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PubMedDate not supplied

Choice of health insurance by families of the mentally ill.

This paper investigates whether choice of health insurance is influenced by the perceived mental and physical health of family members among a sample of policy-holders with private health insurance. A multinomial probit model of the choice among major medical coverage only, traditional full coverage, and coverage through a health maintenance organization is estimated. Results indicate that the presence of at least one family member who rates his or her general health as poor does not affect the policy-holder's choice of health insurance. However, the presence of at least one family member considered at risk of mental illness does in some instances affect the policy-holder's choice of health insurance: We observe significant effects for policy-holders who are female, black, have some college education, work for a large firm, and live in an urban area. These findings suggest that adverse selection may arise when individuals are able to choose between health insurance policies with different degrees of coverage for mental health care and that such effects are far more pronounced for those people who consider themselves at risk for mental illness than physical illness.

Black or African American↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Health care policy evaluation using longitudinal insurance claims data: an application of the panel Tobit estimator.

The British Columbia Ministry of Health provides enhanced prescription drug insurance coverage to residents aged 65 and older. This exogenous change in the effective price of prescription drugs is used to investigate aspects of the drug use by seniors. Three sets of issues are of interest. First, what is the effect of enhanced insurance coverage on drug use and programme costs once drugs are provided free of charge? Second, is this effect permanent, or transitory? Third, are any increases in use observed concentrated among those with lower incomes? Longitudinal administrative claims payment data on 18,000 seniors over the period 1985-92 are used. All individuals in the sample turned 65 at some point and therefore became eligible for subsidized prescription drugs. Health status information is not collected; instead, health status is treated as an individual-specific fixed endowment, subject to a common rate of decay. Estimation is complicated by censoring of real drug expenditures for those under 65, rendering 'first differencing' methods invalid. A semi-parametric fixed effects Tobit estimator is used instead. For most individuals, the extension of insurance does not permanently increase drug use. Males with lower income were the exception. Little evidence of transitory effects to insurance coverage was found. Finally, the extension of insurance has made only a minor contribution to growth in seniors' drug use, relative to secular growth in drug use over time.

Age Factors↗
PubMed1998

Risk adjustment and the trade-off between efficiency and risk selection: an application of the theory of fair compensation.

We exploit the similarity between the problem of risk adjustment with prospective reimbursement schemes in the health care sector and the problem of fair compensation analysed in the social choice literature. The starting point is the distinction between two sets of variables in the explanation of medical expenditures: those for which the insurers (or the providers) can be held responsible, and those for which they have to be compensated. Using this partitioning the objectives of cost-efficiency and no risk selection can be expressed in terms of two simple axioms. If the medical expenditure function is additively separable in the two sets of variables, there exists a natural division rule which is analogous to the standard linear risk adjustment schemes. We show how this rule should be applied if the total level of actual medical expenditures is different from the budget to be divided over the insurers (or providers) and how information from the disturbances in the regression equation can be used in an optimal way. We discuss the analogy with mixed reimbursement systems. If the medical expenditure function is not additively separable in the two sets of variables, the conflict between efficiency and risk selection is unavoidable, even if one has perfect information about that function. The theoretical results are illustrated with empirical results derived from the Belgian setting where the move towards prospective reimbursement of the mutualities has necessitated the introduction of a risk adjustment formula.

Belgium↗
PubMed1998

The role of government in health insurance markets with adverse selection.

This paper analyzes the welfare economics of three arrangements for purchasing health insurance: competitive markets in which consumers are free to choose among options with different levels of coverage and prices; systems with compulsory partial pooling which permit private firms to sell supplementary coverage; and government-run pools that purchase comprehensive coverage at a single price for all consumers. Competitive insurance markets are assumed to face the problem of 'adverse selection'. This refers to a situation in which the insurer cannot observe characteristics of individuals that affect the cost of insurance and that are known to the individuals. Competitive markets with adverse selection are not efficient because low risks cannot purchase comprehensive insurance coverage. However, government-run pools with comprehensive coverage are an inefficient solution to the problem of adverse selection. Compulsory partial coverage may represent an attractive alternative to both competitive markets and comprehensive pools. We discover two situations when government intervention of this type will succeed: when there are not many high risks in the population, and when the risk types are similar. We discuss the implications of these results for health insurance programs in several countries. Our results also have implications for the allocation of public funds for disease-prevention projects. A project targeted at high risks will produce external benefits for low risks, even though they are not directly affected by the program. However, a successful project might eliminate the market for private insurance; in this case the government should consider mandating partial insurance coverage.

