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PubMedDate not supplied

New incentives.

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Economics, Hospital↗
PubMed2000

Effects of financial incentives on medical practice: results from a systematic review of the literature and methodological issues.

OBJECTIVE: To identify all financial incentives that had been proposed, described, or used regardless of their initial objective and, when possible, to assess the results of these incentives on costs, process or outcomes of care. MATERIAL AND METHODS: Systematic review of the literature. Databases searched were: Medline, Embase, Health Planning and Administration, Pascal, International Pharmaceutical Abstracts and the Cochrane Library. Search terms were: health professionals and tape of practice, type of incentive, methodology, languages English or French, January 1993 to May 1999. RESULTS: Financial incentives concerned the modalities of physician payment and financing of the health care system. Confounding factors included: age of the doctor, training, speciality, place and type of medical practice, previous sanctions for over-prescribing, type and severity of disease, type of insurance. Risks of financial incentives were: limited access to certain types of care, lack of continuity of care, conflict of interests between the physician and the patient. Any form of fund-holding or capitation decreased the total volume of prescriptions by 0-24%, and hospital days by up to 80% compared with fee-for-service. Annual cap on doctors' incomes resulted in referrals to colleagues when target income is reached. DISCUSSION: Financial incentives can be used to reduce the use of health care resources, improve compliance with practice guidelines or achieve a general health target. It may be effective to use incentives in combination depending on the target set for a given health care programme.

Capitation Fee↗
PubMed2000

The promise and pitfalls of explicitly rewarding physicians based on patient insurance.

In a large multi-specialty group practice treating approximately equal numbers of health maintenance organization (HMO) and fee-for-service (FFS) patients, we analyzed a natural experiment by the administration to introduce a dual incentive system for physicians. We examine the impact on care when they announced that each physician would be remunerated for HMO care based on a per capita budget, but for FFS care based on billable services. Data were 86,230 episodes for treating patients under age 65 with seven common illnesses. There was no evidence that the intended impact (reducing HMO care) occurred; instead, there were undesired and unintended effects (reduced care for FFS and upset physicians and threats to their corporate culture).

Efficiency, Organizational↗
PubMed1996

A prescribing incentive scheme for non-fundholding general practices: an observational study.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the effects of a financial incentive scheme on prescribing in non-fundholding general practices. DESIGN: Observational study. SETTING: Non-fundholding general practices in former Northern region in 1993-4. INTERVENTION: Target savings were set for each group of practices; those that achieved them were paid a portion of the savings. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Financial performance; prescribing patterns in major therapeutic groups and some specific therapeutic areas; rates of generic prescribing; and performance against a measure of prescribing quality. SUBJECTS: 459 non-fundholding general practices, grouped into three bands according to the ratio of their indicative prescribing amount to the local average (band A > or = 10% above average, B between average and 10% above, C below average). RESULTS: 102 (23%) of 442 practices achieved their target savings (18%, 19%, and 27% of bands A, B, and C respectively). Band C practices that achieved their target had a lower per capita prescribing frequency for gastrointestinal drugs, inhaled steroids, antidepressants, and hormone replacement therapy. There were no other significant differences in prescribing frequency, and no reduction in the quality of prescribing in achieving practices. Total savings of pounds 1.54 m on indicative prescribing amounts were achieved. Payments from the incentive scheme and discretionary quality awards resulted in pounds 463,000 being returned to practices for investment in primary care. CONCLUSIONS: The prescribing behaviour of non-fundholding general practitioners responded to financial incentives in a similar way to that of fundholding practitioners. The incentive scheme did not seem to reduce the quality of prescribing.

Budgets↗
PubMed1992

Potential conflicts of interest in the delivery of medical services: an analysis of the situation and a proposal.

One health care issue that has gained recent public and professional attention is that of professional conflicts of interest with regard to financial incentives to either withhold possibly necessary services or perform unnecessary ones. This essay explores the evidence bearing on the issue, interprets published information, and proposes a solution to deal with the issue.

