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Josep Call

Publications and source records attributed to Josep Call.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
PubMed2005

Piagetian conservation of discrete quantities in bonobos (Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus).

This study investigated whether physical discreteness helps apes to understand the concept of Piagetian conservation (i.e. the invariance of quantities). Subjects were four bonobos, three chimpanzees, and five orangutans. Apes were tested on their ability to conserve discrete/continuous quantities in an over-conservation procedure in which two unequal quantities of edible rewards underwent various transformations in front of subjects. Subjects were examined to determine whether they could track the larger quantity of reward after the transformation. Comparison between the two types of conservation revealed that tests with bonobos supported the discreteness hypothesis. Bonobos, but neither chimpanzees nor orangutans, performed significantly better with discrete quantities than with continuous ones. The results suggest that at least bonobos could benefit from the discreteness of stimuli in their acquisition of conservation skills.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition.

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

Aging↗
PubMed2005

Unwilling versus unable: infants' understanding of intentional action.

Infants experienced a female adult handling them toys. Sometimes, however, the transaction failed, either because the adult was in various ways unwilling to give the toy (e.g., she teased the child with it or played with it herself) or else because she was unable to give it (e.g., she accidentally dropped it). Infants at 9, 12, and 18 months of age reacted with more impatience (e.g., reaching, looking away) when the adult was unwilling to give them the toy than when she was simply unable to give it. Six-month-olds, in contrast, showed no evidence of this differentiation. Because infants' behavioral responses were appropriately adapted to different kinds of intentional actions, and because the adult's actions sometimes produced results that did not match her goal (when having accidents or failed attempts), these findings provide especially rich evidence that infants first begin to understand goal-directed action at around 9 months of age.

Aptitude↗
PubMed2005

Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) encode relevant problem features in a tool-using task.

Two important elements in problem solving are the abilities to encode relevant task features and to combine multiple actions to achieve the goal. The authors investigated these 2 elements in a task in which gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) had to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach reward. Subjects were able to select tools of an appropriate length to reach the reward even when the position of the reward and tools were not simultaneously visible. When presented with tools that were too short to retrieve the reward, subjects were more likely to refuse to use them than when tools were the appropriate length. Subjects were proficient at using tools in sequence to retrieve the reward.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

All great ape species follow gaze to distant locations and around barriers.

Following the gaze direction of conspecifics is an adaptive skill that enables individuals to obtain useful information about the location of food, predators, and group mates. In the current study, the authors compared the gaze-following skills of all 4 great ape species. In the 1st experiment, a human either looked to the ceiling or looked straight ahead. Individuals from all species reliably followed the human's gaze direction and sometimes even checked back when they found no target. In a 2nd experiment, the human looked behind some kind of barrier. Results showed that individuals from all species reliably put themselves in places from which they could see what the experimenter was looking at behind the barrier. These results support the hypothesis that great apes do not just orient to a target that another is oriented to, but they actually attempt to take the visual perspective of the other.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

Twelve- and 18-month-olds copy actions in terms of goals.

In the context of an imitation game, 12- and 18-month-old infants saw an adult do such things as make a toy mouse hop across a mat (with sound effects). In one condition (House), the adult ended by placing the mouse in a toy house, whereas in another condition (No House) there was no house present at the final location. Infants at both ages usually simply put the mouse in the house (ignoring the hopping motion and sound effects) in the House condition, presumably because they interpreted the adult's action in terms of this final goal and so ignored the behavioral means. In contrast, infants copied the adult's action (both the hopping motion and the sound effects) when no house was present, presumably because here infants saw the action itself as the adult's only goal. From very early, infants' social learning is flexible: infants focus on and copy either the end or the means of an adult action as required by the context.

Child Development↗
PubMed2004

Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens).

