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PubMed2004

Improving anesthesiologist performance through profiling and incentives.

STUDY OBJECTIVE: To determine the influence of profiling and incentives on anesthesiologist behavior in relation to several key indicators of performance. DESIGN: Prospective collection and analysis of operational data before and after implementation of a physician profiling, reporting, and incentive program. SETTING: University hospital. MEASUREMENTS: An intervention consisting of two components was studied with the intent of stimulating a high level of performance in relation to a peer group. The first component, a monthly report of physician performance via an individualized performance report, was provided to each physician for each of 6 months. The second component consisted of a financial incentive. For each month in the study, physicians were eligible to receive a variable financial incentive of between $0 and $500 per month depending on individual performance based scoring in relation to each other. Physician performance was tracked in five areas: 1) percentage of first cases of the day in the room at or before the scheduled in-room time, 2) percentage of cases with an anesthesia prep time less than a target, 3) percentage of cases delayed due to waiting for an anesthesiology patient evaluation, 4) percentage of cases delayed during the anesthesiology controlled time, and, 5) percentage of cases delayed due to waiting for the anesthesiology attending. Results were reported to each physician on a monthly basis, by e-mail distribution, of an individualized perioperative efficiency summary report. A monthly financial incentive was awarded to the top performing physicians in the form of a credit to the physician's personal CME/expense account. Also, all physicians received a rank order list of their performance on each indicator at the end of each month. MAIN RESULTS: 31 anesthesiologists, comprising the multispecialty division, and covering all services with the exception of obstetrics, pediatrics, and cardiothoracic anesthesia were tracked for 6 months. Compared to the first month, the percent of first cases of the day in the room at or before the scheduled start time and the percent of cases with an anesthesiology prep time less than target increased significantly (19 +/- 4.6%, vs. 61 +/- 6.5%, 95% CI, p <0.001; and 57 +/- 5.3%, vs. 73 +/- 5.1%, 95% CI, p <0 .001) during the sixth month. The mean number of cases per physician with a delay during anesthesiology controlled time decreased (14.9 +/- 2.9 vs. 3.3 +/- 1, p <0.001), no change occurred in the number of cases with a delay due to waiting for an anesthesiology patient evaluation or number of cases delayed due to waiting for the anesthesiology attending in the sixth month compared with the first month. CONCLUSION: Tracking and rewarding physician performance with monthly profiling and a financial incentive given to the best in a peer group improves anesthesiologist performance in several key areas.

Anesthesiology↗

PubMed2002

The effects of cash and lottery incentives on mailed surveys to physicians: a randomized trial.

Low response rates, especially among physicians, are a common problem in mailed survey research. We conducted a randomized trial to examine the effects of cash and lottery incentives on response rates. A total of 4,850 subjects were randomized to one of three interventions accompanying a mailed survey-no incentive (n = 1,700), cash payment [three levels of Hong Kong dollars (HKD) $10, $20, and $40; N = 50 in each subgroup], or entry into a lottery (three levels of HKD$1,000, $2,000, and $4,000; N = 1,000 in each subgroup) on receipt of the completed questionnaire. The response rates were higher among those offered incentives than those without (19.8% vs. 16.8%, P =.012). Cash was the more effective incentive compared to lottery (27.3% vs. 19.4%, P =.017). Response also increased substantially between the first and second mailings (14.2% vs. 18.8%, P >.001). In addition, those with specialist qualifications were more willing to participate in mailed surveys. We found no significant differences in response outcomes among the various incentive arms. Cash reward at the $20 level was the most cost-effective intervention, in terms of cost per responder. Further systematic examination of the effects of different incentive strategies in epidemiologic studies should be encouraged.

Adult↗

PubMed2004

Effect of prize draw incentive on the response rate to a postal survey of obstetricians and gynaecologists: a randomised controlled trial. [ISRCTN32823119].

BACKGROUND: Response rates to postal questionnaires are falling and this threatens the external validity of survey findings. We wanted to establish whether the incentive of being entered into a prize draw to win a personal digital assistant (PDA) would increase the response rate for a national survey of consultant obstetricians and gynaecologists. METHODS: A randomised controlled trial was conducted. This involved sending a postal questionnaire to all Consultant Obstetricians and Gynaecologists in the United Kingdom. Recipients were randomised to receiving a questionnaire offering a prize draw incentive (on response) or no such incentive. RESULTS: The response rate for recipients offered the prize incentive was 64% (461/716) and 62% (429/694) in the no incentive group (relative rate of response 1.04, 95% CI 0.96 - 1.13) CONCLUSION: The offer of a prize draw incentive to win a PDA did not significantly increase response rates to a national questionnaire survey of consultant obstetricians and gynaecologists.

