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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2006

Evaluating science outside the trial box: applying Daubert to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' criminal history score.

A limited amount of research exists examining the ability of the Criminal History Score of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) to achieve one of its most essential objectives: prediction of recidivism. Building on the work of Schopp [Schopp, R. (2001). Competency, condemnation, and commitment: An integrated theory of mental health law. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association], it is suggested that the scientific admissibility framework and the underlying principles announced by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 507 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993)] should be expanded beyond the constraints of the evidentiary admissibility phase of trial and should apply to legislative and administrative rules that have: a) an empirically testable purpose and b) a substantial impact on the rights of individuals. Such an analysis offers a useful mechanism for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of social science being used by legal institutions. Based upon a hypothetical Daubert analysis, the scientific validity of the Guidelines' Criminal History Score is assessed and demonstrated to be insufficient. The law and policy implications of this finding are discussed.

Crime↗
PubMed1994

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: a new standard for scientific evidence in the courts?

The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow explored the guidelines for admitting "scientific evidence" by way of expert opinion in legal cases. The Federal Rules of Evidence that were revised in 1975 did not explicitly mention the Frye standard and thus left it unclear as to what guidelines should be used by judges in federal courts. The Court held that the Frye rule was superseded by the new Rules and that the judge had to exercise some gatekeeping functions. An expert with sufficient credentials and something relevant to say was an insufficient standard. The implications of this ruling for psychiatric expert testimony are reviewed.

Clinical Competence↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Capillary electrophoresis in court: the landmark decision of the People of Tennessee versus Ware.

Capillary electrophoresis is a versatile and emerging technique. In the fields of law and science, history has been made with the admissibility of CE as a method to evaluate evidence. The extremely low sample requirements, high separation efficiencies, and excellent resolution allow for quantitative techniques from extracted and amplified mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), which was presented as evidence from hair shafts in the case of The People of Tennessee versus Paul Ware (Tennessee v. Ware). This paper discusses the history of the admissibility of scientific evidence. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court Justices rewrote the rules for admission of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert) (509 U.S. 597). After rejecting the longstanding requirements under Frye v. United States (Frye), 293 F.1013 (1923), which focused on the conclusions obtained rather than the methodologies employed, Daubert went further in establishing a liberal policy in the FRE favoring the District Court judges to act as gatekeepers, thus admitting well-grounded scientific evidence. Later this year, the Supreme Court will once again review the issue of how the decisions reached in trial courts should be treated by reviewing courts. CE has demonstrated its ability to meet the requisite scientific standards in the court system. The CE evidence presented in Ware led to a felony conviction.

DNA, Mitochondrial↗
PubMed2001

Application of the Supreme Court's Daubert criteria in radiation litigation.

In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining the admissibility of expert scientific evidence in litigation. This standard is known as the Daubert criteria, named after the pertinent case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The Daubert criteria require the courts to determine whether an expert's testimony reflects scientific knowledge, whether his/her findings are derived by the scientific method, and whether the work product is based on good science. The Daubert criteria are especially important in radiation litigation because issues involving radiation doses and effects are often complex and thus a jury will typically rely heavily on the analysis and opinions of experts. According to the Daubert criteria, scientific opinions must be based on a methodology that has a valid, testable hypothesis; has been subject to peer review; and is generally accepted in the scientific community. Additionally, the expert must be qualified to present opinions based on the methodology. Although the application of the Daubert criteria in radiation litigation is highly dependent on the specific court and judge presiding over the case, there have been recent high-profile cases in which application of the criteria has resulted in the dismissal of analysis and opinions offered by scientific experts. Reasons for the dismissals have included basic scientific errors such as failure of the expert to consider all possible explanations for an observed phenomenon, the selective use of data by the expert, and the failure to acknowledge and resolve inconsistencies between the expert's results and those of other investigators. This paper reviews the Daubert criteria as they apply to radiation litigation and provides examples of the application of the criteria from recent judgments involving the Three Mile Island and Hanford Downwinders cases.

Expert Testimony↗
PubMed2005

What has a decade of Daubert wrought?

There have been changes within the judicial system that may be attributable to opinions on the admissibility of expert testimony that began with the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. After surveying Daubert and subsequent related Supreme Court opinions, I examine a number of questions. Do the factors courts apply post-Daubert in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony make scientific sense? Has Daubert had an impact on the willingness of scientists to become expert witnesses? What do we know about Daubert's impact on improving science in the court room? What has been Daubert's effect on access to the courts? Does Daubert further public policy objectives of protecting the public against harm?

