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At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Modeling pandemic preparedness scenarios: health economic implications of enhanced pandemic vaccine supply.

Influenza pandemic planning is a complex, multifactorial process, which involves public health authorities, regulatory authorities, academia and industry. It is further complicated by the unpredictability of the time of emergence and severity of the next pandemic and the effectiveness of influenza epidemic interventions. The complexity and uncertainties surrounding pandemic preparedness have so far kept the various stakeholders from joining forces and tackling the problem from its roots. We developed a mathematical model, which shows the tangible consequences of conceptual plans by linking possible pandemic scenarios to health economic outcomes of possible intervention strategies. This model helps to structure the discussion on pandemic preparedness and facilitates the translation of pandemic planning concepts to concrete plans. The case study for which the model has been used shows the current level of global pandemic preparedness in an assumed pandemic scenario, the health economic implications of enhanced pandemic vaccine supply and the importance of cell culture-based influenza vaccine manufacturing technologies as a tool for pandemic control.

Disease Outbreaks↗

Revisiting public health preparedness: Incorporating social justice principles into pandemic preparedness planning for influenza.

Public health professionals are responsible for ensuring the health of the nation, which requires that planners for public health emergencies recognize that not including protection for underserved or marginalized communities poses a risk to the entire population. To assure the protection of these populations in the event of a pandemic outbreak, preparedness planning will benefit from the application of several principles of social justice in assuring the protection of all individuals. This article will review the history between public health and social justice, provide a brief review of pandemic preparedness planning efforts, discuss the importance of and make recommendations for the incorporation of principles of social justice in the development of pandemic preparedness plans, and highlight some of the challenges faced by public health in effectively and equitably meeting its charge to protect the nation's health.

Disaster Planning↗

[Principles of epidemic emergency preparedness planning: the example of the German Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan].

Despite significant medical progress, recent events have shown that infectious diseases have not lost significance. Indeed, the threat of worldwide epidemics has increased. Due to their high infectious ness and rapid person-to-person transmissibility, the emergence of new influenza viruses with pandemic potential poses an especially alarming situation in this regard. The world population would be "immunologically naïve" to a new pandemic virus, permitting explosive spread of the disease. During the last century, three influenza pandemics have demonstrated that this is not merely a hypothetical risk. Currently it is feared that the possible human adaptation of avian influenza viruses that have recently become endemic in birds in Southeast Asia could result in a new pandemic strain. With the publication of the German Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan, preparation for this potential threat has reached an important stage in Germany. The implementation of the plan, which includes measures that go beyond the scope of public health, must now proceed swiftly. The long-term goal of pandemic preparedness planning is to be better equipped to deal with potential health threats in general, in particular those ensuing from the emergence of new infectious diseases under conditions of a growing global network.

Animals↗

Pandemic preparedness: different perspectives. How ready are we for the next pandemic?

Europe is not ready for the next pandemic. Nonetheless, several positive developments are cause for optimism. The European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) was founded in May 2005 and has explicitly identified influenza as one of its top four priorities. Europe is also taking steps to streamline the regulatory approval of new vaccines during a pandemic. Europe can learn much from Canada. The Canadian public health authorities have focused on developing the infrastructure, procedures and acceptance for vaccination against the annual influenza epidemics as a means of strengthening pandemic preparedness. The Canadians are also stockpiling antiviral drugs. These drugs are an excellent way to bridge the gap between the appearance of a pandemic virus and the development of an effective vaccine against it. The World Health Organisation (WHO) is driving change on a global level and will table a pandemic preparedness plan at the next World Health Assembly. Preparing now, during the interpandemic period, is the best way to prepare for a pandemic.

Antiviral Agents↗

Pandemic preparedness: pigs, poultry, and people versus plans, products, and practice.

Influenza pandemic preparedness planning is critical for reducing human suffering and negative effects on the economy and society. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is working to ensure a rapid, efficient, and successful response to an outbreak if, when, and where it appears. The CDC's context for strategic planning is based on experiences with seasonal influenza and what is known about past influenza pandemics. From a public health perspective, pandemic preparedness can be achieved with a plan that builds a network of shared responsibility from the local to the global level, with a focus on saving lives with vaccines, antiviral drugs, medical supplies, containment, and communication.

