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Prospective payment for psychiatry--feasibility and impact.

Although 15 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) have been proposed for psychiatric hospital patients, psychiatric hospitals are currently exempt from the DRG prospective payment system. We investigated the ability of the psychiatric DRGs to predict the hospital length of stay and costs by retrospectively analyzing the charts of 8816 randomly selected patients from 32 psychiatric hospitals throughout the United States. In addition, we developed other grouping systems to see whether they would have been better predictors of length of stay. We found that grouping the patients in the 15 psychiatric DRGs reduced the total variance in length of stay by only 3.9 percent. Furthermore, our best alternative grouping--based on major diagnostic categories, whether the patient was transferred from another facility, age, and psychiatric complications and comorbidities--reduced the variance by only 7.8 percent. We conclude that DRGs do not adequately predict length of stay or costs in psychiatric hospitals. We identified factors other than diagnosis that predicted the length of stay better, but all the models we tested would create large financial "winners" and "losers" and thus introduce inappropriate incentives into the care of patients in psychiatric hospitals.

Costs and Cost Analysis↗

Provider response to Medicare's PPS: reductions in length of stay for psychiatric patients treated in scatter beds.

We used Medicare discharge data for the years 1984 and 1985 to analyze reductions in lengths of stay for psychiatric patients treated in general hospitals that did not have specialized psychiatric units. In response to Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS), not-for-profit hospitals experienced declines in lengths of stay averaging between 10% and 20% two years after they went onto PPS, while for-profit hospitals experienced a somewhat greater decline. Lengths of stay fell most rapidly during the months immediately surrounding the date on which a hospital began to be paid under PPS. This response included an anticipatory effect--hospital lengths of stay began shortening just before PPS payments started.

Hospitals, General↗

Changes in medical stability upon admission to a rehabilitation unit.

The implementation of Medicare's prospective payment system in acute care has coincided with a steady increase in medically unstable admissions to our freestanding rehabilitation facility. We investigated the consequences of these admissions by collecting medical information regarding transfers beginning in 1983. Patients requiring transfer back to the acute setting within 1 day of admission were considered medically unstable and their charts were reviewed. The number of patients requiring transfer back within 1 day increased from 1.5% of all first admissions to 3.1% in 1988 (Mantel - Haenszel chi 2 = 8.03, (df = 1), p < .01), but the increase among Medicare patients alone was not significant. This progressive increase was most pronounced in the cerebrovascular accident and spinal cord injury populations. Beginning in 1988, an intensified preadmission evaluation program was implemented, resulting in a significant decline in unstable patient transfers from hospitals where our consultants were on staff. Physiatric consultations at referral institutions decreased the number of unstable patients at admission.

Aftercare↗

Nurse and client perceptions of home health wound care effectiveness after a change in Medicare reimbursement.

The purpose of this study was to begin to explore client and nurse perceptions related to how a change in a Medicare reimbursement, Prospective Payment System (PPS), affects home health care. The target population included home health clients with stage III or greater decubitus ulcers, age 65 years or older. Six Virginia home health agencies were randomly selected. From those sites, all 39 charts that met population criteria were accessed and analyzed, and then 16 care recipients were purposely selected. In addition, 26 home health nurses with pre- and post-PPS experience were purposefully selected. Semistructured, audiotaped interviews were conducted, transcribed, and analyzed using thematic content analysis. Results demonstrated PPS adaptive behavior and an increase in use of education and family caregivers related to wound care. Themes that emerged included professional competence, caregiver as key, and sense of support. Perceptions emphasize the necessity for resource management, collaboration, and patient advocacy.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

Capital PPS 10-year transition up and running.

Hospital financial officers must prepare themselves for the long stretch, as the 10-year transition to Medicare's new capital prospective payment system (PPS) gets underway. Documentation related to capital assets and their financing must be assembled and preserved throughout the transition period; audit procedures must be understood; crucial deadlines must be met; and calculations by Medicare fiscal intermediaries (FIs) must be verified by reference to a hospital's records. Most important, lines of communication with FIs must be established and maintained because rates set this year will determine a substantial portion of Medicare payment for the next decade.

Capital Expenditures↗

The impact of transfer patients on Medicare inpatient cost per discharge.

The cost of inpatient transfer cases has concerned hospitals as well as rate-setters. Reform of transfer payment in Medicare's Prospective Payment System has been suggested to ensure access and adequate treatment for these cases in a period where inpatient revenue has been declining. This analysis indicates that both transfer cases received and cases transferred to other hospitals have above average costs per case but their impact on Medicare inpatient cost per discharge is smaller than that of variables such as case-mix, area wages and resident/bed ratio which are used directly in PPS payment. Evidence is provided indicating the desirability of reform of PPS payment methods for transfer cases.

Cost Control↗

Medicare payment for selected adverse events: building the business case for investing in patient safety.

