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Results for “Reimbursement, Incentive”

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PubMed2004

The relative importance of leadership and payment system. Effects on quality of care and work environment.

The key question addressed in this study is whether the introduction of stronger financial incentives in health care give rise to such a restrictive context that leadership has only a minor influence? Or is good leadership, on the contrary, important to the achievement of both financial and other goals, regardless of contextual factors? Physicians in one Swedish County Council with performance-based reimbursement and in 10 councils without such a system were studied in a cross-sectional questionnaire study. The result of this study indicates that although contextual factors were of substantial importance there is scope for leaders to act, and their actions make a considerable difference, both for the experience of the work process and for the outcome in terms of work environment and quality of care. A good leadership may be able to shield the health care organisation from unwanted side effects of increased financial pressure.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

GPs' payment contracts and their referral practice.

This paper compares the role of general practitioners in determining access to specialists in two types of health care systems: gate-keeping systems, where a general practitioner (GP) referral is compulsory to visit a specialist, and non-gate-keeping systems, where this referral is optional. We model the dependence between the GP's diagnosis effort and her referral behaviour, and identify the optimal contracts that induce the best behaviour from a public insurer's point of view, where there is asymmetry of information between the insurer and the GP regarding diagnosis effort and referral decisions. We show that gate keeping is superior wherever GP's incentives matter.

Family Practice↗
PubMed2006

Paying physicians for quality: evidence and themes from the field.

BACKGROUND: Health plans, self-insured employers, health plans, and provider organizations are currently introducing financial incentives that reward physicians for delivering high-quality medical care. Yet a review of existing research reveals virtually no empirical studies of the effect of direct, internal quality incentives on physician performance. Key-informant interviews with leaders of provider organizations should shed new light on evolving quality incentives within organizations. METHODS: Structured key-informant interviews with administrators and medical directors in 22 medical groups and 9 hospitals affiliated with 10 large, integrated health systems were conducted from July 2003 through January 2004. FINDINGS: Views on the role of financial incentives varied widely and were related to a number of other factors, including institutional culture, community context, organizational strategy and structure, organizational stability, quality measurement, nature and size of incentives, and the sustainability of interventions. DISCUSSION: These findings have implications for the acceptability and structure of financial incentives for quality directed to health care provider organizations. A set of considerations for the design and implementation of quality incentives relate to the incentives' scope, controllability, transparency, size, and orientation (individual or team), as well as the relationship between the extrinsic financial incentives and professionals' intrinsic motivation.

Hospital Administrators↗
PubMed1994

President Clinton's Health Security Act: a financial perspective.

The loftiness of President Clinton's goals may not survive the devil in the details, suggests the author of this article, who identifies four fundamental flaws in the Health Security Act of 1993. First, the act does not link the benefit package of coverage offered to all Americans with the funding available from employers or government to pay for these benefits; second, the act does not provide incentives for consumers to use health resources wisely; third, the act relies too much on government regulation; and fourth, the act provides few incentives for medical research, new drugs, and improved technology.

Computer Communication Networks↗
PubMed1997

Structural incentives and adoption of medical technologies in HMO and fee-for-service health insurance plans.

Recent literature has argued that conventional fee-for-service (FFS) health insurance, as compared to managed care (HMO) insurance, may lead to the adoption of new technology that raises costs and reduces patient welfare. In this paper, we show that this result depends on an increasingly unrealistic key assumption-that FFS insurers cannot refuse to reimburse new technology. We also show that, when the assumption is changed, HMO insurers may adopt costly technologies that FFS insurers do not.

Decision Making, Organizational↗
PubMedDate not supplied

UK budgetary systems and new health-care technologies.

OBJECTIVES: This article outlines the budgetary setting within the UK health-care system. METHODS: It is argued that while prospective budgets can give rise to efficient resource allocation outcomes, this relies on the budget being set at an appropriate level and the accompanying incentive structures being efficient. The organizational structures and the interrelationships are critical. The recent history of UK National Health Service reforms and expenditure is outlined. It is suggested that until recently, although the budget system has the potential to promote efficiency, the aggregate budget allocated to the NHS has probably been too low given public expectations, technology advances, and preferences for health care. RESULTS: The aggregate budget is due to rise considerably over the next 5 years. While some incentive and regulatory provisions will move the budget toward an efficient allocation many microlevel incentive issues remain. CONCLUSION: Whether efficient patterns of health-care allocation emerge remains open to debate, however, because the existing incentive mechanisms are not optimal.

Biomedical Technology↗
PubMed1996

Physician financial incentives and cesarean section delivery.

