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Results for “evolutionarily stable strategy”

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PubMed1992

Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games.

Evolutionarily stable (ES) sets are characterized for evolutionary games in extensive form. It is shown that, for the normal form of games involving informational symmetries or repeated play, the standard approach of determining evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) often fails to predict the evolutionary outcome. The dynamic stability of ES sets is proved in both the pure strategy and mixed strategy models. ES sets are shown to also generalize the notion of direct ESSs (an earlier attempt to apply ESS theory to extensive games). The theory is illustrated by three examples of biological games in extensive form.

Animals↗

PubMed1982

Time scales, persistence and patchiness.

We consider competition in patch-dynamical and more general diffusion-extinction models. These models identify three time scales in ecology. We begin with a reformulation of Levin's 1978 basic model, using a geometric description of diffusion. As in Levin's model, diffusion drives short-term dynamics, and longer-term dynamics depends upon a diffusion-extinction ratio; maximizing this ratio is shown to be an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy. Over still longer times, the effect of organisms upon their environments becomes paramount. We use Mandelbrot's 1977 fractals to develop these models, and thus relate persistence with relative patchiness. Finally, we propose a numerical measure, the fractal exponent H, of successional stage.

Biological Evolution↗

PubMed2004

Individual-based simulations of the War of Attrition.

The War of Attrition model of John Maynard Smith predicts a single, mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for animal contests which are settled by conventional displays with no assessment of the opponent's fighting ability. We test the predictions of the model by simulating the evolution of strategies in a finite population of animals under various assumptions on how possible strategies are coded and mutated. While our simulations for the most part confirm the predictions of the model, we also discovered some significant deviations from the theoretically predicted ESS. Specifically, we found that if inheritance of strategies is somewhat imprecise, then a population can evolve that achieves on average a higher payoff than a population at the theoretically predicted ESS. Moreover, if the ESS is realized as a polymorphism of fixed persistence times, then for small populations, sufficiently stringent statistical tests will reject the hypothesis that these times are distributed as theoretically predicted.

Animals↗

PubMed2003

Pairwise competition and the replicator equation.

Spite in Hamilton's sense is defined as the willingness to harm oneself in order to harm another more. The standard replicator dynamic predicts that evolutionarily stable strategies are payoff-maximizing equilibria of the underlying game, and hence rules out the evolution of spiteful behavior. We propose a modified replicator dynamic, where selection is based on local outcomes, rather than on the population 'state', as in standard models. We show that under this new model spite can evolve readily. The new dynamic suggests conditions under which spite in animals might be found.

Aggression↗

PubMed2004

Resistance is useless?--Extensions to the game theory of kleptoparasitism.

We extend the game theoretic model of kleptoparasitism introduced by Broom and Ruxton (1998, Behav. Ecol. 9, 397-403) in two ways: we allow for asymmetric contests, where the probability alpha of the challenger winning can take any value from 0 to 1; and we allow the handler to choose not to resist the challenge, but to immediately concede and relinquish its food to the challenger. We find, in general, three possible evolutionarily stable strategies--challenge-and-resist (Hawk), challenge-but-do-not-resist (Marauder) and do-not-challenge-but-resist (Retaliator). When alpha = 1/2, we find that Hawk and Marauder are the only ESS's, in contrast to the result of the original model; we also find an overlap region, in parameter space, where two different ESS's are possible, depending on initial conditions. For general alpha, we see that all three ESS are possible, depending on different values of the environmental parameters; however, as the average time of a contest over food becomes long, then the Marauder strategy becomes more and more prevalent. The model makes a potentially significant prediction about animal behaviour in the area of kleptoparasitism, that a searcher, when it meets a handler, will only decline to attack that handler when alpha < 1/2 i.e. when the defender is more likely to win. One possible converse of this statement, that a handler whose probability of success is greater than 1/2 should always resist a challenge, is not true.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity.

