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PubMed1984

A comparison of MMPI profiles for state and private disability insurance applicants.

The use of the MMPI in predicting successful rehabilitation outcomes has met with limited success. Because the motives of a disability insurance applicant may differ greatly from a disability insurance recipient, disability applicants were investigated. The MMPI scores of state disability applicants and private industrial insurance applicants were compared to a control group. Positive outcomes of test taking was possible for all three groups. Significant group differences were found for scales F, Hs, D, Hy, Pd, Pa, Pt, Sc, and Ma. Significant sex differences were found for scales Hs, D, Hy, Mf, Pt, and Sc.

Adult↗
PubMed1982

Recent trends in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.

Earlier analysis documented the rapid growth of the Disability Insurance (DI) program from 1966 to 1975; this article discusses trends since 1975. Over the decade of the 1970's, the population insured for disability increased by 34 percent, and women as a proportion of the insured population rose from 32.4 percent in 1970 to 39.1 percent in 1980, reflecting the increase in female labor-force participation. Of disabled workers receiving benefits, the proportion that were women rose from 28.4 percent in 1970 to 32.4 percent in 1979. Although inflation caused total benefit costs to rise over the entire period, the number of DI beneficiaries began to decline in 1978. Disabled-worker awards reached a peak in 1975 and fell subsequently so that the 1969 and 1981 figures are approximately equal. Relative to 1970, the fraction of awards going to women increased, the share for persons aged 50-54 rose, and the proportion received by those aged 60-64 declined. Decreased in total awards, and hence recipients, stemmed primarily from higher rates of denial at both the initial application and the reconsideration stages. Higher denials were countered by substantial rises in the number of hearings and reversals by administrative law judges (ALJ's). in 1980, only 65 percent of all awards came from initial applications, while over a fourth resulted from ALJ reversals. In future years, recent legislative changes may be expected to curtail program expansion further.

Adult↗
PubMed2000

Health, life and disability insurance and hereditary risk for breast or colorectal cancer.

Fear of insurance discrimination affecting the insurance-seeker and family has been reported as the singlemost important reason why individuals choose not to undergo genetic testing. The eleven health insurers operating on the Norwegian market were mailed a questionnaire asking them to list their insurance products and evaluate two individuals' requests for insurance. The requests were constructed in order to illustrate a high genetic risk for (a) colorectal (HNPCC) and (b) breast cancer (BRCAI/BRCA2), respectively. Nine out of 11 insurers responded. While no restriction was documented concerning risk of BRCA1/BRCA2 and life insurance or disability pension, the premium paid by persons with susceptibility to HNPCC varied between the different insurers from standard to raised premiums. The product 'critical disease' insurance was refused or obtained at normal or raised premiums in both cases, depending on the insurer in question. On examining personal indemnity insurance, we found that the BRCA1/BRCA2-risk individual was offered insurance at the standard premium, whereas HNPCC-risk individuals were offered a standard or raised premium. Only the major Norwegian insurer is in fact diverging in its policies.

Breast Neoplasms↗
PubMedDate not supplied

What every physician needs to know about disability insurance.

Physicians and their patients rely on disability insurance to provide economic protection against unforeseen illness or injury. This article discusses various types of disability coverage and issues that arise in disability claims both from the perspective of the physician as treater as well as consumer.

Employee Retirement Income Security Act↗
PubMed1982

Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled; representative payment--SSA. Final rule.

These final regulations reorganize and restate in simpler language our regulations on representative payment under titles II, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and XVI, Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI) of the Social Security Act. These regulations (1) explain representative payment; (2) state when title II and title XVI benefits will be paid to a representative payee rather than directly to the entitled person; (3) indicate the procedure we follow in selecting a representative payee; (4) specify the responsibilities of a representative payee; and (5) clarify our responsibilities to the beneficiary when we make payments to a representative payee on his or her behalf.

Social Security↗
PubMed2000

The erosion of retiree health benefits and retirement behavior: implications for the disability insurance program.

The effects of retiree health insurance on the decision to retire have not been examined until recently. It is an area of increasing significance because of rising health care costs for retirees, the uncertain future of Medicare, and increased life expectancy. In general, studies suggest that individual retirement decisions are strongly responsive to the availability of retiree health insurance. Early retiree benefits and retirement behavior are also important because they may affect the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program. It is not apparent that if a person loses retiree health benefits, or if fewer people are eligible for retiree health benefits in general, claims for DI will increase. The potential 2-year loss of health benefits may be a deterrent to leaving the labor force and claiming DI, although persons who are unable to work would leave the labor force even without health benefits. In order to understand how the decline in retiree health benefits may affect enrollment in DI, analysts must at least incorporate the role of coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). That act provides many people with access to health insurance during the 2-year gap between eligibility for DI and Medicare. In fact, persons with sufficient means to retire early could use the income from Disability Insurance to buy COBRA coverage during the first 2 years of DI coverage. Determining the effect of the erosion of retiree health benefits on DI must account properly for the role of other factors that affect DI eligibility and participation. The financial incentives of Social Security, pension plans, retirement savings programs, health status, the availability of health insurance, and other factors influencing retirement decisions must be taken fully into account in order to isolate the precise effect of retiree health benefits.

Health Benefit Plans, Employee↗