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The effect of a monetary incentive on return of a postal health and development questionnaire: a randomised trial [ISRCTN53994660].

BACKGROUND: Postal questionnaires are widely used to collect data in healthcare research but a poor response rate may reduce the validity and reliability of results. There was a lack of evidence available relating to use of a monetary incentive to improve the response rate in the healthcare setting. METHODS: The MRC ORACLE Children Study is assessing the health and development of nearly 9000 seven year old children whose mothers' joined the MRC ORACLE Trial. We carried out a randomised controlled trial of inclusion of monetary incentive (five pound voucher redeemable at many high street stores) with the reminder questionnaire to parents. This trial took place between April 2002 and November 2003. When the parents were sent the reminder questionnaire about their child's health and development they were randomly assigned by concealed computer-generated allocation stratified by week of birthday to receive a five pound voucher or no incentive. The population were 722 non-responders to the initial mailing of a 12-page questionnaire. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Difference in response rate between the two groups. RESULTS: Inclusion of the voucher with the reminder questionnaire resulted in a 11.7%(95% CI 4.7% to 18.6%) improvement in the response rate between the two groups. CONCLUSION: This improvement in response rate and hence the validity and reliability of results obtained appears to be justified ethically and financially.

Adult↗

Employer investments in employee health implications for the family as health producer.

The model presented in this paper further extends the demand-for-health model in which the family is the producer of health investments, to consider the case in which an employer has incentives for investing in the health of a family member. The household and the employer are assumed to interact strategically in the production of health. The general insight provided is that the conditions which determine the nature of the relationship between the employer and the employee, for instance market conditions, production technologies, taxes, and government regulation, will also affect the allocation of health investments and health capital within the family.

Efficiency, Organizational↗

The effects of copayments and generic substitution on the use and costs of prescription drugs.

Rising costs of prescription drugs are a concern to both private and public purchasers. Common methods of controlling or sharing costs include copayments and incentives to use generic substitutes. A study of prescription drug use and costs for a set of employer groups reveals that a common change in the rate of copayment from $3 to $5 per prescription is estimated to be associated with a 5% decrease in the number of prescriptions, an offsetting increase in ingredient costs per prescription, a 10% decrease in employer costs per person, and an increase in employee costs of approximately the $2 copayment per prescription.

Cost Sharing↗

Do research payments precipitate drug use or coerce participation?

Providing high-magnitude cash incentives to substance abuse clients to participate in research is frequently viewed as unethical based on the concerns that this might precipitate new drug use or be perceived as coercive. We randomly assigned consenting drug abuse outpatients to receive payments of 10 US dollars, 40 US dollars, or 70 US dollars in either cash or gift certificate for attending a 6-month research follow-up assessment. At the 6-month follow-up, participants received their randomly determined incentive and were then scheduled for a second follow-up appointment 3 days later to detect new instances of drug use. Findings indicated that neither the magnitude nor mode of the incentives had a significant effect on rates of new drug use or perceptions of coercion. Consistent with the contingency management literature, higher payments and cash payments were associated with increased follow-up rates. Finally, the results suggest that higher magnitude payments may be more cost-effective by reducing the need for more intensive follow-up efforts.

Adult↗

Ethical practice in managed care: a dose of realism.

This article examines the ethics of medical practice under managed care from a pragmatic perspective that gives physicians more useful guidance than do existing ethical statements. The article begins with a framework for constructing a realistic set of ethical principles, namely, that medical ethics derives from physicians' role as healers; that ethical statements are primarily aspirational, not regulatory; and that preserving patient trust is the primary objective. The following concrete ethical guidelines are presented: Financial incentives should influence physicians to maximize the health of the group of patients under their care; physicians should not enter into incentive arrangements that they are embarrassed to describe accurately to their patients; physicians should treat each patient impartially without regard to source of payment, consistent with the physician's own treatment style; if physicians depart from this ideal, they should inform their patients honestly; and it is desirable, although not mandatory, to differentiate medical treatment recommendations from insurance coverage decisions by clearly assigning authority over these different roles and by physicians advocating for recommended treatment that is not covered.

Disclosure↗

Realigning clinical and economic incentives to support depression management within a medicaid population: the Colorado access experience.

The authors describe their experiences in developing an economically sustainable depression care management program within Colorado Access, a non-profit Medicaid health plan. They describe high rates of mental health issues, medical comorbidities, and psychosocial barriers to care within the plan's Medicaid population. They discuss how the company redirected resources to incorporate depression care management into an intensive care management program focused on high-cost members with multiple chronic medical conditions. This strategy allowed Colorado Access to cost effectively care manage a targeted group of high-cost Medicaid recipients across multiple primary care physician (PCP) practices without requiring changes in provider workflow.