Theory of indirect reciprocity is important in explaining cooperation between humans. Since a partner of a social interaction often changes, an individual should assess his partner by using social information such as reputation and make decisions whether to help him or not. To those who have 'good' social reputation does a player give aid as reciprocation, whereas he has to refuse to help those who have 'bad' reputation. Otherwise benefits of altruism is easily exploited by them. Little has been known, however, about the definition of 'goodness' in reputation. What kind of actions are and should be regarded as good and what kind of actions bad? And what sort of goodness enables sustaining exchange of altruism? We herein challenge this question with an evolutionary perspective. We generalize social reputation as 'Honor-score' (H-score) and examine the conditions under which individuals in a group stably maintain cooperative relationships based on indirect reciprocity. We examine the condition for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) over 4096 possible cases exhaustively. Mathematical analysis reveals that only eight cases called 'leading eight' are crucial to the evolution of indirect reciprocity. Each in the leading eight shares two common characteristics: (i) cooperation with good persons is regarded as good while defection against them is regarded as bad, and (ii) defection against bad persons should be regarded as a good behavior because it works as sanction. Our results give one solution to the definition of goodness from an evolutionary viewpoint. In addition, we believe that the formalism of reputation dynamics gives general insights into the way social information is generated, handled, and transmitted in animal societies.

Altruism↗

PubMed2005

Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players.

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.

Animals↗

PubMed2005

Evolution of extraordinary female-biased sex ratios: the optimal schedule of sex ratio in local mate competition.

Female-biased sex ratio in local mate competition has been well studied both theoretically and experimentally. However, some experimental data show more female-biased sex ratios than the theoretical predictions by Hamilton [1967. Science 156, 477-488] and its descendants. Here we consider the following two effects: (1) lethal male-male combat and (2) time-dependent control (or schedule) of sex ratio. The former is denoted by a male mortality being an increasing function of the number of males. The optimal schedule is analytically obtained as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) by using Pontrjagin's maximum principle. As a result, an ESS is a schedule where only males are produced first, then the proportion of females are gradually increased, and finally only females are produced. Total sex ratio (sex ratio averaged over the whole reproduction period) is more female-biased than the Hamilton's result if and only if the two effects work together. The bias is stronger when lethal male combat is severer or a reproduction period is longer. When male-male combat is very severe, the sex ratio can be extraordinary female-biased (less than 5%). The model assumptions and the results generally agree with experimental data on Melittobia wasps in which extraordinary female-biased sex ratio is observed. Our study might provide a new basis for the evolution of female-biased sex ratios in local mate competition.

Aggression↗

PubMed2005

Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium.

We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.

Animals↗

PubMed2005

The evolution of n-player cooperation-threshold games and ESS bifurcations.

An evolutionary game of individuals cooperating to obtain a collective benefit is here modelled as an n-player Prisoner's Dilemma game. With reference to biological situations, such as group foraging, we introduce a threshold condition in the number of cooperators required to obtain the collective benefit. In the simplest version, a three-player game, complex behaviour appears as the replicator dynamics exhibits a catastrophic event separating a parameter region allowing for coexistence of cooperators and defectors and a region of pure defection. Cooperation emerges through an ESS bifurcation, and cooperators only thrive beyond a critical point in cost-benefit space. Moreover, a repelling fixed point of the dynamics acts as a barrier to the introduction of cooperation in defecting populations. The results illustrate the qualitative difference between two-player games and multiple player games and thus the limitations to the generality of conclusions from two-player games. We present a procedure to find the evolutionarily stable strategies in any n-player game with cost and benefit depending on the number of cooperators. This was previously done by Motro [1991. Co-operation and defection: playing the field and the ESS. J. Theor. Biol. 151, 145-154] in the special cases of convex and concave benefit functions and constant cost.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Evolutionarily stable defence and signalling of that defence.

We examine the evolution and maintenance of defence and conspicuousness in prey species using a game theoretic model. In contrast to previous works, predators can raise as well as lower their attack probabilities as a consequence of encountering moderately defended prey. Our model predicts four distinct possibilities for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) featuring maximum crypsis. Namely that such a solution can exist with (1) zero toxicity, (2) a non-zero but non-aversive level of toxicity, (3) a high, aversive level of toxicity or (4) that no such maximally cryptic solution exists. Maximally cryptic prey may still invest in toxins, because of the increased chance of surviving an attack (should they be discovered) that comes from having toxins. The toxin load of maximally cryptic prey may be sufficiently strong that the predators will find them aversive, and seek to avoid similar looking prey in future. However, this aversiveness does not always necessarily trigger aposematic signalling, and highly toxic prey can still be maximally cryptic, because the increased initial rate of attack from becoming more conspicuous is not necessarily always compensated for by increased avoidance of aversive prey by predators. In other circumstances, the optimal toxin load may be insufficient to generate aversion but still be non-zero (because it increases survival), and in yet other circumstances, it is optimal to make no investment in toxins at all. The model also predicts ESSs where the prey are highly defended and aversive and where this defence is advertised at a cost of increased conspicuousness to predators. In many circumstances there is an infinite array of these aposematic ESSs, where the precise appearance is unimportant as long as it is highly visible and shared by all members of the population. Yet another class of solutions is possible where there is strong between-individual variation in appearance between conspicuous, poorly defended prey.

