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In the differentiation-of-deception paradigm (DDP), the experimental and control conditions, respectively, consist of questions answered deceptively (D) and honestly (H). Previous DDP studies with the electrodermal SCR as the dependent variable have yielded the basic increase in responding to D relative to H questions (D > H), and have indicated that this effect is probably not due to cognitive factors such as differential retrieval difficulty, and is also relatively unaffected by motivational factors. To test the notion that the D > H effect does not represent genuine deception because of the elimination of the element of choice in the DDP, the present study varied, between two groups of 16 subjects, the degree to which subjects could choose which questions they would answer deceptively. If choice were necessary, or even important, for the differentiation-of-deception phenomenon, the D > H effect should have been greater in the free-choice condition, but the (nonsignificant) trend was in a direction opposite to this prediction. Another orthogonally-varied, between-subject manipulation, was the relative frequency of D and H items. The basic electrodermal D > H phenomenon, including the curious lack of response habituation during the session, has now been duplicated over a variety of conditions, but the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon are far from being well understood.
Clinicians tend to assign greater weight to non-verbal expression than to patients' self-report when judging the location and severity of pain. Judgments can misrepresent the actual experience because patients can successfully alter their pain expressions. The present research provides a basis for discriminating genuine and deceptive pain expressions by expanding detailed accounts of facial expressions to include previously unexamined variables, including study of temporal patterns and contiguity of facial actions as well as the occurrence of specific deception cues. Low back patients' facial expressions (n=40) were videotaped at rest and while undergoing a painful straight leg raise with instructions to: (1) genuinely express their pain, or (2) pretend that it did not hurt. As well, they were asked to fake pain without moving. The Facial Action Coding System was used to describe and quantify facial activity. The different types of expression were compared on the frequency, type, intensity, temporal pattern and contiguity of facial actions, as well as on the frequency of specific deception cues. Findings confirmed the difficulty of discriminating the facial expressions, but indicated that faked pain expressions show a greater number of pain-related and non-pain-related actions, have a longer peak intensity and overall duration, and the facial actions observed tend to be less temporally contiguous than are those in genuine pain expressions. The differences between masked pain and neutral expressions were subtle, with a greater frequency of mouth opening and residual eyebrow movement in masked pain expressions. Thus, there is an empirical basis for discriminating genuine and deceptive facial displays.
The authors investigated whether observers infer others' credibility from the consistency of their visible and audible characteristics, and whether such inferences are justified. In Study 1, target persons were videotaped while reading a standard text; in Study 2, target persons were videotaped while lying or telling the truth. From these videotapes, silent films and audiotapes were produced and presented to independent observers who inferred the targets' personality traits from this information. Measures of cross-modal discrepancy were derived from differences between personality descriptions based on a silent film or an audiotape. Lying resulted in cross-modal discrepancies in impressions of Agreeableness, and cross-modal discrepancies in Agreeableness were related to judgments of dishonesty. Deception detection was substantial if the judges were exposed to acoustic information on the targets, and if the targets faked their curriculum vitae. Deception detection was to some extent, but not entirely, mediated by cross-modal discrepancies in impressions of Agreeableness.
Accounting for the unusual economy of secondary gain or reinforcement, understanding abnormal illness behavior and evaluating for the role of the unconscious and primary gain are three important problems which complicate the understanding of psychogenic pain. These problems might be addressed in part by an examination of the experimental studies of the social psychology of deception of self and others. The forced compliance situation, in which subjects who lie for a certain level of compensation persist in telling the lie in other settings, is one of the best studied of these experimental situations. Ways in which this experimental work might apply to problems in understanding pain patients are explored. Possible applications of this research to treatment are discussed along with areas for further research.
The author argues that both shaman and psychiatrist are obliged to use a degree of self-deception in assuming their roles. The shaman must rationalize his use of trickery to impress his patients, and the psychiatrist deceives himself that his psychotherapeutic techniques have specific healing properties in the face of evidence which suggests that he often merely mobilizes the general effects of placebo and suggestion. Shaman and psychiatrist appear to use the same mental mechanisms in deceiving themselves. Inadequate method and theory may be supported by reference to personal experience and unrelated data or defended by circular reasoning or comparison with an even more inadequate system. The practitioner may also allow his perception of his abilities to be moulded by social consensus.