Computers, Handheld↗

PubMed2003

Implementing health care reform in Israel: organizational response to perceived incentives.

Devising new incentives was a main element of health care reform in Israel, which created a regulated market that embodies many principles of managed competition. This study examined sick fund directors' perceptions of the new incentives and their strategic responses to these incentives, enabling the testing of how managed competition works in practice. The methodology used was a multiple case study of Israel's four sick funds. Data were gathered through in-depth interviews with 160 senior officials, analysis of national health insurance legislation, and analysis of published and unpublished archival documents, newspaper articles, public statements of senior managers, and other published data on the sick funds' behavior. The study revealed discrepancies between planned and perceived incentives and highlighted the effect of the latter on strategy formulation. Analysis of sick fund strategies showed that their responses to managed competition incentives deviated from theoretical expectations, compromising some of the objectives of the reform. The study also shows that contextual features account for the specific model of managed competition that was implemented and for the specific strategies employed by the sick funds. The study concludes by highlighting the need to build a process that will enable policy makers to consider local contextual factors when planning and implementing reform, involving health care providers in designing incentives, continuously monitoring processes and outcomes in the reformed system, and allowing for flexibility in policy making.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗

PubMed1994

Economic incentives and disincentives for efficient prescribing.

Efficient prescribing is a controversial concept when defined in economic terms. Such terms imply that neither the best nor the cheapest drug may be efficient. Efficiency depends on patient evaluations of outcomes--an essential, yet still underdeveloped, field of inquiry. Encouraging prescribing efficiency (once it is clear what efficient treatments are) may require the use of incentives, (economic and otherwise). Although physicians do react to economic incentives, encouraging them to also act as good economists rather than only as good healthcare providers may be difficult since economic efficiency goals may conflict with pure medical goals. While it is conceptually reasonable to assume that economic incentives will accomplish behavioural change, other (noneconomic) incentive mechanisms may appear less controversial. Since it is the result, not the process, that is important, a mix of incentives to achieve efficient solutions is suggested. However, further investigation into both health and economic outcomes research and debate on proper efficiency goals should precede the discussion of optimal incentives.

Cost-Benefit Analysis↗

PubMed2005

Decentralization strategies and provider incentives in healthcare: evidence from the english national health service.

INTRODUCTION: This article examines the incentive effects of delegating operational and financial decision making from central government to local healthcare providers. It addresses the economic consequences of a contemporary policy initiative in the English National Health Service (NHS)-earned autonomy. This policy entails awarding operational autonomy to 'front-line' organisations that are assessed to be meeting national performance targets. In doing so, it introduces new types of incentives into the healthcare system, changes the nature of established agency relationships and represents a novel approach to performance management. METHODS: Theoretical elements of a principal-agent model are used to examine the impact of decentralization in the context of the results of an empirical study that elicited the perceptions of senior hospital managers regarding the incentive effects of earned autonomy. A multi-method approach was adopted. In order to capture the breadth of policy impact, we conducted a national postal questionnaire survey of all Chief Executives in acute-care hospital Trusts in England (n = 173). To provide added depth and richness to our understanding of the impact and incentive effects of earned autonomy at an organisational level, we interviewed senior managers in a purposeful sample of eight acute-care hospital Trusts. RESULTS: This theoretical framework and our empirical work suggest that some aspects of the earned autonomy as currently implemented in the NHS serve to weaken the potential incentive effect of decentralization. In particular, the nature of the freedoms is such that many senior managers do not view autonomy as a particularly valuable prize. This suggests that incentives associated with the policy will be insufficiently powerful to motivate providers to deliver better performance. We also found that principal commitment may be a problem in the NHS. Some hospital managers reported that they already enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, regardless of their current performance ratings. We also found evidence that the objectives of providers may differ from those of both the central government and local purchasers. There is, therefore, a risk that granting greater autonomy will allow providers to pursue their own objectives which, whilst not self-serving, may still jeopardize the achievement of strategic goals. CONCLUSION: It is apparent that the design and implementation features of decentralizing policies such as earned autonomy require careful attention if an optimal balance is to be struck between central oversight and local autonomy in the delivery of healthcare.

Hospitals, Public↗

PubMed1999

Physicians' financial incentives in five dimensions: a conceptual framework for HMO managers.

