Infocast End to End Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza. Opportunities for public-private collaboration.
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This article is partly based on a newly published influenza pandemic preparedness plan and risk analysis for future pandemics in Norway, and presents estimates on morbidity and mortality in influenza pandemics in Norway in the 20th century. In addition, estimates on morbidity and mortality for a future pandemic are given. One of the main conclusions is that excess mortality in connection with Spanish influenza and Asian influenza is highly underestimated. The proportion of the infected that died in the pandemics was low, and was highest for Spanish influenza. The morbidity will be highest if a pandemic similar to Asian influenza reappears, while mortality will be highest if a Spanish flu is repeated. In the worst case scenario for a pandemic today, based on the figures from the Spanish flu, the number of excess deaths could reach 29,000, an increase of 60% compared to the average annual number of deaths seen in the 1990s.
The network of the national COVID-19 Data Portals was developed and linked to the COVID-19 Data Portal (https://www.covid19dataportal.org/)inresponsetothe need for rapid data sharing and analysis during the 2020-2022 SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Built on open-source code developed by the Swedish COVID-19 Data Portal (now the Swedish Pathogens Portal, www.pathogens.se) the network included 12 national portals addressing demand for local open data sharing and access, across data types and resources. It provides a robust case study of national initiatives for FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable and Reusable) resources and a foundation for future pandemic preparedness across pathogens globally. In this paper we outline the structure of the origins of the network of National COVID-19 Datal Portals, the technical aspects and code originating from the Swedish Portal and provide an overview of the services and tools offered by each Portal. The paper showcases the process and operation of four Portals: Sweden, Poland, Spain, Norway and The Netherlands. In this study, we observe that pandemic response greatly benefits from an established infrastructure that can be quickly mobilised, developed and extended. Collaborations and preparation built on solid foundations over several years, supported by investment in the form of national and international research grants, is key for sustainability, continuation and readiness to deploy such efforts.
INTRODUCTION: The development of Nipah virus (NiV) vaccine offers a vital opportunity for pandemic preparedness in Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia, where the first outbreak occurred. However, vaccine acceptance must be understood within diverse cultural, religious, and social contexts. AREAS COVERED: This review explores key challenges and barriers to NiV vaccine uptake among Malaysia's Muslim-majority population, drawing insights from past rollouts such as COVID-19 and HPV vaccines. Key issues include religious concerns, misinformation, historical hesitancy, lack of trust in health authorities, and gaps in knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions, which collectively hinder vaccine acceptance and uptake. The paper also highlights enablers namely religious endorsements, transparent communication, and culturally sensitive engagement with trusted healthcare and community leaders. Evidence-based strategies, like motivational interviewing, narrative communication, and tailored outreach, are discussed. Finally, the 7C model is introduced as a structured framework to address behavioral and psychological barriers to vaccination. EXPERT OPINION: Research gaps remain in understanding local psychological drivers, religious governance dynamics, and misinformation patterns. Future efforts should prioritize nationwide KAP studies, validation of behavioral frameworks such as the 7C model, and interventional research on culturally tailored communication. Integrating early halal certification and coordinated religious engagement will be essential for effective and equitable uptake.
Understanding the geographic spread of emerging respiratory viruses is critical for pandemic preparedness, yet the early spatiotemporal dynamics of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in the United States remain unclear. While mobility and genomic data have revealed important aspects of pandemic spatial spread, several key questions remain: Did the two pandemics follow similar spatial transmission routes? How rapidly did they spread across the United States? What role did stochastic processes play in early spatial transmission? To address these questions, we integrated high-resolution disease data with a robust, data-efficient inference framework combining air travel, commuting flows, and pathogen superspreading potentials to reconstruct their spatial spread across US metropolitan areas. The two pandemics exhibited distinct transmission pathways across locations; however, both pandemics established local circulation in most metropolitan areas within weeks, driven by several shared transmission hubs. Early spatial spread was more strongly associated with air travel than with commuting, though stochastic dynamics introduced substantial uncertainty in transmission routes, creating challenges for timely detection and control. Simulations indicate that broad wastewater surveillance coverage beyond top transmission hubs coupled with effective infection control may slow initial spatial expansion. Our findings highlight the rapid, stochastic spread of pandemic respiratory pathogens and the difficulties of early outbreak containment.
