PubMed · 6550611
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M J Kustaborder, M Rigney. 1983. Interventions for safety.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/6550611/
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OBJECTIVES: To assess whether speed cameras reduce road traffic collisions and related casualties. DESIGN: Systematic review. DATA SOURCES: Cochrane Injuries Group Specialised Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, Medline, Embase, Social Science Citation Index, TRANSPORT database, ZETOC, the internet (including websites of road safety and motoring organisations), and contact with key individuals and organisations. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Road traffic collisions, injuries, and deaths. INCLUSION CRITERIA: Controlled trials and observational studies assessing the impact of fixed or mobile speed cameras on any of the selected outcomes. RESULTS: 14 observational studies met the inclusion criteria; no randomised controlled trials were found. Most studies were before-after studies without controls (n = 8). All but one of the studies showed effectiveness of cameras up to three years or less after their introduction; one study showed sustained longer term effects (4.6 years after introduction). Reductions in outcomes across studies ranged from 5% to 69% for collisions, 12% to 65% for injuries, and 17% to 71% for deaths in the immediate vicinity of camera sites. The reductions over wider geographical areas were of a similar order of magnitude. CONCLUSIONS: Existing research consistently shows that speed cameras are an effective intervention in reducing road traffic collisions and related casualties. The level of evidence is relatively poor, however, as most studies did not have satisfactory comparison groups or adequate control for potential confounders. Controlled introduction of speed cameras with careful data collection may offer improved evidence of their effectiveness in the future.
Behavioral and social sciences theories and models have the potential to enhance efforts to reduce unintentional injuries. The authors reviewed the published literature on behavioral and social science theory applications to unintentional injury problems to enumerate and categorize the ways different theories and models are used in injury prevention research. The authors conducted a systematic review to evaluate the published literature from 1980 to 2001 on behavioral and social science theory applications to unintentional injury prevention and control. Electronic database searches in PubMed and PsycINFO identified articles that combined behavioral and social sciences theories and models and injury causes. The authors identified some articles that examined behavioral and social science theories and models and unintentional injury topics, but found that several important theories have never been applied to unintentional injury prevention. Among the articles identified, the PRECEDE PROCEED Model was cited most frequently, followed by the Theory of Reasoned Action/Theory of Planned Behavior and Health Belief Model. When behavioral and social sciences theories and models were applied to unintentional injury topics, they were most frequently used to guide program design, implementation or develop evaluation measures; few examples of theory testing were found. Results suggest that the use of behavioral and social sciences theories and models in unintentional injury prevention research is only marginally represented in the mainstream, peer-reviewed literature. Both the fields of injury prevention and behavioral and social sciences could benefit from greater collaborative research to enhance behavioral approaches to injury control.
On 5 October 1999, near London Paddington Station, two trains collided on a main line near Ladbroke Grove. The immediate "human error" that preceded this crash was a Signal Passed At Danger (SPAD). Thirty-one people lost their lives and many more were injured. The crash prompted an extensive multi-disciplinary investigation and hearing to identify the factors that contributed to the Signal Passed At Danger event. This included the involvement of psychologists to consider the human factors "responsible" for the crash and the broader system context, including the operational and organizational environment that may have contributed. This paper summarizes the key factors identified in relation to this crash within a system analysis framework. This framework considers multiple sources of influence upon the driver in relation to the committed Signal Passed At Danger. These influences include direct factors attributable to the driver and the immediate circumstances of the event, as well as indirect, or latent, factors within the operational procedures and the management of the organization. This systemic combination of factors, not an isolated case of human error, conspired to propagate the events that resulted in the Signal Passed At Danger event and subsequent crash. This particular case demonstrates that train crashes cannot be distilled to a single causal factor. Rather, such crashes result from a system failure in which unpredicted interactions between direct and indirect influences coincide at an inopportune instant.