SEARCH · PubMed Health

Results for “evolutionarily stable strategy”

Explore indexed PubMed citations for clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health research. Read source abstracts and follow each citation to its original PubMed record.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 253 records · Page 14Linked to original sources

PubMed1998

Spatial heterogeneity and insect adaptation to toxins.

Behavioral responses of insect herbivores to toxins are examined in managed and natural systems with reference to two important but largely ignored factors: heterogeneity in toxin distributions and the nature of the relationship between behavioral responses and physiological adaptation to the same toxins. Heterogeneous toxin distributions, which provide the opportunity for behavioral responses, are ubiquitous in managed and natural systems. Insect herbivores have evolved a wide variety of behavioral responses to such toxins. The nature of behavioral responses reflects toxin apparency, mode of action, and the extent to which sublethal effects influence behavior. The interaction between these behavioral responses to heterogeneously distributed toxins and physiological mechanisms of tolerance has influenced the evolution of insecticide resistance in managed systems and the evolution of plant defensive strategies in natural systems. An understanding of this interaction could lead to more evolutionarily stable methods of crop protection.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2005

Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma.

The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be considered as isolated events. For this case, and assuming simple trigger strategies and many iterations per game, we analyse the rate of convergence to the evolutionarily stable populations. We find that for some values of the payoff parameters of the Prisoner's Dilemma this rate is so low that the assumption, that mutations in the population are infrequent on that time-scale, is unreasonable. Furthermore, the problem is compounded as the group size is increased. In order to address this issue, we derive a deterministic approximation of the evolutionary dynamics with explicit, stochastic mutation processes, valid when the population size is large. We then analyse how the evolutionary dynamics depends on the following factors: mutation rate, group size, the value of the payoff parameters, and the structure of the initial population. In order to carry out the simulations for groups of more than just a few individuals, we derive an efficient way of calculating the fitness values. We find that when the mutation rate per individual and generation is very low, the dynamics is characterized by populations which are evolutionarily stable. As the mutation rate is increased, other fixed points with a higher degree of cooperation become stable. For some values of the payoff parameters, the system is characterized by (apparently) stable limit cycles dominated by cooperative behaviour. The parameter regions corresponding to high degree of cooperation grow in size with the mutation rate, and in number with the group size. For some parameter values, we find more than one stable fixed point, corresponding to different structures of the initial population.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation.

Reputation formation is a key to understanding indirect reciprocity. In particular, the way to assign reputation to each individual, namely a norm that describes who is good and who is bad, greatly affects the possibility of sustained cooperation in the population. Previously, we have exhaustively studied reputation dynamics that are able to maintain a high level of cooperation at the ESS. However, this analysis examined the stability of monomorphic population and did not investigate polymorphic population where several strategies coexist. Here, we study the evolutionary dynamics of multiple behavioral strategies by replicator dynamics. We exhaustively study all 16 possible norms under which the reputation of a player in the next round is determined by the action of the self and the reputation of the opponent. For each norm, we explore evolutionary dynamics of three strategies: unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and conditional cooperators. We find that only three norms, simple-standing, Kandori, and shunning, can make conditional cooperation evolutionarily stable, hence, realize sustained cooperation. The other 13 norms, including scoring, ultimately lead to the invasion by defectors. Also, we study the model in which private reputation errors exist to a small extent. In this case, we find the stable coexistence of unconditional and conditional cooperators under the three norms.

Biological Evolution↗

PubMed2001

Costly signaling and cooperation.

We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that would be of benefit to a potential mate or alliance partner. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including unconditionally sharing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms.

Animals↗

PubMed1996

The evolution of begging: signaling and sibling competition.

In many species, young solicit food from their parents, which respond by feeding them. Because of the difference in genetic make-up between parents and their offspring and the consequent conflict, this interaction is often studied as a paradigm for the evolution of communication. Existent theoretical models demonstrate that chick signaling and parent responding can be stable if solicitation is a costly signal. The marginal cost of producing stronger signals allows the system to converge to an equilibrium: young beg with intensity that reflects their need, and parents use this information to maximize their own inclusive fitness. However, we show that there is another equilibrium where chicks do not beg and parents' provisioning effort is optimal with respect to the statistically probable distribution of chicks' states. Expected fitness for parents and offspring at the nonsignaling equilibrium is higher than at the signaling equilibrium. Because nonsignaling is stable and it is likely to be the ancestral condition, we would like to know how natural systems evolved from nonsignaling to signaling. We suggest that begging may have evolved through direct sibling fighting before the establishment of a parental response, that is, that nonsignaling squabbling leads to signaling. In multiple-offspring broods, young following a condition-dependent strategy in the contest for resources provide information about their condition. Parents can use this information even though it is not an adaptation for communication, and evolution will lead the system to the signaling equilibrium. This interpretation implies that signaling evolved in multiple-offspring broods, but given that signaling is evolutionarily stable, it would also be favored in species which secondarily evolved single-chick broods.

