Learning to commit or avoid the base-rate error.

A S Goodie; E Fantino

doi:10.1038/380247a0

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PubMed · 8637572

Learning to commit or avoid the base-rate error.

A S Goodie·E Fantino

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Abstract

When predicting an event, people neglect overall frequencies (base rates) of various possibilities. We have previously shown that this base-rate occurs not only with word problems, but also in a procedure with repeated trials: a sample cue followed by two choice options, one of which the subject must choose, with feedback regarding the correctness of the choice. Perhaps this base-rate error depends on people's histories of matching physically similar items. In support of this suggestions, we begin by showing that the base-rate error is eliminated with physically unrelated items. We then show that when the relation between items is again arbitrary, but is a relation that subjects already know, the error reappears. Finally we show that teaching subjects new arbitrary relations reintroduces the error in later testing. These experiments demonstrate a fundamental base-rate error dependent on learned relationships without interference from re-existing associations between cues and options, predictions may be made more optimally.

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Concept Formation Cues Humans Probability Learning Problem Solving Journal Article Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.

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A S Goodie, E Fantino. 1996-03-21. Learning to commit or avoid the base-rate error.. https://doi.org/10.1038/380247a0

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