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PubMed · 2073554

Methodologies for clinical ethics.

J F Drane
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Abstract

Truly professional medical ethics requires a methodology that generates both moral discernment and consistently right judgments. In this article the author briefly reviews difficulties involved in ethical decision-making, the historical development of casuistry, and four ethical methodologies employed in clinical medicine today. These latter, which are outlined and compared, are as follows: the methodology developed by David Thomasma in the 1960s and 1970s; one created by Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade; another developed by the author; and the Bochum Protocol authored by Hans-Martin Sass et al. of the Bochum Center for Medical Ethics in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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CasuistryCultural DiversityDecision MakingEthical AnalysisEthical RelativismEthicistsEthics, ClinicalEthics, MedicalEuropeHumanismHumansInternationalityLatin AmericaPhilosophyTheologyUnited StatesVirtuesAnalytical ApproachBioethics and Professional EthicsThomas AquinasJournal ArticleReview

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J F Drane. 1990. Methodologies for clinical ethics.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/2073554/

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