PubMed · 8338589
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H M Sass. Brain metaphysics.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/8338589/
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Some have argued that embryos and fetuses have the moral status of personhood because of certain criteria that are satisfied during gestation. However, these attempts to base personhood during gestation on intrinsic characteristics have uniformly been unsuccessful. Within a secular framework, another approach to establishing a moral standing for embryos and fetuses is to argue that we ought to confer some moral status upon them. There appear to be two main approaches to defending conferred moral standing; namely, consequentialist and contractarian arguments. This article puts forward a consequentialist argument for the conferred moral standing of preembryos, embryos, fetuses, and infants. It states and defends an original version of the commonly-held view that moral standing increases during gestation. It also explores the implications of this viewpoint for several issues: what is involved in showing 'respect' for preembryos; and whether it is permissible to create preembryos solely for research.
The argument that human life should be fully protected once conception is complete has been challenged by the claim that at that time such life is not genuinely individuated in the morally required sense. This essay analyzes the "conception versus individuation" exchange and directs attention to the communal contexts within which the relevant arguments and counter-arguments arise.
Michael Lockwood has recently concluded that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos. The reasons he provides in support of this conclusion commit him inter alia to the following controversial theses: (i) an organism's potential for twinning bears critically on the identity conditions for that organism; and (ii) functionally intact mentality-mediating neurological structures play a critical role in establishing the identity conditions for human organisms. I argue that Lockwood has given us no good reason to endorse either of these theses and, hence, that he has given us no good reason to believe that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos.