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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Maintenance of an insanity defense under Montana's "abolition" of the insanity defense.

In 1979, Montana's insanity defense was replaced with the more restrictive mens rea defense, a change that has been described as an example of "abolition" of the insanity defense. The authors identified cases in which mental health was an issue in seven Montana counties for 3 years before and 3 years after the 1979 reform. They found that acquittals based on the insanity plea markedly declined, but that dismissals based on incompetence to stand trial increased substantially following the reform. They conclude that dismissal based on incompetence to stand trial became a substitute for acquittal based on the insanity plea under mens rea.

Forensic Psychiatry↗

The military insanity defense.

This article describes the military insanity defense. The success of the litigated insanity defense is explored through the number of insanity acquittals over a 28-month period. A questionnaire distributed to all United States Army psychiatrists provided information on the number of forensic evaluations performed, the number of not criminally responsible (NCR) opinions made, and the disposition of noncontested NCR opinions. The questionnaire also tested the Army psychiatrists' knowledge about recent changes in the military insanity defense. This pilot study raises interesting questions about the military insanity defense that further research can address.

Forensic Psychiatry↗

Culpability for inducing mental states: the insanity defense of Dr. Jekyll.

Insanity acquittees are often (erroneously) believed to get away with murder. This article examines one possible cause of this view--that insanity acquittees may have, to various degrees, caused or exacerbated their own mental disorder in the first instance. Such a component of prior fault is illustrated with recourse to the putative insanity defense of Dr. Jekyll, who, while almost certainly not criminally responsible at the time he committed murder (in the guise of Mr. Hyde), was culpable for bringing about that nullification of responsibility (thereby causing the conditions of his own defense). Such culpability (also found in intoxication cases) is examined in relation to medication noncompliance in mentally disordered offenders, and possible solutions for dealing with "culpable madness" are presented.

Criminal Psychology↗

The insanity defense: effects of abolition unsupported by a moral consensus.

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.

Criminal Law↗

Use of posttraumatic stress disorder to support an insanity defense.

OBJECTIVE: The authors examine the allegation that the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is frequently abused in the legal system as the basis for a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. METHOD: Data for the investigation were drawn from a study of insanity pleas gathered from court records in 49 counties in eight states. Data on the 28 insanity plea defendants for whom PTSD was diagnosed before or immediately after trial were compared with data on 8,135 defendants whose insanity pleas were based on other diagnoses. RESULTS: Insanity pleas by defendants with diagnoses of PTSD constituted only 0.3% of the cases. There were few significant differences between the two groups on demographic variables, psychiatric histories, previous involvement in crime, or current charges. The defendants with PTSD were more likely to have been married, less likely to have been arrested as juveniles, and less likely to have been detained after trial. CONCLUSIONS: Contrary to previously expressed concerns, PTSD was infrequently associated with an insanity defense in the cases in this study. In the cases in which pleas based on PTSD were used, they were no more likely to succeed than pleas based on any other diagnosis. Defendants with PTSD-related insanity defenses differed little from other insanity defendants, contradicting the stereotype of the person who is driven by PTSD to commit crimes. The data do not support fears of widespread misuse of the diagnosis of PTSD in connection with the insanity defense.

Humans↗

An empirical investigation of insanity defense attitudes: exploring factors related to bias.

This study's primary aim was to evaluate factors that influence attitudes toward the insanity defense in a sample of 578 college undergraduates. In addition to a comprehensive demographics survey, participants completed the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised (IDAS-R) and the Attitude Toward the Death Penalty (ATDP) Scale. Favorable attitude toward capital punishment and misperceptions about overuse of the insanity defense were related to negative attitudes toward the insanity defense. Hierarchical regression analyses demonstrated that possessing a favorable attitude toward capital punishment was the most robust predictor of a negative attitude toward the insanity defense. These findings provide valuable information about factors that create and maintain biases against the insanity defense and suggest areas of inquiry that could aid attorneys in selecting unbiased jurors.

Adolescent↗

Empirical research on the insanity defense and attempted reforms: evidence toward informed policy.