Adaptation, Biological↗

PubMed2006

Adaptive dynamics via Hamilton-Jacobi approach and entropy methods for a juvenile-adult model.

We consider a nonlinear system describing a juvenile-adult population undergoing small mutations. We analyze two aspects: from a mathematical point of view, we use an entropy method to prove that the population neither goes extinct nor blows-up; from an adaptive evolution point of view, we consider small mutations on a long time scale and study how a monomorphic or a dimorphic initial population evolves towards an Evolutionarily Stable State. Our method relies on an asymptotic analysis based on a constrained Hamilton-Jacobi equation. It allows to recover earlier predictions in Calsina and Cuadrado [A. Calsina, S. Cuadrado, Small mutation rate and evolutionarily stable strategies in infinite dimensional adaptive dynamics, J. Math. Biol. 48 (2004) 135; A. Calsina, S. Cuadrado, Stationary solutions of a selection mutation model: the pure mutation case, Math. Mod. Meth. Appl. Sci. 15(7) (2005) 1091.] that we also assert by direct numerical simulation. One of the interests here is to show that the Hamilton-Jacobi approach initiated in Diekmann et al. [O. Diekmann, P.-E. Jabin, S. Mischler, B. Perthame, The dynamics of adaptation: an illuminating example and a Hamilton-Jacobi approach, Theor. Popul. Biol. 67(4) (2005) 257.] extends to populations described by systems.

Animals↗

PubMed2004

Characterizing the evolutionary dynamics of language.

In a recent article Mitchener and Nowak present a model of the evolutionary dynamics of language. The model exhibits regular and chaotic oscillations in changes to the proportions of grammars spoken in a population over the course of evolution. These oscillations are within the purview of evolutionary game theory, but they suggest the lack of an evolutionarily stable strategy. Implications for self-organization across scales of adaptation are discussed.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

PubMed2006

Uninvadability in N-species frequency models for resident-mutant systems with discrete or continuous time.

The uninvadability concept, that was originally introduced through static comparisons of individual fitness in resident-mutant systems for a single species, is developed for multi-species models with frequency-dependent fitness by extending its equivalent single-species dynamic characterization. This multi-species definition is then reinterpreted in terms of individual fitness functions based on intra and interspecific interactions. The resultant concept is discussed in relation to that of an N-species ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) and to dynamic stability of monomorphic and polymorphic evolutionary systems.

Biological Evolution↗

PubMed2006

Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive.

The ubiquity of cooperation has motivated a major research program over the last 50 years to discover ever more minimal conditions for the evolution of altruism. One important line of work is based on favoritism toward those who appear to be close relatives. Another important line is based on continuing interactions, whether between individuals (e.g., reciprocity) or between lines of descent in a viscous population. Here, we use an agent-based model to demonstrate a new mechanism that combines both lines of work to show when and how favoritism toward apparently similar others can evolve in the first place. The mechanism is the joint operation of viscosity and of tags (heritable, observable, and initially arbitrary characteristics), which serve as weak and potentially deceptive indicators of relatedness. Although tags are insufficient to support cooperation alone, we show that this joint mechanism vastly increases the range of environments in which contingent altruism can evolve in viscous populations. Even though our model is quite simple, the subtle dynamics underlying our results are not tractable using formal analytic tools (such as analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies), but are amenable to agent-based simulation.

Altruism↗

PubMed2003

Evolutionary stability in Lotka-Volterra systems.

