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PubMed2026

Effects of Adding Incentive Spirometry to Hospital-Based Cardiovascular Rehabilitation on Pulmonary Complications, Hospital Length of Stay, and Clinical-Functional Recovery After Cardiac Surgery: A Randomized Controlled Trial.

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: This study investigated the effects of combining incentive spirometry with cardiac rehabilitation compared with cardiac rehabilitation alone on postoperative pulmonary complications, clinical-functional recovery, and hospital length of stay in patients undergoing cardiac surgery. METHODS: Randomized controlled trial was conducted from May 2019 to October 2023 in two hospitals, including 46 inpatients undergoing cardiac surgery. Participants were assigned to incentive spirometry plus cardiac rehabilitation or cardiac rehabilitation alone. Both interventions were performed twice daily; spirometry used a volume-oriented device, and rehabilitation followed a seven-step protocol (2-4 METs). Outcomes included postoperative pulmonary complications, functional capacity (6-min walk test), handgrip strength, respiratory muscle function, and length of hospital stay. RESULTS: The incentive spirometry associated with cardiac rehabilitation group had a longer extracorporeal circulation time (98 ± 26 min) than the cardiac rehabilitation group (76 ± 1; p = 0.008). Both groups showed a postoperative decline in respiratory muscle strength, and walking distance (MD: -64.37 m; 95% CI: [-24.1; -104.6]; d = 0.71), with no difference in postoperative pulmonary complications and handgrip strength. The incentive spirometry associated with cardiac rehabilitation group did not significantly differ on postoperative hospital stay compared with the cardiac rehabilitation group (MD: -1 day; 95% CI: [-4.71; 2.71]; d = -0.19). CONCLUSIONS: In this study, no additional benefit was observed with the addition of incentive spirometry to cardiac rehabilitation compared with cardiac rehabilitation alone. No significant differences were detected between groups in postoperative pulmonary complications, hospital length of stay, or clinical-functional recovery among individuals undergoing cardiac surgery. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Brazilian Registry of Clinical Trials (REBEC) under the number RBR-8tsjf97.

Aged↗

PubMed2026

Financial incentives and health coaching to improve glycemic outcomes among young adults with type 1 diabetes: A factorial randomized trial (SweetGoals).

AIM: This study aimed to improve glycemic control among young adults with type 1 diabetes (T1D), an at-risk and understudied population. METHOD: N = 300 young adults with T1D recruited nationally were randomized to the factorial combination of (1) financial incentives targeting glucose checking and mealtime behaviors and (2) web health coaching focused on increasing motivation and goal setting for self-management behaviors. All received a smartphone app that accessed device data and provided weekly goal feedback. The intervention lasted 6 months. HbA1c (A1c) was assessed at baseline, +6 months, and +12 months. The mean number of glucose checking and mealtime goals met per week during the intervention were tested as mediators of intervention effects on A1c at 12 months. RESULTS: A1c was significantly reduced from baseline to +12 months across all participants. Indirect effects of both incentives and coaching on A1c reductions were significant and partially mediated by mealtime but not glucose checking goal achievement. There was no synergistic (interaction) effect of incentives and coaching. CONCLUSION: Incentives and coaching both improved critical mealtime behavior but through different strategies. These results suggest that either intervention would be suitable for future testing and dissemination, and that lower cost of incentives may favor their prioritization.

Adolescent↗

PubMed1998

Health Care Financing Administration's new regulations for financial incentives in Medicaid and Medicare managed care: one step forward?

Because financial incentives for managed care physicians may create conflicts of interests, new regulations have been instituted that will result in disclosure of certain financial incentives to the Federal Government and to some patients. Given the limitations of these regulations, health plans and physicians should take the lead in addressing concerns about the harmful effects of financial incentives. For example, public disclosure may deter unusually strong financial incentives. Purchasing coalitions, advocacy groups, and journalists should have increased access to information about physician-level incentives. These nonregulatory measures might reassure patients that managed care physicians are committed to their best interests.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.↗

PubMed2006

Improving clinical productivity in the academic setting: a novel incentive plan based on utility theory.