There is currently much debate about the nature of social learning in chimpanzees. The main question is whether they can copy others' actions, as opposed to reproducing the environmental effects of these actions using their own preexisting behavioral strategies. In the current study, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) were shown different demonstrations of how to open a tube-in both cases by a conspecific. In different experimental conditions, demonstrations consisted of (1) action only (the actions necessary to open the tube without actually opening it); (2) end state only (the open tube, without showing any actions); (3) both of these components (in a full demonstration); or (4) neither of these components (in a baseline condition). In the first three conditions subjects saw one of two different ways that the tube could open (break in middle; caps off ends). Subjects' behavior in each condition was assessed for how often they opened the tube, how often they opened it in the same location as the demonstrator, and how often they copied the demonstrator's actions or style of opening the tube. Whereas chimpanzees reproduced mainly the environmental results of the demonstrations (emulation), human children often reproduced the demonstrator's actions (imitation). Because the procedure used was similar in many ways to the procedure that Meltzoff (Dev Psych 31:1, 1995) used to study the understanding of others' unfulfilled intentions, the implications of these findings with regard to chimpanzees' understanding of others' intentions are also discussed.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Word learning in a domestic dog: evidence for "fast mapping".

During speech acquisition, children form quick and rough hypotheses about the meaning of a new word after only a single exposure-a process dubbed "fast mapping." Here we provide evidence that a border collie, Rico, is able to fast map. Rico knew the labels of over 200 different items. He inferred the names of novel items by exclusion learning and correctly retrieved those items right away as well as 4 weeks after the initial exposure. Fast mapping thus appears to be mediated by general learning and memory mechanisms also found in other animals and not by a language acquisition device that is special to humans.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Use of gesture sequences in chimpanzees.

Gestural communication in a group of 19 captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) was observed, with particular attention paid to gesture sequences (combinations). A complete inventory of gesture sequences is reported. The majority of these sequences were repetitions of the same gestures, which were often tactile gestures and often occurred in play contexts. Other sequences combined gestures within a modality (visual, auditory, or tactile) or across modalities. The emergence of gesture sequences was ascribed to a recipient's lack of responsiveness rather than a premeditated combination of gestures to increase the efficiency of particular gestures. In terms of audience effects, the chimpanzees were sensitive to the attentional state of the recipient, and therefore used visually-based gestures mostly when others were already attending, as opposed to tactile gestures, which were used regardless of whether the recipient was attending or not. However, the chimpanzees did not use gesture sequences in which the first gesture served to attract the recipient's visual attention before they produced a second gesture that was visually-based. Instead, they used other strategies, such as locomoting in front of the recipient, before they produced a visually-based gesture.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes' behavior from humans.

A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive ability to detect when they are being watched by other individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to make this determination is unknown. There is particular controversy in the case of the great apes because different studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a situation in which they had to request food from a human observer who was in one of various attentional states. She either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room. In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's body and face orientation so that the observer could have her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face orientation separately. These results suggest that body and face orientation encode two different types of information. Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded to the state of the observer's eyes.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

The use of experimenter-given cues by South African fur seals (Arctocephalus pusillus).

Dogs can use a variety of experimenter-given cues such as pointing, head direction, and eye direction to locate food hidden under one of several containers. Some authors have proposed that this is a result of the domestication process. In this study we tested four captive fur seals in a two alternative object choice task in which subjects had to use one of the following experimenter-given cues to locate the food: (1) the experimenter pointed and gazed at one of the objects, (2) the experimenter pointed at only one of the objects, (3) the experimenter gazed at only one of the objects, (4) the experimenter glanced at only one of the objects, (5) the experimenter pointed and gazed at one of the objects but was sitting closer to one object than to the other, (6) the experimenter pointed only with the index finger at one of the objects, (7) the experimenter presented a replica of one of the objects. The fur seals were able to use cues which involved a fully exposed arm or a head direction, but failed to use glance only, the index finger pointing and the object replica cues. The results showed that a domestication process was not necessary to develop receptive skills to cues given by an experimenter. Instead, we hypothesize that close interactions with humans prior to testing enabled fur seals to uses ome gestural cues without formal training. We also analyzed the behavior of the seals depending on the level of difficulty of the task. Behavioral signs of hesitation increased with task difficulty. This suggests that the fur seals were sensitive to task difficulty.