Animals↗

Conceptional considerations for a German influenza pandemic preparedness plan.

A pandemic appearance of influenza A virus must be expected at any time. The limitations of health preserving and life-saving resources, which will inevitably be reached in the event of a pandemic, will be accompanied by ethical and possibly social conflicts, which can be lessened or resolved only through precautionary planning, clearly specified competencies and transparent decisions within a social consensus. In case of a shortage of vaccines and virostatic agents, decisions will have to be made with regard to the segment of the population that absolutely must be vaccinated. It is currently estimated that a (monovalent) vaccine developed for a new pandemic strain would only suffice for the single vaccination of approximately half of the German population after a year; only 10-14 million vaccine dosages would be available to provide basic immunization and single boosters to personnel required to maintain basic medical care and essential infrastructure after half a year. In the event of local influenza outbreaks, antiviral chemotherapeutic agents could be used to close the gap until a vaccine can become effective. Even if suitable influenza vaccines and virostatic agents are not sufficiently available at the start of a pandemic, it is still possible to at least prevent an outbreak of two of the most feared secondary infections that accompany influenza: pneumococcal pneumonia or meningitis and illnesses resulting from Haemophilus influenzae. Agreement still needs to be reached with manufacturers for guaranteeing the necessary vaccine production or ensuring that they have a sufficient stock to meet the minimum demand for antiviral agents and agents for symptomatic treatment.

Antiviral Agents↗

Fortune favours the prepared mind: a national perspective on pandemic preparedness.

The rapid spread of avian influenza H5N1 in Asia in late 2003 has moved the world to a new state of pandemic alert. The risk of further human cases will persist, as will opportunities for a pandemic virus to emerge. Therefore, Canada has taken a number of steps to strengthen national pandemic preparedness. Coordination has been fostered through the development of a national pandemic preparedness plan and ongoing development of systems and processes for national health emergency management. Specific areas of advancement include: enhancement of rapid surveillance and communication capacity, the pandemic vaccine strategy, acquisition of an antiviral stockpile, research prioritization, international collaboration, and an international meeting of Ministers of Health (October 2005) to enhance global cooperation and coordination in advance of a possible influenza pandemic. Key next steps include: publication of the 2005 edition of the Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan; conducting emergency exercises to help strengthen planning at all levels and across health care, emergency management and NGO sectors; developing H5N1 vaccine and clinical trials; evaluating the need to supplement national antiviral stockpile; and undertaking public and key stakeholder consultations to provide further input into planning strategies and activities.

Animals↗

Epidemiology of pandemic influenza: use of surveillance and modeling for pandemic preparedness.

Along with continual enhancement of current influenza surveillance programs, pandemic preparedness also involves application of current surveillance techniques to past pandemics to identify their viruses and patterns, as well as estimation of the potential burden of future pandemics. Although mortality surveillance has been in place in selected locations for more than a century, the recent development of molecular diagnostics has shed new light on the origin and structure of the viruses responsible for the past 3 pandemics, allowing for comparisons with new viruses identified through ongoing viral surveillance. Models previously used to estimate hospitalizations and mortality associated with past epidemics and pandemics have evolved to estimate the burden and required surge capacity of future pandemics of different severities.

Adolescent↗

Influenza pandemic: preparedness planning in Germany.

The following conceptual framework formed the basis for a common decision made by the health ministers of Germany's 16 federal states to set up an influenza pandemic preparedness plan. The worst case scenario was used, on the basis of the data from the pandemic of 'Spanish flu', in 1918-20. The priority groups for vaccination were assessed, as well as the potentially available antiviral treatments. National policies could be highly improved by a common European view.

Disease Outbreaks↗

Artificial intelligence in molecular diagnostics for pandemic preparedness.