Canada↗
PubMed1999

Community rating and choice between traditional health insurance and managed care.

This paper analyses the consequences of allowing a choice between traditional insurance and managed care under community rating. A model of a competitive health insurance market is developed; with the risk equalization scheme being imperfect. There are two types of individuals who are characterized by different costs with respect to traditional insurance. Compared with a situation where traditional insurance is compulsory, allowing choice can make both types better off, can increase the utility of low-cost types at the expense of high-cost types, as well as having no effect. Inefficiencies under compulsory traditional insurance can be eliminated and new inefficiencies can be created. Market equilibria are not necessarily second best.

Choice Behavior↗
PubMed1999

Duplicate coverage and demand for health care. The case of Catalonia.

An individual has duplicate coverage when he enjoys a compulsory medical public insurance, and in addition he has purchased a private one. This paper studies the implications of duplicate coverage on both demand for visits to specialists and on the selection process of the private insurance market. Econometric models, estimated by the generalized method of moments, accommodate both the endogeneity of insurance choice decision and the non-negativity of the variable number of visits. The choice of instrumental variables is motivated within a theoretical model of demand for health care. The results shows that endogeneity is important for the subsample of heads of household, but not for the subsample of non-heads of household. For the subsample of non-heads of household, a positive effect of duplicate coverage on the number of visits to specialists is found. Health related variables, education and income are also important. Results are consistent with the idea that heads of household that buy private insurance are the ones with poor unobservable health conditions. It is argued that this last result is related to the existence of a compulsory public insurance.

Health Services Needs and Demand↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Managing risk selection incentives in health sector reforms.

The object of the paper is to review theoretical and empirical contributions to the optimal management of risk selection incentives ('cream skimming') in health sector reforms. The trade-off between efficiency and risk selection is fostered in health sector reforms by the introduction of competitive mechanisms such as price competition or prospective payment systems. The effects of two main forms of competition in health sector reforms are observed when health insurance is mandatory: competition in the market for health insurance, and in the market for health services. Market and government failures contribute to the assessment of the different forms of risk selection employed by insurers and providers, as the effects of selection incentives on efficiency and their proposed remedies to reduce the impact of these perverse incentives. Two European (Netherlands and Spain) and two Latin American (Chile and Colombia) case studies of health sector reforms are examined in order to observe selection incentives, their effects on efficiency and costs in the health system, and regulation policies implemented in each country to mitigate incentives to 'cream skim' good risks.

Economic Competition↗
PubMed2003

Life insurance and breast cancer risk assessment: adverse selection, genetic testing decisions, and discrimination.

Life insurance industry access to genetic information is controversial. Consumer groups argue that access will increase discrimination in life insurance premiums and discourage individuals from undergoing genetic testing that may provide health benefits. Conversely, life insurers argue that without access to risk information available to individuals, they face substantial financial risk from adverse selection. Given this controversy, we conducted a retrospective cohort study to evaluate the impact of breast cancer risk information on life insurance purchasing, the impact of concerns about life insurance discrimination on use of BRCA1/2 testing, and the incidence of life insurance discrimination following participation in breast cancer risk assessment and BRCA1/2 testing. Study participants were 636 women who participated in genetic counseling and/or genetic testing at a University based clinic offering breast cancer risk assessment, genetic counseling, and BRCA1/2 testing between January 1995 and May 2000. Twenty-seven women (4%) had increased and six (1%) had decreased their life insurance since participation in breast cancer risk assessment. The decision to increase life insurance coverage was associated with predicted breast cancer risk (adjusted OR 1.03 for each 1% absolute increase in risk, 95% CI 1.01-1.10) and being found to carry a mutation in BRCA1/2 (OR 5.10, 95% CI 1.90-13.66). Concern about life insurance discrimination was inversely associated with the decision to undergo BRCA1/2 testing (RR 0.67, 95% CI 0.52-0.85). No respondent reported having life insurance denied or canceled. In this cohort of women, these results indicate that information about increased breast cancer risk is associated with increase in life insurance purchasing, raising the possibility of adverse selection. Although fear of insurance discrimination is associated with the decision not to undergo BRCA1/2 testing, there was no evidence of actual insurance discrimination from BRCA1/2 testing.

Breast Neoplasms↗
PubMed1993

Capitation payments based on prior hospitalizations.