This paper addresses some common questions about the insanity defense and issues raised by commonly proposed "reforms." The first section begins with a brief description of the insanity defense and the reasons for its existence in the law. It then examines some of the popular myths and public misperceptions surrounding the insanity defense. The next three sections discuss proposed "reforms" and the empirical research that addresses their effect. These reforms, including various procedural changes in definitions, burden of proof, and expert testimony, the institution of a guilty but mentally ill verdict, and the abolition of the insanity defense itself, are reviewed, along with relevant research findings and policy issues. Finally, the development of sound conditional release programs for criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity is proposed as a reform option which could serve the objectives of enhancing public safety and access to appropriate treatment while continuing to meet the objectives of the insanity defense within criminal jurisprudence.

Attitude↗

Empirical research on the insanity defense and attempted reforms: evidence toward informed policy.

The paper addresses some common questions about the insanity defense and issues raised by commonly proposed "reforms." The first section begins with a brief description of the insanity defense and the reasons for its existence in the law. It then examines some of the popular myths and public misperceptions surrounding the insanity defense. The next three sections discuss proposed "reforms" and the empirical research that addresses their effect. These reforms, including various procedural changes in definitions, burden of proof, and expert testimony, the institution of a guilty but mentally ill verdict, and the abolition of the insanity defense itself, are reviewed, along with relevant research findings and policy issues. Finally, the development of sound conditional release programs for criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity is proposed as a reform option which could serve the objectives of enhancing public safety and access to appropriate treatment while continuing to meet the objectives of the insanity defense within criminal jurisprudence.

Expert Testimony↗

The hidden effects of Montana's "abolition" of the insanity defense.

Montana abolished the affirmative insanity defense in 1979. In this article we examine the effect of this change by focusing on all defendants who raised mental health in his/her defense from 1976 to 1985. We found that while post-reform insanity acquittals did dramatically decline, there was a corresponding rise in findings of incompetent to stand trial with charges dismissed, perhaps negating the desired impact. We also compared the defendants and the legal process, finding no significant differences pre to post reform.

Adult↗

The insanity defense on trial.

What was once a great romance between law and psychiatry has ended in disenchantment on both sides. Legal rulings during the 1950s intended to increase the psychiatric presence in the courtroom have been repudiated, and there is now a mood to abolish the traditional insanity defense. Abolitionists charge that the insanity defense has been successfully employed by large numbers of dangerous criminals to avoid punishment, that psychiatrists are dishonest because they serve as expert witnesses for both sides, and that the existence of the defense is evidence of a permissive society that coddles violent criminals. Each of these charges is rebutted by the author, who contends that until recently the insanity defense was a profound hypocrisy: the courts found the defendants not guilty by reason of insanity and then relied on psychiatry to confine them for the rest of their lives. But legal reforms and changes in psychiatric practice during the past 20 years have made it more difficult to confine such persons, and thus the insanity defense has real meaning for the first time. The author believes that despite the loss of protection to society, there are important legal and moral barriers to abolishing the insanity defense.

Commitment of Persons with Psychiatric Disorders↗

Myths, realities, and the political world: the anthropology of insanity defense attitudes.

The author presents the case that society's efforts to understand the insanity defense and insanity-pleading defendants are doomed to intellectual, moral, and political gridlock unless we are willing to take a fresh look at the doctrine through a series of filters-empirical research, scientific discovery, moral philosophy, cognitive and moral psychology, and sociology-in an effort to confront the single most important (but rarely asked) question: why do we feel the way we do about "these people" (insanity pleaders)? He examines this question finally through a model of structural anthropology and concludes that until we come to grips with the extent to which ours is a "culture of punishment," we can make no headway in solving the insanity defense dilemma.

Ethics↗

Insanity defenses: contested or conceded?

The authors examined 316 Oregon criminal cases in which the accused successfully pleaded the insanity defense. Prosecutors agreed to the insanity verdict in more than four out of five cases. In most cases all examining experts diagnosed the defendant as psychotic. The smaller number of defendants who were diagnosed by the state hospital staff as displaying only personality disorders accounted for a disproportionately large percentage of the contested trials. Observing that Oregon's insanity defense system is run by consensus, the authors suggest a reorientation of the insanity defense debate.