The Lotka-Volterra model of population ecology, which assumes all individuals in each species behave identically, is combined with the behavioral evolution model of evolutionary game theory. In the resultant monomorphic situation, conditions for the stability of the resident Lotka-Volterra system, when perturbed by a mutant phenotype in each species, are analysed. We develop an evolutionary ecology stability concept, called a monomorphic evolutionarily stable ecological equilibrium, which contains as a special case the original definition by Maynard Smith of an evolutionarily stable strategy for a single species. Heuristically, the concept asserts that the resident ecological system must be stable as well as the phenotypic evolution on the "stationary density surface". The conditions are also shown to be central to analyse stability issues in the polymorphic model that allows arbitrarily many phenotypes in each species, especially when the number of species is small. The mathematical techniques are from the theory of dynamical systems, including linearization, centre manifolds and Molchanov's Theorem.

Animals↗

PubMed2003

Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game?

What should an individual do if there are no reliable cues to the strength of a competitor when fighting with it for resources? We herein examine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the hawk-dove game, if the opponent's resource-holding potential (RHP) can only indirectly be inferred from the outcome of past interactions in the population. The strategies we examined include the classical mixed strategy in which no information on past games is utilized, the 'imprinting' strategy in which a player increases/decreases its aggressiveness if it wins/loses a game, the 'immediate inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of those opponents it fought before, and the 'transitive inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of a new opponent through a third party with which both players have fought before. Invasibility analysis for each pair of strategies revealed that (i) the transitive-inference strategy can always invade the mixed strategy and the imprinting strategy, and itself refuses invasion by these strategies; (ii) the largest advantage for transitive inference is achieved when the number of games played per individual in one generation is small and when the cost of losing an escalated game is large; (iii) the immediate inference, rather than the transitive inference, can be an ESS if the cost of fighting is small; (iv) a strong linear ranking is established in the population of transitive-inference strategists, though it does not perfectly correlate to the ranking by actual RHPs. We found that the advantage of the transitive inference is not in its ability to correct a misassessment (it is actually the worst in doing so), but in the ability of quickly lining up either incorrect or correct assessments to form a linear dominance hierarchy.

Animals↗

PubMed2003

Sperm competition games: sperm selection by females.

We analyse a co-evolutionary sexual conflict game, in which males compete for fertilizations (sperm competition) and females operate sperm selection against unfavourable ejaculates (cryptic female choice). For simplicity, each female mates with two males per reproductive event, and the competing ejaculates are of two types, favourable (having high viability or success) or unfavourable (where progeny are less successful). Over evolutionary time, females can increase their level of sperm selection (measured as the proportion of unfavourable sperm eliminated) by paying a fecundity cost. Males can regulate sperm allocations depending on whether they will be favoured or disfavoured, but increasing sperm allocation reduces their mating rate. The resolution of this game depends on whether males are equal, or unequal. Males could be equal: each is favoured with probability, p, reflecting the proportion of females in the population that favour his ejaculate (the 'random-roles' model); different males are favoured by different sets of females. Alternatively, males could be unequal: given males are perceived consistently by all females as two distinct types, favoured and disfavoured, where p is now the frequency of the favoured male type in the population (the 'constant-types' model). In both cases, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is for females initially to increase sperm selection from zero as the viability of offspring from unfavourable ejaculates falls below that of favourable ejaculates. But in the random-roles model, sperm selection decreases again towards zero as the unfavourable ejaculates become disastrous (i.e. as their progeny viability decreases towards zero). This occurs because males avoid expenditure in unfavourable matings, to conserve sperm for matings in the favoured role where their offspring have high viability, thus allowing females to relax sperm selection. If sperm selection is costly to females, ESS sperm selection is high across a region of intermediate viabilities. If it is uncostly, there is no ESS in this region unless sperm limitation (i.e. some eggs fail to be fertilized because sperm numbers are too low) is included into the model. In the constant-types model, no relaxation of sperm selection occurs at very low viabilities of disfavoured male progeny. If sperm selection is sufficiently costly, ESS sperm selection increases as progeny viability decreases down towards zero; but if it is uncostly, there is no ESS at the lowest viabilities, and unlike the random-roles model, this cannot be stabilized by including sperm limitation. Sperm allocations in the ESS regions differ between the two models. With random roles, males always allocate more sperm in the favoured role. With constant types, the male type that is favoured allocates less sperm than the disfavoured type. These results suggests that empiricists studying cryptic female choice and sperm allocation patterns need to determine whether sperm selection is applied differently, or consistently, on given males by different females in the same population.

Animals↗