Biomedical subjects

Josep Call

Publications and source records attributed to Josep Call.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2007

Chimpanzees may recognize motives and goals, but may not reckon on them.

Psychological states play a fundamental role in mediating human social interactions. We interpret identical actions and outcomes in radically different ways depending on the motives and intentions underlying them. Moreover, we take reckoning of ourselves stacked up against others, and ideally make moral decisions with others in mind. Recently, evidence has been accumulating suggesting that our closest relatives are also sensitive to the motives of others and can distinguish intentional from accidental actions. These results suggest that chimpanzees interpret the actions of others from a psychological perspective, not just a behavioural perspective. However, based on recent studies, it is not clear whether chimpanzees have any regard for others, calling into the question the point at which fairness and other-regard were used as building blocks for full-fledged human morality.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Are apes really inequity averse?

Brosnan et al. (Brosnan, S. F. Schiff, H. C. & de Waal, F. B. M. 2005 Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. Proc. R. Soc. B272, 253-258) found that chimpanzees showed increased levels of rejection for less-preferred food when competitors received better food than themselves and postulated as an explanation inequity aversion. In the present study, we extended these findings by adding important control conditions, and we investigated whether inequity aversion could also be found in the other great ape species and whether it would be influenced by subjects' relationship with the competitor. In the present study, subjects showed a pattern of food rejection opposite to the subjects of the above study by Brosnan et al. (2005). Our apes ignored fewer food pieces and stayed longer in front of the experimenter when a conspecific received better food than themselves. Moreover, chimpanzees begged more vigorously when the conspecific got favoured food. The most plausible explanation for these results is the food expectation hypothesis - seeing another individual receive high-quality food creates the expectation of receiving the same food oneself - and not inequity aversion.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Cognitive cladistics and cultural override in Hominid spatial cognition.

Current approaches to human cognition often take a strong nativist stance based on Western adult performance, backed up where possible by neonate and infant research and almost never by comparative research across the Hominidae. Recent research suggests considerable cross-cultural differences in cognitive strategies, including relational thinking, a domain where infant research is impossible because of lack of cognitive maturation. Here, we apply the same paradigm across children and adults of different cultures and across all nonhuman great ape genera. We find that both child and adult spatial cognition systematically varies with language and culture but that, nevertheless, there is a clear inherited bias for one spatial strategy in the great apes. It is reasonable to conclude, we argue, that language and culture mask the native tendencies in our species. This cladistic approach suggests that the correct perspective on human cognition is neither nativist uniformitarian nor "blank slate" but recognizes the powerful impact that language and culture can have on our shared primate cognitive biases.

Adolescent↗

PubMed2006

Reliance on head versus eyes in the gaze following of great apes and human infants: the cooperative eye hypothesis.

As compared with other primates, humans have especially visible eyes (e.g., white sclera). One hypothesis is that this feature of human eyes evolved to make it easier for conspecifics to follow an individual's gaze direction in close-range joint attentional and communicative interactions, which would seem to imply especially cooperative (mututalistic) conspecifics. In the current study, we tested one aspect of this cooperative eye hypothesis by comparing the gaze following behavior of great apes to that of human infants. A human experimenter "looked" to the ceiling either with his eyes only, head only (eyes closed), both head and eyes, or neither. Great apes followed gaze to the ceiling based mainly on the human's head direction (although eye direction played some role as well). In contrast, human infants relied almost exclusively on eye direction in these same situations. These results demonstrate that humans are especially reliant on eyes in gaze following situations, and thus, suggest that eyes evolved a new social function in human evolution, most likely to support cooperative (mututalistic) social interactions.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Apes know that hidden objects can affect the orientation of other objects.

