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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed1990

Psychophysiology at the interface of clinical science, cognitive science, and neuroscience.

Research in schizophrenia illustrates that the field of psychophysiology lies at the interface of clinical science, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Electrodermal abnormalities in schizophrenic patients have been found reliably across laboratories, and data reported here demonstrate that these abnormalities are at least partially dependent upon the clinical state of the patients. Both tonic and phasic electrodermal activity increased when schizophrenic patients entered into a psychotic episode, and preliminary evidence suggests that the increases may serve as early prodromal signs of an impending episode. Significance of the electrodermal abnormalities for understanding cognitive and attentional deficits is suggested by associations with secondary reaction time and startle blink probe findings. Neuroscience implications are highlighted by the correlation of the electrodermal abnormalities with regional brain metabolic activity indexed by positron emission tomography. An important task for the future is to interrelate measures from these various domains. The field of psychophysiology is particularly well positioned for this task.

Arousal↗

PubMed2002

A methodology for incorporating web technologies into a computer-based patient record, with contributions from cognitive science.

Cognitive science is a rich source of insight for creative use of new Web technologies by medical informatics workers. I outline a project to Web-enable an existing computer-based patient record (CPR) in the context of ideas from philosophy, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive psychology. Web prototypes play an important role (a) because Web technology lends itself to rapid prototype development, and (b) because prototypes help team members bridge among disparate medical, computing, and business ontologies. Six Web-enabled CPR prototypes were created and ranked. User scenarios were generated using a user communication matrix. Resulting prototypes were compared according to the degree to which they satisfied medical, computing, and business constraints. In a different organization, or at different time, candidate prototypes and their ranking might have been different. However, prototype generation and comparison are fundamentally influenced by factors usefully understood in a cognitive science framework.

Cognitive Science↗

PubMed2001

A methodology for web-enabling a computer-based patient record with contributions from cognitive science.

Cognitive Science↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Collaboration between cognitive science and cognitive rehabilitation: a call for action.

The fields of cognitive science and cognitive rehabilitation share a fundamental interest in the nature of cognition. Both groups address questions that are critical to our understanding of human thought. Researchers in basic cognitive science address these questions from a theoretical perspective. Clinicians in cognitive rehabilitation address them from an applied perspective for individuals with brain injuries. Collaborative efforts and cross-fertilization of theory and practice have been less than what might be expected given the underlying commonality of the two fields. Here, we explore the complex nature of the relationship between cognitive rehabilitation and cognitive science, discuss barriers to collaboration, and suggest ways of overcoming those barriers.

Brain Injuries↗

PubMedDate not supplied

Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: toward an evolutionarily rigorous cognitive science.

Cognitive psychology has an opportunity to turn itself into a theoretically rigorous discipline in which a powerful set of theories organize observations and suggest focused new hypotheses. This cannot happen, however, as long as intuition and folk psychology continue to set our research agenda. This is because intuition systematically blinds us to the full universe of problems our minds spontaneously solve, restricting our attention instead to a minute class of unrepresentative "high-level" problems. In contrast, evolutionarily rigorous theories of adaptive function are the logical foundation on which to build cognitive theories, because the architecture of the human mind acquired its functional organization through the evolutionary process. Theories of adaptive function specify what problems our cognitive mechanisms were designed by evolution to solve, thereby supplying critical information about what their design features are likely to be. This information can free cognitive scientists from the blinders of intuition and folk psychology, allowing them to construct experiments capable of detecting complex mechanisms they otherwise would not have thought to test for. The choice is not between no-nonsense empiricism and evolutionary theory; it is between folk theory and evolutionary theory.

Animals↗

PubMed1998

The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.

According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true.

Cognition↗

PubMed1996

Contributions of cognitive science to the Rorschach Technique: cognitive and neuropsychological correlates of the response process.

This article presents an understanding of the Rorschach Technique in terms of emergent models from cognitive science. We propose a linkage between cognitive psychology and neuropsychology in understanding the operations that underlie the Rorschach response process. Contemporary information processing models are described. The Rorschach Technique is conceived of as a complex process involving all areas of the cerebral hemispheres, encompassing various aspects of visual attention and perception, object recognition, associative memory, language production, and executive functioning. Exner's model of the response process is delineated, including both Association and Inquiry phases, in terms of requisite underlying neuropsychological abilities and anatomical substrates. The question of the Rorschach Technique's status, utility, and potential as a neuropsychological assessment, tool is discussed. Understanding the Rorschach in terms of contemporary cognitive psychological and neuropsychological models heightens appreciation of the technique's complexity and provides a heuristic and conceptual foundation for empirical research.

Journal Article↗

PubMed1999

The emergence of cognitive science in France.

A comparison between the development of cognitive science in France and the USA enables us to analyze some national differences linked to specific connections between the scientific, military, economic and political worlds. The influence of new practices and tools developed during World War II and the Cold War appears to be of crucial importance in understanding the development of this new field, as well as that of cybernetics, computer science, artificial intelligence and molecular biology. This paper can be considered as a study in how the differing contexts in France and the USA shaped the history of the construction of cognitive science in each of these two countries. In spite of various differences, some common aspects may be pointed out: in both cases, computer experts and psychologists using a computational modelling approach were those first engaged in the construction of cognitive science. If in France neuroscience-oriented cognitive science research was stronger than in the USA, it seems that the artificial intelligence orientation is also of growing importance in France.

Artificial Intelligence↗

PubMed2004

Innateness in cognitive science.

Innateness is one of the central concepts of cognitive science; but it is also a source of considerable confusion. In this article, I survey recent attempts to understand the notion of innateness as it figures in cognitive science and indicate which is likely to prove most fruitful. One approach draws directly on our "commonsense" views about innate traits. Another aims to characterize innateness in terms of concepts drawn from biology, such as genetic determination. Yet neither strategy has met with much success. This could indicate that a satisfactory account of innateness needs to make use of the conceptual resources of cognitive science itself. A proposal that takes this suggestion seriously is outlined, and an appeal is made for a more systematic assessment of the role and significance of the notion of innateness to cognitive science.

Adult↗

PubMed2006

Cognitive neuroimaging: cognitive science out of the armchair.

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuroimaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory.

Brain Mapping↗

PubMed2001

Memories, fantasies, archetypes: an exploration of some connections between cognitive science and analytical psychology.

The value of cognitive science as a means of investigating psychodynamic theory and practice is discussed and the limitations of this approach are described. Research findings from cognitive science are drawn on to clarify the nature of memory, which is seen to be a mixture of reproduction and reconstruction and the concepts of true and false memory are explored in this light. The part played by implicit memory and internal working models in producing transference is also examined. New ways of conceptualizing fantasy, which describes it as another facet of internal working models, and the role of transgenerational transmission of attachment patterns in creating internal working models are explored. The nature of archetypes is considered in the light of cognitive science research and a minimalist model is proposed, in which they can be likened to image schemas, that is, primitive conceptual structures that exist in a form which can never be experienced directly or indirectly.

Fantasy↗

PubMed2003

Psychiatry, religion and cognitive science.

OBJECTIVE: To see whether certain findings in cognitive science can serve to bridge the conceptual gap between psychiatry, particularly in its psychotherapeutic aspects, and religious/spiritual understanding. METHOD: A brief review is given of certain basic differences between psychiatric understanding in its psychotherapeutic aspects, and much of Western religious/spiritual understanding. Reference is then made to certain findings in contemporary cognitive science which might challenge the implicit mind-body split of Western religious tradition and its parallel in psychotherapeutic practice. Attention is also drawn to elements in religious/spiritual tradition that run counter to this dualistic point of view. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: Much of contemporary religious/spiritual understanding, and of modern psychiatric understanding, especially in terms of psychotherapy, appear to exist in quite separate domains. Psychotherapy and the greater part of Western religious thinking, however, share a belief in the existence of a transcendent mind. Recent developments in cognitive science and certain spiritual traditions, challenge this implicit mind-body split, providing an opportunity for a renewed dialogue between psychiatry and religion and the possibility of collaborative research.

Cognitive Science↗

PubMed1992

Psychoanalysis and cognitive science: contrasting models of the mind.

