Medicaid and indigent care issue brief: Medicaid: benefits and services: year end report-2004.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · PubMed Health
Explore indexed PubMed citations for clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health research. Read source abstracts and follow each citation to its original PubMed record.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
There have been a number of attempts, particularly in the last five decades to understand the origins of pain in terms of psychological or psychosomatic patterns. These include psychoanalytic explanations relying on hysterical mechanisms, and psychophysiological proposals. The occurrence of pain in the course of psychiatric illness and its remission after the illness, has long been known and is not a controversial issue. However, the reported explanations of pain without overt and obvious prior psychiatric illness have largely failed to convince a significant portion of the professional establishment. These explanations have very often coincided with the interests of insurance companies, whether those insurance companies were providing medical benefits, disability insurance or workers' or accident compensation. Critical examination of the evidence generated by insurance company related research indicates profound weaknesses in it.
The effects of retiree health insurance on the decision to retire have not been examined until recently. It is an area of increasing significance because of rising health care costs for retirees, the uncertain future of Medicare, and increased life expectancy. In general, studies suggest that individual retirement decisions are strongly responsive to the availability of retiree health insurance. Early retiree benefits and retirement behavior are also important because they may affect the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program. It is not apparent that if a person loses retiree health benefits, or if fewer people are eligible for retiree health benefits in general, claims for DI will increase. The potential 2-year loss of health benefits may be a deterrent to leaving the labor force and claiming DI, although persons who are unable to work would leave the labor force even without health benefits. In order to understand how the decline in retiree health benefits may affect enrollment in DI, analysts must at least incorporate the role of coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). That act provides many people with access to health insurance during the 2-year gap between eligibility for DI and Medicare. In fact, persons with sufficient means to retire early could use the income from Disability Insurance to buy COBRA coverage during the first 2 years of DI coverage. Determining the effect of the erosion of retiree health benefits on DI must account properly for the role of other factors that affect DI eligibility and participation. The financial incentives of Social Security, pension plans, retirement savings programs, health status, the availability of health insurance, and other factors influencing retirement decisions must be taken fully into account in order to isolate the precise effect of retiree health benefits.
If a life insurance company provided free radon tests to clients, clients' life expectancies would be extended and profits would thereby be increased. This effect is quantified and it is found that the direct monetary benefits to the company could be substantial. Several subsidiary advantages are also discussed.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Patients and physicians often perceive the current health care system to be unfair, in part because of the ways in which coverage decisions appear to be made. To address this problem the Ethical Force Program, a collaborative effort to create quality improvement tools for ethics in health care, has developed five content areas specifying ethical criteria for fair health care benefits design and administration. Each content area includes concrete recommendations and measurable expectations for performance improvement, which can be used by those organizations involved in the design and administration of health benefits packages, such as purchasers, health plans, benefits consultants, and practitioner groups.
OBJECTIVE: To determine whether a nonresponse bias exists in the offer rate for health benefits in firms with fewer than 50 workers and to present a simple adjustment to correct for observed bias. DATA SOURCES: The 2003 Employer Health Benefits Survey (EHBS) conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, and a follow-up survey of nonrespondents to the 2003 EHBS. STUDY DESIGN: We conducted a follow-up survey to the 2003 EHBS to collect health benefits offering data from firms with fewer than 50 workers. We used McNemar's test to verify that the follow-up survey provided results comparable to the EHBS, and t-tests were used to determine nonresponse bias. We applied a simple weighting adjustment to the EHBS. DATA COLLECTION: The data for both the EHBS and the follow-up survey were collected by the same survey research firm. The EHBS interviews the person most knowledgeable about the firm's health benefits, while the follow-up survey interviews the first person who answers the telephone whether they are the most knowledgeable or not. Principal Findings. Firms with 3-9 workers were more likely to exhibit a bias than were firms with 10-24 workers and 25-49 workers. Although the calculated bias for each size category was not significant, there is sufficient evidence to warrant caution when reporting offer rates. CONCLUSIONS: Survey nonresponse in the EHBS produces an upward bias on estimates for the offer rates of small firms. Although not significant, this upward bias is because of nonresponse by small firms that do not offer health benefits. Our research is limited in that we only control for differences in the size of the firm.