INTRODUCTION: Molecular diagnostics focusing on the detection and analysis of nucleic acids are indispensable tools for early pathogen identification, transmission monitoring, and genomic surveillance during pandemics. Recent technological advances have broadened the diagnostic landscape, incorporating PCR-based methods, isothermal amplification, high-CRISPR-based amplification detection, and sequencing. Despite their diagnostic potential, widespread implementation remains limited by high validation costs, time and logistical constraints, the need for specialized professional knowledge, and a lack of adaptability in resource-limited settings. Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly recognized as a promising but challenging approach, offering tools that streamline assay development, automate data interpretation, and optimize real-time diagnostic performance. AREAS COVERED: This review introduces recently published AI tools with potential to enhance the in-silico design validation process of oligonucleotides for molecular assays. These cover tools for initial assay design and optimization to validation and continuous assay updates. The limitations, including concerns regarding data accuracy, the lack of transparency in data processing ('black box' models), and unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, are highlighted for each tool and as expert opinion. EXPERT OPINION: Collectively, these challenges currently confine most AI-based approaches to research settings and prevent their routine implementation in clinical molecular diagnostics. Their widespread adoption depends on addressing remaining technical, regulatory, and practical challenges.

Humans↗

Global vaccine readiness: equity-by-design in pandemic preparedness and response.

INTRODUCTION: COVID-19 showed that rapid vaccine development and roll-out, while lifesaving, can still yield large, avoidable harms when equity is not considered from the outset. Disparities in vaccine timing and coverage, especially in low-resource settings, amplified health and economic burdens, highlighting the need for preparedness frameworks that combine speed with fairness. AREAS COVERED: We synthesize evidence from literature and policy reports regarding global vaccine roll-out, focusing on avertable mortality under alternative sharing scenarios, procurement design, pooled mechanisms such as COVAX, and the role of distributed manufacturing and delivery capacity. We also examine how transparent data-sharing, effective public communication, genomic surveillance, adaptive trial designs, and modeling hubs can support more responsive and equitable vaccine deployment. Across six reflection points, we translate these lessons into practical priorities for future pandemic readiness, including strengthening healthcare infrastructure, equitable procurement, data transparency, and safeguarding public health decision-making from political and commercial distortion. EXPERT OPINION: We argue that equity-by-design is essential if vaccine innovation is to deliver equitable public health impact. This requires geographically distributed manufacturing, transparency, equity-conditioned advance purchase agreements, and pre-agreed, epidemiology-triggered allocation of vaccines. We recommend institutionalizing disaggregated reporting, standardized data-sharing, greater pathogen genomic sequencing capacity, and communication strategies that support public health protection while countering misinformation.

Humans↗

Influenza pandemic preparedness in France: modelling the impact of interventions.

BACKGROUND: Influenza pandemics result in excess mortality and social disruption. To assist health authorities update the French pandemic plan, the authors estimated the number of health events (cases, hospitalisations, and deaths) in a pandemic and compared interventions in terms of impact and efficiency. METHOD: A Monte Carlo simulation model, incorporating probability distributions of key variables, provided estimates of health events (HE) by age and risk group. Input variables were set after literature and expert consultation. The impact of targeted influenza vaccination and antiviral prophylaxis/treatment (oseltamivir) in high risk groups (elderly, chronic diseases), priority (essential professionals), and total populations was compared. Outcome measures were HE avoided, number of doses needed, and direct cost per HE avoided. RESULTS: Without intervention, an influenza pandemic could result in 14.9 million cases, 0.12 million deaths, and 0.6 million hospitalisations in France. Twenty four per cent of deaths and 40% of hospitalisations would be among high risk groups. With a 25% attack rate, 2000-86,000 deaths could be avoided, depending on population targeted and intervention. If available initially, vaccination of the total population is preferred. If not, for priority populations, seasonal prophylaxis seems the best strategy. For high risk groups, antiviral treatment, although less effective, seems more feasible and cost effective than prophylaxis (respectively 29% deaths avoided; 1800 doses/death avoided and 56% deaths avoided; 18,500 doses/death avoided) and should be chosen, especially if limited drug availability. CONCLUSION: The results suggest a strong role for antivirals in an influenza pandemic. While this model can compare the impact of different intervention strategies, there remains uncertainty surrounding key variables.

Adolescent↗

Influenza pandemic preparedness plan for the United States.