Four bonobos, seven gorillas, and six orangutans were presented with two small rectangular boards on a platform. One of the boards had a piece of food under it so that it acquired an inclined orientation whereas the other remained flat on the platform. Subjects preferentially selected the inclined board. In another experiment, subjects were initially presented with two inclined boards and a transformation took place in which one of the boards fell flat to the platform while the other remained inclined. Subjects also preferred the board that remained inclined. Two additional experiments highlighted some of the possible limitations of their reasoning in this task. Presented with two inclined boards, one of which was visibly supported by a piece of wood, they failed to systematically select the unsupported one whose only reason for being inclined was the presence of the reward. Another experiment presented two rewards in each trial (instead of the customary one) in one of the following two combinations: large banana vs. small carrot or small banana vs. large carrot. Prior to the test, E presented both rewards to the subject and then hid each of them under one of the boards so that both boards were differentially inclined due to the different sizes of the rewards involved. Although subjects selected the board that showed a greater inclination (thus securing the larger reward), they disregarded the type of food that was involved. This often meant that they chose the large carrot over the small banana even though they reversed such a choice when the rewards were not occluded by the boards. Providing subjects with a 'reminder' of the type of reward hidden under the boards did not alter the original results. There was no evidence of learning throughout the various experiments and control tests ruled out the possibility of inadvertent cuing by the experimenter, poor performance due to a lack of motivation, or good performance due to a predisposition to select objects with sloped surfaces. It is concluded that subjects made some inferences about the reason for the inclined orientation of the boards, and not simply associated an inclined orientation with the presence of the reward.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Evolutionary psychology of spatial representations in the hominidae.

Comparatively little is known about the inherited primate background underlying human cognition, the human cognitive "wild-type." Yet it is possible to trace the evolution of human cognitive abilities and tendencies by contrasting the skills of our nearest cousins, not just chimpanzees, but all the extant great apes, thus showing what we are likely to have inherited from the common ancestor. By looking at human infants early in cognitive development, we can also obtain insights into native cognitive biases in our species. Here, we focus on spatial memory, a central cognitive domain. We show, first, that all nonhuman great apes and 1-year-old human infants exhibit a preference for place over feature strategies for spatial memory. This suggests the common ancestor of all great apes had the same preference. We then examine 3-year-old human children and find that this preference reverses. Thus, the continuity between our species and the other great apes is masked early in human ontogeny. These findings, based on both phylogenetic and ontogenetic contrasts, open up the prospect of a systematic evolutionary psychology resting upon the cladistics of cognitive preferences.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Inferences by exclusion in the great apes: the effect of age and species.

This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347-362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.

Age Factors↗

PubMed2006

Apes save tools for future use.

Planning for future needs, not just current ones, is one of the most formidable human cognitive achievements. Whether this skill is a uniquely human adaptation is a controversial issue. In a study we conducted, bonobos and orangutans selected, transported, and saved appropriate tools above baseline levels to use them 1 hour later (experiment 1). Experiment 2 extended these results to a 14-hour delay between collecting and using the tools. Experiment 3 showed that seeing the apparatus during tool selection was not necessary to succeed. These findings suggest that the precursor skills for planning for the future evolved in great apes before 14 million years ago, when all extant great ape species shared a common ancestor.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

What's in it for me? Self-regard precludes altruism and spite in chimpanzees.

Sensitivity to fairness may influence whether individuals choose to engage in acts that are mutually beneficial, selfish, altruistic, or spiteful. In a series of three experiments, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) could pull a rope to access out-of-reach food while concomitantly pulling another piece of food further away. In the first study, they could make a choice that solely benefited themselves (selfishness), or both themselves and another chimpanzee (mutualism). In the next two experiments, they could choose between providing food solely for another chimpanzee (altruism), or for neither while preventing the other chimpanzee from receiving a benefit (spite). The main result across all studies was that chimpanzees made their choices based solely on personal gain, with no regard for the outcomes of a conspecific. These results raise questions about the origins of human cooperative behaviour.

Altruism↗

PubMed2006

How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task.

To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding.

There is little experimental evidence that any non-human species is capable of purposefully attempting to manipulate the psychological states of others deceptively (e.g., manipulating what another sees). We show here that chimpanzees, one of humans' two closest primate relatives, sometimes attempt to actively conceal things from others. Specifically, when competing with a human in three novel tests, eight chimpanzees, from their first trials, chose to approach a contested food item via a route hidden from the human's view (sometimes using a circuitous path to do so). These findings not only corroborate previous work showing that chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, but also suggest that when competing for food chimpanzees are skillful at manipulating, to their own advantage, whether others can or cannot see them.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

How the great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) perform on the reversed contingency task: the effects of food quantity and food visibility.

S. T. Boysen and G. G. Berntson (1995) found that chimpanzees performed poorly on a reversed contingency task in which they had to point to the smaller of 2 food quantities to acquire the larger quantity. The authors compared the performance of 4 great ape species (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) on the reversed contingency task while manipulating food quantity (0-4 or 1-4) and food visibility (visible pairs or covered pairs). Results showed no systematic species differences but large individual differences. Some individuals of each species were able to solve the reversed contingency task. Both quantity and visibility of the food items had a significant effect on performance. Subjects performed better when the disparity between quantities was smaller and the quantities were not directly visible.

