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PubMed2002

Paying research subjects: an analysis of current policies.

BACKGROUND: Few data are available on guidelines used by research organizations to make decisions about paying subjects. OBJECTIVE: To analyze existing guidance regarding payment of research subjects and to identify common characteristics and areas for further research. DESIGN: Descriptive content analysis of policies. MEASUREMENTS: Written policies and rules of thumb about paying subjects from 32 U.S. research organizations. RESULTS: Of 32 organizations, 37.5% had written guidelines about paying subjects; all but 1 reported having rules of thumb. Few (18.8%) were able to provide a confident estimate of the proportion of studies that pay subjects. Organizations reported that investigators and institutional review boards make payment decisions and that both healthy and ill subjects in some studies are paid for their time (87%), for inconvenience (84%), for travel (68%), as incentive (58%), or for incurring risk (32%). Most organizations require that payment be prorated (84%) and described in the consent document (94%). CONCLUSIONS: Most organizations pay some research subjects, but few have written policies on payment. Because investigators and institutional review boards make payment decisions with little specific guidance, standards vary.

Advertising↗

PubMed1987

Provider-patient relations and treatment choice in the era of fiscal incentives: the case of the end-stage renal disease program.

Debates about the extent to which patients can and should participate in medical decision making take on new urgency as cost-containment efforts give patients more financial incentives. The Health Care Financing Administration's recent proposal to enable dialysis patients to "price shop" aroused consternation among nephrologists. A working seminar elucidated their fears about professional incomes and about increased patient autonomy.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

PubMed1996

Managing care, incentives, and information: an exploratory look inside the "black box" of hospital efficiency.

OBJECTIVE: We sought to estimate the impact of individual dimensions of hospitals' managed care strategies on the cost per hospital discharge. STUDY SETTING/DATA SOURCES: Thirty-seven member hospitals of seven health systems in the Pacific, Rocky Mountain, and Southwest regions of the United States were studied. STUDY DESIGN: Separate cross-sectional regression analyses of 21,135 inpatient discharges were performed in 1991 and 23,262 discharges in 1992. The multivariate model was estimated with hospital cost per discharge as the dependent variable. Model robustness was checked by comparing regression results at the individual discharge level with those at the level of the hospital/clinical condition pair. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Information on hospitals' managed care strategies was provided by mail and phone survey of key informants in 1991 and 1992. Other hospital characteristics were collected from AHA Annual Survey data, and discharge data from hospital abstracting systems. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The pooled discharge analysis indicated three dimensions of hospital managed care strategy that consistently related to lower costs per hospital discharge: the proportion of hospital revenues derived from per case or capitation payment, the hospital's mechanisms for sharing information on resource consumption with clinicians, and the use of formalized, systematic care coordination mechanisms. CONCLUSIONS: Three strategies appear to hold promise for enhancing the efficiency of inpatient resource use: (1) "fixed price" hospital payment incentives, (2) hospital approaches to sharing resource use information with clinicians, and (3) the application of formal care management mechanisms for specific clinical conditions.

Aged↗

PubMed2002

Organization and financing of British primary care groups and trusts: observations through the prism of US managed care.

There are many parallels between the UK's new primary care commissioning organizations and the managed care organizations and integrated delivery systems that have evolved in the USA over the last three decades. Those building primary care groups and trusts (PCG/Ts) can learn from the American experience with health maintenance organizations and other similar entities. These lessons should also be relevant to those in other countries interested in establishing innovative primary care led organizations within the broader structure of a socialized health care system. Following an overview of US managed care and an update of the progress of the UK's PCG/Ts, we go on to suggest how new consortia of PCG/Ts might be developed and how budgets and provider incentives could be structured. This international comparison suggests that the resources needed to support the development of effective PCG/Ts will be considerable, as will the need to maintain organizational flexibility. If primary care organizations are to thrive, it will be essential to develop truly integrated budgets for primary and secondary care.