The "induced-demand" model states that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care. We test this model using an exogenous change in the financial environment facing obstetrician/gynecologists: declining fertility in the United States. We argue that the 13.5% fall in fertility over the 1970-1982 period led ob/gyns to substitute from normal childbirth toward a more highly reimbursed alternative, cesarean delivery. Using a nationally representative microdata set for this period, we show that there is a strong correlation between within-state declines in fertility and within-state increases in cesarean utilization.

Age Factors↗
PubMed2001

Episodes in action: linking the cost and quality of nonsurgical coronary revascularization.

By dissociating episodes into four types of risk (i.e., risk of occurrence, clinical risk, technical risk, and utility risk) financial incentives can be created that reward good clinical judgement, superior technical quality, and efficient health care delivery. Using a computer-generated simulation of 100,000 episodes of nonsurgical coronary revascularization (i.e., PTCA), global fees were assigned to each patient, and the relation between clinical performance and financial success was explored for 100 hypothetical practices. Good sensitivity and specificity were achieved in assessing clinical performance. Financial incentives were found to favor providers of appropriate, effective, and efficient care.

Angioplasty, Balloon, Coronary↗
PubMed2006

Developing and testing an instrument for identifying performance incentives in the Greek health care sector.

BACKGROUND: In the era of cost containment, managers are constantly pursuing increased organizational performance and productivity by aiming at the obvious target, i.e. the workforce. The health care sector, in which production processes are more complicated compared to other industries, is not an exception. In light of recent legislation in Greece in which efficiency improvement and achievement of specific performance targets are identified as undisputable health system goals, the purpose of this study was to develop a reliable and valid instrument for investigating the attitudes of Greek physicians, nurses and administrative personnel towards job-related aspects, and the extent to which these motivate them to improve performance and increase productivity. METHODS: A methodological exploratory design was employed in three phases: a) content development and assessment, which resulted in a 28-item instrument, b) pilot testing (N = 74) and c) field testing (N = 353). Internal consistency reliability was tested via Cronbach's alpha coefficient and factor analysis was used to identify the underlying constructs. Tests of scaling assumptions, according to the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix, were used to confirm the hypothesized component structure. RESULTS: Four components, referring to intrinsic individual needs and external job-related aspects, were revealed and explain 59.61% of the variability. They were subsequently labeled: job attributes, remuneration, co-workers and achievement. Nine items not meeting item-scale criteria were removed, resulting in a 19-item instrument. Scale reliability ranged from 0.782 to 0.901 and internal item consistency and discriminant validity criteria were satisfied. CONCLUSION: Overall, the instrument appears to be a promising tool for hospital administrations in their attempt to identify job-related factors, which motivate their employees. The psychometric properties were good and warrant administration to a larger sample of employees in the Greek healthcare system.

Adult↗
PubMed2001

The use of monetary incentives in a community survey: impact on response rates, data quality, and cost.

OBJECTIVES: To assess the effect of incentive size on response rates, data quality, and cost in a digestive health status mail survey of a community sample of health plan enrollees. DATA SOURCES/SETTING: The study population was selected from a database of enrollees in various health plans obligated to receive care at Park Nicollet Clinic-HealthSystem Minnesota, a large, multispecialty group in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and the nearby suburbs. STUDY DESIGN: A total of 1,800 HealthSystem Minnesota enrollees were randomly assigned to receive a survey with an incentive of $5 or $2. The response rates for each incentive level were determined. Data quality, as indicated by item nonresponse and scale scores, was measured. Total cost and cost per completed survey were calculated. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The response rate among enrollees receiving $5 (74.3 percent) was significantly higher than among those receiving $2 (67.4 percent); differences were more pronounced in the first wave of data collection. Data quality did not differ between the two incentive groups. The total cost per completed survey was higher in the $5 condition than in the $2 condition. CONCLUSIONS: A $5 incentive resulted in a higher response rate among a community patient sample with one mailing than did a $2 incentive. However, the response rates in the $2 condition approached the level of the $5 incentive, and costs were significantly lower when the full follow-up protocol was completed. Response rates were marginally increased by follow-up phone calls. The incentive level did not influence data quality. The results suggest if a survey budget is limited and a timeline is not critical, a $2 incentive provides an affordable means of increasing participation.

Adult↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Mental health in the Medicare Part D drug benefit: a new regulatory model?

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 represents the most significant expansion of Medicare benefits since the program's inception and has important implications for mental health. Medicare will become a major payer for psychotropic medications through the new prescription drug benefit. The structure of the drug benefit's delivery system creates incentives for plans to underprovide medications, like psychotropic drugs, that are used persistently and are associated with high expected costs. Regulators have put policies in place to counteract these incentives. This paper examines these strategies' likely success and suggests additional approaches to be considered.

