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PubMed1996

A consensus approach to planetary protection requirements: recommendations for Mars lander missions.

Over the last several years, the nature of the surface conditions on the planet Mars, our knowledge of the growth capabilities of Earth organisms under extreme conditions, and future opportunities for Mars exploration have been under extensive review in the United States and elsewhere. As part of these examinations, in 1992 the US Space Studies Board made a series of recommendations to NASA on the requirements that should be implemented on future missions that will explore Mars. In particular, significant changes were recommended in the requirements for Mars landers, changes that significantly alleviated the burden of planetary protection implementation for these missions. In this paper we propose a resolution implementing this new set of recommendations, for adoption by COSPAR at its 30th meeting in Hamburg. We also discuss future directions and study areas for planetary protection, in light of changing plans for Mars exploration.

Consensus Statements as Topic↗
PubMed1996

Planetary protection program for Mars 94/96 mission.

Mars surface in-situ exploration started in 1975 with the American VIKING mission. Two probes landed on the northern hemisphere and provided, for the first time, detailed information on the martian terrain, atmosphere and meteorology. The current goal is to undertake larger surface investigations and many projects are being planned by the major Space Agencies with this objective. Among these projects, the Mars 94/96 mission will make a major contributor toward generating significant information about the martian surface on a large scale. Since the beginning of the Solar System exploration, planets where life could exist have been subject to planetary protection requirements. Those requirements accord with the COSPAR Policy and have two main goals: the protection of the planetary environment from influence or contamination by terrestrial microorganisms, the protection of life science, and particularly of life detection experiments searching extra-terrestrial life, and not life carried by probes and spacecrafts. As the conditions for life and survival for terrestrial microorganisms in the Mars environment became known, COSPAR recommendations were updated. This paper will describe the decontamination requirements which will be applied for the MARS 94/96 mission, the techniques and the procedures which are and will be used to realize and control the decontamination of probes and spacecrafts.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1996

Selection of sterilization methods for planetary return missions.

Two tasks must be accomplished to provide planetary protection for Mars return missions: (1) sterilization of the scientific module to be landed on Mars and (2) reliable sterilization of all material returned to Earth, while ensuring the scientific integrity of martian samples. This paper examines similarity and differences between these two tasks, and includes a discussion of technological implementation conditions and the nature of terrestrial and hypothesized martian microflora. The feasibility of a number of chemical and physical (ultraviolet and ionizing radiation and heating) methods of sterilization for use on the ground and onboard are discussed and compared. A combination of different methods will probably be selected as the most appropriate for ensuring planetary protection on the return mission.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1996

Planetary protection, legal ambiguity and the decision making process for Mars sample return.

As scientists and mission planners develop planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions, they must recognize the socio-political context in which decisions about the mission will be made and pay careful attention to public concerns about potential back contamination of Earth. To the extent that planetary protection questions are unresolved or unaddressed at the time of an actual mission, they offer convenient footholds for public challenges in both legal and decision making realms, over which NASA will have little direct control. In this paper, two particular non-scientific areas of special concern are discussed in detail: 1) legal issues and 2) the decision making process. Understanding these areas is critical for addressing legitimate public concerns as well as for fulfilling procedural requirements regardless whether sample return evokes public controversy. Legal issues with the potential to complicate future missions include: procedural review under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); uncertainty about institutional control and authority; conflicting regulations and overlapping jurisdictions; questions about international treaty obligations and large scale impacts; uncertanities about the nature of the organism; and constitutional and regulatory concerns about quarantine, public health and safety. In light of these important legal issues, it is critical that NASA consider the role and timing of public involvement in the decision making process as a way of anticipating problem areas and preparing for legitimate public questions and challenges to sample return missions.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1979

Sterile host yeasts (SHY): a eukaryotic system of biological containment for recombinant DNA experiments.

A system of biological containment for recombinant DNA experiments in Saccharomyces cerevisiae (Brewer's/Baker's yeast) is described. The principle of containment is sterility: the haploid host strains all contain a mating-type-non-specific sterile mutation. The hosts also contain four auxotrophic mutations suitable for selection for the various kinds of vectors used. All vectors are derivatives of pBR322 which can be selected and maintained in both yeast and Escherichia coli. The system has recently been certified at the HV2 level by the National Institutes of Health.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMed1979

Isolation of human germ-line DNA suitable for recombinant DNA studies.