A conceptual framework for HMO managers who are evaluating physicians' financial incentives proposes that the incentives vary along five dimensions: (1) the percentage of the physician's income at stake, (2) the organizational level, (3) the synergy between multiple financial incentives, (4) the synergy between financial and nonfinancial incentives, and (5) signaling effects. Managers can apply this framework to assess the intensity of physicians' financial incentives and to devise better incentives.

Capitation Fee↗

PubMed1995

The Department of Health and Human Services issues proposed regulations on physician incentive payments by hospitals.

Hospitals tempted to operate their own physician incentive plans are reminded that, under OBRA 1986, they are precluded from paying physician incentives of any kind to reduce or limit Medicare or Medicaid covered services. In light of the proposed regulations and the guidance of the preamble, hospitals should review their incentive plans to determine whether physicians providing direct patient care are receiving prohibited payments. Further, supervising physicians who are receiving incentives for certain hospital departments may not influence direct care over patients served by those departments, even through other physicians. Some risk may also exist if incentives are based on a formula that considers patients of the supervising physician's medical group. Finally, it may be useful to develop a utilization and quality of care review program specifically designed to assure that patient undertreatment does not occur as a result of any supervising physician incentive program.

Legislation, Hospital↗

PubMed1985

Monetary incentive for pharmacists to control drug costs.

An incentive program that paid hospital pharmacists at United Hospitals Incorporated (UHI) and Children's Hospital Incorporated (CHI) a percentage of the money saved by the pharmacy on drug and i.v. expenses in 1984 is described. Hospital administration, as part of a hospitalwide incentive program, approved the pharmacy department's proposal for a monetary incentive program. Pharmacy managers hoped that, by rewarding all pharmacists for their efforts to control costs, they could potentiate other cost-containment programs (stronger formulary control and improved purchasing and inventory control) and improve clinical services while maintaining quality of care. The incentive calculation was derived from the percentage of expenses saved on drugs and i.v. solutions and sets relative to budget. The payout, to be applied to 1984 salaries of pharmacists, could not exceed 10% of salary or more than 35% of the total savings to the hospital. A screening mechanism was established to protect the hospital from paying an incentive if the total pharmacy expenses exceeded budget. In fiscal 1984, drug and i.v. expenses per adjusted case decreased 1.55%, which led to each full-time pharmacist receiving an average payout of $500. This payout was less than had been anticipated because of a nursing strike at other hospitals, which resulted in an influx of intensive-care patients. The monetary incentive program for pharmacists is a useful tool for controlling drug and i.v. expenses and for rewarding pharmacists for successful cost-saving approaches.

Cost Control↗

PubMed1987

Procuring incentives for community health promotion programs.

Many community health promotion programs have used incentives to encourage participation and to reward health behavior change. To minimize expenses and to enhance a sense of shared responsibility, a number of projects have turned to community merchants as a source of incentives. This study investigated the relative effectiveness of solicitation methods used to procure incentives from local merchants for community health promotion programs. The effect of setting, i.e. level of urban development, and type of business were also analyzed in terms of procurement rates. Two hundred and eighteen merchants were solicited to gain incentives for two programs. Twenty-four incentives were procured at a total value of $480. Telemarketing and face-to-face contact had similar procurement rates, restaurants were by far the type of business most likely to donate, and rural merchants provided incentives significantly more often than urban merchants, while developing urban area merchants' donation rates were midway in between. Telemarketing was the solicitation method clearly most cost effective.

California↗

PubMed2006

The debate over dopamine's role in reward: the case for incentive salience.

INTRODUCTION: Debate continues over the precise causal contribution made by mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward. There are three competing explanatory categories: 'liking', learning, and 'wanting'. Does dopamine mostly mediate the hedonic impact of reward ('liking')? Does it instead mediate learned predictions of future reward, prediction error teaching signals and stamp in associative links (learning)? Or does dopamine motivate the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli ('wanting')? Each hypothesis is evaluated here, and it is suggested that the incentive salience or 'wanting' hypothesis of dopamine function may be consistent with more evidence than either learning or 'liking'. In brief, recent evidence indicates that dopamine is neither necessary nor sufficient to mediate changes in hedonic 'liking' for sensory pleasures. Other recent evidence indicates that dopamine is not needed for new learning, and not sufficient to directly mediate learning by causing teaching or prediction signals. By contrast, growing evidence indicates that dopamine does contribute causally to incentive salience. Dopamine appears necessary for normal 'wanting', and dopamine activation can be sufficient to enhance cue-triggered incentive salience. Drugs of abuse that promote dopamine signals short circuit and sensitize dynamic mesolimbic mechanisms that evolved to attribute incentive salience to rewards. Such drugs interact with incentive salience integrations of Pavlovian associative information with physiological state signals. That interaction sets the stage to cause compulsive 'wanting' in addiction, but also provides opportunities for experiments to disentangle 'wanting', 'liking', and learning hypotheses. Results from studies that exploited those opportunities are described here. CONCLUSION: In short, dopamine's contribution appears to be chiefly to cause 'wanting' for hedonic rewards, more than 'liking' or learning for those rewards.