Colorado↗

Hospital tiers in health insurance: balancing consumer choice with financial incentives.

Variations in efficiency and market power are generating wide variations in the prices charged by hospitals to health insurance plans. Insurers are developing new network structures that expose the consumer to some of the cost differences, to encourage but not mandate differential use of the more economical facilities. The three leading designs include hospital "tiers" within a single broad network, multiple-network products, and the replacement of copayments by coinsurance in HMO as well as PPO products. This paper describes the new network designs and evaluates the challenges they face in influencing consumers' behavior, incorporating information on clinical quality, and supporting medical education and uncompensated care.

Consumer Behavior↗

An analysis of structural incentives in the Arizona Health Care Cost-Containment System.

This article analyzes the financial structures of the prevailing public and private health insurance mechanisms. Based on this analysis, it was concluded that the financial structures of health insurance mechanisms are deficient in that they neither produce efficiency in the consumption of health services, nor generate efficiency in the production of health services. On the other hand, closed-end systems of finance, such as the health maintenance organization (HMO) or the new Arizona Health Care Cost-Containment System (AHCCCS), give more promise of achieving such efficiencies. The AHCCCS represents an important innovation in the public financing of health care, and, for policy purposes, should be considered a viable national alternative for the reform of Medicare and Medicaid.

Arizona↗

Decision making in quasi-markets: a pedagogic analysis.

The objective of the 1991 NHS reforms was to reduce "excessive" vertical integration by constructing a quasi-market in which incentive structures and increased availability of information would enable decision makers make better use of resources. There is, however, no overall framework in which to consider the welfare gains which result from the introduction of a quasi-market or the welfare losses which arise from distortions in a quasi-market. This paper offers an analysis which can be applied to illustrate the difficulty of estimating the welfare loss from cream skimming and also to consider the impact of local monopoly.

Budgets↗

Applying the evidence: guidelines in primary care.

General practice has faced a tremendous workload challenge in meeting the National Service Framework targets. For the first time, the new General Medical Services (GMS) contract links practice remuneration to diagnosis and management of chronic diseases; in particular, it offers practices a significant financial incentive to undertake management of cardiovascular disease. However, in order to undertake the work and meet the targets, particularly those relating to management of blood pressure, serum lipids, and glucose, primary care teams will have to approach cardiovascular disease in a highly systematic manner. Much of the work is likely to fall upon practice nurses. While many in primary care have been reluctant in the past to invest in future health gain, the new GMS contract offers a good opportunity to change that way of thinking.

Cardiovascular Diseases↗

Regulating the behavior of nursing homes through positive incentives: an analysis of Illinois' Quality Incentive Program (QUIP).

The Illinois Quality Incentive Program (QUIP) offers nursing homes a separate bonus payment per Medicaid day for achievement of each of 6 quality standards. Using data from 809 participating nursing homes between 1985-1988, this study found that over 90% of eligible facilities chose to participate annually. Success in achieving bonus payments in multiple standards increased over time, with 27% qualifying for 5 or 6 components by 1988. But the validity of the individual measures and the relationship between achievement of QUIP standards and resident quality was not firmly established. The resident satisfaction standard proved insensitive, with 92% of participating facilities qualifying on this standard.

Humans↗

Nursing homes as acute care providers. A pilot study of incentives to reduce hospitalizations.

This program was designed to encourage treatment of episodes of acute illness in skilled nursing facilities in order to avoid costly and potentially traumatic admission to hospital. It is part of the Monroe County Long Term Care Program, Inc, system of case management and Medicare and Medicaid waivers, and consists of financial incentives, paid by Medicare, to facilities and to responsible physicians to evaluate and care for acutely ill patients in the SNF's when medically safe and feasible. A retrospective evaluation using a physician assessment committee concluded that among the first 112 patients in the program, 76% were very probably saved hospitalization or at least an emergency room visit. Acute bacterial infection was the most common category of episode, occurring in 46% of cases. Considerable savings to both Medicare and Medicaid were estimated to have resulted.

Acute Disease↗

A guide to facilitating consumer choice.

