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At least 217 records · Page 12Linked to original sources
PubMed1976

Strategies for financing national health insurance: who wins and who loses.

Two sources of funds are available to underwrite the costs of any national health-insurance plan: prepayments (premiums, payroll taxes and income taxes) and out-of-pocket payments (coinsurance and deductibles). The extent to which taxes rather than premiums are used to finance an insurance program will be the major determinant of how large a share of the costs of health care will be borne by higher-income groups. The extent to which coinsurance and deductible provisions are reduced or waived for low-income persons will have a less important, but still substantial, role in determining how the costs of a program are distributed. These financing principles, once understood, provide a basis for the design of health-insurance legislation that will achieve any pattern of income redistribution that may be desired.

Deductibles and Coinsurance↗
PubMed1990

Medicare program; establishing procedures for transmitting information between Medicare carriers and Medicare supplemental insurers--HCFA. General notice.

This notice announces and describes the procedure for the automatic transfer of claims information from Medicare carriers to Medicare supplemental (Medigap) insurers when a beneficiary has assigned his or her right of payment to a participating physician or supplier. It delineates the roles of the Medicare carriers, Medigap insurers, State insurance departments, beneficiaries, physicians and suppliers, and HCFA. The procedure for the automatic transfer of claims is required by section 1842(h)(3)(B) of the Social Security Act, as added by section 4081(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 and is intended to speed payment of Medicare supplemental insurance benefits to participating physicians and suppliers.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗
PubMed1991

The interaction between forms of insurance contract and types of technical change in medical care.

A simple three-parameter description of medical technology is introduced to investigate the relationships between technical change, welfare, and type of insurance contract. The value of a particular change in technology depends on the existing form of contract. The marginal equilibrium expected utility to consumers of different types of technical change hinges on the manner in which the insurance arrangement is designed to mitigate moral hazard. These results open the way for a positive model of the effects of insurance arrangements on the types of technology that are adopted and the effects of technical changes on the prevalent forms of insurance contract.

Community Participation↗
PubMed1996

Provider excess loss insurance: a safety net for risky business.

Capitation agreements are challenging healthcare providers to keep the cost of delivering care at or below their agreed-upon capitated payment. To protect themselves when this cannot be accomplished, providers are purchasing provider excess loss insurance, which reimburses providers if their patient costs exceed a deductible or per-member-per-month dollar threshold. It is important that managers understand differences among the three general types of providers excess loss insurance: per-person, aggregate, and carve-out.

Capitation Fee↗
PubMed1985

Liability and liability insurance for medical malpractice.

Physicians typically carry virtually complete malpractice insurance coverage. This contradicts standard theoretical predictions that under a negligence rule of liability there should be no demand for insurance, and insurance policies under moral hazard will contain co-payment provisions. It is argued that judicial 'errors' in defining negligence generate a demand for liability and legal defense insurance. Physician co-payment undermines the insurer's incentives for legal defense and thus induces a trade-off between loss reduction by injury prevention and by legal defense. Fee-for-service reimbursement further distorts the physician's choice between injury prevention and insurance. Implications for the deterrent function of the tort system are discussed.

Actuarial Analysis↗