PubMed Health⌕ Search

PubMed · 15737792

Evolutionary approaches to understanding sleep.

Abstract

A major controversy over REM sleep's role in memory processing may owe to inadequate allowances for the highly conservative nature of evolutionary adaptations. The controversy hinges on whether NREM sleep, alone, retains primitive memory processing capabilities. The selective pressure for primitive sleep, is thought to have been the need to obviate conflicts between enormous neural processing requirements of complex visual analysis and split-second control of movements, on the one hand, and memory processing, on the other. The most efficient memory processing during mammalian and avian sleep appears to be a two-step process: synapses in individual component circuits of events are reinforced primarily by slow brain waves during NREM sleep, with the reinforced components temporally bound by fast waves, and manifested as dreams, during REM sleep. This dual action could account for partitioning of sleep periods into multiple NREM-REM cycles. It is proposed that in the absence of REM sleep, all needed memory processing can be accomplished by NREM sleep, alone, though less efficiently. Many symptoms of fatal familial insomnia are attributed to subnormal nightly reinforcement of brain circuitry because of almost total loss of sleep, and compensatory responses thereto during waking. During this disorder, sensory circuitry seemingly is spared by virtue of its supernormal reinforcement during almost continuous waking. Contrariwise, sparing of an adult's 'higher faculties' in encephalitis lethargica appears to owe to supernormal circuit reinforcement during almost continuous sleep.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

J Lee Kavanau. 2005. Evolutionary approaches to understanding sleep.. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smrv.2004.11.002

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related citations

One, two, three, four, nothing more: an investigation of the conceptual sources of the verbal counting principles.

Since the publication of [Gelman, R., & Gallistel, C. R. (1978). The child's understanding of number. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.] seminal work on the development of verbal counting as a representation of number, the nature of the ontogenetic sources of the verbal counting principles has been intensely debated. The present experiments explore proposals according to which the verbal counting principles are acquired by mapping numerals in the count list onto systems of numerical representation for which there is evidence in infancy, namely, analog magnitudes, parallel individuation, and set-based quantification. By asking 3- and 4-year-olds to estimate the number of elements in sets without counting, we investigate whether the numerals that are assigned cardinal meaning as part of the acquisition process display the signatures of what we call "enriched parallel individuation" (which combines properties of parallel individuation and of set-based quantification) or analog magnitudes. Two experiments demonstrate that while "one" to "four" are mapped onto core representations of small sets prior to the acquisition of the counting principles, numerals beyond "four" are only mapped onto analog magnitudes about six months after the acquisition of the counting principles. Moreover, we show that children's numerical estimates of sets from 1 to 4 elements fail to show the signature of numeral use based on analog magnitudes - namely, scalar variability. We conclude that, while representations of small sets provided by parallel individuation, enriched by the resources of set-based quantification are recruited in the acquisition process to provide the first numerical meanings for "one" to "four", analog magnitudes play no role in this process.

Awareness↗

[The brain-mind debate. Problems in the philosophy of science with regard to psychiatry].

The present interdisciplinary brain-mind debate with regard to neurobiology shows deficits in the criticism of methods and in the precision of language and argumentation. Simplifying localisations of psychic functions, insufficient explanations and over-interpretations in the sense of physical determinism are the consequence. This can be demonstrated in deficits of neurobiological theories of volitional action. Therefore, the current concept of man is less perturbed than is proposed by neurobiologists. For psychiatry besides the neurobiological approach also a separate way of building models seems to be useful if present theoretical psychology and systems science would be regarded. In particular, the systems science of natural systems offers new opportunities to bridge gaps between disciplines involved in the brain-mind debate.

Awareness↗