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PubMedDate not supplied

Coordination of benefits reduces double payments.

As a means of reducing the cost of duplicate health care coverage, the health insurance industry utilizes a mechanism called coordination of benefits (COB). The main purposes of COB are to limit recovery to 100 percent of actual charges and to assign insurers primary and secondary responsibilities to pay these charges. Nearly all health plans, including HMOs, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, and commercial insurers, coordinate benefits, mostly for group coverage, often on the basis of procedures found in state insurance codes. While COB provides an effective cost reduction mechanism to health insurers, several issues remain in its administration, including difficulties that arise when carriers refuse to pay, when HMO members self-refer, and when coordination is attempted with an uninsured plan.

Cost Control↗
PubMed1999

Out-of-pocket health spending by poor and near-poor elderly Medicare beneficiaries.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate out-of-pocket health care spending by lower-income Medicare beneficiaries, and to examine spending variations between those who receive Medicaid assistance and those who do not receive such aid. DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION: 1993 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) Cost and Use files, supplemented with data from the Bureau of the Census (Current Population Survey); the Congressional Budget Office; the Health Care Financing Administration, Office of the Actuary (National Health Accounts); and the Social Security Administration. STUDY DESIGN: We analyzed out-of-pocket spending through a Medicare Benefits Simulation model, which projects out-of-pocket health care spending from the 1993 MCBS to 1997. Out-of-pocket health care spending is defined to include Medicare deductibles and coinsurance; premiums for private insurance, Medicare Part B, and Medicare HMOs; payments for non-covered goods and services; and balance billing by physicians. It excludes the costs of home care and nursing facility services, as well as indirect tax payments toward health care financing. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Almost 60 percent of beneficiaries with incomes below the poverty level did not receive Medicaid assistance in 1997. We estimate that these beneficiaries spent, on average, about half their income out-of-pocket for health care, whether they were enrolled in a Medicare HMO or in the traditional fee-for-service program. The 75 percent of beneficiaries with incomes between 100 and 125 percent of the poverty level who were not enrolled in Medicaid spent an estimated 30 percent of their income out-of-pocket on health care if they were in the traditional program and about 23 percent of their income if they were enrolled in a Medicare HMO. Average out-of-pocket spending among fee-for-service beneficiaries varied depending on whether beneficiaries had Medigap policies, employer-provided supplemental insurance, or no supplemental coverage. Those without supplemental coverage spent more on health care goods and services, but spent less than the other groups on prescription drugs and dental care-services not covered by Medicare. CONCLUSIONS: While Medicaid provides substantial protection for some lower-income Medicare beneficiaries, out-of-pocket health care spending continues to be a substantial burden for most of this population. Medicare reform discussions that focus on shifting more costs to beneficiaries should take into account the dramatic costs of health care already faced by this vulnerable population.

Aged↗
PubMed1988

Use of a preferred provider by employees of the preferred provider.

Little is known about the use of services in a preferred provider organization. We studied Pacific Medical Center (PMC) in Seattle which offered a preferred provider arrangement to its employees who selected a Blue Cross-Blue Shield type of plan. PMC offered to waive copayments and reduce deductibles for those employees when they (or their dependents) used PMC. PMC was thus a preferred provider. In the first 16 months of this program, 632 subjects made at least one claim; of these, 444 (70 percent) used the preferred provider at least once. The use of PMC was highest for male employees (84 percent had at least one visit), next for female employees (74 percent), and lowest for dependents (58 percent). Approximately one-third (32 percent) used PMC exclusively, 30 percent used other providers exclusively, and 37 percent used a combination of PMC and other providers. These may be thought of as best-case estimates, since the subjects--particularly the male employees--had a high level of familiarity with the program and ease of access, while the dependents had high familiarity but less convenient access. Female employees may have used PMC less because of relationships already established with other physicians. Outpatient and inpatient charges were more than twice as high for those who used both PMC and other providers as for those who used one provider exclusively. It may be that the preferred provider arrangement encourages higher charges or, alternatively, that it provides additional flexibility for those who have the most need for care.

Adolescent↗
PubMed1990

A model of capitation.

