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PubMed1987

Molecular pathogenesis of virus infections.

Although a very wide range of viral diseases exists in vertebrates, certain generalizations can be made regarding pathogenetic pathways on the molecular level. The presentation will focus on interactions of virions and their components with target cells. Using coronaviruses as examples the changes in virulence have been traced back to single mutational events; recombination, however, is likely to be an alternative mechanism by which virus-host interactions (e.g. the cell-, organ- or animal species-spectrum) can dramatically change. Receptor molecules are essential for the early interactions during infection and some of these have been identified. Events in the target cell and the host organism are discussed, and wherever possible, aspects of virus evolution and cooperation between infectious agents are highlighted.

Adsorption↗
PubMed2006

Social evolution: lazy wasps look to the future.

Female hairy-faced hover wasps forage for the young of a dominant breeder, but some forage more than others. New research shows that helpers decide how much to help by looking to the future.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

Opportunistic mothers: female marmosets (Callithrix kuhlii) reduce their investment in offspring when they have to, and when they can.

All female primates incur energetic costs associated with producing and caring for offspring, but females belonging to the New World primate family Callitrichidae, the marmosets and tamarins, appear to face even further demands. In fact, the energetic demands of rearing callitrichid infants are thought to have led to the evolution of cooperative infant care in these species. If this explanation is true, then one might expect that natural selection should also have shaped patterns of maternal behavior to be sensitive to the costs of reproduction and equipped females to reduce their investment in offspring under certain conditions. Therefore, we examined the maternal effort and postpartum endocrine profiles of individual female marmosets (Callithrix kuhlii) across conditions that represented two hallmarks of callitrichid reproduction-conception during the early postpartum period and alloparental assistance. When females conceived during the early postpartum period and faced the upcoming demands of caring for their newly conceived litters (Study 1), they significantly reduced their caregiving effort and had significantly higher postpartum levels of estradiol relative to breeding attempts in which conception occurred later in the postpartum period. Postpartum estradiol was negatively correlated with maternal carrying effort. When experienced alloparents were present (Study 2), females again reduced their caregiving effort relative to breeding attempts in which experienced alloparents were not present. Postpartum cortisol, however, did not vary as a function of experienced alloparental assistance. The results of these studies suggest that female marmosets have been subjected to similar selection pressures as females of other primate taxa--to maximize their reproductive success by reducing their investment in offspring under the worst and best of conditions--and suggest that hormones may mediate within-female variation in maternal care. These studies also provide support for the notion that mothers are "flexible opportunists" when it comes to providing care to their young.

Animals↗
PubMed2003

The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions.

We present agent-based simulations of a model of a deme-structured population in which group differences in social institutions are culturally transmitted and individual behaviors are genetically transmitted. We use a standard extended fitness accounting framework to identify the parameter space for which this co-evolutionary process generates high levels of group-beneficial behaviors. We show that intergroup conflicts may explain the evolutionary success of both: (a) altruistic forms of human sociality towards unrelated members of one's group; and (b) group-level institutional structures such as food sharing which have emerged and diffused repeatedly in a wide variety of ecologies during the course of human history. Group-beneficial behaviors may evolve if (a) they inflict sufficient fitness costs on outgroup individuals and (b) group-level institutions limit the individual fitness costs of these behaviors and thereby attenuate within-group selection against these behaviors. Thus, the evolutionary success of individually costly but group-beneficial behaviors in the relevant environments during the first 90,000 years of anatomically modern human existence may have been a consequence of distinctive human capacities in social institution building.

Altruism↗
PubMed2003

Rationality and social behavior.

This article penetrates the relationship between social behavior and rationality. A critical analysis is made of efforts to classify some behaviors as altruistic, as they simultaneously meet criteria of rationality by not truly being self-destructive. Newcomb's paradox is one attempt to create a hybrid behavior that is both irrational and still meets some criterion of rationality. Such dubious rationality is often seen as a source of altruistic behavior. Group selection is a controversial topic. Sober and Wilson (Unto Others--The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998) suggest that a very wide concept of group selection might be used to explain altruism. This concept also includes kin selection and reciprocity, which blurs its focus. The latter mechanisms hardly need further arguments to prove their existence. This article suggests that it is group selection in a strict sense that should be investigated to limit semantic neologism and confusion. In evaluation, the effort to muster a mechanism for altruism out of group selection has not been successful. However, this is not the end to group selection, but rather a good reason to investigate more promising possibilities. There is little reason to burden group selection with the instability of altruism caused by altruistic members of a group having lower fitness than egoistic members. Group selection is much more likely to develop in combination with group egoism. A common project is supported by incitement against free riding, where conformist members joined in solidarity achieve a higher fitness than members pursuing more individualistic options. Group egoism is in no conflict with rationality, and the effects of group selection will be supported rather than threatened by individual selection. Empirical evidence indicates a high level of traits such as conformism and out-group antagonism in line with group egoism. These traits are also likely candidates for behavior favored by group selection since they homogenize the group and link the different individuals closer to one another and a similar fate.

