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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2005

Unauthorized minds: how "theory of mind" theory misrepresents autism.

Recent representations of autism frequently include an assumption that autism is the result of a "theory of mind" deficit (i.e., an inability to understand others' mental states). This notion is examined using a social constructionist perspective. The belief that autism is a sort of "mind-blindness" has much in common with earlier representations of autism that depict it as a puzzle and, paradoxically, as a single entity defined by core characteristics. Theory of mind theorists also, like their predecessors, define autism as a form of insufficiency and as requiring fixing rather than accommodation. Alternative narratives about autistic minds that incorporate the perspectives of people labeled autistic are an important counterbalance to the limitations of such professional viewpoints.

Autistic Disorder↗
PubMed1998

Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind.

"Theory of mind," the ability to make inferences about others" mental states, seems to be a modular cognitive capacity that underlies humans" ability to engage in complex social interaction. It develops in several distinct stages, which can be measured with social reasoning tests of increasing difficulty. Individuals with Asperger"s syndrome, a mild form of autism, perform well on simpler theory of mind tests but show deficits on more developmentally advanced theory of mind tests. We tested patients with bilateral damage to orbito-frontal cortex (n = 5) and unilateral damage in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (n = 5) on a series of theory of mind tasks varying in difficulty. Bilateral orbito-frontal lesion patients performed similarly to individuals with Asperger"s syndrome, performing well on simpler tests and showing deficits on tasks requiring more subtle social reasoning, such as the ability to recognize a faux pas. In contrast, no specific theory of mind deficits were evident in the unilateral dorsolateral frontal lesion patients. The dorsolateral lesion patients had difficulty only on versions of the tasks that placed demands on working memory.

Adult↗
PubMed2004

Decoupling beliefs from reality in the brain: an ERP study of theory of mind.

Theory of mind, attributing behaviors to mental states, is a cognitive ability central to human social interactions. To investigate the neural substrates of theory of mind reasoning, we recorded human event-related brain potentials (ERP) while participants made judgments about belief and judgments about reality. A late ERP component (peaking around 800 ms post-stimulus) with a left frontal scalp distribution, which was inconsistent with a source in the anterior paracingulate cortex and consistent with a source possibly in the left orbitofrontal cortex, differentiated judgments about belief and about reality. This late left frontal component is probably associated with the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental states from reality.

Adult↗
PubMed1997

Social behaviour in pervasive developmental disorders: effects of informant, group and "theory-of-mind".

Theory of mind skills and a range of social behaviour in everyday life were assessed in a sample of 21 children with pervasive developmental disorders and 22 normally-developing preschoolers. Parents, teachers and therapists were interviewed using the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales and a new supplementary scale, the "Echelle d'Adaptation Sociale pour Enfants" (EASE). Teachers and therapists were able to differentiate subtle forms of social problems in everyday life between subgroups of children diagnosed later to have either autism (n = 13) or PDDNOS (n = 8), according to DSM-III-R (1) criteria. This study offers a (small) cross-cultural replication of recent work suggesting that differences in the mentalising skills of children with autism are reflected in the everyday social behaviour of this group. A significant effect of informant was found for the PDD group, and this effect was particularly pronounced when children with autism were considered separately. The implications of informant differences are discussed.

Activities of Daily Living↗
PubMed2007

Children's and adults' neural bases of verbal and nonverbal 'theory of mind'.

Theory of mind (ToM) - our ability to predict behaviors of others in terms of their underlying intentions - has been examined through verbal and nonverbal false-belief (FB) tasks. Previous brain imaging studies of ToM in adults have implicated medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) for adults' ToM ability. To examine age and modality related differences and similarities in neural correlates of ToM, we tested 16 adults (18-40 years old) and 12 children (8-12 years old) with verbal (story) and nonverbal (cartoon) FB tasks, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Both age groups showed significant activity in the TPJ bilaterally and right inferior parietal lobule (IPL) in a modality-independent manner, indicating that these areas are important for ToM during both adulthood and childhood, regardless of modality. We also found significant age-related differences in the ToM condition-specific activity for the story and cartoon tasks in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and left TPJ. These results suggest that depending on the modality adults may utilize different brain regions from children in understanding ToM.