Age Factors↗

PubMed2006

Tracking the displacement of objects: a series of tasks with great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) and young children (Homo sapiens).

The authors administered a series of object displacement tasks to 24 great apes and 24 30-month-old children (Homo sapiens). Objects were placed under 1 or 2 of 3 cups by visible or invisible displacements. The series included 6 tasks: delayed response, inhibition test, A not B, rotations, transpositions, and object permanence. Apes and children solved most tasks performing at comparable levels except in the transposition task, in which apes performed better than children. Ape species performed at comparable levels in all tasks except in single transpositions, in which chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) performed better than gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmeaus). All species found nonadjacent trials and rotations especially difficult. The number of elements that changed locations, the type of displacement, and having to inhibit predominant reaching responses were factors that negatively affected the subjects' performance.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape.

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) conceal visual and auditory information from others.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) competed with a human for food. The human sat inside a booth, with 1 piece of food to her left and 1 to her right, which she could retract from her chimpanzee competitor's reach as needed. In Experiment 1, chimpanzees could approach either side of the booth unseen but then had to reach through 1 of 2 tunnels (1 clear, 1 opaque) for the food. In Experiment 2, both tunnels were clear and the human was looking away, but 1 of the tunnels made a loud noise when it was opened. Chimpanzees preferentially reached through the opaque tunnel in the first study and the silent tunnel in the second, successfully concealing their taking of the food from the human competitor in both cases. These results suggest that chimpanzees can, in some circumstances, actively manipulate the visual and auditory perception of others by concealing information from them.

Animals↗

PubMed2006

What do bonobos (Pan paniscus) understand about physical contact?

The present study aimed to test what bonobos (Pan paniscus) understand about contact. The task consisted of a clear horizontal tube containing a piece of food and a stick with a disk attached. The bonobos chose which side to push or pull the stick for the disk to contact the food and make it accessible. There were 9 variations in tube design, which differed in the positions of the stick, disk, and food. All 5 bonobos passed at least 1 configuration. A recent study (A. E. Helme, N. S. Clayton, & N. J. Emery, 2006) found that rooks could learn only tube configurations that provided an asymmetrical stick cue, whereas bonobos did not demonstrate an understanding of contact but showed more individual variation, attending to the positions of the food, disk, and stick.

Animals↗

PubMed2005

Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical marker to locate hidden food.

Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary marker to locate hidden food in an object-choice situation. We tested domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three studies aimed at pinning down the relative contributions of the human's hand and the marker itself. We baited one of two cups (outside of the dogs' view) and gave the dog a communicative cue to find the food. Study 1 systematically varied dogs' perceptual access to the marker placing event, so that dogs saw either the whole human, the hand only, the marker only, or nothing. Follow-up trials investigated the effect of removing the marker before the dog's choice. Dogs used the marker as a communicative cue even when it had been removed prior to the dog's choice and attached more importance to this cue than to the hand that placed it although the presence of the hand boosted performance when it appeared together with the marker. Study 2 directly contrasted the importance of the hand and the marker and revealed that the effect of the marker diminished if it had been associated with both cups. In contrast touching both cups with the hand had no effect on performance. Study 3 investigated whether the means of marker placement (intentional or accidental) had an effect on dogs' choices. Results showed that dogs did not differentiate intentional and accidental placing of the marker. These results suggest that dogs use the marker as a genuine communicative cue quite independently from the experimenter's actions.

Animals↗

PubMed2005

What does an intermediate success rate mean? An analysis of a Piagetian liquid conservation task in the great apes.

The study investigates what an intermediate success rate means in bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans. Apes participated in liquid conservation experiments where they had to track the larger of two different quantities of juice after various kinds of transformations [Suda, C., & Call, J. (2004). Piagetian liquid conservation in the great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, and Pongo pygmaeus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 118, 265-279). When making a decision, apes sometimes demonstrated hesitant behavior, concurrently pointing to both alternatives or successively changing their choice. Moderately successful apes showed more hesitation than highly successful or unsuccessful apes. The results are consistent with the cognitive conflict model: The experiments created a higher degree of cognitive conflict on moderately successful apes than on very successful or unsuccessful apes. This indicates that an intermediate performance reflects the joint operation and potential conflict between two different cognitive strategies (identity and appearance) inherent to the Piagetian conservation task.

Analysis of Variance↗