Crime↗

The volume and characteristics of insanity defense pleas: an eight-state study.

The authors document the very complex process involved in identifying insanity defense pleas in eight states. Each state and each study county in each state required an individual approach. Most often, county court dockets were hand searched to identify those pleading insanity, although numerous other methodologies were used. The frequency and rate of insanity pleas and acquittals are presented for the study states as well as descriptive data on the characteristics of persons pleading and acquitted NGRI. Overall, the insanity defense was raised in one percent of all felony cases. Further, only 26 percent of those raising the insanity defense were actually acquitted NGRI. The necessity of obtaining data on insanity pleas to adequately understand and ultimately inform future directions of insanity defense research is discussed.

Commitment of Persons with Psychiatric Disorders↗

Relations among mock jurors' attitudes, trial evidence, and their selections of an insanity defense verdict: a path analytic approach.

This study examined an important question relevant to the domain of the insanity defense: What are the interrelationships among important evidential and attitudinal factors which influence how jurors decide their final verdicts? To answer this question, a mock trial in which the insanity defense was argued was presented to 224 college undergraduates by means of an audiotape and slide show. Following the presentation, participants were asked to answer a series of questions regarding the trial. A path model was specified with four evidential factors as endogenous variables, i.e., evaluation of the defendant's mental status, belief that the defendant could be rehabilitated, beliefs regarding the accuracy of the expert witnesses, and mock-jurors' predeliberation verdicts. In addition, three attitudinal factors were specified as exogenous variables, i.e., attitudes toward the insanity defense, attitudes towards due process vs crime control, and attitudes towards the death penalty. The path model was consistent with previous literature, suggesting that jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty and the insanity defense had a direct effect on how they evaluated the accuracy of the expert testimony and their evaluation of the defendant's over-all mental status. In turn, mock jurors' evaluations of the defendant's mental status had a direct effect on their selections of verdict. Importantly, mock jurors' evaluations of the evidential factors, particularly the mental status of the defendant, were a stronger predictor of their selections of verdict than were their initial attitudes.

Attitude↗

Is the insanity defense "unconscionable"?

The debate over the meaningfulness and utility of the insanity defense has continued unabated ober the years. President Nixon has referred to the "unconscionably abuse" of the defense. This paper, presented as part of a panel on the subject, has propounded the view that the defense is unconscionable, using that aspect of the definition dealing with unreasonableness. The historical antecedents and the religious and social philosophy of the concept of responsibility and nonresponsibility have been reviewed. In addition to the inapplicability of the concept to current social problems, and the difficulties of applying current psychiatric knowledge to effect a rational delineation between the two legal entities encompassed under the rubric of responsibility and nonresponsibility, the potential problems and the potential opportunities which may result from the abolition of the plea are presented. With these factors in mind, as well as the obvious failure of the legal-social-penal system in handling the problems of the behaviorally deviant, I believe that the use of the current system has hampered the development of possibly more reasonable alternative systems and that, therefore, the maintenance of the insanity defense is unreasonable and harmful to our society. The insanity defense, as currently constituted and institutionalized, has evolved into a rigid and archaic vestige of the legal system of an earlier era and therefore its use has, in the sense defined, indeed become "unconscionable" and lacking in social meaningfulness.

Ethics↗

The competency of criminal defendants to refuse, for delusional reasons, a viable insanity defense recommended by counsel.

This article addresses the issues of whether mentally ill defendants charged with serious crimes who refuse to plead a viable and counsel-recommended insanity defense for delusional reasons (but who are otherwise competent to stand trial) should be considered to be competent, or incompetent, to stand trial; whether such defendants should be allowed to represent themselves with a delusional defense; and whether an insanity defense may properly be imposed upon such defendants. Based on an analysis of relevant Supreme Court decisions and other relevant cases, it is concluded that such defendants should not be allowed to go forward with a delusional defense (at least until reasonable efforts to treat the defendants' delusions are made). It is also argued, however, that unless an insanity defense would be viable (as well as recommended by counsel) delusional defendants who are otherwise competent to stand trial should be permitted to go forward, and represent themselves, with the defense of their choosing.

Decision Making↗