Toward a general theory of constitutional personhood: a theory of constitutional personhood for transgenic humanoid species.
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Animal Rights↗
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Towards an alternative approach to personhood in the end of life questions.
Within the Western bioethical framework, we make a distinction between two dominant interpretations of the meaning of moral personhood: the naturalist and the humanist one. While both interpretations of moral personhood claim to promote individual autonomy and rights, they end up with very different normative views on the practical and legal measures needed to realize these values in every day life. Particularly when we talk about the end of life issues it appears that in general the arguments for euthanasia are drawn from the naturalist interpretation of moral personhood while the arguments against euthanasia, for their part, are derived from the idealist and/or humanist understanding of the same concept. This article focuses on examining the metaphysical assumptions and internal contradiction found behind the opposing arguments presented by two prominent philosophers of these two traditions: Peter Singer and Ludger Honnefelder. The author claims that neither side of the debate succeeds in defending its normative position without reconsidering how to take the social aspects of moral personhood into account. The author holds that, despite our need to set individual's decision making into social context, the current communitarian narrative concept of personhood fails to offer a convincing alternative. Instead of merely trying to replace psychological and atomistic view of personhood with a collective understanding of an individual's moral identity, we need to discuss the normative relation between the concept of 'moral personhood' and the demand for respect of individual autonomy in Western bioethics within a wider philosophical perspective.
Euthanasia↗
Personhood and human embryos and fetuses.
Public policy decisions concerning embryos and fetuses tend to lack reasoned argument on their moral status. While agreement on personhood is elusive, this concept has unquestioned moral relevance. A stipulated usage of the term, the psychic sense of 'person', applies to early human prenatal life and encompasses morally relevant aspects of personhood. A 'person' in the psychic sense has a minimal psychology, defined as the capacity to retain experiences, which may be nonconscious, through physiological analogs of memory; and the potential to become a person in the full sense. Psychic personhood merits attribution of moral personhood because the experience of a 'person' in the psychic sense has continuity with the experience of a full person; and this experience begins to determine the development of the personal psychological characteristics of that individual. Psychic personhood is a rationally defensible boundary for invasive research involving human embryos and fetuses. Lacking precise empirical knowledge, policy makers could attribute psychic personhood at the time of earliest brainstem activity, that is, during the seventh week of fetal development.
Beginning of Human Life↗
Degrees of personhood.
In this paper I argue that a Naturalist conception of personhood, such as the one defended by Derek Parfit, implies that there are degrees of personhood, i.e., that it makes sense to say one individual has a greater degree of personhood than another. I describe both criteria of general personhood, which distinguish between persons and non-persons, and criteria of particular personhood, which distinguish between one person and another. I examine some of the consequences for ethics, including the rights to life, self-determination, and treatment. There may be circumstances in medicine where we have to judge the value of a patient's life in order to decide what medical treatment, if any, to provide, and although it may be emotionally difficult and politically dangerous, one relevant factor is what degree of personhood that individual has.
Ethical Analysis↗
The failure of theories of personhood.
The belief persists in philosophy, religion, science, and popular culture that some special cognitive property of persons like self-consciousness confers a unique moral standing. However, no set of cognitive properties confers moral standing, and metaphysical personhood is not sufficient for either moral personhood or moral standing. Cognitive theories all fail to capture the depth of commitments embedded in using the language of "person." It is more assumed than demonstrated in these theories that nonhuman animals lack a relevant form of self-consciousness or its functional equivalent. Although nonhuman animals are not plausible candidates for moral personhood, humans too fail to qualify as moral persons if they lack one or more of the conditions of moral personhood. If moral personhood were the sole basis of moral rights, then these humans would lack rights -- and precisely for the reasons that nonhuman animals would.
Animal Rights↗
Who/se we are: baptism as personhood.
The attempt to arrive at some consensus on precisely what qualifies a human as a persons represents one of the more persistently debated and widely significant issues in modern biomedical ethics. The attribution of personhood has been and continues to be a powerful tool in moral discourse. Biomedical and bioethical debates about personhood seem especially morally significant in late modernity given the recent trends in biomedical technology. Our attempts to formally articulate universally agreed upon criteria for personhood represent some of the last vestiges of the hope that we can achieve substantial moral agreement in an otherwise morally fragmented world. In this essay, we argue that, from the perspective of certain strands of the Christian tradition, all bioethics grounded in attempts to develop formal, objective criteria by which we may designate a given individual a person are misguided. Criteria centering on the possession of reflective mental capacity, moreover, are for Christians especially problematic. We suggest that there are no morally neutral ways of designating personhood.
