the computer independently moved a rapidly moving square on a display. Participants had to press a key, thereby stopping the movement. However, the participant or the computer could have caused the square to stop on the observed position, and accordingly, the stopped position of the square could be conceived of as the potential effect resulting from participants' action of pressing the stop key. The location of this position was primed or not just before participants had to stop the movement. Results showed that (subliminal as well as supraliminal) priming of the position enhanced experienced authorship of stopping the square. Additional experimentation demonstrated that this priming of agency was not mediated by the goal or intention to produce the effect.
The claim that visually masked, unidentifiable ("subliminal") words are analyzed at the level of whole word meaning has been challenged by recent findings indicating that instead, analysis occurs mainly at the subword level. The present experiments examined possible limits on subword analysis. Experiment 1 obtained semantic priming from pleasant- and unpleasant-meaning subliminal words in which no individual letter contained diagnostic information about a word's evaluative valence; thus analysis must operate on information more complex than that contained in individual letters. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that analysis must operate on information more complex than that represented by individual bigrams (adjacent letters) or trigrams (three consecutive letters). These findings suggest that while subliminal priming is driven by subword analysis, the effective units of analysis are distributed widely across at least short (four- and five-letter) words.
Shapes that are rendered invisible through backward masking are still able to influence motor responses: this is called masked priming. Yet it is unknown whether this influence is on the control of ongoing action, or whether it merely influences the initiation of an already-programmed action. We modified a masked priming procedure (Schmidt, 2002) such that the critical prime-mask sequence was displayed during the execution of an already-initiated goal-directed pointing movement. Psychophysical tests of prime visibility indicated that the identity of the prime shapes were not accessible to participants for conscious report. Yet detailed kinematic analysis of the finger in motion revealed that masked primes had an influence on the pointing trajectories within 277ms of their appearance, 56ms earlier than the trajectory deviations observed in response to the visible masks. These results indicate that subliminal shapes can indeed influence the control of ongoing motor activity.
Masked stimuli (primes) can affect the preparation of a motor response to subsequently presented target stimuli. Under some conditions, reactions to the main stimulus can be facilitated (straight priming) or inhibited (inverse priming) when preceded by a compatible prime (calling for the same response). In the majority of studies in which inverse priming was demonstrated arrows pointing left or right were used as prime and targets. There is, however, evidence that arrows are special overlearned stimuli which are processed in a favorable way. Here we report three experiments designated to test whether the "arrowness" of primes/targets is a sufficient condition for inverse priming. The results clearly show that although inverse priming appeared when non-arrow shapes were used, the magnitude of the priming effect was larger with arrows. The possible reasons for this effect are discussed.
In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words (i.e., could consciously perceive subword features that enabled reconstruction of whole words). Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux's in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing (rather than partial awareness) of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words.
Two experiments investigated subliminal semantic and form priming in a word-completion task. Visual gap-words with a dominant and a subordinate solution were preceded by form-related or by semantically related words, which were briefly presented and sandwich-masked. Priming of the subordinate solution was assessed in Experiment 1, relative to a neutral condition. Both solutions were primed in Experiment 2. In the absence of conscious prime recognition, both semantic and form primes reliably increased the probability with which the primed solution was given. With our variant of fragment-completion, response priming can be ruled out as explanation. Moreover, effects were already present at first presentation, excluding an interpretation in terms of partial awareness due to massive repetition. The data demonstrate automatic activation at both form and semantic levels in the absence of conscious awareness.
Choice reaction times to visual stimuli (targets) may be influenced by preceding subliminal stimuli (primes). Some authors reported a straight priming effect i.e., responses were faster when primes and targets called for the same response than when they called for different responses. Others found the reversed pattern of results. Eimer and Schlaghecken [Eimer, M. & Schlaghecken, F. (2002). Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition: evidence from masked priming. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 9, 514-520.] showed recently that straight priming occurs whenever a prime is not efficiently masked thereby the information provided by the prime is accessible for consciousness. In the present study, a hypothesis is tested that straight priming is due to mediation of consciousness. To test this hypothesis, prime validity was manipulated. We showed that even when no mask was used so that participants could fully and consciously perceive the prime and participants were informed that primes were mostly invalid, for the short prime-target ISI interval (100 ms) straight priming occurred. The priming was inverse when the ISI was 800 ms. This indicates that participants were able to use the information provided by the prime to prepare the response opposite to that cued by the prime but only if the time between the prime and the target was long enough.
