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At least 865 records · Page 48Linked to original sources
PubMed2000

Towards an alternative approach to personhood in the end of life questions.

Within the Western bioethical framework, we make a distinction between two dominant interpretations of the meaning of moral personhood: the naturalist and the humanist one. While both interpretations of moral personhood claim to promote individual autonomy and rights, they end up with very different normative views on the practical and legal measures needed to realize these values in every day life. Particularly when we talk about the end of life issues it appears that in general the arguments for euthanasia are drawn from the naturalist interpretation of moral personhood while the arguments against euthanasia, for their part, are derived from the idealist and/or humanist understanding of the same concept. This article focuses on examining the metaphysical assumptions and internal contradiction found behind the opposing arguments presented by two prominent philosophers of these two traditions: Peter Singer and Ludger Honnefelder. The author claims that neither side of the debate succeeds in defending its normative position without reconsidering how to take the social aspects of moral personhood into account. The author holds that, despite our need to set individual's decision making into social context, the current communitarian narrative concept of personhood fails to offer a convincing alternative. Instead of merely trying to replace psychological and atomistic view of personhood with a collective understanding of an individual's moral identity, we need to discuss the normative relation between the concept of 'moral personhood' and the demand for respect of individual autonomy in Western bioethics within a wider philosophical perspective.

Euthanasia↗
PubMed1999

Resurrecting autonomy during resuscitation--the concept of professional substituted judgment.

The urgency of the resuscitation and the impaired ability of the patient to make a reasonable autonomous decision both conspire against adequate consideration of the principles of medical ethics. Informed consent is usually not possible for these reasons and this leads many to consider that consent is not required for resuscitation, because resuscitation brings benefit and prevents harm and because the patient is not in a position to give or withhold consent. However, consent for resuscitation is required and the common models employed for this purpose are presumed consent or consent from a patient proxy. However, if we are to honour the principles of respect for patient autonomy, as well as beneficence and non-maleficence, when starting and continuing resuscitation we must try and achieve the best balance between benefit and harm from the patient's perspective. The concept of professional substituted judgment involves the resuscitators gathering as much information about the patient as they possibly can, including any previously expressed attitudes towards such a situation, and combining this with their acquired professional knowledge of the likely benefits and harms of the resuscitation endeavour and then exercising their moral imagination, imagining themselves as the patient, and asking "would I want this treatment?" By employing professional substituted judgment resuscitators should recognise when the balance of benefit and harm becomes unfavourable from the patient's perspective and at this point they have a moral obligation to withdraw resuscitation as they can no longer presume the patient's consent. In this way the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and respect for patient autonomy are more favourably balanced than under other resuscitation decision making processes.

Ethics, Medical↗
PubMed2000

A little toleration, please.

Value pluralism does not imply relativism or subjectivism about values. What it does is allow respect for an at least limited toleration of values with which one may profoundly disagree. Thus a doctor can respect the autonomy of a patient whose values he does not share.

Cultural Diversity↗
PubMed1999

Posthumous reproduction and the meanings of autonomy.

In recent years there has been considerable debate over the legal and ethical issues associated with posthumous reproduction. This article analyses recent cases and legal regulation of reproductive technologies in Australia. The issues associated with posthumous reproduction are explored through a consideration of the nature of an individual's interest in their reproductive material. The suitability of a property-based model as a means of conceptualising interests in reproductive material is explored. The article concludes that the issues in this area need to be analysed in terms of autonomy interests that are understood relationally.

Australia↗
PubMed1994

Bioethics reformation style.

The Hippocratic model is inadequate because it is too paternalistic, argues Rebecca D. Pentz in her response to Cameron. Instead, we would do well to think of the patient/doctor relationship in Reformation terms, using the pastor/congregation relationship as a model. Rejecting Hippocratic paternalism is not tantamount to an assertion of absolute autonomy; it entails patient responsibility, shared with the physician.

Bioethics↗
PubMed1994

Scholarship, consensus and advocacy: a comment on Cameron.

While Cameron is right about the need for Christians to contribute more visibly to medical ethical debates, he is wrong in his analysis of bioethics. Marsha D.M. Fowler and Andrew Jameton find specific problems in several points of Cameron's argument, particularly where the Hippocratic Oath and patient autonomy are concerned.

Bioethics↗