Aged↗
PubMed2003

The New Hampshire financing policy.

OBJECTIVE: This study sought to describe the New Hampshire incentive financing policy and report on its results over the first seven years. METHODS: The description of the policy was based on reviewing state documents and interviews with state officials. The data were obtained from state records. RESULTS: On the targeted outcomes of employment and psychiatric hospitalization the statewide improvement was dramatic. The service system concurrently became more efficient. CONCLUSION: The results suggest the incentive financing based on client outcomes may be a potent state strategy for improving service system performance.

Health Policy↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The iron triangle and the chrome pentagon.

Like the arms race, the healthcare system is built on a framework of incentives driven by fear and finance--also like the arms race, it will not admit to piecemeal reform.

Competitive Medical Plans↗
PubMed1997

Contracts and purchaser-provider relationships in community care.

This paper considers the incentives embodied in contracts between purchasers and providers of residential care for frail elderly people. The paper begins with an assessment of current contractual arrangements. A theoretical inquiry generates propositions that some contracts create incentives for providers to misrepresent users' characteristics. These propositions are found to be supported by sample data. The paper then turns to a theoretical consideration of optimal governance structures and, in particular, the use of incentive contracts. These contracts, it is claimed, may go some way to curbing cost-exaggerating behaviour without providing strong incentives to cream-skim or shirk on quality.

Aged↗
PubMed2000

Effects of a monetary incentive on primary care prescribing in Ireland: changes in prescribing patterns in one health board 1990-1995.

BACKGROUND: In an attempt to curb the rapidly rising costs of primary care prescribing in Ireland, the government introduced a financial incentive scheme in 1993, to encourage general practitioners to restrain their prescribing. PURPOSE: To investigate the effects of a financial incentive scheme on GP prescribing in Ireland on prescribing costs and volume, and on some specific therapeutic areas. METHODS: Prescribing for 3 years before (1990-1992) and 3 years (1993-1995) after the introduction of incentives, based on a defined cohort of 233 general practitioners in the area of one health board. GPs were divided into tertiles based on their performance against their prescribing budgets into 'savers' (generally underspent and received incentive payments), modest overspenders and large overspenders. RESULTS: Savers were always lower cost prescribers than the other groups. They contained their rate and costs of prescribing in contrast to the other groups, e.g. percentage rise in prescribing costs in the year after the introduction of the scheme -7.9%, +1.2% and +7.3% respectively, (P < 0.05) for savers, modest overspenders and large overspenders respectively. This effect was short lived however and was gone by the third year of the study. CONCLUSIONS: The financial incentives had a marked effect on prescribing volume and cost on some practices who could achieve targets and hence incentive payments. The incentives had little effect on high spending practices. Such incentive schemes need careful evaluation if they are not to become perverse to the good health of patients.

Drug Utilization↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Managing psychotropic drug costs: will formularies work?

Payers of pharmaceutical benefits are increasingly turning to drug formularies in an attempt to control rising pharmacy costs, including those for psychotropic drugs. In this paper I examine several issues that policymakers should consider when addressing formulary design for psychotropic drugs: heterogeneity within mental health disorders and limited information about treatment effectiveness for individual patients; the potential for plans to try to use formularies to avoid adverse selection and implications for psychotropic coverage; the interaction of Medicaid formulary policy and manufacturers' incentives for psychotropic innovation; and incentives created by mental health institutions that decrease formularies' potential effectiveness in controlling psychotropic drug costs.

Cost Control↗
PubMed2001

Capitation and primary care in Canada: financial incentives and the evolution of health service organizations.

Alternative approaches to the funding, organization, and delivery of primary care have been the subject of ongoing discussion and debate in many industrialized nations for many years. One common recommendation has been to use capitation, as opposed to fee-for-service, as the payment method for physicians. In this study the authors use data from interviews with physicians and Ministry of Health officials to trace the evolution of Ontario's Health Service Organization (HSO) program, the only program of capitation-funded physician care in Canada. The program has developed in three phases: formation in the early 1970s, expansion in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, and restructuring in the 1990s. The analysis focuses on the perceptions and actions of policymakers and physicians who became involved with the program at different points in its evolution, and identifies how they perceived and responded to the financial incentives that were introduced to promote the program. This case study allows an examination of the shifting objectives, communications, perceptions, and responses of policymakers and stakeholders in changing contexts over a period of more than 20 years. The long history of the HSO program provides the opportunity to examine the factors that can cause financial incentives to go awry. The authors suggest how this case study offers lessons for financial incentive policymaking.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