Altruism↗
PubMed1990

N-person games and the evolution of co-operation: a model based on predator inspection in fish.

Two N-person game theoretical models examining the evolution of co-operation during predator inspection in fish are presented. Predator inspection occurs in small shoals of fish, in which one to a few individuals, the "inspectors" (co-operators) break away from the shoal and cautiously approach a predator to obtain information on this potential danger. In the models presented here, remaining with the shoal and not inspecting is considered an act of defection. Both model I and II produce a stable internal polymorphism of inspectors and noninspectors. While the equilibrial frequency of inspectors can be low (i.e. less than 10%) at large shoal size, the proportion of shoals containing any inspectors--and therefore exhibiting the inspection behavior--is much greater. Both models presented here, and N-person games in general are equivalent to intrademic group selection models of evolution in structured populations, in which shoals are trait groups and co-operation evolves by between-shoal selection. While the results are cast in terms of predator inspection, the model itself is general and applies to any multi-group scenario where co-operators benefit entire groups at their own expense. The results presented here add to the mounting theoretical and empirical evidence that co-operation is frequently not a pure evolutionarily stable strategy, and that many metapopulations should be polymorphic for both co-operators and defectors.

Animals↗
PubMed1991

Distinguishing mechanisms for the evolution of co-operation.

The existence of co-operation between species has been cast as a problem to the selfish-gene view of evolution: why does co-operation persist, when it would seem that individual selection should favor the unco-operative individual who exploits the co-operative tendencies of its partner and gives nothing in return? The recent literature has emphasized one type of model as underlying the evolution and stability of interspecific co-operation, which we term the "partner-fidelity" model, and which is typified by the game theory model known as the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Under this mechanism, individuals are associated with the same partner(s) during an indefinite sequence of interactions. Individuals who at any time fail to co-operate with their partner can be penalized by those same partners in subsequent trials, hence the co-operation can be evolutionarily stable. Many examples of biological co-operation that have been offered appear to conform to this model. However, a few examples appear instead to fit a different and unrecognized mechanism, termed "partner-choice". Under partner-choice, individuals are associated for just one interaction, but an asymmetry enables one member to differentially reward co-operative vs. unco-operative partners in advance of any possible exploitation. Possible examples of co-operation maintained through partner-choice mechanisms are provided by the yucca/yucca moth system and the fig/fig wasp system.

Animals↗
PubMed1989

Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game.

The repeated prisoner's dilemma game has been widely used in analyses of the evolution of reciprocal altruism. Recently it was shown that no pure strategy could be evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Here I show that if there is always some probability that individuals will make a mistake, then a pure strategy can be evolutionarily stable provided that it is "strong perfect equilibria" against itself. To be a strong perfect equilibrium against itself, a strategy must be the best response to itself after every possible sequence of behavior. I show that both unconditional defection and a modified version of tit-for-tat have this property.

Altruism↗
PubMed1997

The archaeological attributes of behaviour: difference or variability?

Did the Neanderthals evolve into anatomically modern humans, or were they replaced by incoming populations of Homo sapiens sapiens? This is perhaps the most well-known question debated by palaeoanthropologists and archaeologists interested in the period from roughly 250,000 to 30,000 years ago in Eurasia. But while this debate may have attracted most of the media attention, there are other research questions that are at least as worthy of public interest as biological origins.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Catalytic O2 evolution from water induced by adsorption of [OH2)(terpy)Mn(mu-O)2Mn(terpy)(OH2)]3+ complex onto clay compounds.

Water oxidation to evolve O2 in photosynthesis is catalyzed by an enzyme whose active site contains a mu-oxo-bridged manganese core. Catalytic O2 evolution has been difficult to establish by manganese-oxo complexes in homogeneous aqueous solutions. The reaction of [(OH2)(terpy)MnIII(mu-O)2MnIV(terpy)(OH2)]3+ (terpy = 2,2':6',2' '-terpyridine) (1) with a CeIV oxidant leads to the decomposition of 1 to the permanganate ion without O2 evolution in an aqueous solution but catalytically produces O2 from water when 1 is adsorbed on clay compounds. 18O-labeling experiments showed that the oxygen atoms in O2 originate exclusively from water. Catalysis of O2 evolution requires cooperation of 2 equiv of 1 adsorbed on clay compounds.

Journal Article↗