PubMed · 7475703
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R Coninx, B Eshaya-Chauvin, H Reyes. 1995-11-04. Tuberculosis in prisons.. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(95)92952-5
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A total of 125 strains collected in Azerbaijan between 1999 and 2002 from HIV seropositives were genetically classified. Of 84 strains classified using HMA, 91.6% were subtype A, 1.2% subtype B, and 7.1% untypeable. Of 41 strains analyzed using partial pol gene sequences, 90.2% were subtype A, 7.3% subtype B, and 2.4% CRF03_AB. Most sequenced A strains clustered with those circulating in countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Two of three sequenced B strains were from individuals who traveled to FSU clustering tightly with B strains from Nikolayev, Ukraine. CRF03_AB, characteristic of the 1996 epidemic in Kaliningrad, Russia, was sequenced from an individual who lived in Russia from 1995 until 2001. The HIV epidemic in Azerbaijan is concentrated in IDU and is closely connected to other such epidemics to the east based on genetics. Of the 41 sequenced strains, 95% were close genetic relatives of HIV strains in IDU networks in the FSU.
An international campaign was waged questioning the benefits of BP's Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in an effort to avoid a "zone of sacrifice" there. This article is an offshoot of that effort and explains the contemporary struggle over the pipeline project. The authors describe the project's background and evaluate the actual and potential impacts of the project in which they consider eight areas. They also assess BP's capacity to confront resistance to the pipeline.
Following the appearance of influenza A/H5 virus infection in several wild and domestic bird species in the Republic of Azerbaijan in February 2006, two clusters of potential human avian influenza due to A/H5N1 (HAI) cases were detected and reported by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe during the first two weeks of March 2006. On 15 March 2006, WHO led an international team, including infection control, clinical management, epidemiology, laboratory, and communications experts, to support the MoH in investigation and response activities. As a result of active surveillance, 22 individuals, including six deaths, were evaluated for HAI and associated risk infections in six districts. The investigations revealed eight cases with influenza A/H5N1 virus infection confirmed by a WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza and one probable case for which samples were not available. The cases were in two unrelated clusters in Salyan (seven laboratory confirmed cases, including four deaths) and Tarter districts (one confirmed case and one probable case, both fatal). Close contact with and de-feathering of infected wild swans was considered to be the most plausible source of exposure to influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Salyan cluster, although difficulties in eliciting information were encountered during the investigation, because of the illegality of some of the activities that might have led to the exposures (hunting and trading in wild birds and their products). These cases constitute the first outbreak worldwide where wild birds were the most likely source of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection in humans. The rapid mobilisation of resources to contain the spread of influenza A/H5 in the two districts was achieved through collaboration between the MoH, WHO and its international partners. Control activities were supported by the establishment of a field laboratory with real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) capacity to detect influenza A/H5 virus. Daily door-to-door surveillance undertaken in the two affected districts made it unlikely that human cases of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection remained undetected.