PURPOSE: Academic internal medicine practices face growing challenges to financial viability due to high overhead, competing institutional missions, and suboptimal physician productivity. The authors describe the development of a clinical incentive plan for a group of academic subspecialty physicians at the Dana Clinic, an outpatient setting at Yale School of Medicine, and report on results of the first year's experience under the plan. METHOD: Utility theory was used to assess the risk profile of clinic faculty and identify incentive payments that would optimize faculty benefit or "utility" while minimizing departmental costs. Under the plan, physicians who reached a productivity target based on work Relative Value Units (wRVUs) between October 2003 and November 2004 had overhead costs covered and received a fixed payment to support salary; additional incentive payments were available for those exceeding the target. Physicians failing to reach the target were responsible for their own overhead costs and received no fixed payment. Physician productivity as measured by wRVU per full-time equivalent (FTE) was compared for the year prior to, and the year following, incentive plan introduction. RESULTS: Forty-seven members of eight academic sections were included in the analysis. Median productivity improved by 34%, with 42 of 47 physicians showing improvement. Significant improvements were also noted in collections (62%) and visit volume (23%), and shifts were observed in coding patterns. CONCLUSIONS: The unique threshold-based structure of the incentive plan, as determined through utility theory modeling, as well as permitting physicians to choose how to achieve the wRVU target were key features of its success, resulting in improved productivity without increasing practice resources or faculty salaries.

Costs and Cost Analysis↗

PubMed1997

Incentives and the management of physician behavior in health service organizations.

The performance of a health services organization is affected by the cumulative behavior of physicians out of proportion to their numbers or the economic value of their services. Managers are challenged to optimize physician behavior and to change it in concert with the evolving expectations of health service customers. Incentives are the tools available for this effort. This article discusses the interrelation of physician behavior, physician needs, and the major classes of incentives: economic, noneconomic, and rules. While most organizations recognize and use financial incentives, few utilize noneconomic incentives systematically. Given the financial restrictions of advanced markets, managers should understand the role of rules and the value of noneconomic issues to physicians when developing incentive programs.

Behavior↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Financial incentives and physicians' perceptions of conflict of interest and ability to arrange medically necessary services.

Many believe that physician payment mechanisms that include incentives to restrain utilization create conflicts of interest for physicians and result in the withholding of needed services. Pooled data from two rounds of the Community Tracking Study physician survey, a nationally representative telephone survey of physicians, are the basis of this analysis. We examine the association between explicit financial incentives linked to physician profiling and perceived conflict of interest, and the reported ability to obtain specific, medically necessary secondary services (referrals, hospitalizations and diagnostic imaging). Logistic regression models were employed to control for potentially confounding influences. After controlling for other factors, physicians subject to profiling linked with financial incentives were much less likely than physicians not affected by profiling to strongly agree that they can make clinical decisions in the best interests of their patients without the possibility of reducing their income. They were also less likely to report that they could always obtain selected medically necessary secondary services for their patients. Physicians subject to explicit financial incentives based on profiling are more likely than other physicians to perceive a conflict of interest. Physicians with financial incentives tied to profiling also experience greater difficulty obtaining medically necessary secondary services for their patients.

Attitude of Health Personnel↗

PubMed1991

Evaluation of a Maryland fiscal incentive plan for placing state hospital patients in nursing homes.

In Maryland a six-month fiscal incentive to promote nursing homes' acceptance of chronic patients discharged from state psychiatric hospitals was evaluated after one year. During the fiscal year of the incentive program, such placements (N = 182) increased an average of 38 percent from previous years. Of 163 patients whose placements were evaluated, 22 were returned to the state hospital during the six-month period that the incentive was in place. Ten of the 22 were returned within 30 days of placement. Contrary to expectation, the return rate did not rise after the incentive was discontinued; four patients were returned during the second six months of the study period. Most returns during the first six months were due to patients' physical and verbal threats. The results supported the use of short-term fiscal incentives and emphasized the importance of intensive supportive interventions with chronic mentally ill patients early in the nursing home placement.