This paper presents a theoretical model of capitation contracts. The consumer's ex ante choice of medical plan is derived under flexible assumptions about provider-patient decision-making. The optimal medical plan is shown to combine full insurance with a provider payment system that is a mixture of capitation and partial reimbursement of provider costs. This solution strongly parallels the 'mixed payment' system derived by Ellis and McGuire (1986, 1990) in the context of prospective payment, though the optimal medical plan derived below may in fact be preferred to that solution in a world with endogenous admissions.

Capitation Fee↗
PubMed1981

Copayments and consumer search: increasing competition in Medicare and other insured medical markets.

Between 1950 and 1980, the physician fee component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 488 percent. In contrast, an index of physician fees adjusted for 1) overall inflation, and 2) the declining proportion which is paid out-of-pocket by the patient, declined over the same 30-year period. This last observation, pointing to the erosion of the market, is important for structuring price competition for physician services. For insured patients, out-of-pocket payments arise from deductibles, coinsurance and limits, each of which is briefly discussed in this article. Following a review of Medicare Part B physician reimbursement, the paper shows that limits can be used to strengthen the incentive which insured patients have to search for less expensive medical care.

Community Participation↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Renewed emphasis on consumer cost sharing in health insurance benefit design.

Purchasers and health plans are reemphasizing deductibles, coinsurance, and other consumer incentives in response to renewed inflation and the continuing backlash against managed care. This paper explores the partial convergence of cost sharing and benefit design for preferred provider and health maintenance products and highlights experiments that foster price-conscious choice among benefit configurations, provider networks, systems of care, drugs, medical devices, and clinicians. Health insurance is evolving from comprehensive coverage for a restricted set of choices to limited coverage for a broader set of choices. Diverse benefit designs and increased consumer cost sharing challenge conventional policy wisdom but may counteract some of the pernicious features of the health care status quo.

Community Participation↗
PubMed1995

Analysis of private health insurance premium growth rates: 1985-1992.

The rate of increase in health care expenditures has been a central policy concern for well over a decade, yet little empirical research has been conducted to examine expenditure growth rates. This study analyzed health insurance premium growth rates for a selected sample of 95 insured groups over the period 1985 to 1992. During this time, premiums increased by approximately 150% in nominal terms and by 45% in real terms. The observed rate of growth was not constant over time, however. The most rapid growth occurred during the years 1986 to 1989; thereafter, the rate of increase in premiums declined. Multivariate analysis was conducted to assess the effects on premium growth rates of selected variables representing insurance benefit design features, market competitive factors, insurance system factors, and group-specific factors. In addition to the percentage increase in benefit payments, other factors found to affect premium growth rates were health maintenance organization market penetration, deductible level, the coinsurance rate, and state insurance mandates. Further, this analysis suggests that the insurance underwriting cycle may play an important role in influencing insurance premium growth rates. These results support the belief that health maintenance organization induced competition has potential to control the rate of increase in health care costs.

Fees and Charges↗
PubMed1992

The Medicare secondary payor provisions: possible rewards and pitfalls.

A 1990 report prepared by the Office of Inspector General estimated that as much as $1 billion is lost to the Medicare program annually because (i) secondary payor situations are not detected and (ii) insurance companies often do not pay when they are required to be the primary payors. Office of Inspector General, No. A-09-98-00151, April 1990, Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) [symbol: see text] 39,112, at 25,649. In order to better enforce the MSP provisions, suggestions have been made at the Congressional level to impose sanctions against providers who demonstrate a pattern of inappropriate billing practices such as double billing, repeated failures to screen beneficiaries for other insurance coverage, and the repeated submission to Medicare of bills that should be submitted to another payor. (See the Subcommittee Report on erroneous payments under the MSP program, supra.) Although authority for such sanctions has yet to be adopted, given the fiscal problems currently plaguing the federal government, providers can expect increased enforcement of the MSP provisions as a means of reducing Medicare costs, and should review their screening and billing practices accordingly.

Admitting Department, Hospital↗
PubMed1992

Pieces of the puzzle: steps toward affordable health care.

This essay proposes a multiple-part solution to the health care affordability crisis. Solution elements include: changing the most commonly held health insurance product to a plan with high-deductible design, and reinstituting community-based health planning. It is proposed that the federal tax code be used to create incentives to change the most commonly held benefit. Further, it is suggested that "capital licenses" be provided to support health planning.

Capital Expenditures↗