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PubMed1994

Treatment of pathological gamblers: an experimental study.

The efficacy of a behavioral treatment for pathological gamblers, including cognitive interventions, problem solving and relapse prevention is examined. Three pathological gamblers meeting DSM-III-R criteria were studied in an experimental multiple baseline design. By the end of treatment the subjects ceased all gambling behaviors, increased their perception of self-control of gambling, and evaluated their problems as less severe. Therapeutic gains were maintained at 6- and 9-month follow-ups. The importance of problem solving and the modification of erroneous perceptions in treatment programs for pathological gambling is discussed.

Adult↗
PubMed1992

Attentional asymmetry in schizophrenia: controlled and automatic processes.

Two versions of Posner's covert orienting task were administered to 14 drug-free schizophrenic patients and 12 normal controls. In the schizophrenic subjects, automatic orienting to exogenous cues in the right visual field was impaired. However, this lateralizing general deficit was not present when the schizophrenics were able to direct attention effortfully in the second version of the task using endogenous cues. These findings support the hypothesis that there is a deficit in left hemispheric mechanisms mediating visual spatial attention in schizophrenia. However, when schizophrenics are given the opportunity to use an attentional strategy they are able to partially overcome this lateralized processing deficit.

Attention↗
PubMed1989

Intuitive reasoning about probability: theoretical and experimental analyses of the "problem of three prisoners".

Among various Bayesian problems of probability, the "problem of three prisoners" (Lindley, 1971; Mosteller, 1965) is an especially good example which illustrates the drastic discrepancy between intuitive reasoning and mathematical formal reasoning about probability. In particular, it raises intriguing questions concerning the mathematical and cognitive relevance of factors such as prior probabilities and the context in which certain information is given. In the current paper, we report a new version of the problem which turned out to be even more counterintuitive. This new version was also designed so that different inferential schemes would lead to separate estimates of posterior probability. The data obtained from questionnaires and theoretical analyses of the original and modified problems suggest that: (1) The psychological processes of intuitive reasoning are qualitatively different from mathematical reasoning. (2) The tendency to neglect prior probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1982) is not always the critical factor for illusory judgments. (3) Intuitive judgments can be categorized by several, distinctive propositional beliefs from which the judgments are apparently derived. We call these prototypical, crude beliefs "subjective theorems," and discuss their nature and roles in the current paper.

Adult↗
PubMed1992

A closer look at the probabilities of the notorious three prisoners.

The "problem of three prisoners", a counterintuitive teaser, is analyzed. It is representative of a class of probability puzzles where the correct solution depends on explication of underlying assumptions. Spontaneous beliefs concerning the problem and intuitive heuristics are reviewed. The psychological background of these beliefs is explored. Several attempts to find a simple criterion to predict whether and how the probability of the target event will change as a result of obtaining evidence are examined. However, despite the psychological appeal of these attempts, none proves to be valid in general. A necessary and sufficient condition for change in the probability of the target event, following observation of new data, is proposed. That criterion is an extension of the likelihood-ratio principle (which holds in the case of only two complementary alternatives) to any number of alternatives. Some didactic implications concerning the significance of the chance set-up and reliance on analogies are discussed.

Attention↗
PubMed1995

The role of covariation versus mechanism information in causal attribution.

Traditional approaches to causal attribution propose that information about covariation of factors is used to identify causes of events. In contrast, we present a series of studies showing that people seek out and prefer information about causal mechanisms rather than information about covariation. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 asked subjects to indicate the kind of information they would need for causal attribution. The subjects tended to seek out information that would provide evidence for or against hypotheses about underlying mechanisms. When asked to provide causes, the subjects' descriptions were also based on causal mechanisms. In Experiment 4, subjects received pieces of conflicting evidence matching in covariation values but differing in whether the evidence included some statement of a mechanism. The influence of evidence was significantly stronger when it included mechanism information. We conclude that people do not treat the task of causal attribution as one of identifying a novel causal relationship between arbitrary factors by relying solely on covariation information. Rather, people attempt to seek out causal mechanisms in developing a causal explanation for a specific event.

Adult↗
PubMed1994

When explanations compete: the role of explanatory coherence on judgements of likelihood.

The likelihood of a statement is often derived by generating an explanation for it and evaluating the plausibility of the explanation. The explanation discounting principle states that people tend to focus on a single explanation; alternative explanations compete with the effect of reducing one another's credibility. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that this principle applies to inductive inferences concerning the properties of everyday categories. In both experiments, subjects estimated the probability of a series of statements (conclusions) and the conditional probabilities of those conclusions given other related facts. For example, given that most lawyers make good sales people, what is the probability that most psychologists make good sales people? The results showed that when the fact and the conclusion had the same explanation the fact increased people's willingness to believe the conclusion, but when they had different explanations the fact decreased the conclusion's credibility. This decrease is attributed to explanation discounting; the explanation for the fact had the effect of reducing the plausibility of the explanation for the conclusion.

Cognition↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Mental models and probabilistic thinking.