Animals↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Improving treatment outcomes for pregnant drug-dependent women using low-magnitude voucher incentives.

The aim of this study was to examine the effectiveness of low-magnitude behavioral incentives in improving attendance for abstinence-treated patients and sustaining illicit-drug abstinence for methadone-treated patients. Subjects were randomly assigned to either incentive or control conditions, with target behaviors differing for the two patient groups (attendance for abstinence-treated and abstinence for methadone-treated patients). Controls received no incentives, whereas incentive subjects could earn $5/day in vouchers during the first 7 days of an intensive outpatient treatment. Results showed that $5/day did not significantly improve attendance in abstinence-treated patients or impact drug abstinence in methadone-treated patients. The data suggest that low-magnitude voucher incentives enhanced treatment attendance by methadone-treated subjects. Although modest monetary incentives had some utility in improving attendance in methadone-treated patients, more potent interventions are needed to improve attendance and maintain abstinence in this high-risk population.

Ambulatory Care↗

PubMed2003

A randomized controlled trial of monetary incentives vs. outreach to enhance adherence to the hepatitis B vaccine series among injection drug users.

BACKGROUND: Injection drug users (IDUs) are at high-risk for hepatitis B virus (HBV) and HIV. Due to concerns about non-adherence to multi-dose vaccine regimens however, IDUs are severely under-immunized against HBV and have been excluded from phase III trials of multi-dose candidate HIV vaccines in the United States. METHODS: Through a randomized controlled trial, we compared the effectiveness of monetary incentives versus outreach to improve IDUs' adherence to the 3-dose hepatitis B vaccine. In 1998-1999, HBV-susceptible IDUs were recruited from San Francisco streets. Eligible participants received their first dose of vaccine and were randomized to either receive monthly monetary incentives (n=48) or maintain weekly contact with an outreach worker (n=48) during the 6-month vaccine series. RESULTS: All 3 doses of vaccine were received by 33 (69%) of IDUs in the monetary incentive arm and 11 (23%) in the outreach arm (odds ratio=13.8; 95% confidence interval, 2.9, 128; P<0.0001). In a multivariate model, receiving monetary incentives was independently associated with vaccine completion (AOR=10.3; 95% CI=3.7, 29.0). CONCLUSIONS: Among IDUs, monetary incentives are superior to outreach in achieving adherence to the multi-dose hepatitis B vaccine series. Monetary incentives may be adapted to future multi-dose candidate HIV vaccine trials in IDUs.

Adult↗

PubMed2000

Economic aspect of health care systems. Advantage and disadvantage incentives in different systems.

European health care delivery systems illustrate the effect of economic incentives on health care delivery. Each country faces the issue of trying to balance the desire for economic efficiency with comprehensive, quality medical care. Without careful use of economic incentives achievable with central control, one gets to pick only two of the three desired goods--high quality, low cost, and comprehensive coverage. In the United States, payment approaches for health care have been undergoing tremendous changes since the early 1980s. These changes have escalated during the 1990s. The basic approach for reimbursing hospital care has been completely restructured by many payers for care, and payment approaches for physicians and long-term care providers also are being restructured. Financing approaches vary from provider to provider and payer to payer, and financing approaches will continue to evolve over time. In the traditional fee-for-service reimbursement system, the incentive to physicians is to do more because more services lead to more revenue. The use of incentives to influence health care practitioners' behavior is common. Incentives are generally financial in nature and expose health care providers to some risk or reward for certain patterns of behavior. Some common incentives used in managed care include capitation payment, in which a physician is paid a fixed fee, regardless of the number of services administered; bonus distribution; and withhold accounts, through which a practitioner stands to gain or lose some amount of money for overuse or underuse of medical resources against budget. In many countries, a strengthening of the position of primary care providers can be observed: Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and now the United States. General practitioners are assumed to function as a gatekeeper to second-line care, such as specialist care, prescription drugs, and hospital care. A further step is to give the primary care providers financial responsibility for the costs of the follow-up care provided by others to their patients. By examining the health care systems of other countries, the potential negative impact of such an approach on the use of specialists can be seen. The negative impact of these approaches on patient care is clear when dermatologists and general practitioners are compared in the delivery of dermatologic health care.