Masked priming experiments occasionally revealed surprising effects: Participants responded slower for congruent compared to incongruent primes. This negative congruency effect (NCE) was ascribed to inhibition of prime-induced activation [Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (2003). Response faciliation and inhibition in subliminal priming. Biological Psychology, 64, 7-26.] that sets in if the prime activation is sufficiently strong. The current study tests this assumption by implementing manipulations designed to vary the amount of prime-induced activation in three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 3, NCEs were observed despite reduced prime-induced activation. Experiment 2 revealed no NCE with at least similar prime strength. Thus, the amount of prime activation did not predict whether or not NCEs occurred. The findings are discussed with regard to the inhibition account and the recently proposed account of mask-induced activation [cf. Lleras, A., & Enns, J. T. (2004). Negative compatibility or object updating? A cautionary tale of mask-dependent priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 475-493; Verleger, R., Jaskowski, P., Aydemir, A., van der Lubbe, R. H. J., & Groen, M. (2004). Qualitative differences between conscious and nonconscious processing? On inverse priming induced by masked arrows. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 494-515].
Negative compatibility effects (NCEs) in the masked-prime paradigm are usually obtained when primes are masked effectively. With ineffective masks-and primes above the perceptual threshold-positive compatibility effects (PCEs) occur. We investigated whether this pattern reflects a causal relationship between conscious awareness and low-level motor control, or whether it reflects the fact that both are affected in the same way by changes in physical stimulus attributes. In a 5-session perceptual learning task, participants learned to consciously identify masked primes. However, they showed unaltered NCEs that were not different from those produced by participants in a control group without equivalent perceptual learning. A control experiment demonstrated that no NCEs occur when prime identification is made possible by ineffective masking. The results suggest that perceptual awareness and low-level motor control are affected by the same factors, but are fundamentally independent of each other.
Thaut and Kenyon [Human Movement Sci. 22 (2003) 321] have shown that, in a task requiring tapping in antiphase with a metronome, the response period adapts rapidly to a small (+/-2%) change in the stimulus period, whereas the relative phase between stimulus and response returns to its pre-change value only very gradually. On the basis of these and earlier findings, Thaut and Kenyon argue that period adaptation is rapid and subconscious, whereas phase adaptation is slow and dependent on awareness of a phase error. This interpretation is at variance with results in the literature suggesting that phase correction is rapid and subconscious, whereas period correction is slow and dependent on awareness of a period mismatch. Although differences in terminology (adaptation versus correction) play a role in this conflict, it primarily reflects different conceptions of sensorimotor synchronization and different interpretations of empirical findings. By excluding from their model a central timekeeper or oscillator with a flexible period, Thaut and Kenyon have omitted an essential component of human timing control that is needed for a proper explanation of their results.
The present study examined the functional association of the amygdala and right ventral prefrontal cortex (PFC) during cognitive evaluation of facial expressions. A situation was created where emotional valence of the stimuli was unconsciously manipulated by using subliminal affective priming. Twelve healthy volunteers were asked to evaluate the facial expressions of a target face (500-ms duration) such as "anger", "neutral", or "happy". All target faces expressed relatively weak anger. Just before the presentation of the target face, a prime of three conditions of 35-ms duration, angry face, neutral face, and white blank was presented. The subjects could not consciously identify the primes in this procedure. Activity in the right amygdala was greater with subliminal presentation of the angry prime compared with subliminal presentation of a neutral face or white-blank stimuli. Most importantly, the degree of activation of the right amygdala was negatively correlated with that of the right ventral PFC only with the anger prime. Furthermore, activation of the amygdala was positively correlated with rate of judgment when the subjects recognized anger in the target faces. These results are discussed in terms of the functional association between the right PFC and the amygdala and its influence on cognitive processing.
The present study investigated if the emotional valence of words modulates the subliminal repetition priming effect in the brain, in particular, the occipitotemporal visual cortex, by adopting a rapid presentation event-related fMRI design. A masked repetition priming paradigm was adopted, in which, before the presentation of the target (either positive or negative or neutral in meaning), a masked prime word that was either a repetition or an unrelated word of the target was presented. The subject made a perceptual judgment on the target. The results revealed that the left mid-fusiform gyrus was sensitive to the emotional manipulation of the repetition priming effect and that the priming effect in the region was greater in the positive than in the negative word condition. The priming effect in the fusiform gyrus in neutral words was not significant, which might be a result of suppression caused by the emotional context. No effect of valence or repetition was found in the amygdala.
There is debate in cognitive neuroscience whether conscious versus unconscious processing represents a categorical or a quantitative distinction. The purpose of the study was to explore this matter using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We first established objective thresholds of the critical temporal parameters for overt and covert presentations of fear and disgust. Next we applied these stimulus parameters in an fMRI experiment to determine whether non-consciously perceived (covert) facial expressions of fear and disgust show the same double dissociation (amygdala response to fear, insula to disgust) observed with consciously perceived (overt) stimuli. A backward masking paradigm was used. In the psychophysics experiment, the following parameters were established: 30-ms target duration for the covert condition, and 170-ms target duration for the overt condition. Results of the block-design fMRI study indicated substantial differences underlying the perception of fearful and disgusted facial expressions, with significant effects of both emotion and target duration. Findings for the overt condition (170 ms) confirm previous evidence of amygdala activation to fearful faces, and insula activation to disgusted faces, and a double dissociation between these two emotions. In the covert condition (30 ms), the amygdala was not activated to fear, nor was the insula activated to disgust. Overall, findings demonstrate significant differences between the neural responses to fear and to disgust, and between the covert presentations of these two emotions. These results therefore suggest distinct neural correlates of conscious and unconscious emotion perception.