Adult↗
PubMed1979

Triunism: a transmaterial train--mind theory.

Triunism postulates that the mind is a unity with the following three structural elements so essential that the absence of any one will prevent its existence: (1) Brain cells and pathways possessing material and transmaterial properties. (2) A flow of environmental information, coded and transduced at the sensory receptors and forming part of the working brain through modifications of its anatomy and physiology. (3) Detectable manifestations derived from (1) and (2) which are expressed inward as perceptions and outward as behaviour. The outside world enters through the senses and becomes a material and functional part of the maturing brain. Without a brain, the mind cannot exist. Without sensory inputs, the mind will not be structured and cannot appear. Without manifestations of inner perceptions and outward motor expression, the mind cannot be recognized by the individual or the environment. Transmaterial entities require the existence of supporting matter and may be represented by patterns of material organization or by temporal or functional relations between parts of the material substratum. They may transcend the existence of specific materials, changing carriers while preserving their nonmaterial identity, but do not possess intrinsic properties of matter such as mass and energy. Transmaterial aspects of reality, including material substratum patterning, and relative temporal, and functional characteristics may be subjects of experimental research.

Animals↗
PubMed2006

It's the thought that counts: specific brain regions for one component of theory of mind.

Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that representing the contents of other people's thoughts and beliefs depends on a component of reasoning about other minds (theory of mind) that is distinct from the earlier-developing mental-state concepts for goals, perceptions, and feelings. To provide converging evidence, the current study investigated the substrate of the late-developing process in adult brains. Three regions--the right and left temporo-parietal junction and the posterior cingulate--responded selectively when subjects read about a protagonist's thoughts, but not when they read about other subjective, internal states or other socially relevant information about a person. By contrast, the medial prefrontal cortex responded equivalently in all of these story conditions, a result consistent with a broader role for medial prefrontal cortex in general social cognition. These data support the hypothesis that the early- and late-developing components of theory of mind rely on separate psychological and neural mechanisms, and that these mechanisms remain distinct into adulthood.

Adult↗
PubMed1996

Playing with reality: I. Theory of mind and the normal development of psychic reality.

The authors of this paper discuss changes in the child's perception of psychic reality during normal development, highlighting a major shift in the child's understanding of minds ('theory of mind') at the oedipal stage. They illustrate this transition with material from the analysis of a 4-year-old girl. They maintain that the very young child uses two forms of psychic reality, which they have called 'psychic equivalent' and 'pretend' modes, which differ primarily in the assumed relationship between internal and external realities. The integration of the dual modes into a singular reflective mode is normally completed by about the age of 4, with affect leading cognition: the child first understands that people have different feelings, then that they may have different thoughts about the same external reality. The authors describe normal psychological growth and neurotic pathology, in which the integration of these two modes of functioning has been only partly achieved.

Adult↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Autism: beyond "theory of mind".

The theory of mind account of autism has been remarkably successful in making specific predictions about the impairments in socialization, imagination and communication shown by people with autism. It cannot, however, explain either the non-triad features of autism, or earlier experimental findings of abnormal assets and deficits on non-social tasks. These unexplained aspects of autism, and the existence of autistic individuals who consistently pass false belief tasks, suggest that it may be necessary to postulate an additional cognitive abnormality. One possible abnormality-weak central coherence--is discussed, and preliminary evidence for this theory is presented.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

Visualizing how one brain understands another: a PET study of theory of mind.

OBJECTIVE: Theory of mind (TOM), or "mentalizing," refers to the ability to attribute mental states to self and others. Inferring what people are thinking and feeling is an important aspect of human social interaction, and it is also an important aspect of both psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. The authors conducted a positron emission tomography (PET) study to examine the neural substrates of TOM, using a task that mimics real-life social interaction. METHOD: Thirteen healthy volunteers underwent [(15)O]H(2)O PET while performing an experimental task and a control task. During the experimental task they created a "story" about the mental state of a stranger whom they imagined encountering on a park bench. During the control task, they read aloud a story requiring no mental state attribution. RESULTS: The TOM task activated an extensive neural network that included the medial frontal cortex, the superior frontal cortex, the anterior and retrosplenial cingulate, and the anterior temporal pole; most of these activations were limited to the left hemisphere. In addition, the largest activation was in the contralateral right cerebellum, as well as the anterior vermis. CONCLUSIONS: A language-based TOM task activated distributed brain regions that are important for representing mental states of the self and others, retrieving memory of personal experiences, and coordinating and monitoring the overall performance of the task. The activations in the medial frontal cortex replicate findings in previous TOM studies, while the activations in the cerebellum reinforce the growing evidence that the cerebellum performs cognitive functions in the human brain.