Conflict of Interest↗
PubMed2004

Variation in activity rates of consultant surgeons and the influence of reward structures in the English NHS.

OBJECTIVES: To explore variation in the National Health Service (NHS) activity rates of consultant surgeons, and examine whether activity is dependent upon the type of contract held and/or bonus payments, after accounting for age and other consultant and hospital characteristics. METHODS: NHS Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for England were used in combination with workforce data in five surgical specialties in 1998/99 and 1999/2000. Descriptive statistics were used to explore variation in activity rates. A multi-level model was used to analyse the relationship between NHS contract and bonus payments, and activity. RESULTS: There is considerable variation in activity rates of English NHS consultant surgeons, with and without adjustment for casemix. Interquartile variation shows that the top 25% of consultants have activity rates 60 to 85% higher than the bottom 25%. A multi-level model indicates that consultant surgeons with a 'maximum part-time' contract have significantly higher activity rates than those with a full time contract (129 more finished consultant episodes (FCEs) per year, 95% CI 97-160). Consultant surgeons who hold discretionary salary points undertake significantly more activity than those without (95 FCEs, 95% CI 62-128). Those with a distinction award (a type of bonus payment) have a tendency towards higher activity rates, but this does not reach statistical significance (48 FCEs, 95% CI -4 to 103). CONCLUSIONS: 'Maximum part-time contract' status is associated with higher absolute activity rates among NHS surgeons. Rich data sources like HES merit careful exploration and increased use as an essential first step in measuring and managing variations in specialists' performance.

Analysis of Variance↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Creating a sustainable physician compensation plan. Serving both fee-for-service and capitated populations.

A large, integrated health system in St. Louis acquired a primary care, health maintenance organization staff model group practice with 55 physicians. Health system leadership positioned the acquired physician group to diversify and expand its fee-for-service patient base to increase revenue and support the expansive fixed cost structure of the health centers. With interim managers, the leaders developed a new physician compensation plan that put a greater portion of the physicians' compensation at risk and provided incentives for enhanced productivity in both the capitated and fee-for-service lines of business. This article explores the key characteristics, benefits and potential areas for improvement associated with the new incentive compensation model and describes the centers' improved operating performance and gains in physician productivity.

Capitation Fee↗
PubMed2002

What you don't know can hurt you: why managed care organizations have a legal duty to disclose the use of financial incentives to limit medical care.

This article, winner of the 2000-2001 American Health Lawyers' Student Writing Competition, examines the conflicting policy goals at the heart of managed care--particularly in the use of financial incentives for physicians who limit their use of referrals and expensive diagnostic tests. While conceding the legality of such incentives, the author contends that Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) have a legal duty to disclose their existence to beneficiaries. After analyzing the basis for imposing a duty to disclose, the author proceeds to examine such issues as the proper timing, level, and extent of disclosure.

Cost Control↗
PubMed2002

Managed care and efficient rationing.

Widespread dissatisfaction with managed care has led to calls for major reform and consumer protection. Although some have concluded that managed care backlash is simply a result of too much rationing, we propose an alternative view that focuses on the nature of services eliminated by managed care. In particular, we point out that managed care rations services largely without regard to consumer preferences. We question whether managed care's emphasis on supply-side control of moral hazard is consistent with the principles of efficient rationing. Further research on the nature of provider and consumer rationing decisions is needed to inform the design of supply-side and demand-side incentives that will lead to an efficient allocation of services.

Consumer Behavior↗
PubMed1994

Risk, risk, who's got the risk?

There are no pat solutions for creating ideal risk-sharing arrangements. The next several years will require a great deal of effort at designing equitable deals that create desired incentives for all parties. The key issue is that in a hospital's rush to position itself for survival, it should not lose sight of the importance of structuring arrangements so that risk can be shared and all parties have desirable incentives.

Contract Services↗