Animal Communication↗

PubMed1996

Evolutionary consequences of a trade-off between parental effort and mating effort.

I investigate the joint evolution of male and female strategies in a dioecious population where individuals can increase their access to mates by attacking or threatening rivals. In some species where individuals can increase their mating success in this way, both sexes allocate resources to parental effort. There may be a trade-off between parental effort and mating effort (for conflict over access to mates). If so, what factors must be included in the model for parental effort by both sexes to be evolutionarily stable? I analyse a simple game theoretic model that allows conflict over access to mates. Three versions of this model are analysed. In the simplest version, variation among individuals of each sex is allowed only in their total parental effort. The more elaborate versions of the model also allow variation in the parental investment per offspring. When this type of variation is allowed, a pair of male and female strategies can only be evolutionary stable if one sex alone contributes all parental effort. However, when non-heritable variation in the resources available to individuals is introduced (the third version of the model), parental effort by both sexes can be maintained.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem.

Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms. 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation. In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole. Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves. Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear. Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection. The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory. Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations. However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises.

Biological Evolution↗

PubMed2006

Separation of time scales, fixation probabilities and convergence to evolutionarily stable states under isolation by distance.

To a first order of approximation, selection is frequency independent in a wide range of family structured models and in populations following an island model of dispersal, provided the number of families or demes is large and the population is haploid or diploid but allelic effects on phenotype are semidominant. This result underlies the way the evolutionary stability of traits is computed in games with continuous strategy sets. In this paper similar results are derived under isolation by distance. The first-order effect on expected change in allele frequency is given in terms of a measure of local genetic diversity, and of measures of genetic structure which are almost independent of allele frequency in the total population when the number of demes is large. Hence, when the number of demes increases the response to selection becomes of constant sign. This result holds because the relevant neutral measures of population structure converge to equilibrium at a rate faster than the rate of allele frequency changes in the total population. In the same conditions and in the absence of demographic fluctuations, the results also provide a simple way to compute the fixation probability of mutants affecting various ecological traits, such as sex ratio, dispersal, life-history, or cooperation, under isolation by distance. This result is illustrated and tested against simulations for mutants affecting the dispersal probability under a stepping-stone model.

Ecology↗

PubMed2001

Heterogeneity stabilizes reciprocal altruism interactions.

In considering the phenomena of reciprocal altruism few would dispute that there are differences in individual quality-in particular, that for some individuals, at least on occasion, the cost of doing favors will exceed the potential of future benefits. That is, at any given time, a typical population is heterogeneous with respect to the affordability of reciprocal altruism. However, methodological limitations of the traditional analytical framework-Single Type (symmetric) Evolutionary Game Theory-have restricted previous analytical efforts to addressing populations idealized in terms of their averages. Here we use the methods of Multitype Evolutionary Game Theory to analyse the role of individual differences in direct reciprocity interactions. Multitype analysis shows that non-idealized populations possess an ESS profile wherein individuals who cannot afford reciprocity (low-quality) defect, while individuals who derive net benefits from reciprocity (high-quality) cooperate. Furthermore, this cooperation is implemented via unmodified tit-for-tat (TfT) strategy. Hence, our results may help resolve a long-standing problem concerning the evolutionary stability of TfT in direct reciprocal altruism. Finally, this difference between idealized and real populations is not restricted to direct reciprocal cooperation. Previously (Lotem et al., 1999) we have demonstrated evolutionarily stable indirect reciprocal cooperation among high-quality individuals in heterogeneous populations.

Altruism↗

PubMed2004

Evolutionarily stable transition rates in a stage-structured model. An application to the analysis of size distributions of badges of social status.

This paper deals with the adaptive dynamics associated to a hierarchical non-linear discrete population model with a general transition matrix. In the model, individuals are categorized into n dominance classes, newborns lie in the subordinate class, and it is considered as evolutionary trait a vector eta of probabilities of transition among classes. For this trait, we obtain the evolutionary singular strategy and prove its neutral evolutionary stability. Finally, we obtain conditions for the invading potential of such a strategy, which is sufficient for the convergence stability of the latter. With the help of the previous results, we provide an explanation for the bimodal distribution of badges of status observed in the Siskin (Carduelis spinus). In the Siskin, as in several bird species, patches of pigmented plumage signal the dominance status of the bearer to opponents, and central to the discussion on the evolution of status signalling is the understanding of which should be the frequency distribution of badge sizes. Though some simple verbal models predicted a bimodal distribution, up to now most species display normal distributions and bimodality has only been described for the Siskin. In this paper, we give conditions leading to one of these two distributions in terms of the survival, fecundity and aggression rates in each dominance class.

