[The term for late insurance is expiring. Applications for late insurance in the legal annuity insurance (employee insurance) have to be presented before December 31, 1975].
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The purpose of an insurance must not be restricted to the payment of claims to those insured persons who suffered a loss, for loss prevention is much preferable to claim settlement. A whole range of different institutions and measures has been established by the Swiss insurers, in which many insurance branches participate. The loss preventing activities can be listed as follows:--Activities of the fire insurers to prevent and fight fires. This is the prevailing duty of the Consulting Agency for Fire Prevention (BfB) as well as the Fire Prevention Service for Industry and Trade (BVD).--Activities of the accident insurers to prevent accidents. The fight against accidents, mostly traffic accidents, in sports and at home is the foremost task of the Swiss Council for the Prevention of Accidents (BfU), an institution created by the Conference of Accident Insurance Managers (UDK) and the Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund (SUVA).--The Health Service in life insurance, after all the periodical medical examinations and consultations granted by many insurers to their insured persons, as well as the pamphlets aiming at health education published by several Companies and finally institutions and measures to promote fitness, e.g. VITA-Parcours.
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Rapid advances in genetic testing have stimulated growing concern about the potential for misuse of genetic data by insurance companies, employers, and other third parties. Thus far, reports of genetically based discrimination in life insurance have been anecdotal. Reasoning that state insurance commissioners were likely to be aware of (1) the extent of current use of and interest in genetic tests by life insurers and (2) consumer complaints about insurance being denied because of genetic condition or because of genetic test results, we conducted a survey of that group. We received responses from 42 of the 51 jurisdictions. Our results suggest (1) that those who regulate the life insurance industry do not yet perceive genetic testing to pose a significant problem in how insurers rate applicants, (2) that life insurers have much legal latitude to require genetic tests, and (3) that so far few consumers have formally complained to commissioners about the use of genetic data by life insurers.
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In a society with strong antitax sentiment and large government deficits, the enactment of universal health insurance is blocked by an impasse over financing. The two chief mechanisms for funding universal health insurance are taxes and insurance premiums. Taxes and premiums are not distinct entities; rather, a spectrum of financing methods exists with varying tax-like and premium-like features. Premium-like financing tends to be voluntary and earmarked for health care, with coverage contingent upon making payments and payments going to private insurance firms. Tax-like financing, in contrast, tends to be mandatory and not earmarked for health care, with coverage not dependent upon making payments and payments going to governments. Over the past century, most industrialized nations have developed highly popular social insurance programs to cover periods of retirement, disability, unemployment, and payment for medical care. Social insurance constitutes a blend of tax-like and premium-like features, offering lessons that might assist in breaking the current impasse over universal health insurance financing.
Analyses of problems in the health insurance market usually focus on the individual and small group market. Consumers in this market who experience an illness or diagnosis of illness in one time period are likely to have their future risk redefined by insurers. Despite the fact that risk-averse consumers should desire protection against redefinition of risk, policies featuring that protection currently are not common in the individual and small group market. Contracts offering that protection must either be offered by pools that can guarantee replenishment of good risks over time, or be multiperiod contracts. Risk replenishment is impossible for individuals and may be technically difficult for many small groups. Also, the terms of multiperiod contracts with a single insurer may be unattractive to individuals and small groups, given the current structure of the market. Multiperiod contracts with a pool, rather than an individual insurer, may make it possible for individuals and small groups to enjoy the same advantages as consumers who obtain employment-based health insurance through large firms.
By the mid-1990s there will be more than 500,000 young adults in the United States over the age of 21 with a cardiac malformation. Presently more than half of this population is denied insurance coverage entirely or in part because of their preexisting condition. Because some did not have coverage and because of uncertainty about whom to see for their cardiology care, patients assessed in NHS-II who were evaluated by their physician on an annual basis before the age of 21 were seen by a cardiologist only every 10 years after the age of 21. However, they have been shown by NHS-II to be well-educated, productive in the workplace, and to share an equal place in society with the general population. Their health-care costs are decidedly lower after the age of 21 than before. This group represents a microcosm of a general society of more than 37 million Americans who, for various reasons, are not insured. Dr. Wiener described an American health-care system in crisis. Smaller companies are no longer able to afford health insurance for all their employees, especially for those with preexisting conditions, because of an industry pricing concept based on a claims-experience standard rather than a community standard. The insurance industry, the government, and patients are demanding medical cost-containment. Health-care costs, 12.2% of the gross national product in 1990, are climbing, and no end to this increase is presently in sight.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
During 1975-76 a no-fault compensation system for treatment injuries in dentistry and failures within prosthodontics was introduced in Sweden. The guarantee insurance scheme for prosthetic treatment has changed somewhat during the years and, in 1987, became mandatory for all dentists in Sweden. All necessary retreatment not included in the National Dental Insurance Scheme (eg allergy to dental materials, all treatment following radiotherapy-related xerostomia) is included. For fixed prosthodontics, all replacements are covered by the scheme for the first 2 years. For removable prosthodontics, this is limited to the first year. A patient may choose any dentist in Sweden to carry out the retreatment. The claim system is simple and the number of cases has steadily increased, probably because dentists are becoming more familiar with the system and are willing to use it. The costs are paid for by private practitioners, the Public Dental Service and private dental laboratories. The insurance files are available for research purposes.
This report examines the major forms of administration of private health insurance plans. Plans are classified according to whether they are employer-only or joint worker-employer-operated and according to whether they are negotiated or not. A further focus of examination that often reflects industry patterns is whether the plans cover workers of a single employer or involve multi-employer arrangements. These classifications of administration and the method of insuring benefits are examined in terms of proportions of workers with specified plan characteristics and health benefits.
Genetic testing raises concerns that individuals will be denied health insurance (and thus, effectively, access to health care), or that employers will screen to eliminate potentially costly workers. Although we as a society do not yet concur on the degree to which private businesses have a responsibility to promote social justice, several different policy alternatives might allow us to weigh the interests of insurers, as businesses, against the interests of citizens in a responsible manner.
This paper argues that optimal treatment of health expenditure risk variation over one's lifetime requires partial offsetting of experience-related premium fluctuations. It argues that government should provide protection against the risk of serious chronic illness by offering risk-related tax credits that offset some (though not all) of the changes in premiums due to such illnesses. The performance of a fallback insurer, present in most market-based health reform proposals, is shown to depend on whether or not it is permitted to risk rate. Forbidding any risk rating is likely to cause adverse selection problems, whereas permitting the fallback insurer to risk rate should help it to perform its proper role and avoid being subject to dumping of high risks.
All records relating to medical prescriptions and services relating to diabetes for a representative sample (n = 6478) of inhabitants of Dortmund in 1988, who were members of the Local Health Insurance in Dortmund, were analysed. 264 patients (4.08%) were receiving antidiabetic drugs during that year, 198 (3.06%) oral ones, 42 (0.65%) insulin and 24 (0.37%) both. 12.41% of all those insured over the age of 60 were on antidiabetic drugs, more women than men (5.08 vs 2.94%; P less than 0.001). The most frequently used oral antidiabetics were sulphonylurea ones (95.1%), while the proportion of biguanides was only 4.4%. On the basis of established diagnosis, regular blood sugar and HbA1 tests, as well as optic fundi examination, a further 104 persons (1.60%) are assumed to have diabetes but not treated by drugs. This sample indicates an overall prevalence of diabetes of 5.68% among the population. Relating it to the age and sex pattern of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany this corresponds to a prevalence of diagnosed diabetes of 4.82%. Thus there are probably a little less than 4 million diabetic citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany.
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