This study estimates that Medicare extra payments under the hospital prospective payment system (PPS) range from about $700 per case of decubitus ulcer to $9,000 per case of postoperative sepsis in the five types of adverse events identifiable in Medicare claims. Medicare extra payment for the five types of events totals more than $300 million per year, accounting for 0.27 percent of annual Medicare hospital spending. But these extra payments cover less than a third of the extra costs incurred by hospitals in treating these adverse events. We conclude that both Medicare and hospitals gain financially by improving patient safety.

Health Care Costs↗

Reimbursement decisions for hospital services: the case of psychiatric units under Medicare.

If the hospital meets specific requirements, under Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) psychiatric units of general hospitals can apply for and receive an exemption from DRG-based payment. I find empirical evidence that the decision to seek an exemption is affected by a complex set of financial considerations. In addition to the difference in expected payment that would result from exempt versus nonexempt status, other factors at work include a facility's dependence on Medicare for revenues and its attitude toward aggressively gaming Medicare reimbursement options. These results indicate the importance of exemption options in an increasingly competitive market for specialized hospital services.

Decision Making↗

Prospective payment's impact on ancillary services. Pastoral care, social services: role in reducing medical costs.

Under the prospective payment system, costs for medical social services, as well as for other inpatient services, are reimbursed at a fixed rate according to the patient's diagnosis. Thus hospitals, under the incentives to reduce costs by limiting services and increasing patient volume, will examine ancillary services to determine whether the services increase or decrease costs. Social and pastoral care workers will likely play an important role in hospitals' cost reduction efforts in several ways: Begin forming a discharge plan early in a patient's care, especially for patients who are at high risk for delayed discharge. Evaluate patients and their families to detect problems that may impede treatment and recovery and refer patients to community and hospital resources for help. In the emergency room, guide persons who do not need to be hospitalized to community resources. Record patient information that may help health professionals improve treatment and speed discharge. Such data include patients' financial status, use of community agencies, and rehabilitation. Counsel patients and families as they make treatment decisions.

Ancillary Services, Hospital↗

Grandfathering: is it a fair capital payment transition approach?

The concept of grandfathering capital obligations was discussed in last year's Congressional debate over capital payment methods for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS). Under grandfathering, hospitals would continue to receive cost-based capital payments for expenditures obligated prior to a threshold date, over a predetermined period of time. While grandfathering protects hospitals that recently invested in major capital projects, it is concluded that grandfathering is an inequitable approach for paying for capital under PPS. It provides payments in excess of cash needs to hospitals that recently invested, at the expense of hospitals that need to invest. An alternative capital payment method based on a straight-line transition, all other things being equal, provides greater protection to a larger number of hospitals.

Capital Financing↗

Medicare program; application of inherent reasonableness payment policy to Medicare Part B services (other than physician services). Final rule.

This final rule finalizes the process that was set forth in an interim final rule published on December 13, 2002, for establishing a realistic and equitable payment amount for Medicare Part B services (other than physicians' services) when the existing payment amounts are inherently unreasonable because they are either grossly excessive or grossly deficient. This process does not apply to services paid under a prospective payment system, such as outpatient hospital services or home health services. The December 2002 interim final rule also described the factors we (or our carriers) will consider and the procedures we will follow in establishing realistic and equitable payment amounts for Medicare Part B services. In addition, this final rule responds to public comments we received on two provisions in the December 13, 2002 interim final rule relating to how we define grossly excessive or deficient payment amounts and to the criteria for using valid and reliable data in applying the inherent reasonableness authority.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

Have procompetitive changes altered hospital provision of indigent care?

In the past decade alone there have been numerous changes in the financial and competitive environment of hospitals in the United States. Some examples include the advent of Medicare's Prospective Payment System, growth in managed care options, relaxation of states' Certificate of Need (CON) regulations, and court cases questioning the tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospitals. In this paper we attempt to reveal how hospitals alter their provision of care to the poor in a more cost conscious and competitive environment. Using hospital data from the State of California for the fiscal years ending in 1983 and 1987, estimates explaining uncompensated care commitments are presented. In particular, this study illustrates how hospitals under different ownership control varied their provision of uncompensated care over the period studied on average and by profitability level. Other factors, such as hospital location, teaching status, medicare patient load, and contractual adjustments, are also included in the analysis. A number of interesting trends are detected. Moreover, the results are found to be compatible with a quid pro quo hypothesis which states that hospital regulators reward large uncompensated care providers with profitable CON licenses.

California↗

An assessment tool translation study.

Policymakers hoped to substitute a new, multi-purpose, functional assessment instrument, the minimum data set post-acute care (MDS-PAC), into the planned prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient rehabilitation hospitals. PPS design requires a large database linking treatment costs with measures of the need for care, so the PPS was designed using the functional independence measure (FIM) database linked to Medicare hospital claims. An accurate translation from the MDS-PAC items to FIM--like items was needed to ensure payment equity under the substitution. This article describes the translation efforts and some of the problems that led policymakers to abandon the effort.