In many countries the concept of capitating health care insurers is receiving increasing attention. In a competitive environment, capitation should induce insurers to concentrate more on cost containment instead of indulging in risk selection. The necessary premium-replacing capitation payments should account for predictable variations in annual per-person health care expenditures as far as these are related to health status. Various studies have shown that crude capitation models based on e.g. age, sex and place of residence, do not reflect expected costs accurately. This implies inefficient pricing possibly leading to risk selection and windfall profits or losses for insurers, thereby undermining the objectives of a capitation system. Using Dutch micro data on some 200,000 individuals, this article stimulates various alternative capitation models based on, among others, diagnostic information from previous hospitalizations. Results suggest that the problems of both risk selection and windfall profits/losses may be mitigated substantially by using this type of information together with data on prior costs. These results are not only relevant for situations where competing insurers are capitated, as intended in the Netherlands, but also when providers are capitated, as in the UK, or when HMOs are capitated, as in the US.

Capitation Fee↗
PubMed2001

The effect of health on acute care supplemental insurance ownership: an empirical analysis.

The empirical effect of health status on private insurance ownership is a mixture of the effect of health on the demand for insurance (subjected to adverse selection) and its effect on the insurer's underwriting practice (subjected to risk-selection). Using bivariate partial observability probit models, this paper provides an empirical identification of health effects on the probability of application and on the probability of rejection in the Israeli market for acute care supplemental health insurance. The analysis shows that while the reduced-form health effect on ownership is negligible, the structural effects are sizeable and indicate that sicker individuals are more likely to apply, but are also more likely to be rejected. The policy implications of the above findings are discussed in the context of the Israeli health system.

Acute Disease↗
PubMed2003

Determinants of health care utilization by German sickness fund members--with application to risk adjustment.

In many countries, social health insurance systems are being reformed in favor of more competition among insurers, while premiums are community rated by regulation. The implicit incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection can only be curtailed using appropriate systems of risk-adjusted equalization payments among insurers. To develop these systems, predictors of individual utilization patterns have to be identified, e.g. via regression analysis using previous utilization data. In some countries such as Germany, such data are hardly ever available. In the early nineties, a number of sickness funds participated in an experiment in which individual utilization data were collected. Our data set covers more than 70,000 members of company sickness funds over a 5-year period. We analyze socio-demographic determinants of utilization which could be used as risk adjusters in a risk equalization scheme. Our results suggest that besides age and sex, the set of risk adjusters should include income, family status and a dummy for the last year of life.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1995

Health insurance access to young adult survivors of childhood cancer in North Carolina.

Historically, there has been evidence to support the hypothesis that survivors of childhood cancer have been discriminated against in the private health insurance market in some areas of the United States. Results of previous studies have been inconsistent and have generally focused on a limited number of outcome variables. A retrospective cohort study of young adult survivors of childhood cancer and their siblings was performed to determine the risk of health insurance access problems of childhood cancer survivors in North Carolina. Mailed questionnaires were completed by 182 cancer survivors from three institutions who were diagnosed between 1976 and 1988, and by 101 of their siblings for a response of 62.1%. Using logistic regression in SAS, cancer survivors were found to be more likely to be denied health insurance than their siblings, with an adjusted odds ratio of 15.1. Childhood cancer survivors also had health insurance policies that excluded care for pre-existing medical conditions more often than their siblings (OR = 5.5). In addition, cancer survivors reported problems obtaining health insurance coverage more frequently than their siblings with an adjusted odds ratio of 22.8. In general, survivors of childhood cancer who were diagnosed in North Carolina have had decreased access to health insurance coverage when compared to their siblings of similar age. North Carolina health insurance regulations permit health insurance firms to discriminate against cancer survivors because of their history of illness, often decreasing their access to needed follow-up care.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Insurance companies' access to genetic information: why regulation alone is not enough.

The background of this paper is the ongoing dismantling of the social insurance systems in favour of commercialisation and privatisation of insurances needed for illness, old age and premature death. This combined with the increased possibility of using genetic testing for differentiating personal insurance premiums has the potentiality of creating a 'genetic proletariat'--an uninsurable high-risk population. The common way of handling this problem in Sweden, and many other developed countries around the North Atlantic, has been to regulate insurance companies' right to ask for and use genetic information in various ways. There is a distinction between partial regulation (that allows insurance companies access to genetic information from genetic tests already made, sometimes only above a specified amount, but not to demand new tests) and total regulation (that forbids insurance companies to ask for or use any genetic information). I will argue that these forms of regulation probably will have adverse consequences given the dismantling of collective social insurance systems. If this is convincing, a better way to solve the problem of an uninsurable high-risk population (and other problems) is to resurrect the collective, obligatory insurance systems in which the individual risk profile does not constitute a basis for premium determination. Both arguments cast in terms of consequences and justice render support for this conclusion.

Genetic Predisposition to Disease↗