PubMed Health⌕ Search

SEARCH · PubMed Health

Results for “Containment of Biohazards”

Explore indexed PubMed citations for clinical trials, systematic reviews and public health research. Read source abstracts and follow each citation to its original PubMed record.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 127 records · Page 7Linked to original sources
PubMed1993

Planetary quarantine in the solar system. Survival rates of some terrestrial organisms under simulated space conditions by proton irradiation.

We have been studying the survival rates of some species of terrestrial unicellular and multicellular organism (viruses, bacteria, yeasts, fungi, algae, etc.) under simulated interstellar conditions, in connection with planetary quarantine. The interstellar environment in the solar system has been simulated by low temperature, high vacuum (77 K, 4 x 10(-8) torr), and proton irradiation from a Van de Graaff generator. After exposure to a barrage of protons corresponding to about 250 years of irradiation in solar space, tobacco mosaic virus, Bacillus subtilis spores, Staphylococcus aureus, Micrococcus flavus, Aspergillus niger spores, and Clostridium mangenoti spores showed survival rates of 82, 45, 74, 13, 28, and 25%, respectively.

Bacteria↗
PubMed1984

Biotechnology and its public.

The author provides a perspective on three key areas of biotechnology: the public debate over hazards, the commercialization of the technology, and ethical issues that are arising in terms of application of genetic therapy to humans. He reviews the history of the recombinant DNA research debate beginning at Asilomar in 1975, when the molecular biologists called for a temporary moratorium on certain experiments, so the NIH might develop guidelines to govern this research. The author then characterizes the lobbying activities of the biologists against proposed regulation at the federal, state and local level. Despite the lobbying, he concludes that Congress did not enact legislation because of the exemplary behavior of the biologists, beginning with their meeting at Asilomar. The author next describes the impact commercialization of this technology will have on academic biologists who traditionally have not been involved in that process (as have chemists and physicists). He also comments on the ethics of biotechnology, concluding that the more powerful biology becomes, the more its uses and some control of those uses will be debated.

Biotechnology↗
PubMed1983

Revised methods for the Salmonella mutagenicity test.

The methods for detecting carcinogens and mutagens with the Salmonella mutagenicity test were described previously (Ames et al., 1975b). The present paper is a revision of the methods. Two new tester strains, a frameshift strain (TA97) and a strain carrying an ochre mutation on a multicopy plasmid (TA102), are added to the standard tester set. TA97 replaces TA1537. TA1535 and TA1538 are removed from the recommended set but can be retained at the option of the investigator. TA98 and TA100 are retained. We discuss other special purpose strains and present some minor changes in procedure, principally in the growth, storage, and preservation of the tester strains. Two substitutions are made in diagnostic mutagens to eliminate MNNG and 9-aminoacridine. Some test modifications are discussed.

Animals↗
PubMed1995

Evaluation of the E. coli ribosomal rrnB P1 promoter and phage-derived lysis genes for the use in a biological containment system: a concept study.

A concept study devised for the development of a biological containment system has been conducted. We show that the lysis genes of different phage origin function in a variety of bacteria. They may therefore be suited for conditional suicide cassettes. Moreover, we tested whether the Escherichia coli rrnB P1 promoter could function as an environmentally responsive element sensing poor growth conditions expected after an accidental release of E. coli production strains from a bioreactor. Mimicking poor nutrient conditions by production of the alarmone guanosine tetraphosphate (ppGpp) with a plasmid encoded ppGpp synthetase I, the rrnB P1 promoter activity was completely turned off. These experiments suggested that the rrnB P1 promoter may be used as an efficient biosensor for altered growth conditions. A concept for a conditional suicide system employing the rrnB P1 promoter and phage-derived lysis genes as key components is discussed.

Amino Acid Sequence↗
PubMed1984

Revised planetary protection policy for solar system exploration.

