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PubMed1995

Proposal for Canadian-style single-payer health care receives cool reception in US.

Is health care reform dead in the US? It may be, if the reception given President Clinton's reform plan and a proposal for a single-payer program in California is any indication. There has been a dramatic move to the right south of the border, where people have lined up to oppose "big government" and additional government programs. Still, American proponents of a single-payer program similar to Canada's insist that the battle for reform is not yet over.

Canada↗

PubMed2003

Proposal of the Physicians' Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance.

The United States spends more than twice as much on health care as the average of other developed nations, all of which boast universal coverage. Yet more than 41 million Americans have no health insurance. Many more are underinsured. Confronted by the rising costs and capabilities of modern medicine, other nations have chosen national health insurance (NHI). The United States alone treats health care as a commodity distributed according to the ability to pay, rather than as a social service to be distributed according to medical need. In this market-driven system, insurers and providers compete not so much by increasing quality or lowering costs, but by avoiding unprofitable patients and shifting costs back to patients or to other payers. This creates the paradox of a health care system based on avoiding the sick. It generates huge administrative costs that, along with profits, divert resources from clinical care to the demands of business. In addition, burgeoning satellite businesses, such as consulting firms and marketing companies, consume an increasing fraction of the health care dollar. We endorse a fundamental change in US health care--the creation of an NHI program. Such a program, which in essence would be an expanded and improved version of traditional Medicare, would cover every American for all necessary medical care. An NHI program would save at least 200 billion dollars annually (more than enough to cover all of the uninsured) by eliminating the high overhead and profits of the private, investor-owned insurance industry and reducing spending for marketing and other satellite services. Physicians and hospitals would be freed from the concomitant burdens and expenses of paperwork created by having to deal with multiple insurers with different rules, often designed to avoid payment. National health insurance would make it possible to set and enforce overall spending limits for the health care system, slowing cost growth over the long run. An NHI program is the only affordable option for universal, comprehensive coverage.

Cost Control↗

PubMed2000

Why single payer? Why now?

US health care costs are the highest in the world and are again rising. A reopening of debate on health care reform is imminent. More than 44 million Americans have no health insurance, an increase of 11 million people since 1989. Although women have been slightly more likely to have health insurance than men, recent declines in Medicaid enrollment resulting from welfare reform are eroding this slim advantage. Being uninsured is associated with compromised access to primary care and an increased risk of dying. At least 29 million Americans are underinsured; although they have some insurance, they would nonetheless be bankrupted by a major illness. A single-payer national health insurance system would cover all Americans in a non-profit, tax-funded system similar to Social Security. It would simplify health administration, saving at least $100 billion annually on paperwork and redirecting that money to patient care.

Female↗

PubMed1998

The need for single-payer catastrophic health insurance.

Both physicians and patients are becoming increasingly frustrated with the decreasing flexibility of our health-care system. Forty-one million citizens remain uninsured while ill patients in managed-care plans find themselves subject to bureaucratic hurdles in attempting to obtain necessary care. Rather than relying on the market place to provide affordable insurance to patients, physicians should embrace single-payer catastrophic coverage. A government insurance program should be enacted that covers all medical bills that exceed a $15,000 deductible annually for families and a $10,000 deductible annually for individuals. Patients could then purchase plans through the private sector to cover these deductibles. While such a plan would require a tax increase, premiums would decrease, health insurance would become more affordable to low wage earners, and more treatment decisions would be made by physicians and patients.

Connecticut↗

PubMed1993

Reimbursement issues facing patients, providers, and payers.