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The orchid family is renowned for its enormous diversity of pollination mechanisms and unusually high occurrence of non-rewarding flowers compared to other plant families. The mechanisms of deception in orchids include generalized food deception, food-deceptive floral mimicry, brood-site imitation, shelter imitation, pseudoantagonism, rendezvous attraction and sexual deception. Generalized food deception is the most common mechanism (reported in 38 genera) followed by sexual deception (18 genera). Floral deception in orchids has been intensively studied since Darwin, but the evolution of non-rewarding flowers still presents a major puzzle for evolutionary biology. The two principal hypotheses as to how deception could increase fitness in plants are (i) reallocation of resources associated with reward production to flowering and seed production, and (ii) higher levels of cross-pollination due to pollinators visiting fewer flowers on non-rewarding plants, resulting in more outcrossed progeny and more efficient pollen export. Biologists have also tried to explain why deception is overrepresented in the orchid family. These explanations include: (i) efficient removal and deposition of pollinaria from orchid flowers in a single pollinator visit, thus obviating the need for rewards to entice multiple visits from pollinators; (ii) efficient transport of orchid pollen, thus requiring less reward-induced pollinator constancy; (iii) low-density populations in many orchids, thus limiting the learning of associations of floral phenotypes and rewards by pollinators; (iv) packaging of pollen in pollinaria with limited carry-over from flower to flower, thus increasing the risks of geitonogamous self-pollination when pollinators visit many flowers on rewarding plants. All of these general and orchid-specific hypotheses are difficult to reconcile with the well-established pattern for rewardlessness to result in low pollinator visitation rates and consequently low levels of fruit production. Arguments that deception evolves because rewards are costly are particularly problematic in that small amounts of nectar are unlikely to have a significant effect on the energy budget of orchids, and because reproduction in orchids is often severely pollen-, rather than resource-limited. Several recent experimental studies have shown that deception promotes cross-pollination, but it remains unknown whether actual outcrossing rates are generally higher in deceptive orchids. Our review of the literature shows that there is currently no evidence that deceptive orchids carry higher levels of genetic load (an indirect measure of outcrossing rate) than their rewarding counterparts. Cross-pollination does, however, result in dramatic increases in seed quality in almost all orchids and has the potential to increase pollen export (by reducing pollen discounting). We suggest that floral deception is particularly beneficial, because of its promotion of outcrossing, when pollinators are abundant, but that when pollinators are consistently rare, selection may favour a nectar reward or a shift to autopollination. Given that nectar-rewardlessness is likely to have been the ancestral condition in orchids and yet is evolutionarily labile, more attention will need to be given to explanations as to why deception constitutes an 'evolutionarily stable strategy'.
A standing enigma in pollination ecology is the evolution of pollinator attraction without offering reward in about one third of all orchid species. Here I review concepts of pollination by deception, and in particular recent findings in the pollination syndromes of food deception and sexual deception in orchids. Deceptive orchids mimic floral signals of rewarding plants (food deception) or mating signals of receptive females (sexual deception) to attract pollen vectors. In some food deceptive orchids, similarities in the spectral reflectance visible to the pollinator in a model plant and its mimic, and increased reproductive success of the mimic in the presence of the model have been demonstrated. Other species do not mimic specific model plants but attract pollinators with general attractive floral signals. In sexually deceptive orchids, floral odor is the key trait for pollinator attraction, and behaviorally active compounds in the orchids are identical to the sex pheromone of the pollinator species. Deceptive orchids often show high variability in floral signals, which may be maintained by negative frequency-dependent selection, since pollinators can learn and subsequently avoid common deceptive morphs more quickly than rare ones. The evolution of obligate deception in orchids seems paradoxical in the light of the typically lower fruit set than in rewarding species. Pollination by deception, however, can reduce self-pollination and encourage pollen flow over longer distances, thus promoting outbreeding. Although some food deceptive orchids are isolated through postzygotic reproductive barriers, sexually deceptive orchids lack post-mating barriers and species isolation is achieved via specific pollinator attraction. Recent population genetic and phylogenetic investigations suggest gene-flow within subgeneric clades, but pollinator-mediated selection may maintain species-specific floral traits.