Drug Industry↗
PubMed2003

Quantitative EEG and the Frye and Daubert standards of admissibility.

The 70-year-old Frye standards of "general acceptance" were replaced by the Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert criteria of the scientific method, which established the standards for admissibility of evidence in Federal Court. The four Daubert criteria were: 1- Hypothesis testing, 2- Estimates of error rates, 3- Peer reviewed publication and 4- General acceptance (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 61 U.S.LW 4805 (U.S. June 29, 1993)). The present paper starts with the Daubert four factors and then matches them, step by step, to the scientific peer reviewed literature of quantitative EEG (QEEG) in relation to different clinical evaluations. This process shows how the peer reviewed science of the Digital EEG and the Quantitative EEG (QEEG) meet all of the Daubert standards of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, the science and technical aspects of QEEG in measuring the effects of neurological and psychiatric dysfunction also match the recent Supreme Court standards of "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge (General Electric Co v. Joiner, 1997, Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 1999). Finally, it is shown that QEEG scientific knowledge and QEEG "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge meet the trilogy standards of the Supreme Court rulings in support of QEEG's admissibility as a clinically valid method in the evaluation of the nature and extent of neurological and psychiatric disorders.

Electroencephalography↗
PubMed1997

Admissibility and per se exclusion of hypnotically elicited recall in American courts of law.

State v. Mack (1980) ruled that hypnotically elicited testimony is per se excluded from Minnesota law courts; this court also ruled that police could employ hypnosis in an attempt to construct an independently corroborated case. In recent years, there have been moves to rescind this exclusion; this raises a question of the probative value of such additional information when it is uncorroborated. This situation is compared with that of the polygraph as an index of deception: Like hypnosis, it is excluded per se in most American jurisdictions. Some legal decisions in Wisconsin are used to illustrate one alternative to the per se exclusion approach. Admissibility of scientific evidence in American courts of law has been based on a criterion of "general acceptability within the relevant scientific community," as first elucidated in Frye v. United States (1923). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Frye decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), by making general acceptability but one of several admissibility criteria. Three Daubert-based decisions, one involving hypnosis and all concerned with "recovered repressed memories," indicate some problems in law posed by Daubert.

Crime↗
PubMed2005

Regulatory parallels to Daubert: stakeholder influence, "sound science," and the delayed adoption of health-protective standards.

There is broad agreement that regulatory decisions should be based on evidence. But interested parties have used the "sound science" mantle to demand extended research, analysis, and review of evidence for the sole purpose of delaying health-protective regulation. This historical review shows how the forces behind the "sound science" reasoning leading to the Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc decision on science in the courtroom have operated in parallel in environmental regulation.Like Daubert, certain "sound science" regulatory tools can be used to improve decision quality. However, these tools can also challenge the federal government's ability to safeguard the public's health and well-being. Most recently, political tampering with science provides the foundation for some policymakers to disregard science completely in the environmental regulatory process.

Dioxins↗
PubMed1997

Osteopathic physicians and expert medical testimony.

The US Supreme Court addressed the issue of expert medical and scientific testimony in the 1993 case Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The guidelines to be used as a standard for expert medical witnesses under Daubert differ from earlier standards used by many courts for more than 70 years. This commentary reviews the history of previous and current standards used to determine admissibility of medical testimony in legal proceedings and discusses the ramifications of these standards for osteopathic physicians involved in the medical malpractice process.

Clinical Competence↗
PubMed2005

A cognitive scientist looks at Daubert.

Our system of justice requires that trials be maximally fair. It is part of what holds this society together. Indeed, it is part of the genius of the justice system to have a kind of balance between strict and nurturant morality within the judicial system, so that the system itself provides a kind of moral and political balance. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993) has upset that balance and has made our judicial system significantly less fair and more politically conservative. Daubert is not just about the application of some procedural rule (Rule 702). Daubert functions in its application as a strategic initiative that significantly moves America in a conservative direction, in the moral and political spheres, as well as in the legal sphere.

Cognitive Science↗
PubMed2005

Law's knowledge: science for justice in legal settings.

