Patient incentives and hospital insurance: a political science perspective.
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The goal of the National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey (NMCUES) of 1980 was to improve the understanding of the ways in which Americans use and pay for health care. This report is one in a series of descriptive reports based on NMCUES data. Data concerning insurance coverage were collected from household respondents in NMCUES. These data included the kind of insurance in effect for each person, the services covered, and the amounts paid by each source. In addition, the administration of private insurance plans and the kinds of charges covered were identified. The purpose of this report is to provide descriptive information about supplemental insurance coverage among the aged Medicare population with special emphasis on private supplemental health insurance coverage. For this report, supplemental insurance is defined as coverage (i.e., Medicaid, private, or other) in addition to Medicare and is to be distinguished from the Supplementary Medical Insurance part of Medicare that is known as SMI or Part B of Medicare. The results presented are based on data collected about the civilian, noninstitutionalized persons in the NMCUES national household sample who at any time during the survey year of 1980: (1) were 65 years of age or over, and (2) reported having been covered by Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI), or Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI), or both. This report uses time-adjusted estimates that assign a single individual to different categories of insurance coverage according to the proportion of the year that he or she was covered by each kind of insurance. Consequently, estimates are made for person-years of coverage although they are expressed as persons for convenience. Approximately 4 out of 5 aged Medicare beneficiaries reported having some kind of insurance coverage in addition to Medicare during 1980. Approximately 67 percent of the aged Medicare population are estimated to have had private insurance in addition to Medicare; an estimated 13 percent had Medicaid. (Both of these estimates include 2.5 percent who reported Medicaid and private insurance simultaneously.) About 21 percent of the aged Medicare beneficiaries reported that Medicare was their only source of third-party coverage. The percentage of the aged Medicare beneficiaries who reported Medicare as their only source of third-party coverage was consistently 20 percent regardless of health status. However, the distribution among insurance categories of the remaining 80 percent who reported supplemental coverage of some type varied by health status. Medicare beneficiaries who were in poor health were much more likely to have Medicaid than Medicare beneficiaries who reported being in excellent health.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
This notice announces the inpatient hospital deductible and the hospital and skilled nursing facility coinsurance amounts for services furnished in calendar year 1992 under Medicare's hospital insurance program (Medicare Part A). The Medicare statute specifies the formulae to be used to determine these amounts. The inpatient hospital deductible will be $652. The daily coinsurance amounts will be: (a) $163 for the 61st through 90th days of hospitalization in a benefit period; (b) $326 for lifetime reserve days; and (c) $81.50 for the 21st through 100th days of extended care services in a skilled nursing facility in a benefit period.
This notice announces the inpatient hospital deductible and the hospital and extended care services coinsurance amounts for services furnished in calendar year 1993 under Medicare's hospital insurance program (Medicare Part A). The Medicare statute specifies the formulae to be used to determine these amounts. The inpatient hospital deductible will be $676. The daily coinsurance amounts will be: (a) $169 for the 61st through 90th days of hospitalization in a benefit period; (b) $338 for lifetime reserve days; and (c) $84.50 for the 21st through 100th days of extended care services in a skilled nursing facility in a benefit period.
This notice announces the inpatient hospital deductible and the hospital and extended care services coinsurance amounts for services furnished in calendar year 1994 under Medicare's hospital insurance program (Medicare Part A). The Medicare statute specifies the formulae to be used to determine these amounts. The inpatient hospital deductible will be $696. The daily coinsurance amounts will be: (a) $174 for the 61st through 90th days of hospitalization in a benefit period; (b) $348 for lifetime reserve days; and (c) $87 for the 21st through 100th days of extended care services in a skilled nursing facility in a benefit period.