Aged↗

PubMed1997

Providing incentives to control health care costs and remain competitive in the marketplace: a pilot study.

Few marketplaces in the United States have been subject to as much scrutiny, and undergone as much transformation in the 1990s, as has health care. Even based on the slowest growth rates experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States is projected to be spending $3,140,221 per minute on health care by the year 2000. The purpose of this study was to examine how coordination between providers of medical care, and working with their customers (i.e., payors) might reduce costs without compromising quality. Providing incentives to these groups of businesses that form the health systems can be a means for achieving both individual health system objectives. Because of the importance of pharmacists in health care delivery systems, they were considered an excellent group for testing and measuring the impact of incentive programs. The study involved a before and after six month period involving dispensing patterns through a pharmacy benefit manager. Incentives were provided to pharmacies based on percent improvement in generic substitution rates and formulary compliance. A network of 342 independent pharmacies, with their dispensing patterns monitored through a pharmacy benefit manager under its contract program. The results of the study were that generic substitution rates rose from the pre-trial period of 68.5% to 73.7% in the first three months of the trial period, and to 75.6% in the second three months of the trial period. The overall increase in substitution was from 68.5% in the base period to 74.7% over six months. These differences were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Estimated savings to health plans on an annualized basis would be approximately $3.4 million, and the payout per conversion to pharmacies was $3.23. While not measured directly, no adverse clinical effects were reported due to substitutions. Thus, an incentive system to reward those health care providers can effectively control expenses to achieve mutually desirable goals of all parties. If properly structured, the providers, health systems of which they are a part, and payors can benefit. Using an incentive program like the one designed for this study, health systems may be able to be more competitive in marketing their services to payors.

Cost Control↗

PubMed1999

The use of physician financial incentives and feedback to improve pediatric preventive care in Medicaid managed care.

OBJECTIVE: Immunizations and other cost-effective preventive services remain underused by many children, especially those living in poverty. Given the effectiveness of provider-based tracking systems and the widespread use by managed care organizations of financial incentives to influence physician practice patterns, we designed and tested an intervention combining these strategies. We studied whether a system of semiannual assessment and feedback, coupled with financial incentives, could improve pediatric preventive care in a Medicaid health maintenance organization (HMO). METHODOLOGY: We randomly assigned primary care sites serving children in a Medicaid HMO to one of three groups: a feedback group (where physicians received written feedback about compliance scores), a feedback and incentive group (where physicians received feedback and a financial bonus when compliance criteria were met), and a control group. We evaluated compliance with pediatric preventive care guidelines through semiannual chart audits during the years 1993 to 1995. RESULTS: Compliance with pediatric preventive care improved dramatically in the study period. Repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a significant increase in all three study groups throughout the time in total compliance scores (from 56%-73%), as well as scores for immunizations (from 62%-79%) and other preventive care (from 54%-71%). However, no significant differences were observed between either intervention group and the control group, nor were there any interaction (group-by-time) effects. CONCLUSIONS: Feedback to physicians, with or without financial incentives, did not improve pediatric preventive care in this Medicaid HMO during a time of rapid, secular improvements in care. Possible explanations include the context and timing of the intervention, the magnitude of the financial incentives, and lack of physician awareness of the intervention.

Analysis of Variance↗

PubMed1999

The ethics of managed care financial incentives to limit care. Some thoughts for specialists.

This article supplies an introduction to the structure and purpose of managed care financial incentives, with particular attention to those affecting referrals to specialists. It then addresses some of the ethical problems attending such incentive schemes and discusses the characteristics that make some financial incentives preferable to others. An agenda for specialists such as plastic surgeons who are often on the "receiving end" of incentive schemes designed to limit the use of specialty care is outlined. This proposed agenda encourages specialists to participate actively in shaping incentive schemes in ways that help keep health care costs down without sacrificing patients' interests in obtaining necessary specialty care.

