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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMedDate not supplied

Cost analysis of equipment failure of a radiology department and possible choices about maintenance.

PURPOSE: Our aim was to evaluate the economic impact of equipment failures in a radiology department with a view to guiding maintenance policy decisions. MATERIAL AND METHODS: We assessed the negative economic impact caused by the interruption of activity of a radiodiagnostics section due to equipment failure, taking into account: the effects occurring during the first day of equipment down-time (assuming that the equipment failure occurs in the middle of the shift) and the effects during the following days until the repair of the failure; the effects occurring in the short- and long-term. To exemplify the negative impact of inactivity due to equipment failure, we chose three radiology sections with different levels of technological and operational complexity (chest radiology, gastrointestinal radiology and remote-controlled diagnostics). For each, we evaluated the loss of contribution margin and the idle capacity costs (short- and long-term impact). RESULTS: The negative economic effects were: for thoracic radiology, 496,77 Euro in the first day, and 30,99 Euro from the second day onwards; for gastrointestinal radiology, 526,40 Euro for the first day, and 730,39 Euro from the second day onwards; for remote-controlled diagnostics, 786,25 Euro for the first day, and 927,67 Euro from the second days onwards. DISCUSSION: Our results indicate that the level of idle capacity costs (mainly equipment and staff) increases with the complexity of the equipment, whereas the contribution margin appears to fluctuate, because the charges are state-imposed and do not vary with the complexity of equipment. Moreover, our analysis shows that if the workload of a broken machine can easily be assigned to an additional shift using another machine, losses are considerably reduced from the second day onwards. Once the negative economic impact of equipment failures has been evaluated, the second step is to choose the best kind of maintenance. CONCLUSIONS: A sound calculation of the economic impact of equipment failures is very useful for guiding the head of department and the hospital manager in deciding whether to purchase maintenance services (or a long-term guarantee) from the equipment manufacturer, to set up an auxiliary centre for maintenance and repair, or to purchase a third-party maintenance contract.

Costs and Cost Analysis↗
PubMed1984

An analysis of major errors and equipment failures in anesthesia management: considerations for prevention and detection.

Adaptations of the critical-incident technique were used to gather reports of anesthesia-related human error and equipment failure. A total of 139 anesthesiologists, residents, and nurse-anesthetists from four hospitals participated as subjects in directed or open-ended interviews, and 48 of them functioned as "trained observers." A total of 1,089 descriptions of preventable "critical incidents" were collected. Of these, 70 represented errors or failures that had contributed in some way to a "substantive negative outcome." From these incidents, ten potential strategies were developed for prevention or detection of incidents. Overall patterns observed in this wider study were similar to those of our earlier report. The incidents most frequently reported included breathing circuit disconnections, drug-syringe swaps, gas-flow control errors and losses of gas supply. Only 4% of the incidents with substantive negative outcomes involved equipment failure, confirming the previous impression that human error is the dominant issue in anesthesia mishaps. Among the broad categories of key strategies for mishap prevention were additional technical training, improved supervision, improved organization, equipment human-factors improvements, and use of additional monitoring instrumentation. The data also suggest that less healthy patients are more likely to be affected adversely by errors. It is suggested that, in future studies of anesthesia mortality and morbidity, untoward events should be classified according to preventive strategy rather than outcome alone as an aid to those who wish to apply the experience of others to lessen the risk in their individual practice.

Accident Prevention↗
PubMed1993

The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Equipment failure: an analysis of 2000 incident reports.

Of the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study, 177 (9%) were due to "pure" equipment failure according to pre-defined criteria. Of these 107 (60%) involved anaesthetic equipment, 42 (24%) involved monitors, 17 (10%) other theatre equipment and 11 (6%) the gas or electricity supply. Ninety-seven (55% of the 177) were potentially life-threatening; of these two-thirds would be detected by the array of monitors recommended by the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and all but 9 of the remainder would be handled by application of the crisis management algorithm recommended elsewhere in this symposium. Of the 9 remaining, 2 were electrical shock, 3 overheating of a humidifier or blood warmer, 2 the unavailability of a spare laryngoscope and 1 the consequence of a power failure. Meticulous adherence to the equipment checking and monitoring guidelines of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists and application of a suitable crisis management algorithm should protect the patient from potentially life-threatening equipment failure in virtually all cases except electric shock, power failure and overheating of warming devices.

Anesthesiology↗
PubMed1997

[Equipment failures in anesthesia and how to avoid them. An overview].

Despite the progress achieved in the fields of medical technology and quality assurance and extensive legal requirements there are still failures during the use of anaesthetic equipment which could be avoided. Describing well known failure modes the purpose of this paper is to sharpen the sense for their occurrence and avoidance and thus to contribute to their reduction. The first part of this paper introduces the safety concept of an anaesthetic workstation. Central issues are the intended use, the state of engineering, preparation and checking, and appropriate operator reactions. The second part deals with the interface between human being and machine. Following the modules of the anaesthetic workstation--breathing system, ventilator, dosage units for gases and anaesthetic agents, monitoring--we will consider representative failures and risks which may accrue during the different stages of use of the equipment.

Anesthesiology↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Managing equipment failures: nursing practice requirements for meeting the challenges of the Safe Medical Devices Act.

The Safe Medical Devices Act (SMDA) has two major effects for the user facilities: the reporting of specific medical device-related incidents and the tracking of medical devices through the user facility. As the final ruling becomes effective in 1996, it is imperative that healthcare professionals take an active role in identifying the effects of the SMDA and the impact that it poses on healthcare facilities. This article supports nursing's role in developing a medical device tracking process. Included in the overall plan to promote the user supporting system successfully are such ideas as employee education about medical equipment safety, development of unit-based medical device resource materials for employees to access, and promotion of the steps for reporting a medical device malfunction.

Consumer Product Safety↗
PubMed2005

Avoiding pitfalls in assembling an equipment failure rate database for risk assessments.

As companies move progressively toward quantifying the risks of releases of hazardous materials, there becomes a greater need for developing the data necessary to populate the risk analysis. Sophisticated mathematical models have been developed to predict the consequences of a hazardous material release. But the effort devoted to the frequency side of the "risk equation" has been very disorganized by comparison, with inconsistent or non-existent definitions of "failure", mixing of incompatible data, application of data from one industry to a completely different industry, and a host of other problems. Nonetheless, through judicious assembly and analysis of a variety of data sources, a useful failure rate database can be developed. Many seminal sources of data are described, with an emphasis on loss of containment failure rates. Pitfalls in interpreting failure rate data are also illustrated.

Chemical Industry↗