Escalating costs of health care delivery and the current constraints imposed by the federal budget deficit seriously threaten to compromise patient care and innovative biomedical research. Recent third-party refusal to cover some patients treated in protocols has had considerable impact on trial research. In addition, reimbursement for conventional care sometimes has been refused if delivered as part of a study (e.g., MOPP therapy versus ABVD therapy) or for an indication that is not specifically cited on the Food and Drug Administration label. Who should cover the patient care costs of patients participating in clinical trials? One approach would have patients cover these costs themselves. A second approach is the reinstitution of patient care costs into research grants. A third possibility is that the pharmaceutical industry support patient care costs of clinical research. Historically, hospital expenses of patients participating in studies have been paid by health insurance policies. In the absence of a clinical trial, many patients would be treated with Food and Drug Administration-approved therapies despite a lack of substantial benefit. Such marginal treatments are compensated by third-party payers routinely. The current system is arbitrary and expensive, compromises research and development, and equates new treatment with no treatment. By refusing to reimburse the patient care costs of investigational therapy, third-party carriers are, in fact, making medical decisions. There is a growing and legitimate concern that the pace of clinical research will be impeded significantly at a time when many exciting developments will be ready for clinical trials. The molecular steps in carcinogenesis are being documented rapidly for common malignancies, such as colon cancer. Immunologic, biologic, and hormonal approaches, and emerging technologies, such as marrow transplant or antibody toxin conjugates, already are being studied in the clinic. Health policy legislation and decisions by the insurance industry have a direct impact on physicians, facilitating, or often impeding, the care physicians are able to provide. Who makes health policy decisions? Increasingly, these decisions are being made not by physicians, but by public health experts, economists, and, more recently, large industries grappling with the cost of providing insurance coverage (and its effects on competitive pricing in a world market). Therefore, physicians need to position themselves to influence the development of medical policy, particularly as it relates to the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of patients with cancer.

Clinical Trials as Topic↗

PubMed1987

Commercial insurers and all-payer regulation. Evidence on hospitals' responses to financial need.

This study explores commercial insurers' claims about cost-shifting in the broader context of hospitals' responses to revenue needs. It relies on hospital survey data from 1980 and 1982, a period that pre-dates Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) for hospitals. While we find that limited amounts of cost-shifting occur, evidence does not support the notion that it is a perfect safety valve to control financial status. In addition, all-payer rate-setting does not appear to be related to hospitals' ability to shift costs. Instead, inpatient rate controls cause hospitals to contain costs, seek greater outpatient revenues and accept lower margins. Are the financial 'stresses' associated with PPS sufficient enough to kick off renewed concerns about cost-shifting? Some aggregate data from the PPS-era indicates that lower growth in Medicare payments has not resulted in cost-shifting on a widespread basis.

Cost Allocation↗

PubMed1991

Physician response to fee changes with multiple payers.

This paper develops a general model of physician behavior with demand inducement encompassing the two benchmark cases of profit maximization and target-income behavior. It is shown that when income effects are absent, physicians maximize profits, and when income effects are very strong, physicians seek a target income. The model is used to derive own and cross-price expressions for the response of physicians to fee changes in the realistic context of more than one payer under the alternative behavior assumptions of profit maximization and target income behavior. The implications for public and private fee policy, and empirical research on physician response to fees, are discussed.

Choice Behavior↗

PubMed1998

Managed care for congestive heart failure: influence of payer status on process of care, resource utilization, and short-term outcomes.

BACKGROUND: Although health maintenance organizations (HMO) are insuring an increasing number of Americans, there are concerns that cost-reduction strategies may limit access to medical care or jeopardize its quality. This study was conducted to examine the influence of insurance payer status on the process of care and resource utilization among patients hospitalized for congestive heart failure (CHF). METHODS AND RESULTS: Administrative information on all 1995 New York State hospital discharges assigned ICD-9-CM codes indicative of CHF in the principal diagnosis position were obtained from the Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System database. The following were compared among patients with HMO, indemnity, Medicaid fee-for-service, and Medicare fee-for-service insurance coverage: demographics, comorbid illness, process of care, length of stay, hospital charges, mortality rate, and CHF readmission rate. A total of 43,157 patients were identified (HMO, 1322; indemnity, 4350; Medicaid, 3878; Medicare, 33 607). Noninvasive procedures were used with similar frequency, whereas greater use of invasive techniques was observed among HMO and indemnity patients. After adjustment for patient characteristics and hospital type and location, HMO care was associated with shorter length of stay and lower hospital charges, the latter partially explained by fewer hospital days. Medicaid patients had the longest length of stay, greatest hospital charges, and highest CHF readmission rate. The adjusted risk of death during the index hospitalization did not vary among insurance groups. CONCLUSIONS: Though insuring only a small proportion of New Yorkers hospitalized for CHF, managed care plans provide similar access to clinical services while generating fewer charges. Whether these observed differences in short-term outcomes derive from patient mix or quality of care is uncertain and deserves wider prospective study.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2002

Payer type and the returns to bypass surgery: evidence from hospital entry behavior.