Animals↗

PubMed1999

Kin competition, the cost of inbreeding and the evolution of dispersal

Dispersal is often presented as a mechanism to avoid competition among relatives and inbreeding depression. However, the formal analysis of the effects of both these factors on the evolution of dispersal has only been conducted in few studies with strong restrictive assumptions. In this paper, I first derive the evolutionary stable dispersal rate as a function of three parameters: (1) the cost of dispersal, c, (2) the coefficient of relatedness among randomly chosen offspring, R, and (3) the cost of inbreeding, delta. In a second step, relatedness is used as a dynamical variable for the derivation of the evolutionarily stable dispersal rate. Finally, in a third step, relatedness and the cost of inbreeding are assumed to be dynamical variables. This allows to analyse the more realistic situation where dispersal, relatedness and the cost of inbreeding are coevolving simultaneously. Several subcases are considered depending on the genetic determinism (haploid or diploid), the control of the dispersal strategy (parent or offspring control of dispersal) and the plasticity of dispersal with sexes (with or without sex-specific dispersal rates). This analysis clarifies the role of the cost of inbreeding and kin competition on the evolution of dispersal (in particular on the evolution of sex-biased dispersal rates) and leads to quantitative and testable predictions. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2006

Conservation of glycolytic oscillations in Saccharomyces cerevisiae and human pancreatic beta-cells: a study of metabolic robustness.

The present study compares two computer models of the first part of glucose catabolism in different organisms in search of evolutionarily conserved characteristics of the glycolysis cycle and proposes the main parameters that define the stable steady-state or oscillatory behavior of the glycolytic system. It is suggested that in both human pancreatic beta-cells and Saccharomyces cerevisiae there are oscillations that, despite differences in wave form and period of oscillation, share the same robustness strategy: the oscillation is not controlled by only one but by at least two parameters that will have more or less control over the pathway flux depending on the initial state of the system as well as on extra-cellular conditions. This observation leads to two important interpretations: the first is that in both S. cerevisiae and human beta-cells, despite differences in enzyme kinetics and mechanism of feedback control, evolution seems to have kept an oscillatory behavior coupled to the glucose concentration outside the cytoplasm, and the second is that the development of drugs to regulate metabolic dysfunctions in more complex systems may require further study, not only determining which enzyme is controlling the flux of the system but also under which conditions and how its control is maintained by the enzyme or transferred to other enzymes in the pathway as the drug starts acting.

Computer Simulation↗

PubMed1996

Discrete clutch sizes, local mate competition, and the evolution of precise sex allocation.

Optimal sex allocation under a population structure with local mate competition has been studied mainly in deterministic models that are based on the assumption of continuous clutch sizes; Hamilton's (1967) model is the classic example. When clutch sizes are small, however, this assumption is not appropriate. When taking the discrete nature of eggs into account it becomes critically important whether females control only the mean sex ratio ("binomial" females) or the variance as well ("precise" females). As both types of sex ratio control have been found, it is of interest to investigate their evolutionary stability. In particular, it may be questioned whether perfect control of the sex ratio is always favoured by natural selection when mating groups are small. Models based on discrete clutch sizes are developed to determine evolutionarily stable (ES) sex ratios. It is predicted that when all females are of the binomial type they should produce a lower proportion of daughters than predicted by Hamilton's model, especially when clutch size and foundress number are small. When all females are of the precise type, the ES number of sons should generally be either a stable mixed strategy or a pure strategy, but there are special cases (for two foundresses and particular clutch sizes) where the ES number of sons lies in a trajectory of neutrally stable mixed strategies; the predicted mean sex ratios can be either higher or lower than predicted by Hamilton's model. The existence of ES mixed strategies implies that individual females do not necessarily have to produce sex ratios with perfect precision; some level of imperfection can be tolerated (i.e., will not be selected against). When the population consists of both binomial and precise females, the latter always have a selective advantage. This advantage of precision does not disappear when precision approaches fixation in the population. The latter result contradicts the conclusions of Taylor and Sauer (1980) which is due to their way of expressing selective advantage; they define selective advantage as the between-generation increase per allele, which will always become vanishingly small when an allele reaches fixation, irrespective of fitness differences.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

War of attrition with implicit time cost.

In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the strategies of the whole population. We identify and analyse the underlying mechanisms responsible for the implicit time cost. Each player participates in a series of games, where those prepared to wait longer win with higher certainty but play less frequently. The model is characterized by the ratio of the winner's score to the loser's score, in a single game. The fitness of a player is determined by the accumulated score from the games played during a generation. We derive the stationary distribution of strategies under the replicator dynamics. When the score ratio is high, we find that the stationary distribution is unstable, with respect to both evolutionary and dynamical stability, and the dynamics converge to a limit cycle. When the ratio is low, the dynamics converge to the stationary distribution. For an intermediate interval of the ratio, the distribution is dynamically but not evolutionarily stable. Finally, the implications of our results for previous models based on the war of attrition are discussed.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Putting competition strategies into ideal free distribution models: habitat selection as a tug of war.