In order to control contamination of planets by terrestrial microorganisms and organic constituents, U.S. planetary missions have been governed by a planetary protection (or planetary quarantine) policy which has changed little since 1972. This policy has recently been reviewed in light of new information obtained from planetary exploration during the past decade and because of changes to, or uncertainties in, some parameters used in the existing quantitative approach. On the basis of this analysis, a revised planetary protection policy with the following key features is proposed: deemphasizing the use of mathematical models and quantitative analyses; establishing requirements for target planet/mission type (i.e., orbiter, lander, etc.) combinations; considering sample return missions a separate category; simplifying documentation; and imposing implementing procedures (i.e., trajectory biasing, cleanroom assembly, spacecraft sterilization, etc.) by exception, i.e., only if the planet/mission combination warrants such controls.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1989

Planetary protection policy overview and application to future missions.

The 1967 treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space reflected both concerns associated with the unknown nature of the space environment and the desire of the world scientific community to preserve the pristine nature of celestial objects until such times as they could be studied in an effective manner. Since 1967, NASA has issued policy directives that have adopted the guidelines of COSPAR for protecting the planets from contamination by Earth organisms and for protecting the Earth from the unknown. This paper presents the current status of planetary protection (quarantine) policy within NASA, and a prospectus on how planetary protection and back contamination issues might be addressed in relation to future missions envisioned for development by NASA either independently, or in cooperation with the space agencies of other nations.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1989

Planetary protection issues for sample return missions.

Sample return missions from a comet nucleus and the Mars surface are currently under study in the US, USSR, and by ESA. Guidance on Planetary Protection (PP) issues is needed by mission scientists and engineers for incorporation into various elements of mission design studies. Although COSPAR has promulgated international policy on PP for various classes of solar system exploration missions, the applicability of this policy to sample return missions, in particular, remains vague. In this paper, we propose a set of implementing procedures to maintain the scientific integrity of these samples. We also propose that these same procedures will automatically assure that COSPAR-derived PP guidelines are achieved. The recommendations discussed here are the first step toward development of official COSPAR implementation requirements for sample return missions.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1992

Planetary Protection Policy (U.S.A.).

Through existing treaty obligations of the United States, NASA is committed to exploring space while avoiding biological contamination of the planets, and to the protection of the Earth against harm from materials returned from space. Because of the similarities between Mars and Earth, plans for the exploration of Mars evoke discussions of these Planetary Protection issues. US Planetary Protection Policy will be focused on the preservation of these goals in an arena that will change with the growth of scientific knowledge about the martian environment. Early opportunities to gain the appropriate data will be used to guide later policy implementation. Because human presence on Mars will result in the end of Earth's separation from the martian environment, it is expected that precursor robotic missions will address critical planetary protection concerns before humans arrive.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1992

Space experiment on behaviors of treefrog.

Japanese treefrogs (Hyla japonica) are planned to be sent to the space station MIR. Experimental system was developed to observe their behaviors under microgravity.

Animals↗
PubMed1996

Refinement of planetary protection policy for Mars missions.

Under existing COSPAR policy adopted in 1984, missions to Mars (landers, probes, and some orbiters) are designated as Category IV missions. As such, the procedures for implementing planetary protection requirements could include trajectory biasing, cleanrooms, bioload reduction, sterilization of hardware, and bioshields. In 1992, a U.S. National Research Council study recommended that controls on forward contamination of Mars be tied to specific mission objectives. The report recommended that Mars landers with life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization procedures for bioload reduction, while spacecraft (including orbiters) without life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level pre-sterilization procedures for bioload reduction but need not be sterilized. In light of this, it is proposed that the current policy's Category IV and its planetary protection requirements be divided into two sub-categories as follows: Category IVa, for missions comprising landers and probes without life detection experiments, which will meet a specified bioburden limit for exposed surfaces, and Category IVb, for landers and probes with life detection experiments, which will require sterilization of landed systems. In addition, Category III orbiter mission specifications are expanded to be consistent with these recommendations.

Containment of Biohazards↗