Behavior and event-related potentials (ERP) were recorded while participants made truthful and deceptive responses about previously memorized words under three instructional conditions: consistent truthful, consistent deceptive, and random deceptive. To determine if practice affected the deception-related activity we reported previously [R. Johnson, Jr., J. Barnhardt, J. Zhu, The deceptive response: effects of response conflict and strategic monitoring on the late positive component and episodic memory-related brain activity. Biol. Psychol., 64 (2003) 217-253; R. Johnson, Jr., J. Barnhardt, J. Zhu, The contribution of executive processes to deceptive responding. Neuropsychologia, 42 (2004) 878-901], participants performed two blocks of 145 trials of each condition. In the consistent truthful condition, practice benefited performance as indicated by decreased reaction time (RT) and RT variability. In addition, practice increased P300 amplitude and decreased the amplitude of a medial frontal negativity (MFN), which is believed to index the use of response-monitoring processes. However, a different pattern of results obtained in the two deception conditions. Although practice decreased RTs by almost as much as in the consistent truthful condition, the extent to which deceptive response in both conditions were slower than those in the consistent truthful condition actually increased slightly. Hence, the component of RT reflecting processing of conflicting response information did not decrease. In accord with the RT results, MFN amplitudes in the consistent deceptive and random deceptive conditions were unaffected by practice, suggesting that the amount of executive processes required to make and/or monitor deceptive responses was undiminished by practice. Although P300 amplitude increased slightly in the consistent deceptive condition, there was no change in the random deceptive condition. Thus, a major finding here is that, unlike truthful responses, the conceptually driven response conflicts underlying deceptive responses appear to be as resistant to practice-induced changes as described previously for perceptually driven response conflicts.
BACKGROUND: Some physicians may resort to deception to secure third-party payer approval for patient procedures. Related physician attitudes, including willingness to use deception, are not well understood. OBJECTIVE: To determine physician willingness to deceive a third-party payer and physician attitudes toward deception of third-party payers. METHODS: A cross-sectional mailed survey was used to evaluate physician willingness to use deception in 6 vignettes of varying clinical severity: coronary bypass surgery, arterial revascularization, intravenous pain medication and nutrition, screening mammography, emergent psychiatric referral, and cosmetic rhinoplasty. We evaluated 169 board-certified internists randomly selected from 4 high- and 4 low-managed care penetration metropolitan markets nationwide for willingness to use deception in each vignette. RESULTS: Physicians were willing to use deception in the coronary bypass surgery (57.7%), arterial revascularization (56.2%), intravenous pain medication and nutrition (47.5%), screening mammography (34.8%), and emergent psychiatric referral (32.1%) vignettes. There was little willingness to use deception for cosmetic rhinoplasty (2.5%). Rates were highest for physicians practicing in predominantly managed care markets, for clinically severe vignettes, and for physicians spending less time in clinical practice. Physician ratings of the justifiability of deception varied by perspective and vignette. CONCLUSIONS: Many physicians sanction the use of deception to secure third-party payers' approval of medically indicated care. Such deception may reflect a tension between the traditional ethic of patient advocacy and the new ethic of cost control that restricts patient and physician choice in the use of limited resources.
We measured behavioral responses (RT) and recorded event-related brain potentials (ERPs) when participants made truthful and deceptive responses about perceived and remembered stimuli. Participants performed an old/new recognition test under three instructional conditions: Consistent Truthful, Consistent Deceptive and Random Deceptive. Compared to Consistent Truthful responses, Consistent Deceptive responses to both perceived and remembered stimuli produced the same pattern of less accurate, slower and more variable responses and larger medial frontal negativities (MFN). The MFN is thought to reflect activity in anterior cingulate cortex, a brain area involved in monitoring actions and resolving conflicting response tendencies. The Random Deceptive condition required participants to strategically monitor their long-term response patterns to accommodate a deceptive strategy. Even compared to the Consistent Deceptive condition, RTs in the Random Deceptive condition were significantly slower and more variable and MFN activity increased significantly. MFN scalp distribution results revealed the presence of three different patterns of brain activity; one each for truthful responses, deceptive responses and strategic monitoring. Thus, the data indicate that anterior cingulate cortex plays a key role in making deceptive responses.
Self-deception is made unnecessarily puzzling by the assumption that it is an intrapersonal analog of ordinary interpersonal deception. In paradigmatic cases, interpersonal deception is intentional and involves some time at which the deceiver disbelieves what the deceived believes. The assumption that self-deception is intentional and that the self-deceiver believes that some proposition is true while also believing that it is false produces interesting conceptual puzzles, but it also produces a fundamentally mistaken view of the dynamics of self-deception. This target article challenges the assumption and presents an alternative view of the nature and etiology of self-deception. Drawing upon empirical studies of cognitive biases, it resolves familiar "paradoxes" about the dynamics of self-deception and the condition of being self-deceived. Conceptually sufficient conditions for self-deception are offered and putative empirical demonstrations of a kind of self-deception in which a subject believes that a proposition is true while also believing that it is false are criticized. Self-deception is neither irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the assistance of mental exotica. The key to understanding its dynamics is a proper appreciation of our capacity for acquiring and retaining motivationally biased beliefs.