Adult↗
PubMed2002

[Reading mind from pictures of eyes: theory of mind, language ability, general intellectual ability, and autism].

Some researchers have claimed that theory of mind or 'mind reading' ability, necessary for inferring the mental states of others, depends on language ability. However, previous tests of theory of mind were verbally demanding, and high correlations found might have been an artifact. This paper reports the performance of 22 children with autism, with varying degrees of dysfunction, on a test devised by Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997), based on a relatively nonverbal theory of mind. The test involved inference of mental states from photographs of human eyes. Results indicated that mind reading ability was independent of language ability, general intelligence, or mental age. Test scores were, however, strongly related to the severity of autistic disorder. These results suggest both the independence of mind-reading ability from language ability and general intelligence, and a strong relationship between theory of mind deficit and the autistic disorder.

Autistic Disorder↗
PubMed1997

[Review of the research on "theory of mind"].

The concept "theory of mind", first proposed by Premack and Woodruff (1978), has drastically changed our view of the mind. In the first half of this paper, the concept's history and recent developments were reviewed. Included were studies of non-human primates, normal children, and autistic children, in addition to some philosophical discussions. The "false belief" paradigm has been successful in understanding children older than 4 years and in characterizing children with high-functioning autism. But with the paradigm alone, it is difficult to explain the "mind" of most non-human primates, younger children, and a large part of autistic children. In the second half, a theoretical discussion was made to understand early developments of mind. The theory theory and competing theories of modularity, simulation, and intersubjectivity were compared concerning the observability of mind (of self and others), the basic mechanisms for understanding the mind, the indispensability of theorizing the mind, and the need for metarepresentation in pretend plays.

Animals↗
PubMedDate not supplied

Relative roles of general and complementation language in theory-of-mind development: evidence from Cantonese and English.

Complex complements are clausal objects containing tensed verbs (e.g., that she cried) or infinitives (e.g., to cry), following main verbs of communication or mental activities (e.g., say, want). This research examined whether English- and Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds' complement understanding uniquely predicts their representation of other minds (i.e., theory of mind). Results showed that neither meaning of main verbs (communication vs. desire) nor complement structure (tensed vs. infinitival) affected the correlation between complement understanding and theory of mind. More important, the correlation became insignificant after controlling for general language comprehension. These findings led to the conclusion that the syntax of complement per se does not contribute uniquely to theory-of-mind development; general language comprehension is a more important factor to consider.

Child, Preschool↗
PubMed1997

Organic unity theory: an integrative mind-body theory for psychiatry.

The potential of psychiatry as an integrative science has been impeded by an internal schism that derives from the duality of mental and physical. Organic unity theory is proposed as a conceptual framework that brings together the terms of the mind-body duality in one coherent perspective. Organic unity theory is braided of three strands: identity, which describes the relationship between mentally described events and corresponding physically described events; continuity, which describes the linguistic-conceptual system that contains both mental and physical terms; and dialectic, which describes the relationship between the empirical way of knowing that is associated with the physical domain of the linguistic-conceptual system and the hermeneutic way of knowing that is associated with the mental domain. Each strand represents an integrative formulation that resolves an aspect of mental-physical dualism into an underlying unity. After the theory is presented, its implications for psychiatry are briefly considered.

Concept Formation↗
PubMed2005

[The current mind-brain theories in analytical philosophy of mind and their epistemic significance for psychiatry].