Christianity↗
Proximate personhood as a standard for making difficult treatment decisions: imperiled newborns as a case study.
... The standard of personhood is gaining increased attention and prominence. The essential claim is that only individuals with capacities for significant cerebral functioning possess a morally unique claim to existence. Persons are defined as individuals who are self-aware and capable of self-direction (Engelhardt), able to enter meaningful relationships (McCormick), capable of minimal independent existence (Shelp), and in possession of a minimal 20-40 I.Q. (Joseph Fletcher). These are "high standard" personhood positions (those holding higher-brain related criteria). It is a commonplace with most such positions that newborns -- all newborns -- are not, strictly speaking, persons. That is, newborns are not self-aware, intentionally choosing individuals.... The thesis of this essay is that a developing individual's right to life increases as he or she approaches the threshold of personal life. That is, the more a newborn approximates -- or is proximate to -- undisputed personhood (e.g. the status of readers of this essay), the greater his or her claim to life. The two pivotal criteria for determining personhood are the potentiality for and development toward becoming an undisputed personal being. I am presupposing, for purposes of argument, that the handicapped infant would not be an excessive familial burden or an inordinate financial load for society, one an ancient and the other a modern criterion. That condition granted, this essay contends that if an imperiled newborn is reasonably projected to reach at least minimal personal capacity, treatment should be given.
Abortion, Induced↗
Professionals' perceptions of maintaining personhood in hospice care.
This qualitative study examines the attempts made by hospice staff to support and maintain the personhood of hospice patients. The study was conducted over a six-month period at two hospice facilities in northwest England. Thirty staff members were interviewed about their interpretation of the hospice philosophy and how this influences their work with regard to patient personhood. Staff employed methods of normalizing the often-distressing symptoms that accompany serious illness, with the aim of maintaining personhood and dignity. Related to the support of personhood, is the concept of the "special" patient. Staff members discussed feelings of attachment towards particular patients that had developed out of the care-giving relationship. There was no suggestion that staff perceived special patients as receiving preferential treatment at the expense of other patients. However, experiences with "special" patients positively impacted staff members by reinforcing occupational choice and the inherent rewards of the profession.
England↗
Personhood and illness among the Kulina.
This article offers both a contribution to the ethnography of ethnomedicine among the Kulina Indians of western Amazonia--a region in which there has been little ethnomedical research--and an extended illustration of the value of the concept of "personhood" in the analysis of ethnomedical beliefs and practices. I argue that the current medical anthropological fixation on the Body is neither good ethnography nor productive theory, and I use the Kulina example to illustrate how the cultural dimensions of personhood provide a more satisfactory framework for the understanding of illness. Kulina conceptions of illness are closely linked to the substances and processes through which personhood is acquired, expressed, and transformed. I consider the two major categories of illness in Kulina ethnomedicine, and focus special attention on the more serious of these: potentially fatal illnesses that are linked to witchcraft and to the violations of prohibitions. I suggest how these illnesses serve as languages for the simultaneous negotiation of social issues and personhood.
Adult↗
Paradigms and personhood: a deepening of the dilemmas in ethics and medical ethics.
There are many calls for a definition of personhood, but also many logical and Wittgensteinian reasons to think fulfilling this is unimportant or impossible. I argue that we can consider many contexts as language-games and consider the person as the key player in each. We can then examine the attributes, presuppositions and implications of personhood in those contexts. I use law and therapeutic psychology as two examples of such contexts or language-games. Each correlates with one of the classic "theories" of ethics-deontology and consequentialism. But each is a large enough cluster to consider them as paradigms in a sense related to Thomas Kuhn's notion in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Showing the presuppositions about and "takes" on personhood together with the connections involved in the paradigms deepens the dilemmas we already know to be present.
Bioethical Issues↗
Maternal assignment of fetal personhood to a previous pregnancy loss: relationship to anxiety in the current pregnancy.
The degree of personhood a mother assigns to her dead fetus (i.e., whether she felt she lost a pregnancy or a baby) may help explain the meaning of a perinatal loss and the amount of anxiety experienced in a subsequent pregnancy. This descriptive study of 72 multigravidas with a history of one or two perinatal losses was conducted to understand the relationships between the assignment of fetal personhood and the influence of that assignment on state anxiety and pregnancy anxiety in a subsequent pregnancy. Assignment of personhood was significantly related to pregnancy anxiety and to the gestational age of the first loss but not to state anxiety. Understanding and responding to women's perceptions of perinatal losses and their significance for women may be one way to support them in subsequent pregnancies.
Anxiety↗
Dementia, personhood, and nursing: learning from a nursing situation.