Budgets↗

PubMed2001

The incentive effects of the Medicare indirect medical education policy.

Medicare provided teaching hospitals with US$ 5.9 billion in supplemental graduate medical education (GME) payments in 1998. These payments distort input and output prices and provide teaching hospitals with incentives to hire residents, close beds, and admit more Medicare patients. The structure of the GME payment policy creates substantial variation in input and output prices between teaching hospitals. We examine the extent to which hospitals responded to these financial incentives using a panel data set of 3,900 hospitals, including over 900 teaching hospitals. We find that teaching hospitals did hire residents and close beds in response to the Medicare policy, but did not increase Medicare admissions or alter their use of registered nurses (RNs).

Aged↗

PubMed2005

Clinical practice guidelines and quality of care for older patients with multiple comorbid diseases: implications for pay for performance.

CONTEXT: Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) have been developed to improve the quality of health care for many chronic conditions. Pay-for-performance initiatives assess physician adherence to interventions that may reflect CPG recommendations. OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the applicability of CPGs to the care of older individuals with several comorbid diseases. DATA SOURCES: The National Health Interview Survey and a nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries (to identify the most prevalent chronic diseases in this population); the National Guideline Clearinghouse (for locating evidence-based CPGs for each chronic disease). STUDY SELECTION: Of the 15 most common chronic diseases, we selected hypertension, chronic heart failure, stable angina, atrial fibrillation, hypercholesterolemia, diabetes mellitus, osteoarthritis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and osteoporosis, which are usually managed in primary care, choosing CPGs promulgated by national and international medical organizations for each. DATA EXTRACTION: Two investigators independently assessed whether each CPG addressed older patients with multiple comorbid diseases, goals of treatment, interactions between recommendations, burden to patients and caregivers, patient preferences, life expectancy, and quality of life. Differences were resolved by consensus. For a hypothetical 79-year-old woman with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, type 2 diabetes, osteoporosis, hypertension, and osteoarthritis, we aggregated the recommendations from the relevant CPGs. DATA SYNTHESIS: Most CPGs did not modify or discuss the applicability of their recommendations for older patients with multiple comorbidities. Most also did not comment on burden, short- and long-term goals, and the quality of the underlying scientific evidence, nor give guidance for incorporating patient preferences into treatment plans. If the relevant CPGs were followed, the hypothetical patient would be prescribed 12 medications (costing her 406 dollars per month) and a complicated nonpharmacological regimen. Adverse interactions between drugs and diseases could result. CONCLUSIONS: This review suggests that adhering to current CPGs in caring for an older person with several comorbidities may have undesirable effects. Basing standards for quality of care and pay for performance on existing CPGs could lead to inappropriate judgment of the care provided to older individuals with complex comorbidities and could create perverse incentives that emphasize the wrong aspects of care for this population and diminish the quality of their care. Developing measures of the quality of the care needed by older patients with complex comorbidities is critical to improving their care.

Aged↗

PubMedDate not supplied

The NHS internal market: economic aspects of its medium-term development.

With the re-election of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in April 1992, it is now likely that the major reforms of its National Health Service as outlined in the 1989 White Paper--Working for Patients--and embodied in the 1990 National Health Service and Community Care Act will be implemented to completion. This article examines the reforms as a re-structuring of incentives facing agencies within the internal market for health care, and forecasts how agency behaviour is likely to change as a result of such re-structuring. Medium-term implications of the reforms for hospitals, general practitioners and patients are derived. A number of problems in the continued development of the internal market are anticipated.

Contract Services↗

PubMed1999

Financial incentives influencing the integration of mental health care and primary care.

