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To assess the level of concordance between two published measures of dream bizarreness, 100 randomly selected dreams from 93 college students were scored for primary process using the Auld, Goldenberg, and Weiss scale and for dream distortion using Zepelin's scale. This analysis yielded a strong relationship between these measures, indicating adequate concurrent validity for the content analysis of the construct of dream bizarreness.
Drawings done by a patient before examination led to the suspicion of cataphasia, in view of previous experience of similar pictures drawn by verbigerate patients, and this proved to be so. We assume that the verbigerate affection of the thinking process is pictorially reflected in spontaneous casual drawing. In a less spontaneous situation, on other hand, the patient will not be so completely disorganised, and thus the author of an utterly confused drawing can still retain some measure of mental control in the course of tests.
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This article begins by looking at the way we try to construe or make sense of the world in which we live. How in the very nature of such sense-making there is the potential for sowing the seeds of self-deception by trying to fit our (relatively simplified) bipolar constructs to a complex unitary universe. Non-verbal and verbal construing are compared. Verbal construing enables us to reach an even more sophisticated level of self-deception, via myths created by limiting metaphors--such as "man-the-machine." The institutions which we create and the people who are invested in them tend to solidify in-group myths, often with the help of metaphor. It is argued that personal, constructivist, and eclectic approaches to psychotherapy can be envisaged as enterprises to begin the process of demythologising clients in the safety of the therapeutic setting. In therapy, clients can experiment with empowering themselves in reconstruing the problem areas of their lives and actively testing out these new constructions against personal experience. Clients can also learn to explore the meaning behind symptoms, i.e., to give cognitive form to feeling with the help of their intuitive sensitivity.
In Experiment 1 (N = 16), under conditions of high memory load (60 pictures and 50 paragraphs) and a 1-week retention interval, undergraduate subjects reported their memory for photographs of scenes (cued recall and free-recall tasks). Subjects frequently reported memory for photographs that they had actually never seen, but had read about in a brief paragraph. In Experiment 2 (N = 40), the same pattern of results was obtained with immediate testing. Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the likelihood of subjects falsely attributing scene memory (based on reading) to actually having viewed a photograph was reduced when metacognitive awareness of imaging during reading was made salient. Awareness of image creation was induced by requiring subjects to rate the paragraphs with respect to imagery vividness. Although other measures of memory remained the same, subjects in the induced-imagery condition made 50% fewer confusion errors than subjects who read the paragraphs without imagery instructions. The results are discussed in the context of Johnson and Raye's (1981) reality monitoring model.
Seven out of 17 patients interviewed in a long-term followup of psychoanalysis showed either improvement in psychological functioning or a retention of psychological gains they had made during the course of psychoanalysis. Six patients deteriorated in their psychological functioning, but their gains were restored with subsequent treatment. Four patients deteriorated in psychological functioning without restoration, whether or not treatment was reentered. Neither analysts' assessments at the time of termination nor patients' assessments of themselves or assessments based on psychological tests one year after termination predicted which patients would improve or retain psychological change. No causal generalizations about factors related to psychological change can be made from these data. Different factors in interaction are suggested to account for the stability and instability of psychological change.
Previous studies of children's understanding of big suggest a curvilinear trend. 3-year-olds, like adults, interpret big as referring to area, while 5-year-olds take big to mean tall. The results of 6 experiments indicate that the curvilinear trend is not obtained in all stimulus contexts. When objects vary extremely, younger and older children take big to mean tall. The object to which big is applied also influences whether height, length, or area is attended to. Moreover, in a production task, adults rarely used the work big to describe the stimuli with which children's understanding of big is typically tested. Taken together, the results suggest that the meaning and use of big is complex and that big may not at any age refer simply to the larger object. It is proposed that the meaning of big is a dynamic system driven by a multiple of perceptual, conceptual, and semantic influences.
The effects of two psychosocial treatments, Reality Orientation and Sheltered Workshops, were evaluated against an assessment-only control. Thirty nursing home residents (mean age, 64.4 years) were randomly assigned to one of two groups in one of the three experimental conditions. Residents assigned to therapy conditions met for 15 group sessions led by trained nursing home personnel. Program effects were assessed before and after treatment using three variables: the Life Satisfaction Index-A, nurses' ratings, and behavior observations. The Sheltered Workshop treatment produced significant gains in Life Satisfaction Index-A scores and staff perceived social interest; Reality Orientation resulted in nonsignificant decrements in Life Satisfaction Index-A scores. Neither treatment produced effects on observer-rated on-ward behavior. The results underscore the importance of empirically evaluating therapy effects with the institutionalized aging and suggest that Sheltered Workshops may be more beneficial for this population than has previously been recognized.
This research report summarizes the results of a study into the abilities of 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children to deceptively lead others into false beliefs, and is intended to help arbitrate a growing controversy as to when young persons first acquire some theory-like understanding of other minds. Utilizing a novel hide-and-seek board game as a context within which to observe children's spontaneous use of deceptive strategies, a total of 50 subjects between the ages of 2 1/2 and 5 were tested. In contrast to the competing findings of others, which are claimed to establish that children younger than approximately 4 suffer a cognitive deficit that wholly blocks them from the possibility of entertaining any sort of contrastive beliefs about beliefs, the results of this study show that even 2 1/2-year-olds are capable of already successfully employing a range of deceptive strategies that both trade upon an awareness of the possibility of false beliefs and presuppose some already operative theory of mind.