Activities of Daily Living↗

Reforming Medicare provider payment.

The basic thesis of this paper is that, in the short to medium term (that is to say, the politically relevant term), fee-for-service payment will be the dominant form of Medicare transaction--and that is not such a bad thing. Capitated arrangements will grow, and should be encouraged, especially for long-term-care services, but for reasons to be discussed, it would be a mistake to put too many policy eggs into that basket. As the nascent Prospective Payment System (PPS) for hospital care reveals, fee-for-service payment can take almost an infinite variety of forms, and the connection between the choice of form and the cost impact is highly variable and somewhat uncertain. PPS needs considerable improvement; so, unquestionably, does the current nonsystem of physician payment. An analysis of potential improvements in both arenas will constitute the bulk of this discussion. That emphasis reflects not only the personal predilections of the author, but also the contention that those are the most sensible things to talk about.

Aged↗

Impact of conversion to critical access hospital status for Oklahoma's rural hospitals.

CONTEXT: The Medicare Rural Hospital Flexibility Grant Program established a new hospital category, the Critical Access Hospital, designed to provide financial stability to small rural hospitals that were losing money after changes in the Prospective Payment System implemented by Medicare. PURPOSE: This article describes the impact of conversion to Critical Access Hospital (CAH) status for 15 small rural hospitals in Oklahoma. Objectives of the study were to identify how conversion to CAH affected hospital utilization and finances for the first year after conversion. METHODS: A telephone survey was used to collect information from hospital administrators. Fifteen of 16 eligible hospitals participated in the study. FINDINGS: In general, services and patient census declined slightly with conversion to CAH. All 15 hospitals had reported losses prior to conversion, totaling $6,985,033. Ten hospitals reported losses after conversion. After converting to CAH status, the hospitals reported total losses of $3,094,547. The hospitals had a net change of $4,293,040. CONCLUSIONS: Most of the 15 study hospitals greatly improved their financial situation in the first year after conversion to CAH status, but in aggregate still operated at a loss.

Critical Care↗

What do PPS margins mean? Different things to different groups.

Since the inception of Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS) in 1983, the interpretation of Medicare PPS operating margins has generated much debate and confusion. Numerous estimates often show considerable range from the highest to the lowest within roughly the same time periods. In almost all instances the reason for these differences is attributable to elements of the study design. In this article adapted from a paper he wrote for The Catholic Health Association, Allen Dobson identifies and describes the legitimate reasons for differences among studies of Medicare PPS operating margins. His paper provided a useful framework for reviewing studies of this type. He determined that three sets of factors--statistical, methodological, and interactive--influence the magnitude of margin estimates. Dr. Dobson concluded that the various margin estimates all show essentially the same thing: Margins under PPS have fallen significantly and are likely to continue to do so as long as actual case costs rise more rapidly than actual case revenues. By PPS year 6, few types of hospitals are likely to receive adequate funds from Medicare to cover their expenses.

Costs and Cost Analysis↗

The effect of financial pressure on the quality of care in hospitals.

This paper examines the effect of financial pressure on hospital quality, using health outcomes after treatment for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) as quality indicators. The financial pressure variables are: fiscal pressure from the Prospective Payment System (PPS) for inpatient care, and changes in health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration at the county level. The study shows that both types of financial pressures adversely affect short-term health outcomes, but do not affect patient survival beyond 1 year after patients' hospital admissions. Furthermore, the impact of HMO penetration appears to differ from that of Medicare payment changes for certain hospitals because HMO penetration encourages price competition.

Cardiology Service, Hospital↗

Medicare program; changes in provider agreement regulations related to federal employees health benefits--HCFA. Final rule.

This final rule makes two changes to Medicare's provider agreement regulations concerning payment for inpatient hospital services furnished to retired enrollees of fee-for-service Federal Employee Health Benefits (FEHB) plans who do not have Medicare Part A coverage. The first change specifies that payment for inpatient hospital services furnished to retired Federal workers age 65 or older who are enrolled in a fee-for-service FEHB plan but are not covered under Medicare Part A is limited to a payment amount that approximates the Medicare diagnosis-related group payment rates established under Medicare's inpatient hospital prospective payment system. The second change specifies that HCFA will consider termination or nonrenewal of a hospital's provider agreement with Medicare if a hospital knowingly and willfully fails to accept, on a repeated basis, the Medicare rate as payment in full for inpatient hospital services provided to a retired Federal worker who is enrolled in a fee-for-service FEHB plan and who does not have Medicare Part A coverage. This final rule implements section 7002(f) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

Aged↗