BACKGROUND: To present preparedness planning for an influenza pandemic for two nursing subunits: nursing services in hospitals and schools of nursing in universities. DISCUSSION: The preparedness plan is modeled on a modified Haddon matrix, a logical approach to identify measures appropriate for the pre-event, event, and postevent phases of an influenza pandemic. For the pre-event phase, the objective is to ensure preparedness for the potential pandemic outbreak through training, communication, surveillance, infection control, and vaccination. Once the pandemic outbreak is declared, the aim is to implement effective measures to ensure a rapid and appropriate response. For the postevent phase, the plan is focused on the restoration of core functions, vigilance for a second or possibly more waves of the pandemic, and psychosocial support to staff and students. CONCLUSION: Measures required to prepare for, respond to, and manage the consequences of influenza pandemic are identified. This planning indicates the need to balance a logical approach with contextual perspectives and the importance for nursing leaders to develop plans for subunits of larger entities.
Analysis of national influenza pandemic preparedness plans reveals that the preparations for an effective response in the early stages of a pandemic, while a vaccine is still being prepared, are giving cause for concern.
Pandemic influenza is one of a small number of infectious diseases that pose a significant global threat. Pandemic preparedness has accelerated around the world in recent years in response to the perceived increased risk of a pandemic developing following the emergence of H5N1 avian influenza in domestic poultry flocks in Asia, Africa and Europe. There is a hierarchy of pandemic plans - international, national, state, and local - and harmonisation of all of these is imperative for a coordinated and effective response. At the national and state levels, plans have been developed for a whole-of-government response to a pandemic, in addition to plans specifically for the health sector. It is inevitable that influenza pandemics will occur and careful planning is crucial to mitigate their potentially devastating effects.
In accordance with World Health Organization guidelines, the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports designed a national plan to minimize effects of pandemic influenza. Within the scope of the Dutch pandemic preparedness plan, we were asked to estimate the magnitude of the problem in terms of the number of hospitalizations and deaths during an influenza pandemic. Using scenario analysis, we also examined the potential effects of intervention options. We describe and compare the scenarios developed to understand the potential impact of a pandemic (i.e., illness, hospitalizations, deaths), various interventions, and critical model parameters. Scenario analysis is a helpful tool for making policy decisions about the design and planning of outbreak control management on a national, regional, or local level.
Influenza virus causes annual epidemics and occasional pandemics. Frequent mutations in circulating influenza strains ("antigenic drift") result in the need for annual vaccination. More than two-thirds of persons in the U.S. are recommended for annual vaccination. Because influenza vaccine is available seasonally, mass vaccination strategies are well suited to its delivery. Although doctors offices are the most frequent setting for influenza vaccination overall, workplaces, clinics, and community sites (retail stores and pharmacies) also are common vaccination settings. Influenza vaccination also is delivered in mass vaccination clinics to health care workers and military personnel. Universal influenza vaccination, which has been recommended as a strategy to improve prevention by increasing vaccination coverage and providing indirect protection of adults by decreasing infection and transmission among children, would require expanded use of mass vaccination, for example in schools, as well as in the community. Influenza pandemics occur when a new influenza A subtype is introduced into the population ("antigenic shift"). Most or all of the population is susceptible to the pandemic virus and two doses of vaccine may be needed for protection. U.S. pandemic preparedness and response plans indicate that the entire population should be vaccinated beginning with defined priority groups including those who provide essential services including healthcare and those at highest risk of severe illness and death. Pandemic influenza vaccination will occur primarily through the public sector in mass clinic settings. Vaccination program planning must consider issues including coordination, staffing, clinic location and lay-out, security, record keeping, and communications. Exercising vaccination clinics is important for preparedness and can be done in the context of annual influenza vaccination.
Outbreaks caused by highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses have spread worldwide and the containment is impossible no longer. During the outbreaks, over 200 human infection cases with 55% fatality are confirmed at the moment and some human-to -human transmission in family clusters have been observed in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. The potency of pandemic caused by highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza is increasing gradually. Consequently, development of effective H5N1 vaccine and its licensing for vaccination to human are urgent countermeasures for pandemic preparedness. In the present article, the author reviews the development of H5N1 attenuated vaccine by reverse genetic technology and discuss the problems on the vaccine production to be dissolved before pandemic occur.
