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A S Goodie

Publications and source records attributed to A S Goodie.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Representing the task in Bayesian reasoning: comment on Lovett and Schunn (1999).

The RCCL model (M. C. Lovett & C. D. Schunn, 1999) produces predictions that are non-novel or that do not truly spring from its principles. However, it offers the valuable insight that learning processes may affect the selection of both representations and strategies within those representations, and points the way to possible theoretical progress on implicit and explicit control. The authors' account of base-rate neglect under direct experience is compared with RCCL, and it is concluded that learning-based models allow for tests that are not fostered by representation-based models.

Bayes Theorem↗

Base rates versus sample accuracy: competition for control in human matching to sample.

People often place undue weight on specific sources of information (case cues) and insufficient weight on more global sources (base rates) even when the latter are highly predictive, a phenomenon termed base-rate neglect. This phenomenon was first demonstrated with paper-and-pencil tasks, and also occurs in a matching-to-sample procedure in which subjects directly experience case sample (cue) accuracy and base rates, and in which discrete, nonverbal choices are made. In two nonverbal experiments, subjects were exposed to hundreds of trials in which they chose between two response options that were both probabilistically reinforced. In Experiment 1, following one of two possible samples (the unpredictive sample), either response was reinforced with a .5 probability. The other sample (predictive) provided reinforcement for matching on 80% of the trials in one condition but in only 20% of the trials in another condition. Subjects' choices following the unpredictive sample were determined primarily by the contingencies in effect for the predictive sample: If matching was reinforced following the predictive sample, subjects tended to match the unpredictive sample as well; if countermatching the predictive sample was generally reinforced, subjects tended to countermatch the unpredictive sample. These results demonstrate only weak control by base rates. In Experiment 2, base rates and sample accuracy were simultaneously varied in opposite directions to keep one set of conditional probabilities constant. Subjects' choices were determined primarily by the overall accuracy of the sample, again demonstrating only weak control by base rates. The same pattern of choice occurred whether this pattern increased or decreased rate of reinforcement. Together, the results of the two experiments provide a clear empirical demonstration of base-rate neglect.

Adult↗

Learning to commit or avoid the base-rate error.

When predicting an event, people neglect overall frequencies (base rates) of various possibilities. We have previously shown that this base-rate occurs not only with word problems, but also in a procedure with repeated trials: a sample cue followed by two choice options, one of which the subject must choose, with feedback regarding the correctness of the choice. Perhaps this base-rate error depends on people's histories of matching physically similar items. In support of this suggestions, we begin by showing that the base-rate error is eliminated with physically unrelated items. We then show that when the relation between items is again arbitrary, but is a relation that subjects already know, the error reappears. Finally we show that teaching subjects new arbitrary relations reintroduces the error in later testing. These experiments demonstrate a fundamental base-rate error dependent on learned relationships without interference from re-existing associations between cues and options, predictions may be made more optimally.

Concept Formation↗