From the perspective of philosophy, the idea of humans lying to themselves seems irrational and maladaptive, if even possible. However, the paradigm of cognitive modularity admits the possibility of self-deception. Trivers argues that self-deception can increase fitness by improving the effectiveness of inter-personal deception. Ramachandran criticizes Trivers' conjecture, arguing that the costs of self-deception outweigh its benefits. We first modify a well-known cognitive modularity model of Minsky to formalize a cognitive model of self-deception. We then use Byrne's multi-dimensional dynamic character meta-model to integrate the cognitive model into an evolutionary hawk-dove game in order to investigate Trivers' and Ramachandran's conjectures. By mapping the influence of game circumstances into cognitive states, and mapping the influence of multiple cognitive modules into player decisions, our cognitive definition of self-deception is extended to a behavioral definition of self-deception. Our cognitive modules, referred to as the hunger and fear daemons, assess the benefits and the cost of competition and generate player beliefs. Daemon-assessment of encounter benefits and costs may lead to inter-daemonic conflict, that is, ambivalence, about whether or not to fight. Player-types vary in the manner by which such inter-daemonic conflict is resolved, and varieties of self-deception are modeled as type-specific conflict-resolution mechanisms. In the display phase of the game, players signal to one another and update their beliefs before finally committing to a decision (hawk or dove). Self-deception can affect player beliefs, and hence player actions, before or after signaling. In support of Trivers' conjecture, the self-deceiving types do outperform the non-self-deceiving type. We analyse the sensitivity of this result to parameters of the cognitive model, specifically the cognitive resolution of the players and the influence of player signals on co-player beliefs.
An organism may use misinformation, knowingly (through deception) or unknowingly (as in the case of camouflage), to gain advantage in a competitive environment. From an evolutionary perspective, greater tactical deception occurs among primates closer to humans, with larger neocortices. In humans, the onset of deceptive behaviours in childhood exhibits a developmental trajectory, which may be regarded as 'normal' in the majority and deficient among a minority with certain neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. autism). In the human adult, deception and lying exhibit features consistent with their use of 'higher' or 'executive' brain systems. Accurate detection of deception in humans may be of particular importance in forensic practice, while an understanding of its cognitive neurobiology may have implications for models of 'theory of mind' and social cognition, and societal notions of responsibility, guilt and mitigation. In recent years, functional neuroimaging techniques (especially functional magnetic resonance imaging) have been used to study deception. Though few in number, and using very different experimental protocols, studies published in the peer-reviewed literature exhibit certain consistencies. Attempted deception is associated with activation of executive brain regions (particularly prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices), while truthful responding has not been shown to be associated with any areas of increased activation (relative to deception). Hence, truthful responding may comprise a relative 'baseline' in human cognition and communication. The subject who lies may necessarily engage 'higher' brain centres, consistent with a purpose or intention (to deceive). While the principle of executive control during deception remains plausible, its precise anatomy awaits elucidation.
The demonstration of deception as a psychophysiological phenomenon requires a comparison of physiological responses to two conditions (experimental and control) which differ only with respect to deception. Such electrodermal (skin conductance response) differentiation was recently reported in the Differentiation of Deception paradigm, which controls for two potentially important sources of confounding in polygraph (often referred to as the Detection of Deception): differential question significance and differential frequency of question occurrence. The present study manipulated (between 32 subjects in a 2 x 2 design) two two-level, subjective factors in the paradigm: Perceived Accuracy of polygraphy (written and oral instructions characterising accuracy as high vs low) and Perceived Memorial Content (20 more complex, less personal, and less meaningful questions vs 6 less complex, more personal, and more meaningful questions). Significant differentiation of deception was again obtained, as was evidence for the effectiveness of the manipulations. However, the deception phenomenon was not clearly affected by either of the two subjective factors. In addition, one post-hoc test showed significantly increased differentiation under the low Perceived Accuracy condition, which is contrary to the widespread belief of polygraphers that high perceived accuracy is not only important but even essential for the detection of deception. However, the applied, polygraphic aim of detecting guilt in individuals is quite different from the scientific, psychophysiological aim of differentiating deception as a psychological process, and the phenomena involved probably have different causes.