Psychiatric problems are common in general medical practice and strongly influence utilization of medical care. Although several studies have demonstrated the positive clinical and financial impact of psychiatric interventions for medical patients, historic and economic forces have tended to maintain the separation of the primary health and mental health components of care. The author discusses the financial incentives that influence the success or failure of initiatives to integrate mental health care and primary care. Most models for financing care that use fee-for-service, carve-out, or capitated arrangements have done little to encourage collaborative treatment planning and coordination of care or have created conditions that work against such integration. True financial incentives for integration of psychiatric and primary health care are provided only by a shared-risk model of capitation-a model that has long existed in staff-model health maintenance organizations. This model increases motivation to lower overall utilization of care, improve patients' overall health status, and search for more effective models of care.

Capitation Fee↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Independent practice association physician groups in California.

We surveyed independent practice association (IPA) physician groups in California about their approaches to staffing, physician payment, and governance. Most IPAs desired more primary care physicians but not more specialists. Capitation was the major mode of remuneration for primary care physicians in 77 percent of IPAs, and for specialists in 30 percent of IPAs. Most IPAs also used financial incentives related to use of referral or ancillary services. Boards of directors were dominated by physicians, but governance tended to be centralized rather than highly democratic. We found that IPAs mirror many of the broader trends in physician staffing and physician payment that exist in managed care organizations.

California↗

PubMed1986

Hospital cost and efficiency under per service and per case payment in Maryland: a tale of the carrot and the stick.

The simultaneous operation of per case and per service payment systems in Maryland, and the varying levels of stringency used in setting per case rates, allows a comparison of the effects of differing incentive structures on hospital costs. This paper presents such a comparison with 1977-1981 data. Regressions performed on cost-per-case and total cost data indicate that costs were lower only when per case payment limits were very stringent. Positive net revenue incentives appeared to be insufficient to induce a reduction in length of stay or ancillary services use. These changes in medical practice patterns thus appear more likely under the threat of financial losses--that is, under the threat of the stick rather than the inducement of the carrot.

Ancillary Services, Hospital↗

PubMed2006

On the front lines of care: primary care doctors' office systems, experiences, and views in seven countries.

This 2006 survey of primary care physicians in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States reveals striking differences in elements of practice systems that underpin quality and efficiency. Wide gaps exist between leading and lagging countries in clinical information systems and payment incentives. U.S. physicians are among the least likely to have extensive clinical information systems or incentives targeted on quality and the most likely to report that their patients have difficulty paying for care. Disease management capacity varies widely. Overall, findings highlight the importance of nationwide policies: Policy changes in the United States could lead to improved performance.

Ambulatory Care Information Systems↗

PubMed1990

Giving physicians incentives to contain costs under Medicaid.

In this article, the risk arrangements in Medicaid programs that put physicians at risk are summarized. These programs--partial capitation and health insuring organizations--pay physicians a capitation amount to cover some or all physician services. Physicians also receive part of the savings from reduced hospitalization. Most of these programs have successfully lowered Medicaid costs. They could serve as models for other Medicaid programs, State-level programs to cover people ineligible for Medicaid, and programs abroad, such as in the United Kingdom.

Capitation Fee↗

PubMed2001

Understanding managed care: practice implications for NPs.

Highly effective nurse practitioners in managed care settings may understand the basic concept of managed care without appreciating how the context of managed care impacts their practice. This article discusses the concept of managed care within the context of 4 managed care strategies. In developing this paper, our goals were first, to describe contracts, incentives, management, and medical necessity as managed care strategies and second, to discuss some of the ways these strategies can significantly impact nurse practitioner practice. Illustrative practice examples are used to suggest that those nurse practitioners who understand managed care, both as a theoretical concept and as a context for practice, may find that they are better able to develop innovative ways to meet the needs of their patients.

Humans↗

PubMed1984

The incentive plan: an approach for modification of physician behavior.

Blue Shield of Massachusetts undertook a one-year study in 1981 to determine if a group of obstetrician/gynecologists could be motivated to reduce average length of stay (ALOS) for normal deliveries, cesarean sections, and hysterectomies. The group decreased ALOS for all three procedures. Additional studies are required to determine what portion of the decrease in ALOS can be attributed to change in physician behavior.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurance Plans↗

PubMed2002

The use of expensive health technologies in the era of managed care: the remarkable case of neonatal intensive care.