Animal Communication↗
PubMed2004

Inferences about the location of food in the great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus).

Bonobos (Pan paniscus; n = 4), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; n = 12), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla; n = 8), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus; n = 6) were presented with 2 cups (1 baited) and given visual or auditory information about their contents. Visual information consisted of letting subjects look inside the cups. Auditory information consisted of shaking the cup so that the baited cup produced a rattling sound. Subjects correctly selected the baited cup both when they saw or heard the food. Nine individuals were above chance in both visual and auditory conditions. More important, subjects as a group selected the baited cup when only the empty cup was either shown or shaken, which means that subjects chose correctly without having seen or heard the food (i.e., inference by exclusion). Control tests showed that subjects were not more attracted to noisy cups, avoided shaken noiseless cups, or learned to use auditory information as a cue during the study. It is concluded that subjects understood that the food caused the noise, not simply that the noise was associated with the food.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

Piagetian liquid conservation in the great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, and Pongo pygmaeus).

An understanding of Piagetian liquid conservation was investigated in 4 bonobos (Pan paniscus), 5 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and 5 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). The apes were tested in the ability to track the larger of 2 quantities of juice that had undergone various kinds of transformations. The accuracy of the apes' judgment depended on the shape or number of containers into which the larger quantity was transferred. The apes made their choice mainly on the basis of visual estimation but showed modest success when the quantities were occluded. The results suggest that the apes rely to a greater extent on visual information, although they might have some appreciation of the constancy of liquid quantities.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

'Unwilling' versus 'unable': chimpanzees' understanding of human intentional action.

Understanding the intentional actions of others is a fundamental part of human social cognition and behavior. An important question is therefore whether other animal species, especially our nearest relatives the chimpanzees, also understand the intentional actions of others. Here we show that chimpanzees spontaneously (without training) behave differently depending on whether a human is unwilling or unable to give them food Chimpanzees produced more behaviors and left the testing station earlier with an unwilling compared to an unable (but willing) experimenter These data together with other recent studies on chimpanzees' knowledge about others' visual perception show that chimpanzees know more about the intentional actions and perceptions of others than previously demonstrated

Animals↗
PubMed2003

Spatial rotations and transpositions in orangutans ( Pongo pygmaeus) and chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes).

This study investigated the ability of three chimpanzees and three orangutans to track the position of a reward after a series of displacements. The reward was placed under one of two opaque containers resting on a platform. Experiment 1 investigated rotational displacements in which the platform was rotated 0 degrees, 180 degrees, or 360 degrees. Experiment 2 investigated transpositional displacements in which the platform remained stationary while the containers either remained stationary, or swapped their positions (in a one- two- or three-step sequence). In both experiments, the initial position of the reward was indicated either by directly showing the reward under the containers, or by placing a landmark, which had been previously associated with the reward, on top of the baited container. Subjects successfully tracked the reward through rotations and transpositions when they had seen it, but their performance substantially deteriorated when the landmark indicated the reward's initial position, even though subjects successfully used the landmark to find the reward in the absence of displacements. This decrease was especially pronounced in rotational displacements. A language-trained orangutan outperformed all the other apes and solved all problems.

Animals↗
PubMed2003

Chimpanzees understand psychological states - the question is which ones and to what extent.

New data suggest that relatively drastic revisions are needed in our theoretical accounts of what other animal species understand about the psychological states of others. Specifically, chimpanzees seem to understand some things about what others do and do not see, or have and have not seen in the immediate past, as well as some things about others' goal-directed activities. This is especially so in competitive situations. They clearly do not have a human-like theory of mind, however, and so the challenge is to specify precisely how ape and human social cognition are similar and different.

Journal Article↗