Dna from human sperm cells can be isolated with size and purity sufficient for use in recombinant DNA research. The DNA averages 100 000 base pairs (bp) in size (about 70.10(6) daltons) and is free of somatic cell, bacterial, and viral DNA. It can therefore be cloned under P2 + EK2 conditions as stipulated in the 1978 NIH Guidelines for recombinant DNA research.

Centrifugation, Density Gradient↗
PubMed1981

Specific-purpose plasmid cloning vectors. I. Low copy number, temperature-sensitive, mobilization-defective pSC101-derived containment vectors.

Two cloning vector plasmids, pHSG415 (7100 bp) and a lambda phage cos site-containing derivative (cosmid) thereof, pHSG422 (8760 bp), were constructed from a low copy number plasmid (pSC101) replicon to permit the propagation of cloned DNA segments at low gene dosage levels. Two features of the vectors, namely temperature sensitivity of replication and inability to be mobilized by conjugative plasmids, cause them to exhibit a high level of "biological containment". The essential characteristics of pHSG415 and pHSG422 may be summarized as follows: (1) their genome copy number is low (4--6 copies/chromosome); (2) their replication ceases at high temperature and they are rapidly lost from host cells grown at temperatures of 37 degrees C and above; (3) the relaxation nick site of pSC101, which is thought to be synonymous with its origin of transfer replication, is absent from the vectors; as a consequence, they are not mobilized to a significant extent by co-existing conjugative plasmids that are able to mobilize wild-type pSC101; (4) they contain unique insertion sites for DNA fragments generated by the following restriction endonucleases: EcoRI, XhoI, XmaI, HindIII and PstI; pHSG415 additionally contains single BamHI, BstEII and HincII sites and may also be used to clone PvuI-generated fragments; (5) the plasmids confer upon their host cells resistance to chloramphenicol, kanamycin and ampicillin, and every unique cloning site, except those of BamHI and BstEII, is located within one of these antibiotic-resistance genes.

Anti-Bacterial Agents↗
PubMed1996

[Intellectual property rights in Costa Rica in the light of the Biodiversity Convention].

This report analyzes intellectual property rights and acquisition of biological samples in light of the Biological Diversity Convention, with emphasis on Costa Rica. It examines the legal framework which exists for the protection of biological resources in this country, especially evaluating the law regarding protection of biota, which was approved in 1992. This includes information regarding access to genetic resources, and regulation for the aforementioned law. It examines the Biological Diversity Convention which was signed at the Rio Summit in 1992, whose objectives and goals, above all, emphasize the subject of distribution of benefits to be derived from the utilization of biological resources.

Animals↗
PubMed1992

Genetic engineering strategies for environmental applications.

Environmental applications of genetically engineered microorganisms are currently hampered not only by legal regulations restricting their release, but also by the frequent dearth of adequate genetic tools for their construction in the laboratory. Recent approaches to strain development include the use of non-antibiotic markers as selection determinants, the use of transposon-vectors for the permanent acquisition of recombinant genes, and the utilization of expression devices based on promoters from promiscuous plasmids and biodegradative pathway genes.

Biotechnology↗
PubMed1978

Planetary protection guidelines for outer planet missions.

Facilities, techniques, and operational procedures used to implement Planetary Protection (PP) requirements for the Viking Project are reviewed in order to better define the COSPAR resolution which proposes that Outer Planet spacecraft be assembled using Viking-like clean room technology. It is concluded that, for such missions, PP requirements can be met by adopting Viking clean room standards, personnel and operation procedures, and by establishing PP as an official entity in project management.

Containment of Biohazards↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Humans to Mars: a feasibility and cost-benefit analysis.

Mars is a compelling astrobiological target, and a human mission would provide an opportunity to collect immense amounts of scientific data. Exploration alone, however, cannot justify the increased risk. Instead, three factors drive a human mission: economics, education, and exploration. A human mission has a unique potential to inspire the next generation of young people to enter critically needed science and engineering disciplines. A mission is economically feasible, and the research and development program put in place for a human mission would propel growth in related high-technology industries. The main hurdles are human physiological responses to 1-2 years of radiation and microgravity exposure. However, enabling technologies are sufficiently mature in these areas that they can be developed within a few decade timescale. Hence, the decision of whether or not to undertake a human mission to Mars is a political decision, and thus, educational and economic benefits are the crucial factors.

Aerospace Medicine↗