UNLABELLED: The use of neonatal intensive care (NIC) continued to rise rapidly in the 1990s despite the concerns of observers about its cost effectiveness and its successes being mostly in facilities with high volume and capabilities. The objective of this study is to test the effects of insurance type, competition among hospitals, and market pressure from managed care plans on the supply and cost of NIC. The analysis uses logistic and linear models with techniques to avoid bias from (a) market area definitions based on actual patient flows and (b) self-selection of hospitals by patients with unmeasured risk of needing NIC. The data source contains all births in short-term hospitals in New Jersey during 1990 and 1994. Both the number of days and charges for NIC are reported. Key findings are that the decision of a hospital to offer NIC was associated with teaching status, the proportion of infants in the market area with documented high risk, and the market concentration of major competitors. The market share of managed care plans and the concentration of enrollment were not associated with either NIC being offered or with the standardized charges. Whether a particular patient was given to a NIC depended on patient risk factors and whether a NIC unit was present, but not on payer group. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that young insured parents (with the advice of their obstetricians) prefer hospitals with NIC and also are relatively profitable enrollees for health plans. IN CONCLUSION: using the results here and in other research, public and private policy makers may consider several ways to strengthen the incentives for health plans to contract for cost-effective birth-related services. The results also raise questions for a number of regulatory and payment policies and call for better public data on costs and outcomes for NIC.

Cost-Benefit Analysis↗

PubMed1987

Competitive health plans and alternative payment arrangements for physicians in the United States: public sector examples.

The Medicaid program in the United States is moving to a competitive managed care system whereby patients no longer have freedom of choice of physicians and physicians are given incentives to provide care cost effectively. The wide variety of competitive managed care programs represents attempts to introduce rationality into the relationship between consumers and providers in a community. Early evidence, based largely on preliminary data analysis indicates that competing plans which place physicians at some financial risk and also employ administrative mechanisms, are more likely to show cost savings than health plans that do not employ these methods.

Cost Control↗

PubMed2001

Screening and preventable illness.

If an agent does not discount the future at a constant rate, as in some forms of myopia, her optimal strategy is unattainable without some commitment device. We apply this familiar idea to a model of screening and disease prevention, and explore how financial incentives can correct suboptimal health choices. In general, myopia need not imply under-screening. While the optimal intervention for prevention effort is a state-invariant subsidy, the optimal intervention for screening may involve a tax or a subsidy. When screening and prevention are coincident, a simple and practical subsidy equal to one minus the discount factor to both screening and intervention is indicated.

Cost of Illness↗

PubMed2002

Substitution in a Medicaid mental health carve-out: services and costs.

The objective is to empirically test the incentives associated with a Medicaid capitated mental health carve-out contract, whether outpatient services (less expensive, inside the contract) and residential treatment center care (costly care, outside of the contract) were substituted for inpatient psychiatric hospitalization used by children and adolescents. Data sources include Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) claims for the non-capitated comparison sites and for residential treatment center use, and "shadow billing" encounter data for the experimental capitated managed care sites that provided public mental health services for children and adolescents with Medicaid insurance statewide in Colorado from September 1994 to June 1997. Two part least squares regression models are used to decompose services. Managed care sites are compared to sites that remained under FFS financing, before and in two post-periods after the carve-out. Principal findings show that children and adolescents who received mental health services from a capitated managed care provider were significantly less likely to receive inpatient care, and significantly more likely to receive residential treatment center care. In addition, insurance contract design contains financial incentives that affect the amount and mix of clinical care provided to clients by risk-bearing provider agencies. Findings provide evidence of cost substitution from inpatient care both inside the specialty system and outside the carve-out to other child-serving systems.

Adolescent↗