This article begins with an orientational survey of the historical evolution of analytical philosophy of mind (APM) which was formulated in the last 40 years as "philosophy of mind" in the Anglo-Saxon scientific-cultural world and which, in the meantime, dominates to a great extent contemporary German philosophy. Then there follows a discussion of the currently most popular mind-brain theories in philosophy. In comparison to the more marginal dualist variants (interactionism, epiphenomenalism, parallelism), it is mainly the monistic positions of non-reductive, reductive and eliminative materialism and the materialist functionalism underlying it, which determines analytical philosophy of mind and its influence on psychopathology and psychiatry. Under the additional influence of modern brain research methods, particularly neuroimaging, it is progressively developing into a subdiscipline of neuroscience, a complex and increasingly more firmly established scientific discipline which comprises the totality of all sciences dealing with neuronal functions, including the close epistemic associations of APM and neuroimaging. This is the effective epistemic central idea determining the theory of the neuronal network which, in the form of a connectionist psychopathology, is intended to make possible a fundamentally new access to the comprehension of psychiatric forms of illness. In this respect it is evident, however, that the perception of the naturality of the mind as the fundamental thesis of APM and thus of connectionism cannot be followed through, since, up to now, neither from the phenomenality of the mind (especially the quality of senses, "Qualia") nor from intentionality of the mind (i. e. the ability to act intentionally, free from the constraint of the causality of nature and thus in self-responsible fashion) has proved it possible to reconstruct a generally accepted naturalist theory. Furthermore, it has not been possible to reformulate it in an exclusively physical, i. e. non-phenomenological concept and terminology which is, above all, free from the intentionality idiom. The consequence of this, however, is that a connectionist psychopathology can only represent a subpersonal, i. e., subhuman area and that in order to establish a personal psychopathology, naturalistic unreduced theories of experience-qualities and intentional acts of completeness are absolutely essential. The neuroscientific-connectionist paradigm of psychopathology must therefore - at least for the present - be supplement by the paradigm of a non-natural (e. g. phenomenological-hermeneutic) psychopathology. This result can only encourage the relinquishing of epistemically one-sided materialist and other monistic mind-brain theories of APM in favour of an epistemically open pragmatic interactionist dualism as the scientific position which best represents the current state of knowledge.

Humans↗
PubMed2001

Mind reading: neural mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective.

Human self-consciousness as the metarepresentation of ones own mental states and the so-called theory of mind (TOM) capacity, which requires the ability to model the mental states of others, are closely related higher cognitive functions. We address here the issue of whether taking the self-perspective (SELF) or modeling the mind of someone else (TOM) employ the same or differential neural mechanisms. A TOM paradigm was used and extended to include stimulus material that involved TOM and SELF capacities in a two-way factorial design. A behavioral study in 42 healthy volunteers showed that TOM and SELF induced differential states of mind: subjects assigned correctly first or third person pronouns when providing responses to the stimuli. Following the behavioral study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in eight healthy, right-handed males to study the common and differential neural mechanisms underlying TOM and SELF. The main factor TOM led to increased neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and left temporopolar cortex. The main factor SELF led to increased neural activity in the right temporoparietal junction and in the anterior cingulate cortex. A significant interaction of both factors TOM and SELF was observed in the right prefrontal cortex. These divergent neural activations in response to TOM and SELF suggest that these important differential mental capacities of human self-consciousness are implemented at least in part in distinct brain regions. Press

Adult↗
PubMed1993

Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: a test of relevance theory.

Sperber and Wilson's (1986) relevance theory makes explicit the role of the comprehension of intentions in human communication. Autistic people have been hypothesized to suffer from a specific and characteristic impairment in the ability to attribute such mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions); a lack of "theory of mind". According to relevance theory, then, autistic people should have specific difficulties with the use of language for communication. Relevance theory allows precise predictions about the levels of communicative competence that should be possible with either no, first-order only, or second-order theory of mind ability. Three experiments are reported which tested predictions following from the analysis of figurative language in terms of relevance and theory of mind, in able autistic and normal young subjects. The results lend support to relevance theory. In addition, the findings suggest that some autistic subjects are eventually able to attribute mental states. Lastly, the results demonstrate close links between social and communicative understanding in autism and normal development.

Adolescent↗