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Making the morally relevant features explicit: a response to Carson Strong.

Bernard Gert
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Abstract

Carson Strong criticizes the application of my moral theory to bioethics cases. Some of his criticisms are due to my failure to make explicit that both the irrationality or rationality of a decision and the irrationality or rationality of the ranking of evils are part of morally relevant feature 3. Other criticisms are the result of his not using the two-step procedure in a sufficiently rigorous way. His claim that I come up with a wrong answer depends upon his incorrectly regarding a weakly justified violation as one that all impartial rational persons would agree was permitted, rather than as one about which rational persons disagree.

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Bioethical IssuesDeceptionEthical AnalysisEthical TheoryGenetic PrivacyHumansMoralsPaternalismTreatment RefusalTruth DisclosureAnalytical ApproachBioethics and Professional EthicsJournal Article

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BibTeXRIS

Bernard Gert. 2006. Making the morally relevant features explicit: a response to Carson Strong.. https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2006.0003

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