Cost Control↗

PubMed1997

The impact of physician economic incentives on admission rates of patients with ambulatory sensitive conditions: an analysis comparing two managed care structures and indemnity insurance.

The utilization of financial incentives to limit the use of health resources by primary care physicians represents a common reimbursement strategy by managed care organizations. These arrangements are virtually nonexistent with indemnity insurance. This analysis compares the hospitalization rates of patients with low-acuity medical conditions--ambulatory sensitive conditions (ASCs)--among three groups receiving care from primary care physicians. The physicians were compensated under different reimbursement mechanisms, in which incentives for reduced resource utilization varied. The groups can be described as follows: (1) a capitated for-profit group practice in which the physician partners have a relatively high economic incentive for lower utilization (group I); (2) physicians providing care under the auspices of three separate independent practice associations, in which the associations are capitated but the physicians are paid on a discounted fee-for-service basis (the associations also were included in this group) (group II); and (3) physicians who service patients whose care continues to be paid for by traditional indemnity insurance (group III). Financial incentives in the third group cohort were believed to be low to intermediate, and the physicians were assumed to have had no economic incentives to restrain their use of healthcare resources. Additional data analysis examined the role of emergency department utilization among patients in the groups. Group I patients ages 25 to 44 were admitted for ambulatory sensitive conditions at a significantly lower rate than were patients in groups II or III--0.8/1,000, 2.7/1,000, and 2.9/1,000, respectively. No difference was apparent in admission rates between patients in groups II and III. Overall emergency department utilization rates were lowest in the group I capitated panel (70/1,000), much higher in the group II independent practice association panel (363/1,000) and highest in the group III indemnity panel (466/1,000). Each of these rates was significantly different from the other. Both the ED utilization rate and ambulatory sensitive condition admission rate may have been affected by differences in socioeconomic status among the patient panels in the three groups. The overall effect of this variable on the two admission rates could not be isolated.

Ambulatory Care↗

PubMed2001

Implementing evidence-based medicine: the role of market pressures, compensation incentives, and culture in physician organizations.

OBJECTIVES: To assess the extent to which market pressures, compensation incentives, and physician medical group culture are associated with the use of evidence-based medicine practices in physician organizations. METHODS: Cross-sectional exploratory study of 56 medical groups affiliated with 15 integrated health systems from across the United States, involving 1,797 physician respondents. Larger medical groups and multispecialty groups were overrepresented compared with the United States as a whole. Data are from two sources: (1) surveys of physicians assessing the culture of the medical groups in which they work, and (2) surveys of medical directors and other managerial key informants pertaining to care management practices, compensation methods, and the management and governance of the medical groups. Physician-level data were aggregated to the group level to attain measures of group culture and then merged with the data regarding care management, incentives, and management and governance. Stepwise multiple regression was used to examine the study hypotheses. RESULTS: As hypothesized, the number of different types of compensation incentives used (cost containment, productivity, quality) was positively associated with the comprehensiveness of care management practices. The degree of salary control (ie, market-based salary grades and ranges versus the use of bookings or fees and individual negotiation) was also positively associated with the deployment of care management practices. As hypothesized, market pressures in the form of percentages of health maintenance and preferred provider organization patients seen were generally positively associated with the use of care management practices. Organizational culture had no association except that a patient-centered culture in combination with a greater number of different types of compensation incentives used was positively associated with greater use of care management practices. CONCLUSIONS: Both compensation incentives and managed care market pressures were significantly associated with the use of evidence-based care management practices. The lack of association for culture may be due to the relatively amorphous nature of most physician organizations at this point.

Cross-Sectional Studies↗

PubMed2002

Incentives in financing mental health care in Austria.