In 2 experiments we investigated trance logic, or the tolerance of logical incongruity, in age regression and hallucination. Experiment 1 tested 21 hypnotizable and 19 unhypnotizable subjects in an application of the real-simulating model of hypnosis. Experiment 2 tested 26 high and 19 low imagery ability subjects in an adaptation of the model to the imagination context. Subjects' experiences were investigated through the experiential analysis technique. More real than simulating subjects displayed trance logic during age regression, but they did not differ on the major measures of trance logic during hallucination. This pattern of responding occurred in both the hypnosis and the imagination contexts. Subjects' comments suggested that completeness of and belief in age regression or hallucination may play some role in trance logic. The importance of understanding trance logic from the subject's point of view is discussed.
The Leeds Technique for Therapy with the Aged is described and evaluated. The purpose of the study was two-fold--to evaluate the therapy itself, and to examine it as a possible extra incentive for nurses working with the aged. Forty-six elderly patients were included in the study. Fourteen took part in a pilot study. Later, in a more carefully controlled investigation, the remaining 32 patients were divided into two groups, one of experimental subjects and one of control subjects. Improvement was assessed using the Clifton Assessment Schedule (CAS) and the Stockton Geriatric Rating Scale (SGRS). Twenty-five of the 30 experimental subjects improved and 10 were discharged. Eight of the 16 control subjects improved, but none was discharged.
Twenty-three acute psychotic patients who were drug free at the time of testing performed a motor task designed to elicit many errors. Normal subjects and many of the psychotic patients were able to correct these errors in the absence of visual feedback. The ability to make such corrections depends on the subject knowing what response he has just made. Patients with experiences of alien control of their thoughts and actions who formed a subgroup of those classified as schizophrenic, were significantly less likely to make error corrections in the absence of visual feedback. This result is consistent with our previous suggestion (Frith, 1987) that these symptoms are a consequence of problems with the central monitoring of responses.
Several lines of investigation have evolved from the initial cognitive model of depression and other disorders. A large number of studies have tested the cognitive model using both clinical and laboratory-based strategies. In general, studies that most closely approximate the clinical conditions from which the theory was derived are supportive of the cognitive model of depression. Studies of anxiety and panic, although fewer, generally support the cognitive model of anxiety and panic. The application to the treatment of clinical problems has been promising and supports the concept of cognitive specificity. The cognitive therapy of depression has led to the utilization of specific cognitive strategies based on the specific conceptualizations of a given disorder to a wide variety of disorders. Study of abnormal reactions has also provided clues to the cognitive structure of normal reactions.
Recent research on the development of children's knowledge about the mind has shown that young 3-year-olds have difficulty inferring that another person holds a false belief about a matter of verifiable fact, even when provided with considerable help. 4 studies tested the hypothesis that they would have less difficulty inferring that another person holds an odd, nonnormative belief about a matter of taste or value--one which, like the false fact belief, they themselves do not hold. On fact-belief tasks, an experimenter acted as if, or even explicitly stated that, she believed that the contents of a container were other than what the children knew to be the case. On value-belief tasks, she behaved as if she believed that a stimulus had a good or bad taste, smell, or appearance, whereas they thought it had the opposite. The results of all 4 studies confirmed the hypothesis.
This article describes the evaluation of schizophrenia patients' maintenance of grip as a comprehensive assessment of the total psychosocial status of these patients. This evaluation was tested with new schizophrenic patients (DSM-III) who took part in a standardized interview at entry and after a 2-year follow-up. The interviews and examinations were conducted by the psychiatric teams responsible for the treatment of the patients. There was a clear positive correlation between the evaluation of maintenance of grip and interpersonal interaction, heterosexual development, hobbies, level of activity and productivity (working) of the patients, and a negative correlation with negative symptoms. The psychodynamically interpreted evaluation of the degree of regression correlated positively with maintenance of grip, but only after the 2-year follow-up. At entry the other variables describing the psychosocial status of the patient explained 22% of the variation in maintenance of grip, but 41% at the follow-up stage. The evaluation of maintenance of grip presented at baseline also predicted the coping of the patients during the follow-up stage. The authors recommend that the evaluation of maintenance of grip be used as an auxiliary tool in the assessment and treatment of schizophrenia patients.
Realizing that scientific knowledge was not based on a simple disclosure of reality, but was rather invented and developed in accordance with our own conceptions and prejudices, it should no longer be possible to consider matters as if they existed independently of us 'out there'. Taking as examples the notions of 'memory' and 'information' we try to elucidate the relevance this perspective has with respect to neuro- and psychophysiological research.
Although Gibson (1979) did not explicitly discuss the perspectival appearing of the ecological environment, his important ecological approach to visual perception can accommodate both (a) the stream of visual-perceptual experience that flows at the heart of the visual system's total activity of ordinary visual preceiving (ordinary seeing), and (b) the dimension of the visual experiential stream that is the ecological environment's perspectival appearing to the visual perceiver. In the present article, perspectival appearing is located at the level of brain centers of the visual system, where processes are determined by the spatiotemporally structured visual stimulus flux. And the stream of visual experience is interpreted as itself possessing a kind of perspective structure (as does the visual stimulus flux), including variant and invariant features that the visual system isolates and extracts from experience, producing the perceiver's cognitive visual "awareness-of" (Gibson, 1979) the environment and self in the environment.
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