Appreciation of the personhood of people with dementia calls for care that looks beyond the disease to the person within. In this column the author discusses the concept of personhood for people with dementia and presents a method of teaching person-centered care developed within the theoretical framework of nursing as caring. The study of an aesthetic expression of a nursing situation, written by a nurse who cares for people with Alzheimer's disease in a nursing home, is presented to assist nurses to learn to see beyond the disease to the person and to develop relationships that nurture personhood.
Aged↗
Personhood in the bioethics literature.
Althought the literature--medical, philosophical, religious, and legal-- on personhood is vast, there is little evidence that writers on this topic are approaching a consensus on the meaning of the concept or on criteria for its application. Some writers set low, or minimal, standards for personhood - others posit higher, more normative standards. But throughout, the moral values writers antecedently embrace determine the definition they arrive at by way of conclusion. Personhood has not been a useful concept for resolving dilemmas in bioethics.
Abortion, Induced↗
Does your care plan tell my story? Documenting aspects of personhood in long-term care.
Learning about aspects of one's personhood allows the nurse to know the individual as a person and to individualize the care provided. A pilot project was conducted on a supportive residential care unit to explore why health records in long-term care rarely reveal who the person is. Five nurse participants generated a list of features of an individual's personhood that they felt should be known by members of the team. They subsequently gathered that information from a variety of sources, with documentation in a designated location provided on the plan of care. They were thus able to overcome some of the previously encountered barriers to collecting and documenting the personhood data reflecting their knowledge of the individual as a person. Although nurses were successful in learning who the persons were, changes in approach to care as a result of the new knowledge have not been measured.
Aged↗
Preembryo Personhood: an assessment of the President's Council arguments.
The President's Council on Bioethics has addressed the moral status of human preembryos in its reports on stem cell research and human therapeutic cloning. Although the Council has been criticized for being hand-picked to favor the right-to-life viewpoint concerning human preembryos, it has embraced the idea that the right-to-life position should be defended in secular terms. This is an important feature of the Council's work, and it demonstrates a recognition of the need for genuine engagement between opposing sides in the debate over stem cell research. To promote this engagement, the Council has stated in secular terms several arguments for the personhood of human preembryos. This essay presents and critiques those arguments, and it concludes that they are unsuccessful. If the best arguments in support of the personhood of human preembryos have been presented by the Council, then there are no reasonable secular arguments in support of that view.
Advisory Committees↗
Stem cell research, personhood and sentience.
In this paper the permissibility of stem cell research on early human embryos is defended. It is argued that, in order to have moral status, an individual must have an interest in its own wellbeing. Sentience is a prerequisite for having an interest in avoiding pain, and personhood is a prerequisite for having an interest in the continuation of one's own existence. Early human embryos are not sentient and therefore they are not recipients of direct moral consideration. Early human embryos do not satisfy the requirements for personhood, but there are arguments to the effect that they should be treated as persons nonetheless. These are the arguments from potentiality, symbolic value and the principle of human dignity. These arguments are challenged in this paper and it is claimed that they offer us no good reason to believe that early human embryos should be treated as persons.
Animals↗
The personhood of the human embryo.
My interlocutor is anyone who denies personhood to the embryo on the grounds that a human person can exist only in conscious activity and that in the absence of consciousness a person cannot exist at all. I probe personal consciousness to the point at which the distinction between the being and the consciousness of the human person appears, and argue on the basis of this distinction that the being of a person can exist in the absence of any consciousness. I proceed to argue that it is not only entirely possible for the embryo to be a human person, but that, given the embodied personhood of us human beings, this is the only reasonable assumption which we can make.
Abortion, Induced↗
The beginning of personhood: a Thomistic biological analysis.
'When did I, a human person, begin to exist?' In developing an answer to this question, I utilize a Thomistic framework, which holds that the human person is a composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul. Eric Olson and Norman Ford both argue that beginning of an individual human biological organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in the uterus occurs and the 'primitive streak' begins to form. Prior to this point, there does not exist an individual human organism, but a cluster of biological cells which has the potential to split and develop as one or more separate human organisms (identical twinning). Ensoulment (the instantiation of a human intellective soul in biological matter) does not occur until the point of implantation. This conception of the beginning of human personhood has moral implications concerning the status of pre-implantation biological cell clusters. A new understanding of the beginning of human personhood entails a new understanding of the morality of certain medical procedures which have a direct affect on these cell clusters which contain human DNA. Such procedures discussed in this article are embryonic stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, procured abortion, and the use of abortifacient contraceptives.
Abortifacient Agents↗