OBJECTIVE: . To examine the effect of premiums and benefits on the health plan choices of older enrollees who choose Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) health plans as their primary payer. DATA SOURCES: Administrative enrollment data from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and plan premiums and benefits data taken from the Checkbook Guide to health plans. STUDY DESIGN: We estimate individual plan choice models where the choice of health plan is a function of out-of-pocket premium, actuarial value, plan attributes, and individual characteristics. Plan attributes include plan structure (fee-for-service/preferred provider organization, point-of-service, or health maintenance organization), drug benefit structure, and whether or not the plan covers other types of spending such as dental services and diabetic supplies. The models are estimated by conditional logit. Our study focuses on three populations that currently choose FEHBP as their primary health care coverage and are similar to the Medicare population: current employees and retirees who are approaching the age of Medicare eligibility (ages 60-64) and current federal employees age 65+. Current employees age 65+ are eligible for Medicare, but their FEHBP plan is their primary payer. Retirees and employees 60-64 are not yet eligible for Medicare but are similar in many respects to recently age-eligible Medicare beneficiaries. We also estimate our model for current employees age 55 and younger as a comparison group. DATA COLLECTION METHODS: We select a random sample of retirees and employees age 60-64, as well as all current employees age 65+, from the OPM administrative database for the calendar year 2001. The plan choices available to each person are determined by the plans participating in their metropolitan statistical area. We match plan premium and attribute information from the Checkbook Guide to each plan in the enrollee's list of choices. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We find that current workers 65+, 60-64, and non-Medicare eligible retirees are sensitive to variation in plan premiums. The premium elasticities for these groups are similar in magnitude to those of the age 55 and under employee group. Older workers and retirees not yet eligible for Medicare are willing to pay a substantial amount for plans with open provider networks. The willingness to pay for open networks is significantly greater for these groups than for younger employees. Willingness to pay for open network plans varies significantly by income, but varies little by age within group. CONCLUSIONS: Our finding that older workers and non-Medicare eligible retirees are sensitive to plan premiums suggests that choice-based reform of Medicare would lead to cost-conscious choices by Medicare beneficiaries. However, our finding that these groups are willing to pay more for open network plans than younger employees suggest that higher risk individuals may migrate toward higher benefit, higher cost plans. Our findings on the relationship between income and willingness to pay for open network plans suggest that means testing is a viable reform for lowering Medicare program costs.
Concerns about attracting disproportionate numbers of employees with alcohol problems limit employers' willingness to offer health plans with generous alcohol treatment benefits. This paper analyzes two potential avenues of adverse selection, namely biased enrollment into plans and biased exit from plans offered by 57 employers between 1991 and 1997. We compare alcohol treatment use rates and costs of new and old enrollees between more generous and less generous plans; we also analyze disenrollment rates and enrollment duration by plan generosity for users and nonusers of alcohol treatment services. To avoid confounding benefit generosity with other plan features, in particular the use of managed care mechanisms, we compare plans that were administered in the same way by a large managed behavioral health care organization. Overall, we find no evidence of adverse selection into more generous plans. Contrary to the selection hypothesis, treatment costs of new members compared to old members are lower in firms with more generous treatment benefits than in firms with more limited benefits. Also, users of alcohol treatment services do not remain disproportionately enrolled longer in plans with generous benefits.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Both the oldest and the newest form of health care, home care is popular with cost managers and patients, but the subject of debate among wary third-party payers. In a frank message to employers, the Executive Director of the Illinois Council of Home Health Services tells how home care can benefit the fastest-growing employee subgroups and how those advantages translate to significant employer gains.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
With the passage of the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA), Congress took an important first step toward equalizing treatment under medical plans between physical and mental illnesses by requiring parity in annual and lifetime dollar limits between physical and mental illness. But the Act was limited in scope: it did not mandate mental health benefits nor prohibit other common types of differentials between physical and mental illnesses, such as higher cost-sharing or lower limits on outpatient visits or inpatient treatments. Before Congress' action in 1996, a few of the states had adopted some type of parity requirement. Since 1996, state parity activity has accelerated.Recently, the Center for Health Services Research and Policy through a grant from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, examined contracts providing for mental health benefits for state employees in eight states to assess whether legislative attempts to require parity between physical and mental illnesses resulted in noticeable differences in behavioral health benefits for state employees. We concluded that, except in states that have mandated full parity for some or all types of mental illnesses, behavioral health benefits for state employees have not changed significantly as a result of the state parity laws, since they still remain subject to traditional restrictions, such as higher cost-sharing and greater limitations on outpatient visits and inpatient treatment days, than those imposed on physical illnesses. Thus the considerable state activity surrounding mental health parity may have little effect on state employees' access to mental health services, since although state laws required parity in dollar limitations, they generally permitted the continuation of other plan design features that are more restrictive for mental health coverage. However, many of the contracts we examined were multi-year contract and may not have fully reflected recent state activity. Moreover, if Congress renews the Mental Health Parity Act when it expires in September, 2001, and expands the scope of the Act to cover some of these other plan design features, states with more limited parity laws are likely to follow. In that case, perhaps state employees with mental illnesses may see significant change in the future.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.