Although the relationship between psychoanalysis and cognitive science has begun to be addressed, theorists have not constructed a unifying conceptual framework from which to compare and contrast these disciplines. This paper begins by considering the models of mind of cognitive science, and of classical and contemporary psychoanalysis. It is argued that it is useful to reformulate psychoanalytic constructs in terms of cognitive science models. Psychoanalysts have therefore become, and will continue to be, more cognitivist in their work. Nevertheless, psychoanalytic theory and practice is so fundamental that it constitutes the only starting point for clinical cognitivists. The reformulation of psychoanalysis in cognitivist terms is beneficial for both psychoanalysis and cognitive science. The explanatory power of the cognitivist remodelling of psychoanalysis can, of course, be fully assessed only once it has taken place. This paper encourages that theoretical work to proceed.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy↗

PubMed2000

Dispelling the "mystery" of computational cognitive science.

H. Crowther-Heyck (1999) argued that early advocates of computational cognitive science, especially George Miller, aimed to bring about a revival of traditional mentalism, including the issues of consciousness and free will. He therefore found it inexplicable, and even "ironic," that they selected the computer as their main research tool because computers seem no more conscious and no more free than, for instance, the telephone switchboard that was one of the behaviorists' key metaphors. I argue, by contrast, that this misunderstands the main thrust of cognitive science, which was not to bring back all of traditional mentalism, but was rather only to give a rigorous account of intentionality. Once this is recognized, Crowther-Heyck's "mystery" of cognitive science is dispelled because, as is well known, computers use symbolic representations, and thus were seen by the early cognitive scientists as being prime mechanical models of intentional processes.

Cognitive Science↗

PubMed2006

Translating genetics, cognitive science, and other basic science research findings into applications for prevention.

A growing body of research across genetics, cognitive science, and other basic science suggests the complexity and interconnectedness of multiple factors contributing to individual variation in susceptibility to engage in risk behaviors. Advances in these disciplines may direct new research directions and the development and evaluation of innovative intervention components for prevention that consider novel but central susceptibility factors. This article highlights findings from three interrelated areas of basic science research--genetics, neuroscience, and cognitive science--that together continue to inform prevention science. A primary objective of this article is to suggest how this research might guide primary prevention interventions. Translating findings from these disciplines can help to facilitate testable hypotheses for prevention science and explain potential limitations of current intervention approaches.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2002

Introduction to the Special Section on Cognitive Science and Psychological Assessment.

This introduction to the Special Section on Cognitive Science and Psychological Assessment begins with a brief overview of cognitive science and its interface with the clinical assessment of cognitive functioning. Concepts and themes permeating the articles in this section are then taken up. Included are cognitive-model architectures and model parameters, differential emphasis on efficiency versus content of cognition, and implementation of stochastic and dynamical aspects of cognitive processes. Selected distinguishing attributes of the respective contributions are highlighted.

Cognition Disorders↗

PubMed1993

Emotion and two kinds of meaning: cognitive therapy and applied cognitive science.

The clinical cognitive approach assumes that emotional reactions are mediated through the meanings given to events. Cognitive therapy aims to change emotion by changing meanings. It focuses on specific level meanings, evaluating the truth value of particular beliefs. Bower's science-driven associative network theory of cognition and emotion is also primarily concerned with specific meanings. This focus on meaning at a specific level causes problems, e.g. the contrasts between 'intellectual' and 'emotional' belief, between 'cold' and 'hot' cognition, and between explicit and intuitive knowledge. These problems are resolved in the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) approach. ICS distinguishes between a specific and a more holistic, intuitive, level of meaning. In contrast to alternative approaches, ICS suggest that holistic level meanings are of primary importance in emotion production. Representations at this level consist of schematic mental models, encoding high-order inter-relationships and prototypical patterns extracted from life experience. The ICS approach to meaning is described and its implications for understanding and treating emotional disorders discussed, together with relevant empirical findings. ICS suggests a therapeutic focus on holistic rather than specific meanings, a role for 'non-evidential' interventions, such as guided imagery, and a rational basis for certain experiential therapies.

Adaptation, Psychological↗

PubMed1999

An embodied cognitive science?

The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between neural systems and the wider world in which they function. Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely physically embodied, environmentally embedded science of the mind is still unclear. In this article I will raise a number of critical questions concerning the nature and scope of this approach, drawing a distinction between two kinds of appeal to embodiment: (1) 'Simple' cases, in which bodily and environmental properties merely constrain accounts that retain the focus on inner organization and processing; and (2) More radical appeals, in which attention to bodily and environmental features is meant to transform both the subject matter and the theoretical framework of cognitive science.

Journal Article↗