Some purchasers and policymakers are advocating models that offer consumers a choice of health plans as a way to help them choose a plan that best meets their needs and to create incentives for health plans to compete on the basis of efficiency, quality, and service. A review of six consumer-choice models indicates that these objectives can be met if purchasers (1) create a level field for comparison through standardized benefits and structured enrollment processes; (2) offer a limited number of plans that meet appropriate selection criteria; (3) provide comprehensive, objective, and reliable consumer information; (4) support the process with education; and (5) hold plans accountable through uniform reporting of performance data.

Choice Behavior↗

The limits of marginal economic incentives in the Medicaid program: concerns and cautions.

In January 1985, New York State implemented legislation that allowed for a 30 percent increase in Medicaid fees for physicians providing primary care services. This was intended to increase their levels of participation. Yet the outcome was not as expected. In upstate New York, the number of physicians participating in Medicaid each month actually declined; in New York City, the monthly rate of increase in participating physicians, which was part of the overall sharp rise in all licensed physicians, underwent a decline. Furthermore, utilization measures suggest that "procedural upgrading" might have become a problem in New York City. These results suggest that a marginal increase in New York State's low Medicaid fees will not have a positive effect on physician participation levels.

Fees, Medical↗

Improving physicians' preventive health care behavior through peer review and financial incentives.

We assessed improvement of preventive health care behaviors by physicians in an independent practice association-health maintenance organization. A before-after, 3-year study of a defined cohort measured changes through chart audit, accompanied by peer review, feedback, and financial incentives. Outcome measures consisted of rates of mump-measles-rubella (MMR) immunization, screening for cholesterol levels, and charting adequacy. Offices meeting MMR vaccination standards over 3 years increased from 78% to 96% (P < .05); those meeting standards for screening for cholesterol levels, from 92% to 95%. The average scores for charting adequacy rose from 87% to 92% (P < .05). The percentage of practices not in compliance with a standard of 90% decreased as follows: for MMR vaccination, from 57% to 12%; for screening for cholesterol levels, from 21% to 11%; and for charting adequacy, from 53% to 29% (P < .05).

Cholesterol↗

Managed care: practice, pitfalls, and potential.

The results of coordinating and changing patterns of health care using managed care activities and organizations are reviewed in this article. Although utilization review and high-cost case management programs reduce the use of expensive services, incentives for providers of care, placing them at risk, are important for managing the intensity of health care. Managed care appears capable of reducing health care costs substantially. However, this increased efficiency has not translated to lower insurance premiums or modulated total health care expenditures because either purchasers are not aware or are not concerned about securing care at the least cost. To correct these deficiencies and deliver the potential of managed care, the author suggests the need to separate insurance into its three components parts (financing, risk spreading, and program management) and developed policies for each.

Cost Control↗

Making competition in health care work.

Health care reform in the United States is on a collision course with economic reality. Most proposals focus on measures that will produce one-time cost savings by eliminating waste and inefficiency. But the right question to ask is how to achieve dramatic and sustained cost reductions over time. What will it take to foster entirely new approaches to disease prevention and treatment, whole new ways to deliver services, and more cost-effective facilities? The answer lies in the powerful lessons business has learned over the past two decades about the imperatives of competition. In industry after industry, the underlying dynamic is the same: competition compels companies to deliver constantly increasing value to customers. The fundamental driver of this continuous quality improvement and cost reduction is innovation. Without incentives to sustain innovation in health care, short-term cost savings will soon be overwhelmed by the desire to widen access, the growing health needs of an aging population, and the unwillingness of Americans to settle for anything less than the best treatments available. The misguided assumption underlying much of the debate about health care is that technology is the enemy. By assuming that technology drives up costs, reformers neglect the central importance of innovation or, worse yet, attempt to slow its pace. In fact, innovation, driven by rigorous competition, is the key to successful reform.

Community Participation↗

The effects of hospital rate-setting programs on volumes of hospital services: a preliminary analysis.

This article describes a preliminary study of the effects of State rate-setting programs on volumes of hospital services, specifically admission rates, occupancy levels, and average lengths of stay. A volume response to rate-setting may be anticipated as a result of program effects on hospital costs or charges as well as on hospitals' behavioral incentives. We analyzed data for samples of hospitals and counties in States with and without rate-setting programs for the 9-year period 1969 to 1978. The results suggested that rate regulation has brought about, in some States, an increase in hospital occupancy by increasing patients' lengths of stay. Few programs have had a measurable effect on the admission rate. Programs that regulate per diem rates seem to produce more consistent and predictable volume effects than those controlling charges. The findings were generally consistent with prior hypotheses and partially account for earlier findings regarding the effects of rate-setting programs on hospital costs.

Bed Occupancy↗