Remembering a depressive primary object: memory in the dialogue between psychoanalysis and cognitive science.

Abstract

Memory has always been a central issue in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Recent developments in the cognitive and neural sciences suggest that traditional notions of memory based on stored structures which are also often underlying psychoanalytic thinking cannot account for a number of fundamental phenomena and thus need to be revised. We suggest that memory be conceived as a) a theoretical construct explaining current behaviour by reference to events that have happened in the past. b) Memory is not to be conceived as stored structures but as a function of the whole organism, as a complex, dynamic, recategorizing and interactive process, which is always 'embodied'. c) Memory always has a subjective and an objective side. The subjective side is given by the individual's history, the objective side by the neural patterns generated by the sensory motor interactions with the environment. This implies that both 'narrative' (subjective) and 'historical' (objective) truth have to be taken into account achieving stable psychic change as is illustrated by extensive clinical materials taken from a psychoanalysis with a psychogenic sterile borderline patient.