In this paper, we estimate the returns associated with the provision of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery, by payer type (Medicare, HMO, etc.). Because reliable measures of prices and treatment costs are often unobserved, we seek to infer returns from hospital entry behavior. We estimate a model of patient flows for CABG patients that provides inputs for an entry model. We find that FFS provides a high return throughout the study period. Medicare, which had been generous in the early 1980s, now provides a return that is close to zero. Medicaid appears to reimburse less than average variable costs. HMOs essentially pay at average variable costs, though the return varies inversely with competition.

California↗

PubMed2002

Measuring the success of treatment for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease--patient, physician and healthcare payer perspectives.

The success of treatments for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) is evaluated by measuring the impact on a range of health outcomes. However, outcome measures differ in their relative importance to the various stakeholder groups. Patients are most interested in the impact on quality of life and on mortality, while physicians also value information about the effect of treatments on lung function and disease progression. In contrast to patients and physicians, healthcare payers take a population perspective, and need to balance the health gains achieved and the costs of treatment. If the management of COPD is to be improved, it is important, first, to understand the outcomes of importance to each relevant stakeholder group, and then second, to refocus the measures in terms that all stakeholders can value.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗

PubMed1996

Payer-hospital collaboration to improve patient satisfaction with hospital discharge.

BACKGROUND: Brigham and Women's Hospital, in Boston, and its major health maintenance organization (HMO), Harvard Community Health Plan, collected data in spring 1994 which revealed that patients were less satisfied with hospital discharge planning than with other elements of care. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION PROCESS: An interdisciplinary team, formed in November 1994 and composed of eight members from the hospital and HMO, used data from the hospital's Patient Satisfaction Survey, flowcharting, and phone interviews with patients to identify discharge planning-related problems. For example, follow-up contact with patients after discharge was erratic and no clear signal of the successful "hand off" of care from the hospital team to the community team existed. IMPROVEMENT CYCLE 1: Eighty-three percent of the payer's patients that received the improvement strategy developed by the interdisciplinary team-a concierge service-rated discharge planning as excellent or very good, compared to 63% of control patients. IMPROVEMENT CYCLE 2: PLAN SOLUTIONS/STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING HOSPITAL DISCHARGE PLANNING: The results of the team's Cycle 1 improvement provided information for the team to use in designing a second cycle of incremental improvement activity. For example, to address the lack of clarity about who was responsible for making decisions about discharge and follow-up care, the attending physician was designated the transition-of-care coordinator. Once all the improvements were implemented, Cycle 2 patients who received the intervention rated satisfaction with discharge higher (83% versus 73%) than the control group. CONCLUSIONS: Implications of hospitalwide implementation of discharge planning-related services attempted on one unit are being considered.

Ancillary Services, Hospital↗

PubMed1995

The use of technology assessment by hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and third-party payers in the United States.

A case study design was used to determine the reliance on technology assessment of decisionmakers in hospitals, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and third-party payers. Thirty different organizations were contacted and semistructured interviews conducted. The study found that hospitals, HMOs, and insurers are conducting technology assessments, but the form and sophistication of these analyses range widely. Hospitals are particularly focused on traditional financial analyses ("prudent purchasing") with the exception of pharmacy committees, which generally conduct more sophisticated socio-economic analyses. HMOs and insurers conduct outcome assessments for coverage of expensive or controversial technologies but exclude economics. Technology assessment will become increasingly important in resource allocation decision making and it is in the interest of technology providers to foster better information, a more comprehensive assessment process, and a more efficient assessment system.

Decision Making, Organizational↗

PubMed2001

Primary care compensation at an academic medical center: a model for the mixed-payer environment.