This notice announces the inpatient hospital deductible and the hospital and extended care services coinsurance amounts for services furnished in calendar year 1995 under Medicare's hospital insurance program (Medicare Part A). The Medicare statute specifies the formulae to be used to determine these amounts. The inpatient hospital deductible will be $716. The daily coinsurance amounts will be: (a) $179 for the 61st through 90th days of hospitalization in a benefit period; (b) $358 for lifetime reserve days; and (c) $89.50 for the 21st through 100th days of extended care services in a skilled nursing facility in a benefit period.
This notice announces the inpatient hospital deductible and the hospital and extended care services coinsurance amounts for services furnished in calendar year 1996 under Medicare's hospital insurance program (Medicare Part A). The Medicare statute specifies the formulae to be used to determine these amounts. The inpatient hospital deductible will be $736. The daily coinsurance amounts will be: (a) $184 for the 61st through 90th days of hospitalization in a benefit period; (b) $368 for lifetime reserve days; and (c) $92 for the 21st through 100th days of extended care services in a skilled nursing facility in a benefit period.
This notice announces the inpatient hospital deductible and the hospital and extended care services coinsurance amounts for services furnished in calendar year 1997 under Medicare's hospital insurance program (Medicare Part A). The Medicare statute specifies the formulae to be used to determine these amounts. The inpatient hospital deductible will be $760. The daily coinsurance amounts will be: (1) $190 for the 61st through 90th days of hospitalization in a benefit period; (b) $380 for lifetime reserve days; and (c) $95 for the 21st through 100th days of extended care services in a skilled nursing facility in a benefit period.
The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) contains a wealth of information about the people whose care is financed by the program. This article examines their satisfaction with medical care received and explores the relationship of these attitudes with the characteristics of subgroups of the enrolled population. Satisfaction with medical care among Medicare beneficiaries is found to be generally high (80-90 percent). Disabled Medicare beneficiaries are less satisfied than the aged, and health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollees less satisfied than fee-for-service (FFS) patients. Others with lower-than-average satisfaction are people with poorer health status, those covered by Medicaid, and those without supplementary insurance.
This notice announces the inpatient hospital deductible and the hospital and extended care services coinsurance amounts for services furnished in calendar year 1998 under Medicare's hospital insurance program (Medicare Part A). The Medicare statute specifies the formulae to be used to determine these amounts. The inpatient hospital deductible will be $764. The daily coinsurance amounts will be: (a) $191 for the 61st through 90th days of hospitalization in a benefit period; (b) $382 for lifetime reserve days; and (c) $95.50 for the 21st through 100th days of extended care services in a skilled nursing facility in a benefit period.
Public and private payers can set the terms of demand-side cost sharing in insurance for patients and supply-side cost sharing in the form of reimbursement for providers. This paper summarizes a model in which health care utilization is affected by both demand- and supply-side cost sharing. The combined effects of these two policies are simulated in an application to inpatient mental health care. Because supply-side cost sharing (as would take place in a prospective payment system) limits cost without imposing financial risk on patients, it is preferred as a policy for restraining cost. I show in the case studied that when supply-side cost sharing is introduced, insurance coverage should improve.
These rules amend the Medicare regulations that deal with supplementary medical insurance (SMI) premiums. These changes are necessary to conform our rules to changes made in the Medicare laws since the rules were last published. The purpose is to ensure that those who must apply our rules are not misled or confused by content that fails to reflect statutory changes and modified policy.
Throughout the 1980s, Medicare has 'turned against its service suppliers' and began to literally rewrite the rules of the health insurance game. This paper is set in that changing environment and describes one supplier's response.
Probit regression estimates show the effects of the price of insurance, anticipated medical expenditures, and other factors on reported decisions about purchasing hypothetically offered supplementary insurance policies. The demand estimates can characterize how much supplemental insurance would be purchased under different tax policies affecting health insurance purchases. Although eliminating the current tax subsidy to insurance is shown to decrease demand, the results indicate a substantial demand for supplementary insurance even in the absence of present tax incentives. However, our results on adverse selection raise concerns about the potential stability of supplemental insurance markets.