Previous functional neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the amygdala activates in response to fearful faces presented below the threshold of conscious visual perception. Using a backward masking procedure similar to that of previous studies, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study the amygdala and anterior cingulate gyrus during preattentive presentations of sad and happy facial affect. Twelve healthy adult females underwent blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) fMRI while viewing sad and happy faces, each presented for 20 ms and "masked" immediately by a neutral face for 100 ms. Masked happy faces were associated with significant bilateral activation within the anterior cingulate gyrus and amygdala, whereas masked sadness yielded only limited activation within the left anterior cingulate gyrus. In a direct comparison, masked happy faces yielded significantly greater activation in the anterior cingulate and amygdala relative to identically masked sad faces. Conjunction analysis showed that masked affect perception, regardless of emotional valence, was associated with greater activation within the left amygdala and left anterior cingulate. Findings suggest that the amygdala and anterior cingulate are important components of a network involved in detecting and discriminating affective information presented below the normal threshold of conscious visual perception.
We examined whether consciously undetected fear signals engage a collateral brainstem pathway to the amygdala and prefrontal cortex in the intact human brain, using functional neuroimaging. 'Blindsight' lesion patients can respond to visual fear signals independently from conscious experience, suggesting that these signals reach the amygdala via a direct pathway that bypasses the primary visual cortex. Electrophysiological evidence points to concomitant involvement of prefrontal regions in automatic orienting to subliminal signals of fear, which may reflect innervation arising from brainstem arousal systems. To approximate blindsight in 22 healthy subjects, facial signals of fear were presented briefly (16.7 ms) and masked such that conscious detection was prevented. Results revealed that subliminal fear signals elicited activity in the brainstem region encompassing the superior colliculus and locus coeruleus, pulvinar and amygdala, and in fronto-temporal regions associated with orienting. These findings suggest that crude sensory input from the superior colliculo-pulvinar visual pathway to the amygdala may allow for sufficient appraisal of fear signals to innervate the locus coeruleus. The engagement of the locus coeruleus could explain the observation of diffuse fronto-temporal cortical activity, given its role in evoking collateral ascending noradrenergic efferents to the subcortical amygdala and prefrontal cortex. This network may represent an evolutionary adaptive neural 'alarm' system for rapid alerting to sources of threat, without the need for conscious appraisal.
The contribution of each hemisphere to the generation of number representations was investigated by two lateralized priming experiments in which participants had to compare Arabic digits to a fixed standard of four. In Experiment 1, unmasked primes (Arabic digits or word numerals) were used. In Experiment 2, masked primes were presented consciously or subconsciously. In both experiments similar priming effects were found in the left (LH) and the right hemisphere (RH) when the prime was presented consciously. However, asymmetries emerged when the primes were presented subconsciously: while the priming effects of digits and word numbers were equally large in the right visual half field (RVF-LH), the influence of the word prime on the semantic and the response stage of the left visual half field (LVF-RH) was absent, indicating that a word prime was no longer processed when it was presented subconsciously in LVF-RH. We believe that the origin of the latter effect can be attributed to a failure to transfer word number primes from the RH to the LH when attentional resources are restricted.
The amygdala is a key structure in a limbic circuit involved in the rapid and unconscious processing of facial emotions. In the present study, the role of the amygdala in automatic, involuntary appraisal processes, which are believed to be a crucial component of emotion processing, was investigated in 23 healthy subjects. Amygdala activity was recorded in response to masked displays of angry, sad, and happy facial expressions using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In a subsequent experiment, the subjects performed a masked affective priming task that characterizes automatic emotion processing by investigating the biasing effect of subliminally presented emotional faces on evaluative ratings to subsequently presented neutral stimuli. In the affective priming task, significant valence-congruent evaluation manipulation was observed. Subjects rated neutral targets more positively if they were primed by happy faces. Significant correlations were found between amygdala responses to masked negative facial expressions and negative evaluation shifts elicited by the corresponding emotion quality in the affective priming task. Spontaneous amygdala reactivity to facial emotions appears to be a determinant of automatic negative evaluative response tendencies. This finding might shed some light on how amygdala hyperresponsivity contributes to negative cognitive biases commonly observed in affective disorders.