In preparation for the next influenza pandemic, a comprehensive and action-oriented plan is presently under development that focuses on six major areas: (1) improvements in ongoing virologic and disease-based surveillance systems; (2) vaccination of high-priority target groups, and, given sufficient vaccine supplies, the entire US population; (3) liability programs for vaccine manufacturers and health care providers; (4) research to improve detection of new variants and to accelerate the availability of existing and novel vaccines and antiviral agents; (5) integrated, multicomponent communication systems for rapid information dissemination and exchange; and (6) emergency preparedness plans to provide for adequate medical care and maintenance of essential community services. The sudden and unpredictable emergence of pandemic influenza and its potential for causing severe health and social consequences dictate the need for close collaboration among a wide variety of organizations in both the public and private sectors.

Humans↗

Influenza pandemic preparedness action plan for the United States: 2002 update.

Preparation for the next influenza pandemic includes development of a national plan that has 3 goals: to limit the burden of disease, to minimize social disruption, and to reduce economic losses attributable to the pandemic. Priority areas to be addressed and improved in the plan to achieve these goals include global and national influenza surveillance, vaccine development and production, vaccine use and coverage, chemoprophylaxis and therapy, guidelines for clinical care and health resources management, emergency preparedness, and research. This multifaceted plan will require close collaboration between public and private sectors to ameliorate the potentially devastating impact of pandemic influenza.

Disease Outbreaks↗

Interactions between influenza and bacterial respiratory pathogens: implications for pandemic preparedness.

It is commonly believed that the clinical and epidemiological characteristics of the next influenza pandemic will mimic those of the 1918 pandemic. Determinative beliefs regarding the 1918 pandemic include that infections were expressed as primary viral pneumonias and/or acute respiratory distress syndrome, that pandemic-related deaths were the end states of the natural progression of disease caused by the pandemic strain, and that bacterial superinfections caused relatively fewer deaths in 1918 than in subsequent pandemics. In turn, response plans are focused on developing and/or increasing inventories of a strain-specific vaccine, antivirals, intensive care beds, mechanical ventilators, and so on. Yet, there is strong and consistent evidence of epidemiologically and clinically important interactions between influenza and secondary bacterial respiratory pathogens, including during the 1918 pandemic. Countermeasures (eg, vaccination against pneumococcal and meningococcal disease before a pandemic; mass uses of antibiotic(s) with broad spectrums of activity against common bacterial respiratory pathogens during local epidemics) designed to prevent or mitigate the effects of influenza-bacterial interactions should be major focuses of pandemic-related research, prevention, and response planning.

Bacterial Infections↗

Vaccines and antiviral drugs in pandemic preparedness.

While measures such as closing schools and social distancing may slow the effects of pandemic influenza, only vaccines and antiviral drugs are clearly efficacious in preventing infection or treating illness. Unless the pandemic strain closely resembles one already recognized, vaccine will not be available early. However, studies can be conducted beforehand to address questions concerning vaccine dose, frequency of inoculation, and need for adjuvants. In contrast, antiviral drugs, particularly the neuraminidase inhibitors, will be effective for treatment and available if stockpiling takes place. Special questions need to be answered if a highly lethal virus, such as influenza A (H5N1), produces the pandemic. Both vaccines and antiviral drugs will be required for a coordinated strategy.

Antiviral Agents↗

How to develop and implement pandemic preparedness plans? The need for a coherent European policy.

How should public health authorities confront the threat of pandemic influenza? Is massive stockpiling the answer? If so, the costs could be overwhelming. Or is vaccination of pre-selected segments of the population the best approach? If so, then what about the tough ethical question that must be addressed: for whom--and by whose decision? Are local and national health authorities operating on the same wavelength? Just how all-encompassing should a national preparedness plan be? Finally, can we count on one national government to shuttle vaccines across Europe's internal borders where they are needed to deal with an outbreak--or will hoarding and panic ensue? These issues and more were the focus of debate during the conference's session on preparedness plans, chaired by Dr. D. Fedson, former professor of medicine at the University of Virginia. As participants observed, Europe faces an alarming diversity of approaches and states of readiness from one country to the next, which cries out for a coherent European policy.

Disaster Planning↗