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Persons, practices, and the conception argument.

W Werpehowski
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Abstract

The argument that human life should be fully protected once conception is complete has been challenged by the claim that at that time such life is not genuinely individuated in the morally required sense. This essay analyzes the "conception versus individuation" exchange and directs attention to the communal contexts within which the relevant arguments and counter-arguments arise.

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Beginning of Human LifeEmbryo ResearchEthics, MedicalFertilizationFertilization in VitroHumansLifeMoral ObligationsMoralsPersonhoodTheologyTwinning, MonozygoticUnited StatesValue of LifeDeclaration on Procured AbortionDonum VitaeGenetics and ReproductionReligious ApproachVaticanJournal Article

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W Werpehowski. 1997. Persons, practices, and the conception argument.. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp%2F22.5.479

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