Legal developments following Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc indicate a growing need to reevaluate the decision's fundamental assumptions about law, science, and their interactions.I argue that in Daubert and two successor cases, the Supreme Court misconceived both the nature of scientific practice and its links to legal fact-finding. The decisions endorsed a separatist model of law and science, pre-supposing a sharper boundary between the institutions than exists or should exist. A better approach is to recognize that law and science are both knowledge-generating institutions, but that fact-making serves different functions in these two settings. The important question for the law is not how judges can best do justice to science, but rather how courts can better render justice under conditions of uncertainty and ignorance.

Drug Industry↗
PubMed2005

Science and regulation: current impasse and future solutions.

We reflect on four articles that examine the Supreme Court's Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc decision and efforts by private interests to derail public health and environmental regulations. The articles' authors make the case that the impact of Daubert and related decisions in court settings pale by comparison to the threat that Daubert-like thinking poses in the regulatory arena. A growing number of companies, however, have made substantial changes in practice and in culture by embracing a philosophy where health and environment are priorities. Mechanisms could be established to encourage firms to pledge to use science to meet public health and environmental goals, as well as channel the ingenuity of the private sector towards ecological, economical, and equitable systems of production.

Expert Testimony↗
PubMed2005

The weight of scientific evidence in policy and law.

The term "weight of evidence" (WOE) appears in regulatory rules and decisions. However, there has been little discussion about the meaning, variations of use, and epistemic significance of WOE for setting health and safety standards. This article gives an overview of the role of WOE in regulatory science, discusses alternative views about the methodology underlying the concept, and places WOE in the context of the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993). I argue that whereas the WOE approach to evaluating scientific evidence is gaining favor among regulators, its applications in judicial processes may be in conflict with some interpretations of how the Daubert criteria for judging reliable evidence should be applied.

Causality↗
PubMed2003

Daubert, cognitive malingering, and test accuracy.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) held that trial judges should permit expert scientific testimony only when "the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, and ... properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Vallabhajosula and van Gorp ("V & vG," 2001) have suggested that when the Daubert standard is applied to tests for malingered cognitive deficits, courts should deem admissible only results that meet this mathematical standard: assuming a pretest probability of .3, a "positive" score on the malingering test should yield a posttest probability of at least .8. This paper shows that V & vG's criterion may lead to misunderstandings about the kind of information maligering measures provide. After reviewing cases that have discussed both the Daubert decision and malingered cognitive deficits, this paper uses data from the Test of Memory Malingering (T.N. Tombaugh, 1996) to provide a general characterization of the mathematical properties of malingering measures. The paper then describes how pretest knowledge about malingering is combined with knowledge about a test's performance to generate a posttest probability of malingering. The results can help mental health experts respond to Daubert-inspired challenges to conclusions based on malingering measures.

Bayes Theorem↗
PubMed2005

Psychological evidence at the dawn of the law's scientific age.

The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., holding that the admissibility of scientific evidence depends on its scientific merit, has made American law receptive to valid science to an unprecedented degree. We review the implications for psychology of the law's taking science seriously. We consider the law before Daubert, and the ways that Daubert as well as modifications to the Federal Rules of Evidence have affected the admissibility of expert testimony. We describe the ramifications of these changes for psychology used as authority to create a general legal rule, as evidence to determine a specific fact, and as framework to provide context. Finally, future prospects for improving psychological testimony are offered: Court-appointed experts will increase the psychological sophistication of judges and juries, and evidence-based practices on the part of psychologists will increase the sophistication of the expert testimony that they proffer in court.

Expert Testimony↗
PubMed2005

The (near) irrelevance of Daubert to criminal justice and some suggestions for reform.

Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc should have an extraordinary impact on criminal litigation, because there is rarely a criminal trial that does not rely on some form of expert testimony. In fact, it is almost irrelevant. Despite the frequency of prosecution proffered scientific and expert testimony in criminal cases, Daubert is rarely invoked to challenge it. In civil cases, when expert testimony is challenged in criminal proceedings, the outcome could not be more different. Because most violent crimes are committed by the poor, their court appointed advocates--overworked and under-financed--are not up to the challenge. In the absence of a system of effective representation, Daubert will not improve scientific evidence in criminal cases. The only way to guard against the misapplication of forensic science is to impose controls and reforms long before the cases come to court.

Criminal Law↗