When resources are patchily distributed in an environment, behavioral ecologists frequently turn to ideal free distribution (IFD) models to predict the spatial distribution of organisms. In these models, predictions about distributions depend upon two key factors: the quality of habitat patches and the nature of competition between consumers. Surprisingly, however, no IFD models have explored the possibility that consumers modulate their competitive efforts in an evolutionarily stable manner. Instead, previous models assume that resource acquisition ability and competition are fixed within species or within phenotypes. We explored the consequences of adaptive modulation of competitive effort by incorporating tug-of-war theory into payoff equations from the two main classes of IFD models (continuous input (CI) and interference). In the models we develop, individuals can increase their share of the resources available in a patch, but do so at the costs of increased resource expenditures and increased negative interactions with conspecifics. We show how such models can provide new hypotheses to explain what are thought to be deviations from IFDs (e.g., the frequent observation of fewer animals than predicted in "good" patches of habitat). We also detail straightforward predictions made uniquely by the models we develop, and we outline experimental tests that will distinguish among alternatives.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

The interaction between reproductive lifespan and protandry in seasonal breeders.

The timing and duration of reproductive activities are highly variable both at the individual and population level. Understanding how this variation evolved by natural selection is fundamental to understanding many important aspects of an organism's life history, ecology and behaviour. Here, we combine game theoretic principles governing reproductive timing and the evolutionary theory of senescence to study the interaction between protandry (the earlier arrival or emergence of males to breeding areas than females) and senescence in seasonal breeders. Our general model applies to males who are seeking to mate as frequently as possible over a relatively short period, and so is relevant to many organisms including annual insects and semelparous vertebrates. The model predicts that protandry and maximum reproductive lifespans should increase in environments characterized by high survival and by a low competitive cost of maintaining the somatic machinery necessary for survival. In relatively short seasons under these same conditions, seasonal declines in the reproductive lifespans of males of equivalent quality will be evolutionarily stable. However, over a broad range of potential values for daily survival and maintenance cost, reproductive lifespan is expected to be relatively short and constant throughout a large fraction of the season. We applied the model to sockeye (or kokanee) salmon Oncorhynchus nerka and show that pronounced seasonal declines in reproductive lifespan, a distinctive feature of semelparous Oncorhynchus spp., is likely part of a male mating strategy to maximize mating opportunities.

Aging↗

PubMed2003

Threat displays are not handicaps.

Within a general framework of handicap signalling it was proposed that threat displays are handicaps, they can work only if they put the signaller at a disadvantage, which is only acceptable to honest signallers. The aim of the present article is to investigate this proposal with the help of a simple game-theoretical model. It was found: (1) that the use of cost-free signals is an ESS against the invasion of handicapped signals even if cheating is played as part of a mixed strategy in the population; (2) that the use of handicaps may be an ESS against cost-free signals but only if we assume that the invading cost-free signal is not accepted by weak individuals as a signal of strength; (3) that the establishment of a handicapped signal in the first place is an unresolved problem, because both cost free signals and negative-handicaps are evolutionarily stable against the invasion of handicaps; (4) that in contrast to handicaps the use of negative-handicaps can invade a population using cost-free signals (a negative-handicap is a signal which may serve other functions as well); (5) that negative-handicaps are ESS against cost-free signals as well as against handicaps; and (6) thus, the most likely evolutionary end point is that the biggest negative-handicap would be used as a threat display. This is a posture, which prepares the animal most efficiently to fight; hence, most probably it is the initial position of the fighting technique of the given species. (7) Finally, the investigation of the threat displays of well-studied taxa (great tit, cats, dogs, and hoofed mammals) confirms that threat displays are indeed negative-handicaps. They do not put the user into a disadvantaged position, instead the initial position of the species specific fighting technique is used as a threat display as predicted by the present model.

Aggression↗

PubMed2005

Emergence of a convex trade-off between transmission and virulence.

Most models of virulence evolution assume that a parasite cannot raise its transmission rate without causing more harm to its host. However, the existence of such trade-off relationships has recently been challenged. Here, we study how a trade-off can emerge from a model that explicitly incorporates within-host dynamics. We find that the existence and the convexity of the trade-off are robust, which implies a definite level of evolutionarily stable virulence (ESV) for the parasite. However, we also show that the dependence of the ESV on parameter values may be very strong. One possible consequence of this sensitivity is that relationships between transmission and virulence observed across populations need not conform to the patterns expected on the basis of a common (fixed) trade-off. We discuss possible experiments and implications of our results for the development of virulence management strategies.

Disease Transmission, Infectious↗