Delivery of Health Care↗

PubMed2003

Unconditioned sexual incentive motivation in the male Norway rat (Rattus norvegicus).

Sexual incentive motivation was evaluated in a procedure consisting of a large open field where incentive animals were confined behind wire mesh openings. When sexually inexperienced male rats (Rattus norvegicus) were exposed to the receptive female-male incentives, they spent more time close to the female. If the incentives were receptive female-nonreceptive female, the receptive female was preferred. However, when the alternatives were nonreceptive female-male, no preference was obtained. Castration abolished preference for the receptive female, and treatment with testosterone propionate restored it. Estradiol plus oil is as efficient as estradiol plus progesterone for giving the ovariectomized female incentive properties. The living female can be replaced with female odor. Sexual experience did not have any long-term effects on the female's incentive value, but immediately preceding limited sexual activity enhanced it

Analysis of Variance↗

PubMed2004

Ethics in human subjects research: do incentives matter?

There is considerable confusion regarding the ethical appropriateness of using incentives in research with human subjects. Previous work on determining whether incentives are unethical considers them as a form of undue influence or coercive offer. We understand the ethical issue of undue influence as an issue, not of coercion, but of corruption of judgment. By doing so we find that, for the most part, the use of incentives to recruit and retain research subjects is innocuous. But there are some instances where it is not. Specifically, incentives become problematic when conjoined with the following factors, singly or in combination with one another: where the subject is in a dependency relationship with the researcher, where the risks are particularly high, where the research is degrading, where the participant will only consent if the incentive is relatively large because the participant's aversion to the study is strong, and where the aversion is a principled one. The factors we have identified and the kinds of judgments they require differ substantially from those considered crucial in most previous discussions of the ethics of employing incentives in research with human subjects.

Decision Making↗

PubMed2004

Incentives in smoking cessation: status of the field and implications for research and practice with pregnant smokers.

We review the rationale and empirical evidence for the use of incentive and contingency management strategies for smoking cessation. Plausible theoretical rationales exist for the application of these strategies to smoking cessation, and a great deal of research with illicit drug users in laboratory or controlled treatment settings suggests such strategies can be effective. Contingency management methods have been effective in modifying smoking behavior in volunteers not seeking cessation assistance in highly controlled settings. Incentives have been used primarily as a component of worksite interventions, in community-wide quit-and-win programs, in quasiexperimental and experimental trials, and more recently with low-income pregnant women. Worksite studies have rarely been designed to isolate the impact of incentives. Nevertheless, they appear to be useful in these settings especially in increasing participation and increasing awareness about the deleterious effects of smoking. Quit-and-win programs are used widely in the United States and internationally and appear to attract many participants and produce modest quit rates. The quality of the evaluations of quit-and-win programs varies considerably, and none has employed rigorous control or comparison groups to sufficiently identify the effect of incentives. Recent controlled studies have yielded promising results with pregnant smokers, and larger trials are in progress. We discuss key methodological issues in mounting and evaluating incentive interventions, particularly during pregnancy, and discuss the practical and ethical issues arising from the use of incentives.

Adult↗

PubMed1996

Combining operant-baseline-derived conditioned excitors and inhibitors from the same and different incentive classes: an investigation of appetitive-aversive interactions.

The dynamics of appetitive-aversive interaction theory were assayed in an experiment where excitors and inhibitors from the same and different incentive classes were compounded. Excitatory and inhibitory incentive properties acquired by the discriminative stimuli resulted from the reinforcement differences between components of four-component multiple training schedules, with the influence of competing peripheral responses factored into the design. Rats' barpressing was maintained in tone and in click by food or free-operant shock avoidance; extinction was programmed in click-plus-light and in the simultaneous absence of tone, click, and light. In Test 1, an excitor that occasioned operant responding and an inhibitor that occasioned response cessation were compounded. Here, compounding an inhibitor with an excitor from the same incentive class reduced responding significantly more than did compounding an inhibitor with an excitor from the other incentive class. In Test 2, the compounds consisted of elements that individually occasioned operant responding. Here, compounding stimuli that were excitors from different incentive classes appeared to create reciprocal inhibition that counteracted the additive effects produced when these stimuli were excitors from the same incentive class. Predictions from appetitive-aversive interaction theory and Weiss' two-factor model of stimulus control were confirmed within this experimental design, where all conditioning was a by-product of the behavioural contingencies programmed on the operant baselines.

Animals↗