Influenza vaccinations and antiviral drugs are the foundation of epidemic and pandemic preparedness, but only close collaboration between public health authorities and industry can achieve the necessary production levels and ensure the smooth distribution necessary to protect European citizens from this public health scourge. To focus the minds of all public health stakeholders, ESWI has translated these simple facts into clear achievable goals: it recommends that EU governments vaccinate one-third of their populations by 2010 and stockpile antiviral drugs for 20% of their citizens while promoting public-private partnerships. The scientific justification behind this objective is easily understood namely that while the annual flu shot protects against three viral strains,the pandemic vaccine will focus on only the one highly lethal virus. As a result if countries succeed in meeting the target to vaccine one-third of the EU-25 population with a trivalent vaccine, sufficient monovalent pandemic vaccine could be produced to vaccinate almost the entire EU-25 population at least once. Achieving these objectives would go far to containing the pandemic and ensuring necessary treatment to avoid needless deaths and social and economic disruption. It would also signal that influenza preparedness had become part of the European mindset. Relying on the technique of force-field analysis organised by professional facilitators the session asked government representatives and policy makers to identify existing factors that either provide support for the objectives or hinder progress.
BACKGROUND: Vaccination serves as an effective intervention for health promotion and disease prevention across the socioecological systems and has played an important role during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, global disparities in vaccine coverage have increased uncertainty about the trajectories of viral adaptation, and the potential interplay between SARS-CoV-2 adaptation and vaccine rollout warrants further quantification. METHODS: Using over 13 million SARS-CoV-2 genomes across 86 countries from March 2020 to September 2022, we analyzed nonlinear associations between SARS-CoV-2 adaptation and vaccination coverage, considering public health and social measures, international travel, and infection dynamics, before and after the emergence of Omicron. Additionally, we examined the relationship between SARS-CoV-2 adaptation and COVID-19 mortality. RESULTS: During the pre-Omicron period, we found positive associations between nonsynonymous to synonymous divergence (dN/dS) ratios in the S1 subunit and medium levels of adjusted vaccine coverage (effect size: 0.96 [95% CI 0.47, 1.45]), while the association became insignificant at high levels (effect size: -1.89 [95% CI -4.20, 0.43]). However, no significant associations were found when Omicron dominated, possibly due to the immune escape ability of Omicron variants and the complex immune landscape shaped by mass hybrid immunity. Moreover, we observed evidence of dynamic interdependence and positive correlations between COVID-19 mortality and SARS-CoV-2 adaptation, with COVID-19 mortality interpreted as a proxy for uncontrolled viral spread. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest a complex nonlinear relationship between vaccine-induced immunity and SARS-CoV-2 adaptation, with high vaccine coverage potentially linked to lower positive selection. We also observed directional coupling between COVID-19 mortality and SARS-CoV-2 adaptation. This may have implications for fair and fast vaccination in pandemic preparedness and response. CLINICAL TRIAL NUMBER: Not applicable.
Avian influenza is a panzootic and recurring human epidemic with pandemic potential. Pandemic requirements for a viral pathogen are: a novel virus must emerge against which the general population has little or no immunity; the new virus must be able to replicate in humans and cause serious illness; and the new virus must be efficiently transmitted from person to person. At present, only the first two conditions have been met. Nonetheless, influenza pandemics are considered inevitable. Expected worldwide human mortality from a moderate pandemic scenario is 45 million people or more than 75% of the current annual global death burden. Although mathematical models have predicted that an emerging pandemic could be contained at its source, this conclusion remains controversial among public health experts. The Terrestrial Animal Health Code and International Health Regulations are enforceable legal instruments integral to pandemic preparedness. Donor support in financial, material and technical assistance remains critical to disease control efforts - particularly in developing countries where avian influenza predominately occurs at present. Personal protective equipment kits, decontamination kits and specimen collection kits in lightweight, portable packages are becoming standardized. Air transport border control measures purporting to delay importation and spread of human avian influenza are scientifically controversial. National pandemic plans prioritize beneficiary access to antiviral drugs and vaccines for some countries. Other medical commodities including ventilators, hospital beds and intensive care units remain less well prioritized in national plans. These resources will play virtually no role in care of the overwhelming majority of patients worldwide in a pandemic. Prehospital care, triage and acute care all require additional professional standardization for the high patient volumes anticipated in a pandemic.