BACKGROUND: In Austria, financing health care -and even more so mental health care- is characterized by a mix of federal and provincial responsibilities, lack of uniformity in service provision and service providers, and diverse funding arrangements. The division between financing structures for health care and social care makes the situation even more complex. This state of affairs results in various, partly counterproductive and sometimes paradoxical financial incentives and disincentives for the providers, recipients and financiers of mental health services. In several provinces of Austria, recent reform plans in mental health care have focused strongly on establishing community-based and patient-oriented mental health care. One of the main challenges in implementing this new policy is the re-allocation of resources. AIMS OF THE STUDY: The authors hypothesize that the existing structure of mental health care financing, with its incentives and disincentives, constitutes an obstacle to patient-oriented community-based mental health care. Analyzing the characteristics of the overall mental health care financing system in one Austrian province, Lower Austria, will provide a better understanding of actor-relationships and inherent incentives and highlight implications for the process of deinstitutionalization. METHOD: The authors used an analytical framework based on the principal-agent theory, empirical evidence, and information on financial, organizational and legal structures to identify the characteristics of actor-relationships and the position of single actors within the system. RESULTS: The article shows how incentives are linked to existing constellations of actors involved in mental health care financing and identifies significant power relations. As a consequence, incentives and disincentives within the financing system result in hospital- centered and supply-oriented mental health care in Lower Austria. DISCUSSION: The current system of financing mental health care provides an obstacle to the provision of patient-oriented and community-based mental care. This is due to existing constellations and power relations among the actors where, most importantly, patients are the weakest party in the patient-payer-provider triangle. Balancing power relations will be a significant prerequisite for alternative financing systems. IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH POLICIES AND FURTHER RESEARCH: If a community and needs-based mental health care system is to be established in Austria, the financing structures have to be changed accordingly. Applying a principal-agent framework is useful for identifying key aspects in mental health care financing in relation to the provision of services. Further research is needed to help develop alternative financing mechanisms that support community-based and patient-oriented mental health care systems.

Austria↗

PubMed2004

Designing institutions and incentives in hospitals: an organization economics methodology.

Recent seminal developments in organization economics, namely the decision rights approach, offer an opportunity to shed new light on an old question, the design of effective institutions. Drawing on conclusions about how and why firm organizational boundaries change, the decision rights approach is used in this article as an analytical lens to develop a new method for assessing institutional and incentive design in restructured hospitals. The article explains the decision rights approach and shows how the Decision Rights Framework developed from it, is a way of mapping of incentive structures to allow a comparative assessment of institutional design, an understudied area, as most work on hospitals has focused on assessing equity versus efficiency tradeoffs. The new method is illustrated drawing on one example from a case study of an innovative self-corporatized hospital in Lebanon that was at the vanguard of hospital restructuring legislation, adopted for system-wide reforms. A country with a strong private sector tradition, Lebanon was fertile territory for analyzing how high-powered incentive schemes emerge from a public sector setting, in a manner similar to the evolution of a firm in reaction to market forces. Among the findings revealed by the approach is that key to "good" design is the identification of requisite incentives and the matching up of incentives with goals through decision rights allocations. The appropriate organizational form is then a logical result.

Decision Making, Organizational↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Incentives and disincentives in the Indian family welfare program.

The Indian family welfare program has offered financial incentives since the early 1960s to both family planning motivators and acceptors of sterilization and the IUD. This article reviews the available evidence regarding the impact of incentives on the quality and quantity of family planning services in India. Administrative concerns related to the implementation of incentive programs are discussed, and the current debate on disincentives, as well as the brief period when disincentives were used, is summarized. The studies reviewed, though few in number and varying in quality and methodology, indicate that incentives to acceptors help to increase the level of contraceptive acceptance, especially when they are part of a well designed strategy of service delivery and client motivation. Incentives do not appear to have an adverse effect on quality of services and acceptors, and they do not seem to influence method choice. Disincentives, if they are used, should not impinge on fundamental individual rights of either the parents or the child.