OBJECTIVE: Peripheral arterial disease (PAD) is associated with high rates of morbidity and mortality and serves as an important marker for advanced systemic atherosclerosis accompanied by symptomatic or asymptomatic ischemia of the coronary, cerebral, and visceral vasculature. There are little published data on the use of health care resources and costs attributable to PAD. The objectives of this study were to evaluate, from a societal perspective, PAD-related health care resource utilization and to determine the total annualized costs and cost components for patients with PAD, with particular attention to the key outcomes of myocardial infarction (MI), transient ischemic attacks (TIA), stroke, and amputations. METHODS: This study examined medical, hospital and outpatient, and pharmacy claims from a large managed care database with dates of service from January 1, 1999, through August 31, 2003. Patients with PAD were identified from claims using International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) diagnosis codes (primary or secondary codes), ICD-9-CM procedure codes, current procedural terminology (CPT) codes, or by a pharmacy claim for cilostazol or pentoxifylline. The index date for each patient was the first occurrence of either a medical claim for PAD or a pharmacy claim for 1 of the 2 drugs. Patients were required to be a minimum of 18 years old with continuous plan eligibility. The prevalence of PAD in adults in a managed care setting was also determined, as were annual rates for the key outcomes of MI, TIA, stroke, and amputations. Health care resource utilization and costs were calculated for PAD patients after the index date for a period of at least 12 months per patient for medications, outpatient/physician office visits, laboratory/diagnostic procedures, emergency department visits, and hospitalization. Cost was defined as the allowed charge on each administrative claim, including the amount paid by the insurer plus the amount paid by the health plan members (copay, deductible, and coinsurance). RESULTS: Prior to application of exclusion criteria for patients aged 18 years or older and the minimum period of continuous eligibility, the overall prevalence of PAD was 1.18% of the total managed care organization population.s 6.67 million members. The PAD study cohort consisted of 30,561 patients with a mean age of 70.7 years at index. The most common comorbidities identified in the preindex period for these PAD patients included hypertension (67% of patients); metabolic disorders/hypercholesterolemia (57%); heart disease including cardiomyopathy, dysrhythmias, and heart failure (55%); and ischemic heart disease (47%). Over a mean postindex period of 25.2 months (median 23.4 months), the total mean annualized PAD-related cost was $5,955 per patient per year (PPPY). Hospitalizations accounted for the largest component cost category, averaging $4,442 PPPY or 75% of the total annualized PAD-related cost per PAD patient. PAD-related noncoronary procedures averaged $729 PPPY (12.2% of total annual PAD-related costs), and PAD-related medications (including antihypertensives and lipid-lowering therapy) totaled $610 (10.2% of total annual costs), including $313 PPPY for antihypertensives and $207 for lipid-lowering therapy. For the subgroup of 24,075 newly identified PAD patients, 8,479 (35.2%) were hospitalized during an average 25.2 months of follow-up, with the mean time to first hospitalization of 8.9 months. CONCLUSIONS: Approximately 75% of the total PAD-related patient cost in an average of 25 months of follow-up is contributed by hospital costs, and 35% of patients newly diagnosed with PAD experienced a hospitalization in a mean of 8.9 months after the index diagnosis. Based upon mean annual health and member costs of only $313 PPPY for antihypertensives and $207 for lipid-lowering therapy, drug therapy in PAD patients may be underutilized.
Demand-side cost sharing and the supply-side reimbursement system provide two separate instruments that can be used to influence the quantity of health services consumed. For risk-averse consumers, optimal payment systems--pairs of insurance and reimbursement plans--are characterized by conflict rather than consensus between patient and provider about the quantity of treatment. A model of conflict resolution based on bargaining theory is used to represent the outcome when the payment system creates divergences between desired demand and desired supply. Using that model, we describe the optimal combination of insurance and reimbursement systems that maximize consumer welfare.
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