Understanding the characteristics of available influenza or influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance systems is important for seasonal influenza surveillance and pandemic preparedness. We compared five influenza or ILI data sources in Victoria: notifications of laboratory-confirmed influenza to the Victorian Department of Human Services; hospital emergency presentations and hospital admissions; sentinel general practitioner surveillance; and medical locum service surveillance. Seasonal trends for influenza and ILI activity were similar for all data sources. Community ILI surveillance, operating as sentinel GP, locum service or hospital emergency department surveillance, in conjunction with notification of laboratory-confirmed influenza, would provide adequate inter-pandemic surveillance for influenza in Victoria and, by extension, in any Australian jurisdiction. Other surveillance systems would be needed for early pandemic case or cluster detection, while pandemic monitoring would be better achieved by a more automated system.
General practice will play a key role in both prevention and management of an influenza pandemic. Australian pandemic plans acknowledge a role for general practice, but there are few published data addressing the issues that general practitioners and their practices will face in dealing with such a crisis. The outcome will revolve around preparation in three key areas: Definition of the role of general practice within a broad primary care pandemic response, and adequate preparation within general practices so they can play that role well. Planning exercises and forums must include GPs, and rehearsals must include practical experience for general practices and their staff. Local Divisions of General Practice and GP practices can advocate for this, can define their role, and can prepare by using pandemic preparedness checklists; Definition and enactment of communication strategies to facilitate transfer of useful clinical and administrative data from practices and rapid dissemination of information into the community via general practice; Resource provision, which should be centrally funded but locally distributed, with personal protective equipment, vaccines and antivirals readily available for distribution. Resources must include support for human resource management to ensure appropriate health care professionals reach areas of workforce demand. Administrative, clinical and financial resources must be available to train GPs and practices in pandemic awareness and response.
Influenza constitutes the most widespread and significant respiratory infectious disease in the world, resulting in increased morbidity, mortality and economic loss each epidemic year. Pandemic influenza is a worldwide epidemic usually caused by a new virus variant to which the majority of the population has no immunity. As demonstrated in the devastating pandemic of 1918 to 1919, a pandemic virus may infect 30 to 50% of the worlds population and kill 1 to 2% of those infected. Pandemic control must be a concerted and co-ordinated world strategy and under the auspices of the World Health Organization, pandemic preparedness plans have been formulated, including: intensified surveillance for more rapid identification of new reassortant viruses with potential human virulence and infectivity, laboratory characterization of the new viruses so that vaccine may be prepared, development of techniques for more rapid vaccine production and the manufacture and stock piling of antiviral drugs. The H5N1 outbreak of virulent chicken influenza in 1997 in Hong Kong which resulted in the deaths of six of 18 infected persons serves as a wake-up call. Should such a virus attain high transmissibility in humans, a pandemic of tragic proportions might ensue. Even though the timing of onset of the next pandemic cannot be precisely predicted, world governments must understand the urgency of the problem and increase funding for influenza pandemic control.
Circulating bat coronaviruses present a significant pandemic threat, yet our understanding of their genetic diversity and evolutionary dynamics remains limited. Over 3 years, we sampled 1,462 bats in Cambodia's Steung Treng province, identifying extensive and diverse coronaviruses co-circulation. Using metatranscriptomic and amplicon sequencing, we generated 33 complete sarbecovirus genomes sequences, revealing novel lineages that cluster into four distinct groups, each associated with different Rhinolophus bat species. Our analysis highlights rapid migration and recombination of sarbecovirus lineages over short distances and timescales. Of note, the receptor-binding domains of two novel viral groups exhibit high similarity to SARS-CoV-2, and pseudovirus assays confirmed the ability of this spike protein to mediate entry into cells expressing human ACE2, suggesting a potential zoonotic risk. The observed genetic diversity underscores the urgent need for continuous surveillance to identify high-risk animal-to-human interfaces and inform pandemic preparedness.