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PubMed2003

The effect of investment material and ceramming regime on the surface roughness of two castable glass-ceramic materials.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the surface roughness (R(a)) of two castable glass-ceramic materials, cast using four different investment materials and employing different ceramming regimes. METHODS: Forty discs, each 12 mm diameter and 2 mm thick were produced from two castable glass-ceramic materials, one a glass ionomer derivative based on 1.5SiO(2)-1Al(2)O(3)-0.53P(2)O(5)-1CaO-0.67CaF(2) (LG112), the other a fluorcanasite material based on 0.60SiO(2)-0.05K(2)O-0.10Na(2)O-0.15CaO-0.10CaF(2) (SG3). The discs were made using four dental investments, two gypsum-bonded (Whip-Mix Cristobalite (WMC), Degussa California (DC)) and two phosphate-bonded (Fujivest Super (FS), Techceram Glass (TG)). A Ni-Cr metal/ceramic alloy (Wiron 99) was also used as a control. Each investment was used to produce 10 discs for each glass-ceramic material, five left in the as-cast, glass state, the other five cerammed. Ceramming was carried out either within the investment mold or after de-vesting from the investment mold. The discs had their surface roughness values measured using a stylus, surface contact measuring instrument. RESULTS: For the Ni-Cr alloy the phosphate-bonded investments produced discs significantly smoother than those produced by the two gypsum-bonded investments (p<0.05). The FS investment produced the smoothest discs (p<0.05), but there was no significant difference between the discs produced by the two gypsum-bonded investments (p>0.05). For the SG3 material no significant differences were seen between the as-cast glass and cerammed discs (p>0.05), with the WMC investment producing the smoothest discs (p<0.05), and the TG investment the roughest (p<0.05). The LG112 material showed a significant difference between glass and cerammed discs for the gypsum-bonded investments (p<0.05) but not when using phosphate-bonded investments (p>0.05). With LG112 the WMC investment produced smoother discs than the DC and TG investments (p<0.05). The DC investment produced rougher discs than the two phosphate-bonded investments (p<0.05). SIGNIFICANCE: The selection of investment material can have a significant effect on the as-cast surface finish of castable glass-ceramic materials. A gypsum-bonded investment material gave smoother surface finishes compared to phosphate-bonded investments. The ceramming process significantly increases surface roughness.

Analysis of Variance↗
PubMedDate not supplied

The Canada Pension Plan's experience with investing its portfolio in equities.

For the past few years, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) has been investing some of its assets in equities. Without changes, an imbalance between revenues and outlays would exhaust the CPP reserve fund by 2015. Creating an entity that was independent of government was one of several changes the federal and provincial governments enacted to achieve fuller funding. The governments created an independent Investment Board (the CPP Investment Board, or "CPPIB") to oversee the new investments. Because the plan already owned a large government bond portfolio, the CPPIB decided to invest new CPP funds in broad equity indices in March 1999. In 2000, the CPPIB began actively investing a portion of the CPP funds. Key features of that policy and some observations about its implementation include the following: In addition to investing CPP revenues in equities, reform also included contribution rate increases, benefit reductions, and a financing stabilizer. The new investment policy accounted for 25 percent of the total effect of all the reforms. It is premature to know if the investments will achieve their long-term performance objective. The new equity investments are projected by the Chief Actuary, in his most recent Actuarial Report, to earn a 4.5 percent real rate of return on Canadian equity and 5.0 percent real return on foreign equity for a blended real return of 4.65 percent based on an equity mix of 70 percent Canadian and 30 percent non-Canadian. However, it is too early to tell if the equity investments will achieve that goal over the long run. The Investment Board's mandate is to maximize returns. The Investment Board, which oversees the CPP's new investments, has broad discretion to pursue maximum returns on its assets without incurring undue risk of loss while keeping in mind the financial obligations and other assets of the CPP. Furthermore, it has developed into a professional investment organization staffed with private-sector experts in finance and investment. The board is designed to be independent of government. The federal and provincial governments designed the board to operate at arm's length from themselves. The process for selecting directors includes public- and private-sector participation, and the board is in compliance with several sets of governance guidelines for corporations. CPPIB management, with the support of its board of directors, has decided to implement a virtual corporation model involving a small team of senior executives setting strategies for implementation primarily by external professional firms. Consequently, as a virtual corporation, the board currently relies on external fund managers to make investments and vote proxies. Several measures are designed to ensure accountability to the public. The investment legislation subjects the board to overlapping layers of oversight to ensure accountability to the public. The features of this oversight include public meetings in each province as well as quarterly statements and annual reports to Parliament, the federal and provincial finance ministers, and the public. The 10 finance ministers review the CPPIB's mandate and regulations every 3 years, and the CPPIB is subject to a special examination every 6 years by an auditor appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance.

Canada↗