Birth Intervals↗

PubMed1994

Skewed incentives in our healthcare delivery system.

Policymakers agree that cost-containment in healthcare delivery cannot be attained unless the incentives for providers, patients, and payers can be changed. The authors review the existing incentives that have led to escalating costs and conflicting interests for providers, patients, employers, third-party payers and taxpayers. They examine the current incentives for each group and explore the changing incentives that the new integrated healthcare systems and managed care present. They conclude that the new systems are not a simplistic solution to the "healthcare crisis" in cost, access, and quality, but they emphasize that these new systems have already introduced new incentives for provider collaboration and cooperation. The traditional ties of the osteopathic medical profession allow a quick response to creating new integrated systems, but require collaboration to add tertiary care to the profession's strong primary care and community hospital base.

Conflict of Interest↗

PubMed1994

Incentives improve outcome in outpatient behavioral treatment of cocaine dependence.

OBJECTIVE: To assess whether incentives improved treatment outcome in ambulatory cocaine-dependent patients. METHOD: Forty cocaine-dependent adults were randomly assigned to behavioral treatment with or without an added incentive program. The behavioral treatment was based on the Community Reinforcement Approach and was provided to both groups. Subjects in the group with incentives received vouchers exchangeable for retail items contingent on submitting cocaine-free urine specimens during weeks 1 through 12 of treatment, while the group without incentives received no vouchers during that period. The two groups were treated the same during weeks 13 through 24. RESULTS: Seventy-five percent of patients in the group with vouchers completed 24 weeks of treatment vs 40% in the group without vouchers (P = .03). Average durations of continuous cocaine abstinence documented via urinalysis during weeks 1 through 24 of treatment were 11.7 +/- 2.0 weeks in the group with vouchers vs 6.0 +/- 1.5 weeks in the group without vouchers (P = .03). At 24 weeks after treatment entry, the voucher group evidenced significantly greater improvement than the no-voucher group on the Drug scale of the Addiction Severity Index (ASI), and only the voucher group showed significant improvement on the ASI Psychiatric scale. CONCLUSIONS: Incentives delivered contingent on submitting cocaine-free urine specimens significantly improve treatment outcome in ambulatory cocaine-dependent patients.

Adult↗

PubMed2006

Effects of lower-cost incentives on stimulant abstinence in methadone maintenance treatment: a National Drug Abuse Treatment Clinical Trials Network study.

BACKGROUND: Contingency management interventions that provide tangible incentives based on objective indicators of drug abstinence have improved treatment outcomes of substance abusers, but have not been widely implemented in community drug abuse treatment settings. OBJECTIVE: To compare outcomes achieved when a lower-cost prize-based contingency management treatment is added to usual care in community methadone hydrochloride maintenance treatment settings. DESIGN: Random assignment to usual care with (n = 198) or without (n = 190) abstinence incentives during a 12-week trial. SETTING: Six community-based methadone maintenance drug abuse treatment clinics in locations across the United States. PARTICIPANTS: Three hundred eighty-eight stimulant-abusing patients enrolled in methadone maintenance programs for at least 1 month and no more than 3 years. INTERVENTION: Participants submitting stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples earned draws for a chance to win prizes; the number of draws earned increased with continuous abstinence time. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Total number of stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples provided, percentage of stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples provided, longest duration of abstinence, retention, and counseling attendance. RESULTS: Submission of stimulant- and alcohol-negative samples was twice as likely for incentive as for usual care group participants (odds ratio, 1.98; 95% confidence interval, 1.42-2.77). Achieving 4 or more, 8 or more, and 12 weeks of continuous abstinence was approximately 3, 9, and 11 times more likely, respectively, for incentive vs usual care participants. Groups did not differ on study retention or counseling attendance. The average cost of prizes was 120 dollars per participant. CONCLUSION: An abstinence incentive approach that paid 120 dollars in prizes per participant effectively increased stimulant abstinence in community-based methadone maintenance treatment clinics.

Adult↗