This paper outlines the theory of reasoning based on mental models, and then shows how this theory might be extended to deal with probabilistic thinking. The same explanatory framework accommodates deduction and induction: there are both deductive and inductive inferences that yield probabilistic conclusions. The framework yields a theoretical conception of strength of inference, that is, a theory of what the strength of an inference is objectively: it equals the proportion of possible states of affairs consistent with the premises in which the conclusion is true, that is, the probability that the conclusion is true given that the premises are true. Since there are infinitely many possible states of affairs consistent with any set of premises, the paper then characterizes how individuals estimate the strength of an argument. They construct mental models, which each correspond to an infinite set of possibilities (or, in some cases, a finite set of infinite sets of possibilities). The construction of models is guided by knowledge and beliefs, including lay conceptions of such matters as the "law of large numbers". The paper illustrates how this theory can account for phenomena of probabilistic reasoning.

Humans↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Extracting the coherent core of human probability judgement: a research program for cognitive psychology.

Human intuition is a rich and useful guide to uncertain events in the environment but suffers from probabilistic incoherence in the technical sense. Developing methods for extracting a coherent body of judgement that is maximally consistent with a person's intuition is a challenging task for cognitive psychology, and also relevant to the construction of artificial expert systems. The present article motivates this problem, and outlines one approach to it.

Artificial Intelligence↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Uncertainty and the difficulty of thinking through disjunctions.

This paper considers the relationship between decision under uncertainty and thinking through disjunctions. Decision situations that lead to violations of Savage's sure-thing principle are examined, and a variety of simple reasoning problems that often generate confusion and error are reviewed. The common difficulty is attributed to people's reluctance to think through disjunctions. Instead of hypothetically traveling through the branches of a decision tree, it is suggested, people suspend judgement and remain at the node. This interpretation is applied to instances of decision making, information search, deductive and inductive reasoning, probabilistic judgement, games, puzzles and paradoxes. Some implications of the reluctance to think through disjunctions, as well as potential corrective procedures, are discussed.

Decision Making↗
PubMed1996

A hypothesis-assessment model of categorical argument strength.

According to the proposed hypothesis-assessment model, the strength of inductive categorical arguments, such as {All Robins Have Substance X therefore All Birds Have Substance X}, is determined by the same factors that affect hypothesis plausibility in the everyday social milieu. The premises of such arguments are viewed as evidence and the conclusion is viewed as a hypothesis. Specifically, the proposed model predicts that the perceived strength of general-conclusion categorical arguments will be a function of (a) the number of premises that instantiate the conclusion; (b) the scope of the conclusion; and (c) the number of accessed alternatives to the conclusion. In Experiment 1, one group rated the strength of individual arguments and another constructed superordinate hypotheses in response to the premise information alone. Most of the variance in perceived argument strength was accounted for by the proposed predictors, R = .94. Experiment 2 employed a new set of arguments and included an additional forced-choice condition in which subjects had to choose the stronger of two arguments. Again, the correlation between predictors and argument strength was high, R = .91, and, all significant forced-choice preferences except one were correctly predicted by the model. The one unpredicted preference suggests the need to include conclusion accessibility as a fourth factor. Also, on a subset of the forced-choice pairs in which no significant preference was observed, two distinct patterns of responding were detected-one predicted and the other unanticipated. Some strengths and limitations of the proposed hypothesis-assessment model are discussed in light of these results.

Adult↗
PubMed1983

Late components of saccade-related brain potentials in guessing tasks.

The late positive components of lambda responses were studied in a guessing task modified in such a way that subjects had to perform a saccadic eye movement in order to perceive task-relevant information. Responses from 6 scalp areas were investigated in 9 subjects and in 2 conditions: control and guessing. In both conditions subjects performed two consecutive saccades in a given trial: the first to the middle light, the second to the target area. In the control condition the subjects knew beforehand what the 'target' would be. In the guessing condition they had to make a guess before each trial as to which of the three target stimuli would appear. The target stimuli occurred with unequal probability and were presented in a randomized sequence. Unlike the control condition, the guessing task led to the appearance of a late positive component in the lambda response. Similar to traditional ERP findings, this late positivity showed an amplitude maximum at the parietal area and a peak latency at 375 msec from saccade onset. Furthermore, Principal Component-Varimax Analysis (PCVA) of the lambda responses revealed a first factor giving the strongest loading in the latency range of the P300, and a second factor which was identified as the slow wave. These factors are quite similar to the factors found in the PCVA of ERPs. Our results suggest that the late components of lambda responses reflect the effects of information processing in cognitive tasks similarly to the way the late positive components of ERPs do.

Adult↗
PubMed1994

Orienting of attention in deafferented patients.

Visual attentional processes were compared in two deafferented patients and 11 normal subjects. Two consecutive stimuli were presented in rapid succession in one of two locations. A peripheral cue first oriented attention to one location where a response was requested. After 100 msec, a second response was required at either the same or opposite location (valid vs invalid cue). Four probabilities of valid cue occurrence were presented: 100, 80, 50 and 20%. Results showed (1) faster reaction times for the second response on cued than on uncued signals; (2) greater attentional effects with increased cue probability; (3) smaller attentional effects in patients. These findings suggest that the patients adopted a cost-minimizing strategy.

Adult↗