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Results for “Pandemic Preparedness”

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PubMed2006

Geographic representativeness for sentinel influenza surveillance: implications for routine surveillance and pandemic preparedness.

OBJECTIVE: To review the guidelines for geographic representativeness applied to sentinel influenza surveillance as proposed in the Framework for an Australian Influenza Pandemic Plan (1999). METHODS: The number of sentinel practices, participating general practitioners and their consultation rates per 100,000 population, by region, were described for the Victorian sentinel surveillance system for 2003 and 2004. Influenza-like illness rates per 1,000 consultations were calculated for all participating practices and for a subset of regular participators. Indicators of seasonal influenza activity, set according to predefined thresholds, were compared in the two groups. RESULTS: During these two influenza seasons, a subset of approximately one-quarter (27%) of participating practices provided almost half (45%) of the patient swabs and detected the same level of influenza activity over two influenza seasons as all participating practices. However, this subset of GPs recorded only 0.3% of all GP consultations in Victoria in 2004. CONCLUSIONS: There should be an updated, evidence-based strategy for interpandemic influenza based on the number of general practice consultations. Requirements for surveillance during various pandemic phases also need to be reviewed.

Disaster Planning↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Commonwealth pandemic preparedness plans.

This paper describes the work being done by the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing to prepare for a possible influenza pandemic. It provides an overview of Australian Government initiatives and explains both the purpose and the content of the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza. It summarises efforts to improve regional detection and response capabilities and it explains the role of simulation exercises in Australian pandemic planning.

Animals↗

PubMed2002

Pandemic preparedness: lessons learnt from H2N2 and H9N2 candidate vaccines.

Vaccination against influenza is considered to be one of the key interventions in case of a pandemic. Unfortunately, shortages in vaccine supplies will occur because of the substantial increase in vaccine demands worldwide and the limited available supply resources. The recommended use of monovalent--instead of current trivalent--vaccines containing 15 micro g hemagglutinin (HA) per dose can theoretically triple vaccine volumes but is unlikely to meet the demand. Furthermore, previous experiences demonstrated that one dose of 15 micro g HA will not be sufficient to elicit protective antibody levels in unprimed individuals. Modified formulation approaches were investigated, that would be suitable to provide significantly higher volumes of potent vaccine within a given period of time. Low doses of HA combined with aluminum (Al) adjuvants and the use of whole virus instead of split or subunit antigens can lead to substantial increases in process yield. In addition, production of whole virus vaccines will reduce manufacturing complexity. In a dose-finding study in healthy adults and elderly, immune responses after administration of Al-adjuvanted low-dose formulations were compared to a standard split virus vaccine (Fluarix, GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium). All vaccines were safe and well tolerated. Antigen concentrations as low as 1.9 micro g HA/strain per dose of adjuvant-containing experimental vaccines induced protective antibody levels in primed populations. Reactogenicity profiles of Al-adjuvanted low-dose vaccines were investigated in a feasibility trial. Neither the use of Al-adjuvant nor of whole virus had a significant effect on general reactions. Studies in unprimed populations with H2N2 and H9N2 candidate vaccines showed different results, with a potential need for a two-dose schedule. Indeed, hemagglutination inhibition titers did not reach protective levels after a single vaccine dose but could be met following administration of a second dose. The same is true for Al-adjuvanted whole virus formulations with an up to eightfold-reduced antigen content. It may be concluded that the use of Al-adjuvanted whole virus vaccines with low HA content can raise protective antibody levels after two vaccine doses, which may, in turn, result in significant increases of vaccine supplies in the case of a pandemic.

Adjuvants, Immunologic↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Taking care of the sick and scared: a local response in pandemic preparedness.

Virtually all health care operations, including public health, are undertaken only at a local or regional level. Large-scale infectious disease emergencies, such as SARS or pandemic influenza, will be recognized and managed at a local level. The creation of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) was an important step in strengthening public health capacity. However, we need adequate operational capacity in local public health departments to have a strong public health system. Local public health takes an integral role in the preparation for and management of infectious disease emergencies. Local public health departments and regional public health infrastructures must be positioned to both maintain core functions and to lead and support health sector response to emergencies. The local establishment of a flexible and sustainable emergency management system must address the need to: integrate health care and first responders; provide all-hazards tools for managing a crisis at the frontline; rank service priorities and provide surge resources; and provide accurate information on a timely basis. Only the leaders within the local or regional health care facilities and organizations can develop workable plans to deliver health care. PHAC must ensure and support the local public health infrastructure and local emergency preparedness. Without this support, there will be consequences for local response to major public health emergencies.

Canada↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Ensuring a broad and inclusive approach: a provincial perspective on pandemic preparedness.

The SARS crisis revealed critical gaps in Ontario's health emergency response capacity, and identified, in the starkest terms possible, the need for improved emergency response planning. This article reviews the development of the Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic (OHPIP), released in June 2005. Some key points arising from the provincial planning process include the necessity to: ensure a broad and inclusive development process; ensure the pandemic plan identifies: 1) clear roles and responsibilities of federal, provincial/territorial and municipal levels of government, 2) the approach to occupational health and safety issues and ethical decision-making, 3) a communications strategy linking all affected sectors and levels of government and health sector; 4) any commitments to antiviral stockpiling, vaccine and antiviral allocation and use, and an approach for drug delivery from provincial stockpiles to local public health units; 5) health human resource management and supplementation; and 6) key programs/services to be scaled back to maximize surge capacity; address best practices (e.g., involve all sectors of the health care system at the outset, acquire strategic expertise, coordinate/advocate with broader emergency response system, etc); and, outline future stages that include strengthening the delivery of clinical care to influenza cases; clarifying the role of primary care practitioners during a pandemic; leveraging Ontario's significant e-Health investments.

Disaster Planning↗

PubMed2006