The authors' academic medical center, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts, developed a primary care physician (PCP) salary incentive program for employed academic physicians. This program, first implemented in 1999, was needed to meet the financial imperatives placed on the institution by managed care and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997; its goal was to create a set of incentives for PCPs that is consistent with the mission of the academic center and helps motivate and reward PCP's work. The program sought to simultaneously increase productivity while optimizing resource utilization in a mixed-payer environment. The salary incentive program uses work relative-value units (wRVUs) as the measure of productivity. In addition to productivity-derived base pay, bonus incentives are added for efficient medical management, quality of care, teaching, and seniority. The authors report that there was significant concern from several members of the physician staff before the plan was implemented; they felt that the institution's PCPs were already operating at maximum clinical capacity. However, after the first year of operation of this plan, there was an overall 20% increase in PCP productivity. Increases were observed in all PCP subgroups when stratified by professional experience, clinical time commitment, and practice location. The authors conclude that the program has succeeded in giving incentives for academic PCPs to achieve under the growing demands for revenue self-sufficiency, managed care performance, quality of care, and academic commitment.

Academic Medical Centers↗

PubMed2004

Effects of nursing home ownership type and resident payer source on hospitalization for suspected pneumonia.

BACKGROUND: Whether to hospitalize residents with suspected pneumonia is a complex decision determined both by clinical and financial considerations. The decision to hospitalize may be different in for-profit and not-for-profit facilities and for different payment sources. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study was to examine the role of proprietary status in the decision to hospitalize residents with suspected pneumonia, controlling for facility- and resident-level factors. DATA AND METHODS: The analysis uses the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Nursing Home Component, a nationally representative sample of 5899 nursing home residents in 815 facilities. During the year, 766 elderly residents in the sample were suspected of having pneumonia infections and 224 were hospitalized for them. Logistic regression is used to assess factors affecting the decision to hospitalize among the 766 with pneumonia infections. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Hospitalization for suspected pneumonia. RESULTS: Residents with suspected pneumonia in not-for-profit facilities are hospitalized at a rate half that of for-profit facilities. The difference is most pronounced for residents who are older and more cognitively impaired and those who are covered by Medicare or private funds. Medicaid residents are most likely overall to be hospitalized, with higher rates in not-for-profit than for-profit facilities. CONCLUSION: Risk of hospitalization for suspected pneumonia varies widely by ownership type and resident payer source, with lowest overall risk in not-for-profit facilities. Higher Medicaid hospitalization in not-for-profit facilities is consistent with heterogeneity in the not-for-profit sector, where Medicaid residents are sorted into the lower-quality facilities.

Activities of Daily Living↗

PubMed2000

Estimating the national cost of treating people with HIV disease: patient, payer, and provider data.

OBJECTIVE: Existing estimates of the national cost of treating all people with HIV disease use data from a sample of people with HIV disease to extrapolate the cost of treating all people with HIV disease (patient-based approach). This study derives estimates using two novel approaches (i.e., payer-based and provider-based) and compares these with existing estimates. DATA SOURCES: These include the Health Insurance Association of American and the American Council of Life Insurance 1996 HIV survey, the 1996 State Inpatient Databases (SID) maintained by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, and the IMS America Ltd. survey of independent and chain drugstores. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The cost of treating all people with HIV disease in 1996 was between $6.7 and $7.8 billion U.S., and the average annual cost of treating a person with HIV disease was between $20,000 and $24,700 U.S. CONCLUSIONS: Analysts should derive estimates of the cost of treating people with HIV disease using several different approaches. K

Costs and Cost Analysis↗

PubMed2003

Competition, payers, and hospital quality.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the effects of competition for both Medicare and HMO patients on the quality decisions of hospitals in Southern California. DATA SOURCE: Secondary discharge data from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development for the State of California for the period 1989-1993. STUDY DESIGN: Outcome variables are the risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates for pneumonia (estimated by the authors) and acute myocardial infarction (AMI) (reported by the state of California). Measures of competition are constructed for each hospital and payer type. The competition measures are formulated to mitigate the possibility of endogeneity bias. The relationships between risk-adjusted mortality and the different competition measures are estimated using ordinary least squares. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The study finds that an increase in the degree of competition for health maintenance organization (HMO) patients is associated with a decrease in risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates. Conversely, an increase in competition for Medicare enrollees is associated with an increase in risk-adjusted mortality rates for hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: In conjunction with previous research, the estimates indicate that increasing competition for HMO patients appears to reduce prices and save lives and hence appears to improve welfare. However, increases in competition for Medicare appear to reduce quality and may reduce welfare. Increasing competition has little net effect on hospital quality in our sample.

California↗

PubMed1999

Payer costs of patients diagnosed with epilepsy.

PURPOSE: To identify the annual cost to a third-party payer of inpatient and outpatient services and prescription drugs for patients diagnosed with epilepsy or convulsions. METHODS: Retrospective study using administrative and claims data from a private insurer in the Northeast United States with >1.8 million covered lives. Health plan members were included if they had a claim for epilepsy or convulsions and a claim for an antiepileptic drug (AED) between January 1992 and December 1996. Annual costs and frequencies of all medical services, and of services related to epilepsy, were compared among five groups of patients defined by the most intensive procedure they received: invasive therapeutic procedure (group 1); invasive diagnostic procedure without an invasive therapeutic procedure (group 2); noninvasive diagnostic procedure without an invasive procedure (group 3); neurologist or neurosurgeon visit without an invasive procedure or noninvasive diagnostic procedure (group 4); or none of the preceding services (group 5). RESULTS: In the cohort of 9,090 patients meeting the inclusion criteria, mean age was 38 years, 53% were female, 30% had malignant disease, and 25% had cardiac disease. The mean annual cost of all medical services was $9,617. Mean annual costs of all services were $43,333, $29,847, $11,300, $4,362, and $5,855, and annual costs of inpatient and outpatient encounters coded as epilepsy plus AEDs were $24,369, $10,330, $3,127, $1,079, and $1,086, in groups 1-5, respectively. Services used to stratify patients into the groups accounted for 37% of the total costs. CONCLUSIONS: The annual costs of medical services for patients with epilepsy are high and vary considerably because of treatment of epilepsy and management of comorbidities.

Adult↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Negotiating with third party payers: one community pharmacy's experience.

OBJECTIVES: To evaluate financial terms and legal wording in insurance contracts and negotiate their terms with companies to improve an independent pharmacy's financial position and to determine the time required to negotiate a contract and translate that time into a salary cost. SETTING: An independent pharmacy in a small town in Alabama with a population of approximately 6,000. PRACTICE DESCRIPTION: The prescription department accounts for two-thirds of the pharmacy's sales and dispenses approximately 70,000 prescriptions each year. Insurance companies paid for over 59% of these prescriptions in 2000. The pharmacy is open 7 days a week with one full-time pharmacist and a second pharmacist who works 2 days a month. PRACTICE INNOVATION: A contract negotiation form was developed that addressed factors that might affect a pharmacy's decision to accept or reject a contract; the form included an area for recording the time involved in negotiating each contract. INTERVENTIONS: Insurance companies selected by the pharmacy owner were faxed copies of an Insurer Demographics Collection Form. Upon collection of all data and finalization of proposed changes, a copy of the contract with the proposed changes marked, along with a letter explaining and justifying the changes, was sent to the insurance company. If no response was received from the company, the contact person was called and negotiations proceeded over the telephone. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Primary end points were the percentage of companies that would negotiate and the average increase in reimbursement achieved. Secondary end points included the time involved in negotiations and the translation of that time into a salary cost. RESULTS: None of the nine participating companies accepted any of the changes proposed. The time to negotiate each contract ranged from 28 minutes to 74 minutes, taking an average of 48.4 minutes. Depending on the division of work between the pharmacist and the technician, the salary cost for the negotiations ranged from $14.68 to $18.73 per contract. CONCLUSION: This study provides a realistic description of attempts at contract negotiation between one pharmacy and nine third party payers. The difficulty of achieving successful results and the necessity of carefully considering the time and cost of contract negotiations underscore how important it is for independent pharmacists to concentrate their efforts on contracts and terms they have an opportunity to change.

Alabama↗